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ABSTRACT

This hearing explored the value of work, and how changes in the economy and the composition of the work force have affected families. Witnesses (1) reported data on such topics as the kinds of jobs currently available, women's participation in the work force, unemployment, and labor force growth over the next decade; (2) argued that the economy is largely structured to complement the 19th century model of marriage, and that anti-discrimination and affirmative action legislation, along with upgrading of female-dominated jobs, is needed to facilitate the development of egalitarian marriages; (3) argued that the welfare poor do not work because of the permissive character of government policy; (4) discussed the economic contribution of women to family well-being, gender differencs in labor market positions and earnings, and the implications of research findings for policy; (5) reported on studies of black Americans and the relationship between rapid displacement of unskilled industrial jobs, growing role strains within black families, and related psychosocial consequences; (6) discussed the causes of poverty for single mothers, and the effect of welfare on work and dependency; (7) reported research on the effect of economic dislocation on children's lives; and (8) described experiences with and aspects of education and training programs around the country. (RH)

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WORK IN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILIES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, ON APRIL 17, 1986

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families

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WORK IN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILIES

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,
Washington, DC.

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. George Miller (chairman of the select committee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Miller, Schroeder, Boggs, Weiss, Levin, Sikorski, Wheat, Evans, Coats, and Johnson.

Staff present: Judy Weiss, professional staff; Anthony Jackson, professional staff; Mark Souder, minority director; Anne Wynne, professional staff; and Joan Godley, committee clerk.

Chairman MILLER. The Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families will come to order.

Today the select committee will examine another issue of critical importance to the well-being of the American family: the balancing of work and family life.

Today we will look at what work means to families, to their economic security as well as their emotional well-being.

The relationship between work and family is changing.

There has been a dramatic increase in the number of workers who are parents of young children, while the jobs, income and benefits available are much different than in previous generations. Families are having to adjust. Unfortunately, our policies and institutions have not always kept pace with the changes in family structure and in the workplace.

As a result, many families find they must now choose between adequate income and adequate involvement.

Not long ago, the norm was for father to bring home the bacon and mother to cook it. Today, married mothers are one of the fastest growing segments of today's work force.

Today, the two-parent, two-earner family has become the most common family type in this country. Today, a wife's contribution to family income is what keeps many of the families in the middle class, above the poverty line. Today, more than 16 percent of all families are headed by single women. Many of these families are impoverished, although two-thirds of these single women are in the labor force.

In the case of low-income families, payments for child care, transportation and health insurance often take so much of their

paycheck that public assistance appears to be a more attractive option.

Today, many people work full time and still earn poverty level wages. If our public and private policies do not adjust to these facts of life, the health and stability of our families will suffer.

We have gathered leading scholars and researchers for this hearing. We will learn about the programs designed to provide the education and training some parents and young people need to get back into the work force and stay there. And, as is our tradition, we will also hear from working parents.

Today's economy is more competitive and complex than ever. Today's families, and tomorrow's families must prosper in that context if we are to prosper at all.

Work and families are not issues very often investigated together. But, in fact, they are inseparable, and our obligation, as policymakers and as a committee, is to take a very hard look, a realistic look at them. Today's hearing is a first step in that direction.

[Opening statement of Congressman George Miller follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

Today the Select Committee will examine another issue of critical importance to the well-being of the American family: balancing work and family life.

Meaningful, remunerative work has always been central to family prosperity. Today we will look at what work means to families, to their economic security, as well as their emotional well-being.

This is a subject of special relevance to this committee, which has been charged by Congress to look at trends and conditions among our families, and the children who live in them.

The relationship between work and family is changing.

Because there has been a dramatic increase in the number of workers who are parents of young children, and because the jobs, income and benefits available are much different than in previous generations, families are having to adjust. Unfortunately, our policies and institutions have not always kept pace.

As a result, many families find they must now choose between adequate income and adequate involvement.

Not long ago, the norm was for father to bring home the bacon and mother to cook it. Today, married mothers are one of the fastest growing segments of today's work force.

Today, a two-parent, two-earner family has become the most common family type in this country.

Today, a wife's contribution to family income is what keeps many families in the middle class, above the poverty line.

Today, more than 16 percent of all families are headed by single women, many of whose families live in poverty, although two-thirds of these women are in the labor force.

Today, for low-income families, payments for child care, transportation, and health insurance often take so much of their paycheck that public assistance appears to be a more attractive option.

Today, many people work full time and still earn poverty level wages.

If our public and private policies do not adjust to these facts of life, the health and stability of our families will suffer.

This morning we will review the changes that have taken place in family composition, the economy, and the work force. We will see how first men and single women, and increasingly married mothers, have moved into the paid labor force.

We will hear from leading scholars and researchers. We will learn about programs designed to provide the education and training some parents and young people need to get back into the work force and stay there. And, as is our tradition, we will also hear from working parents.

Today's economy is more competitive and complex than ever. Today's families, and tomorrow's families, must prosper in that context, if they are to prosper at all.

Work and family are not issues very often investigated together. But in fact they are inseparable, and our obligation, as policymakers and as a committee, is to take a very hard, realistic look at them. Today's hearing is a good first step in that direction.

"WORK IN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILIES," A FACT SHEET

A STRONG COMMITMENT TO WORK IN AMERICA

More people are employed in the U.S. than ever before. In 1985, there were over 115.5 million people in the civilian labor force. That number is expected to increase to over 129 million by 1995. Nearly two-thirds of the growth will be among women; nearly 20 percent will be among blacks. (BLS, Hayghe, 4/86.)

In 1985, the labor force participation rates for white, black, and Hispanic adults over the age of 16 were 65.0 percent, 62.9 percent, and 64.6 percent, respectively. (BLS, Hayghe, 4/86.)

In 1984, 62.9 percent of families living below the poverty line had at least some members who worked every week of the year. One-quarter of those families had at least one member who worked full time, year round. (Report of the Committee on Government Operations, 12/85.)

In 1985, 8.3 million adults over age 16 (7.2 percent) were unemployed. 6.2 percent of white adults, 10.5 percent of Hispanic adults, and 15.1 percent of black adults were unemployed. (BLS, Hayghe, 4/86.)

LABOR MARKET SHIFTING

In 1900, 38.1 percent of the labor force worked in agriculture, 24.1 percent in services—producing industries, and 37.8 percent in goods-producing industries. By 1970, those figures were 3.8 percent, 56.4 percent, and 39.8 percent, respectively. By 1978, only 3 percent of the labor force were farmers. (Galenson and Smith, 1978.)

Between 1979–84, more than 11 million workers lost employment due to plant closings or relocations, production shifts or elimination of a position. The manufacturing sector alone lost about 1.8 million employees since its 1979 high, and has shown no growth over the past year. (Bluestone, 6/85; Norwood, 1986.)

Employment in services-producing industries has grown dramatically—from 31 percent of the work force in 1900 to 69 percent of the work force in 1984. (Rumberger and Levin, 7/85.)

Nearly 7 out of every 10 jobs created since November 1982 were in the service-producing sector. In the next decade, 9 out of 10 jobs created are projected to be in this sector. (CRS, 7/85; BLS, 1986.)

MORE PARENTS IN LABOR FORCE/MORE TWO-EARNER FAMILIES

In 57 percent of all families with children under the age of 18, either the only parent present, or both parents, are employed. (BLS, 2/86.)

Nearly 34 million children, 50 percent of whom live in two-parent families, have working mothers. (BLS, 9/85.)

By 1990, a majority (55 percent) of married mothers of children under age six will be in the labor force, an 80 percent increase since 1970. (Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 1984.)

Eighty percent of working women will bear at least one child while employed. (Catalyst, 1986.)

MORE MOTHERS WORKING FULL TIME

Of all mothers who worked in 1985, approximately 70 percent worked full time. In 1985, 84 percent of black working mothers, 69 percent of white working mothers, and 79 percent of Hispanic working mothers worked full time. (BLS, 9/85; Hayghe, 4/86.)

In 1985, among employed mothers with children under age three, 65 percent of all mothers in that category, 81 percent of black mothers, and 76.3 percent of Hispanic mothers worked full time. (Hayghe, 4/86.)

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME DECLINING, WHILE COST OF RAISING CHILDREN SIGNIFICANT

Between 1947–73, the real income of median-income families increased nearly 4 percent above inflation annually. Between 1974–84, a similar family experienced an

actual decline in their real income. In 1984, median family income (in 1984 dollars) was $26,433, below its 1973 high point ($28,167). (JEC; The Urban Institute, 12/85.)

Between 1967 and 1984, the earnings of all female heads of households increased, but their family incomes declined. In each case, the increased earnings were more than offset by declines in cash transfers and in earnings of other household members. (Danziger and Gottschalk, JEC, 11/85.)

If the personal exemption, the primary means through which the tax code adjusts for family size, had been indexed for inflation it would be worth over $2,600. It is currently $1,040. (Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 1985.)

The typical American family with two children, medium socioeconomic status, in which the wife works part time, is likely to spend $82,400 to rear one child from birth to age 18. (Espenshade, The Urban Institute, 1984.)

Comprehensive budgets for full time undergraduate students enrolled for the 1985-86 academic year are estimated to be $5,294 at public institutions and $10,476 at independent institutions. (The American Council on Education, 1/86.)

INCOME DECLINES PARTICULARLY SEVERE FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN

Between 1979 and 1984, average family income for the poorest fifth of all families with children plunged 23.8 percent, adjusting for inflation. In addition, the average income of the next-to-poorest fifth of families with children dropped 14 percent, while the average income of the middle fifth of these families fell 10.5 percent. Only one group of families with children came out ahead—those in the wealthiest fifth. (JEC; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 11/85.)

The gap between upper and lower income families with children is now wider than at any time since 1947. (Danziger and Gottschalk for the JEC, 11/85.)

WIVES CONTRIBUTION TO FAMILY INCOME INCREASES, HELPS KEEP FAMILIES OUT OF POVERTY

Between 1967 and 1984, wives' contribution to family income increased from 10.6 to 18.0 percent for white families with children, from 19.4 to 31.1 percent for black families with children and from 14.4 to 19.4 percent for Hispanic families with children. On the average, in 1984 the earnings of two-parent families were 23.4 percent higher than they would have been had wives not worked and had all other income sources remained at their 1984 levels. (Danziger and Gottschalk, JEC, 11/85.)

In 1984, poverty was 35 percent lower than it would have been had wives not worked. For black two-parent families, in particular, a major portion of the decline in poverty—from 31.3 percent in 1967 to 19.3 percent in 1984—is associated with increased earnings of wives. (Danziger and Gottschalk, JEC, 11/85.)

PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY POLICIES

Forty-six percent of women with children under age two who were surveyed, and 23 percent of the male counterparts, said child care concerns would influence the decision on whether to accept a promotion. (BNA, 1/86.)

Twenty-six percent of all mothers and 45 percent of single mothers with children under five, and 36 percent of mothers in families with incomes less than $15,000, who were not working, said they would work if affordable child care were available. (Census Bureau, 1982.)

In a study by Boston University reported in late 1985, the stress of balancing work and family responsibilities was found to be the most significant factor contributing to depression among employees. More than one-third of all employees in the study reported significant difficulties with managing family responsibilities. (Work and Family: A Changing Dynamic, BNA, 1986.)

Chairman MILLER. Our first witness will be Dr. Janet Norwood, Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.

Dr. Norwood, welcome to the committee. We appreciate your taking the time to come and to speak with us.

Your prepared statement will be put in the record in its entirety. You can summarize in the manner you are most comfortable.

STATEMENT OF JANET L. NORWOOD, PH.D., COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Ms. NORWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure to discuss some of our data. I am happy to be here today.

We have really seen extraordinary change over the last two decades. In many ways I think the family has served as a focal point of that change.

We have had a tremendous job expansion in the economy, and more and more women have left their homes to go into the paid labor force. Increasingly, I believe Americans are planning lifestyles and their living standards upon the assumption that wives as well as husbands will contribute to family income.

At the same time that is going on, a really huge restructuring of industry is underway. We are seeing employment declines in goods-producing industries, like steel and apparel manufacturing, but jobs increasing in industries that provide services.

Manufacturing employment today is about 1.8 million below its 1979 high. It has shown no net growth over the past year. The economy has more than recovered from the 1981–82 recession, but manufacturing jobs have recovered less than 60 percent of the jobs lost in that downturn.

But there is much more to this story in manufacturing than the number of jobs. Except for cyclical movements, overall employment in this industry has held about steady for nearly 20 years. And while we have lost high-paying jobs in several key manufacturing industries, we have also lost low-paying jobs in such industries as apparel, textiles, tobacco and shoes. It should also be noted that substantial future employment growth is projected for such manufacturing industries as office and computer machines, medical instruments, and communications equipment.

The miracle, of course, in terms of jobs, has been in the service-producing sector. Nearly 3 million jobs have been added to this sector in the past year alone. Moreover, we project that that growth will continue.

There has been some concern about the quality of jobs in the service-producing sector. But the sector is so diverse that the jobs cannot be categorized as either high- or low-wage.

For example, 80 percent of the country's professional and managerial workers are employed in the sector. It is the home of such low-paying jobs as in fast-food restaurants and nursing homes, but it is also the home of high-paying jobs like computer services, legal services, and advertising.

As I indicated before, these labor market changes often affect the family. Only a small portion of the labor force lives alone or with persons who are not relatives. Some 70 percent of the labor force is made up of persons who live in married-couple families. In addition, there has been a marked increase in the number of families maintained by women on their own.

Currently one-tenth of the labor force lives in such families, including the women themselves, their older children and other relatives. Another 3 percent of the labor force consists of unmarried men and their families.

With an increase in the number of families maintained by women, and the growing labor force participation of wives, husbands are no longer the sole support of most of the Nation's families. More than half of all husband-wife families now have two adult earners, with the wife's income making a substantial contribution to her family's well-being.

The average working wife contributes 28 percent of her family's annual income. And for wives who have year round full time jobs, the average contribution is 40 percent. And nearly half of all working wives do work full time the year round.

I might point out, Mr. Chairman, since we seem to see continually in the media discussions of the average family defined as the husband supporting a nonworking wife, and exactly two children, that this pattern represents a very, very small proportion of the families in this country.

One important development that flows from these changes is the fact that increasing numbers of the Nation's children have working mothers. Record numbers of women are working, even when they have children not yet old enough to attend school.

In 1985, 54 percent of all mothers with children under 6 years of age were in the labor force. It is even more astonishing to recognize that nearly half of all married mothers with infant children, those under a year, were working, or looking for work. In addition, nearly 70 percent of the mothers whose youngest child is between the age of 6 and 13, are in the labor force.

Now, when you look at it from the other side, from the point of view of the children, there are 9.5 million children under the age of 6, and 15 million who are 6 to 13 years of age who had a mother in the labor force last year. And most of these mothers worked full time. In fact, almost 3 out of every 4 employed mothers of school-aged children, and more than 2 out of 3 employed mothers of preschoolers worked full time.

A study done a few years ago on the child care arrangements used by some 5 million women between the ages of 18 and 44, showed that most children were taken care of in their own homes, or in someone else's home. Only 16 percent used a group care center.

Clearly, the availability of child care is of particular relevance for people maintaining families on their own. Today, over 10 million families are maintained by women who are divorced, separated, never married, or widowed. About three-fifths of these women are parents with children under 18 in their home.

When their youngest child is school age, three-fourths of these single parents are in the labor force. When they have preschoolers, over half are in the labor force.

Once in the labor market, however, the female single parent is often plagued by educational deficiencies, high unemployment, and low earnings. The economic status of these families is well below that of the majority of American families.

When she is employed, the typical woman maintaining a family on her own is likely to be working full time, be at a generally low-paying, and comparatively low-skilled job. Last year, the median earnings for women maintaining families who are working full

time on wage and salary jobs were $278 a week, close to what wives earned, but considerably below the median for husbands.

Only one-third of the women maintaining families had another wage-earner in the family. In contrast, 60 percent of all married-couple families were in the multiple-earner category. The consequence of all this is that about one in every three American families maintained by women, was living in poverty.

While a smaller proportion of married-couple families face serious labor-market problems, I certainly do not want to leave the impression that they are all immune from these difficulties. Multiworker families are more likely to have the cushioning effect of another worker when unemployment hits. But it is also true that to a certain extent unemployment tends to run in families.

Persons with a high level of educational attainment often marry each other, as do persons with more limited labor market skills. Even more important, when high unemployment hits a specific geographic area it can affect more than one family member.

The unemployment rate for persons with unemployed spouses runs more than three times the rate for persons with employed spouses. Thus, in 1985, the unemployment rate for wives with unemployed husbands was 17 percent compared with 4.8 percent for wives whose husbands were working.

While the number of married couples who are both unemployed is quite small—it averaged less than 200,000 in 1985—the impact of multiple unemployment on their financial well-being is really quite large.

At BLS we do some projections of the future. We expect the labor force as a whole to grow more slowly over the next decade than it has in the past. But we do expect an increase, an increase which will not be concentrated among young workers, because our baby-boom generation is largely well established in the labor force. Nearly three-quarters of the 1995 labor force is projected to be in the prime working ages of 25 to 54. Nearly 70 percent of women in that age group are now in the labor force, and by 1995 we expect that figure to increase. In fact, we anticipate that about two-thirds of the increase in the labor force in the next decade will come from women.

We also have a rather interesting set of data at the Bureau which looks at worklife estimates for individuals. These data show that women born in 1970 could expect to spend 22 years in the labor force; 10 years later in 1980, the expected worklife for female infants was nearly 30 years, or 38 percent of total life expectancy. Women who would complete 3 or more years of college could expect to spend on average 45 percent of their lives in the labor force. While men still have longer worklife expectancy, the gap has been narrowing, as increases in life expectancy for men have been generally allocated to nonmarket activities.

Mr. Chairman, I think the data show quite clearly that women are in the labor force to stay. That as we move forward into the 1990's, they will be a larger proportion of the work force than they were before. And we know, also, that most families in the United States will have women as well as men helping to support them. And that most children now have working mothers and they will continue to do so.

I would be glad to try to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Janet Norwood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JANET L. NORWOOD, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss with you some issues relating to work and the family.

Over the past 20 years, our country has seen extraordinary social and economic change. In many ways, the family has served as a focal point of that change. The number of jobs in the economy has expanded, and more and more women have left their homes to go into the paid labor force. Increasingly, Americans are planning their life styles and living standards on the assumption that wives as well as husbands will contribute to family income.

At the same time, a huge restructuring of industry is under way. Employment is declining in such goods-producing industries as steel and apparel manufacturing, but increasing in industries that provide services, like health care, business services, and merchandising. It is important to understand these trends if we are to understand what is happening to our economy—and our lives.

Manufacturing employment today is about 1.8 million below its 1979 high, and it has shown no net growth over the past year. While the economy has more than recovered from the 1981–82 recession, manufacturing industries have recovered less than 60 percent of the jobs lost in that downturn. Some of these manufacturing industries may face a troubled future, and some of the factory workers displaced from their jobs may need retraining before they can move into other industries.

But there is more to the story in manufacturing. Except for cyclical movements, overall employment in this industry has held about steady for nearly 20 years. In contrast, manufacturing jobs in most European countries fell in absolute as well as relative terms. And, while we have lost high-paying jobs in several key manufacturing industries, we have also lost low-paying jobs in apparel, textiles and shoe production. It should also be noted that substantial future employment growth is projected for such manufacturing industries as office and computer machines, medical instruments and supplies, and communications equipment.

The employment miracle, of course, has been in the service-producing sector. Nearly 3 million jobs have been added to this sector in the past year alone. Moreover, BLS projects that 90 percent of the job increase in the next decade will take place in the service sector. Among the specific industries projected to add the largest number of jobs are eating and drinking places, computer and data processing services, educational services, personnel supply services, and health services.

There has been some concern about the quality of jobs in the service producing sector. In fact, the sector is so diverse that the jobs cannot be categorized as either high-wage or low-wage. For example, 80 percent of the country's professional and managerial workers are employed in the sector. While there are low-paid positions in fast-food restaurants and nursing homes, there are also high-paying jobs in computer services, legal services, and advertising. Those employed in insurance, wholesale trade and auto repair tend to have near-average earnings. Thus, the shift to services does not mean we are becoming a Nation of hamburger makers. Many service sector jobs are neither low-paid nor dead-end. In fact, the BLS Employment Cost Index shows that in recent years, workers in the service industry jobs have had larger increases in compensation (wages and fringe benefits) than factory workers.

As I indicated earlier, these labor market changes often affect the family. Only a small portion of the labor force lives alone or with persons who are not relatives, such as roommates or housemates. Some 70 percent of the labor force is made up of persons who live in married-couple families. In addition, there has been a marked increase in the number of families maintained by women on their own. Currently, one-tenth of the labor force lives in such families, including the women themselves, their older children (age 16 and over), and other relatives. Another 3 percent of the labor force consists of unmarried men and their families.

With an increase in the number of families maintained by women and the growing labor force participation of wives, husbands are no longer the sole support of most of the Nation's families. More than half of all husband-wife families now have two adult earners, with the wife's income making a substantial contribution to her family's well-being. The average working wife contributes 28 percent of her family's annual income; among wives who have year-round full-time jobs, the average contribution is 40 percent. And nearly half of all working wives do work full time the year round.

One important development that flows from these changes, of course, is the fact that increasing numbers of the Nation's children have working mothers. Record numbers of women are working in the 1980's, even when they have children not yet old enough to attend school.

In 1985, 54 percent of all mothers with children under 6 years of age were in the labor force. An even more astonishing fact is that nearly half of all married mothers with infant children—those 1 year old or less—were working or looking for work. In addition, nearly 70 percent of the mothers whose youngest child is between the ages of 6 and 13 are also in the labor force.

Looking at the number of children involved, about 9.5 million under the age of 6 and 15 million 6 to 13 years of age had a mother in the labor force in 1985. And most of these mothers worked full time. In fact, almost three out of every four employed mothers of school age children and more than two out of every three employed mothers of preschoolers work full time.

A study done a few years ago on the child care arrangements used by some 5 million women between the ages of 18 and 44 showed that the most popular form of care for children under age 5 was either in their own homes (32 percent) or in someone else's home (42 percent). Only 16 percent of the mothers used a group care center. The remaining 10 percent cared for their child (or children) themselves while working.

Clearly, the availability of child care is of particular relevance for people maintaining families on their own. Today, over 10 million families are maintained by women who are divorced, separated, never married, or widowed. About three-fifths of these women are parents with children under age 18 in the home. When their youngest child is school age (6 to 17 years), three-fourths of these single parents are in the labor force; when they have preschoolers (under age 6), over half are in the labor force.

Once in the labor market, however, the female single parent is often plagued by educational deficiencies, high unemployment, and low earnings. The economic status of these families is well below that of the majority of American families.

When she is employed, the typical woman maintaining a family on her own is likely to be working full time, but at a generally low-paying and/or comparatively low-skilled job. Last year, the median earnings for women maintaining families who were working full time on wage and salary jobs were $278 a week, close to what wives earned ($285), but considerably below the median for husbands ($455). Only one-third of the women maintaining families had another wage earner in the family. In contrast, 60 percent of all married-couple families were in the multiple-earner category. The consequence of all of this is that, in 1984, about 1 in every 3 families maintained by women was living in poverty, whereas the poverty rate among all other families was 1 in 13.

While a smaller proportion of married-couple families face serious labor market problems, I would not want to leave the impression that they all are immune from these difficulties. Multiworker families are more likely to have the cushioning effect of another worker when unemployment hits. But it is also true that to a certain extent unemployment tends to run in families. Persons with a high level of educational attainment and good preparation for careers often marry each other, as do persons with more limited labor market skills. Even more important, when high unemployment hits a specific geographic area, it can affect more than one family member. The unemployment rate for persons with unemployed spouses runs more than three times the rate for persons with employed spouses. Thus, in 1985, the unemployment rate for wives with unemployed husbands was 17 percent, compared with 4.8 percent for wives with employed husbands. While the number of married couples who are both unemployed is small—it averaged less than 200,000 in 1985—the impact of multiple unemployment on their financial well-being may be large.

What will the future bring? While we have no crystal ball, BLS does study trends and makes projections for some labor force measures. We expect the labor force as a whole to grow more slowly over the next decade than it has in the past. Nonetheless, the increase is projected to be in the neighborhood of 15 million. This advance will not be concentrated among young workers, because the baby boom generation is largely well established in the labor force and the following generation was considerably smaller in size. Nor will the growth come from the opposite end of the age spectrum, since persons 55 years and older have been reducing their rates of labor force participation as early retirement has become more available. Thus, nearly three-quarters of the 1995 labor force is projected to be in the prime working ages (25 to 54 years). This compares with two-thirds of the 1985 labor force. Participation among men in this age group is expected to edge down slightly during the coming decade, but women's participation is expected to continue to rise. Nearly 70 percent

of women in this age group are now in the labor force; by 1995 the figure is expected to be near 80 percent. It seems hard to believe that as recently as 1970 it was only 50 percent.

An interesting set of data that we have developed at BLS looks at worklife estimates for individuals. These data show that women born in 1970 could expect to spend 22 years in the labor force. Ten years later, the expected worklife for female infants was nearly 30 years, or 38 percent of total life expectancy. Women who would complete 3 or more years of college could expect to spend on average 45 percent of their lives in the labor force. While men still have longer worklife expectancy (39 years or 55 percent), the gap has been narrowing, as increases in life expectancy for men have been generally allocated to nonmarket activities.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Norwood, for your testimony. It is always very enlightening.

On page 2 of your testimony you mention that manufacturing employment today is about 1.8 million below its 1979 high, and it has shown no net growth over the past year. There is an article that is getting some attention in Foreign Affairs by Peter Drucker, who suggests that at least in a peace-time scenario, no growth in manufacturing will take place, in fact, there will be a continuation of the trend downward. He doesn't say at what rate, but he predicts there will be no reversal of the trend in the reduction of blue-collar jobs. Is that consistent with what you have seen and what you expect?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, I think there are a couple of points there. One is we need to look at output as well as jobs. Manufacturing output has increased despite the lack of job growth.

This means that we have had fairly high productivity growth in manufacturing industries.

The second point is that there is a restructuring, not just by industry, going on in this country, but a restructuring by occupation. We are losing factory operatives, but gaining managerial and professional workers.

We are gaining jobs in the service-producing sector. A large number of those jobs, one in every eight new jobs created during the recovery period since the end of 1982, has been in business services. Some of that may well have been work that was formerly done in the manufacturing industry but it is now being contracted out, payroll, for example, legal services, many of the financial services work that was done before. But I think on balance it is true that over the next decade there will be a slight increase in manufacturing jobs, but as a proportion of all jobs in this country it is quite clear that services is taking the lead.

Chairman MILLER. Within the service sector you mentioned that it is a composite of low-paid positions and in many instances high-paid positions. Where do women seem to fit in terms of that range?

Can you tell the committee where women fit into that service sector; how many of them; what percentage of them are at the high-paid end of the service sector; and what percentage of them are at the low-paid end?

Ms. NORWOOD. We can certainly supply for the record some information on women's earnings.

We know, of course, that women have always been concentrated in the lower ends of any industry. Women have been in the apparel and textile industry in much larger proportions than they have

been in the steel or automobile industries, and that is a very different pay scale.

In the service sector, women have been heavily represented in retail trade, in restaurants and other eating and drinking places, and less so in wholesale trade and some of the financial services.

On the other hand, there has been a trend, fairly small, but nevertheless increasing, for women to move into some of those higher paying occupations.

[The information follows:]

1985 MEDIAN USUAL EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS, BY OCCUPATION AND SEX

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Total	77,002	$343	45,589	$406	31,414	$277
Managerial and professional specialty occupations	19,381	488,	11,078	583	8,302	399
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations	9,328	497	5,835	593	3,492	383
Legislators, chief executives and general administrators, public administration	18	(1)	14	(1)	4	(1)
Administrators and officials, public administration	411	510	248	584	164	439
Administrators, protective services	39	(1)	32	(1)	7	(1)
Financial managers	372	581	237	677	135	400
Personnel and labor relations managers	105	540	57	631	48	(1)
Purchasing managers	101	676	78	714	23	(1)
Managers, marketing, advertising, and public relations	389	627	301	712	87	413
Administrators, education and related fields	424	561	240	639	184	479
Managers, medicine and health	94	490	37	(1)	57	469
Managers, properties and real estate	190	366	116	410	74	323
Postmasters and mail superintendents	32	(1)	20	(1)	12	(1)
Funeral directors	17	(1)	16	(1)	1	(1)
Managers and administrators, n.e.c.	4,302	512	2,935	616	1,367	363
Management-related occupations	2,834	450	1,504	515	1,330	382
Accountants and auditors	1,064	458	592	519	472	383
Underwriters, and other financial officers	561	468	282	556	278	397
Management analysts	78	583	53	693	25	(1)
Personnel, training, and labor relations specialists	316	454	135	551	181	384
Purchasing agents and buyers, farm products	11	(1)	9	(1)	2	(1)
Buyers, wholesale and retail trade, except farm products	157	416	79	490	78	310
Purchasing agents and buyers, n.e.c.	198	445	119	513	79	347
Business and promotion agents	18	(1)	12	(1)	6	(1)
Construction inspectors	38	(1)	35	(1)	3	(1)
Inspectors and compliance officers, exc. construction	157	459	121	477	35	(1)
Management relation occupations, n.e.c.	236	396	65	501	171	372
Professional specialty occupations	10,053	481	5,243	571	4,810	408
Engineers, architects, and surveyors	1,678	649	1,559	662	119	524
Architects	75	488	62	507	12	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Engineers	1,585	661	1,479	673	107	544
Aerospace engineers	87	691	82	699	5	(1)
Metallurgical and materials engineers	17	(1)	16	(1)	1	(1)
Mining engineers	8	(1)	8	(1)	.....	.....
Petroleum engineers	26	(1)	26	(1)	1	(1)
Chemical engineers	57	723	53	731	4	(1)
Nuclear engineers	12	(1)	12	(1)	.....	.....
Civil engineers	201	629	192	643	10	(1)
Agricultural engineers	2	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Electrical and electronic engineers	520	664	477	672	43	(1)
Industrial engineers	174	598	157	608	17	(1)
Mechanical engineers	257	665	244	676	13	(1)
Marine engineers and naval architects	18	(1)	17	(1)	1	(1)
Engineers, n.e.c.	204	629	193	650	10	(1)
Surveyors and mapping scientists	18	(1)	18	(1)	.....	.....
Mathematical and computer scientists	518	605	361	642	157	512
Computer systems analysts and scientists	317	603	228	625	88	523
Operations and systems researchers and analysts	157	616	107	663	51	519
Actuaries	14	(1)	11	(1)	3	(1)
Statisticians	25	(1)	11	(1)	14	(1)
Mathematical scientists, n.e.c.	5	(1)	4	(1)	1	(1)
Natural scientists	327	580	266	599	61	462
Physicists and astronomers	21	(1)	19	(1)	2	(1)
Chemists, except biochemists	104	588	85	601	20	(1)
Atmospheric and space scientists	10	(1)	8	(1)	2	(1)
Geologists and geodesists	42	(1)	38	(1)	4	(1)
Physical scientists, n.e.c.	14	(1)	11	(1)	2	(1)
Agricultural and food scientists	16	(1)	13	(1)	3	(1)
Biological and life scientists	61	506	43	(1)	18	(1)
Forestry and conservation scientists	35	(1)	34	(1)	1	(1)
Medical scientists	23	(1)	14	(1)	9	(1)
Health diagnosing occupations	243	595	186	633	57	504
Physicians	209	607	158	656	51	507
Dentists	14	(1)	13	(1)	1	(1)
Veterinarians	15	(1)	11	(1)	3	(1)
Optometrists	2	(1)	2	(1)	0	(1)
Podiatrists	1	(1)	.....	.....	1	(1)
Health diagnosing practitioners, n.e.c.	2	(1)	2	(1)	0	(1)
Health assessment and treating occupations	1,435	435	238	507	1,197	424
Registered nurses	1,010	434	66	492	945	431
Pharmacists	120	566	85	600	36	(1)
Dietitians	71	336	3	(1)	68	339
Therapists	188	406	53	422	135	400
Inhalation therapists	56	391	25	(1)	32	(1)
Occupational therapists	15	(1)	2	(1)	13	(1)
Physical therapists	40	(1)	9	(1)	31	(1)
Speech therapists	44	(1)	5	(1)	39	(1)
Therapists, n.e.c.	32	(1)	12	(1)	20	(1)
Physicians' assistants	45	(1)	31	(1)	14	(1)
Teachers, college and university	459	581	330	638	129	487

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Earth, environmental, and marine science teachers	3,	(1)	3	(1)	0	(1)
Biological science teachers	18	(1)	15	(1)	3	(1)
Chemistry teachers	15	(1)	12	(1)	3	(1)
Physics teachers	12	(1)	12	(1)	.....	.....
Natural science teachers, n.e.c.	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Psychology teachers	12	(1)	10	(1)	2	(1)
Economics teachers	10	(1)	9	(1)	0	(1)
History teachers	13	(1)	10	(1)	3	(1)
Political science teachers	10	(1)	9	(1)	1	(1)
Sociology teachers	7	(1)	6	(1)	1	(1)
Social science teachers, n.e.c.	4	(1)	3	(1)	1	(1)
Engineering teachers	14	(1)	12	(1)	2	(1)
Mathematical science teachers	30	(1)	25	(1)	5	(1)
Computer science teachers	8	(1)	6	(1)	2	(1)
Medical science teachers	14	(1)	10	(1)	4	(1)
Health specialities teachers	34	(1)	12	(1)	23	(1)
Business, commerce, and marketing teachers	15	(1)	12	(1)	3	(1)
Agriculture and forestry teachers	6	(1)	6	(1)	.....	.....
Art, drama, and music teachers	25	(1)	18	(1)	7	(1)
Physical education teachers	10	(1)	8	(1)	3	(1)
Education teachers	10	(1)	7	(1)	3	(1)
English teachers	38	(1)	22	(1)	16	(1)
Foreign language teachers	19	(1)	11	(1)	8	(1)
Law teachers	5	(1)	5	(1)	.....	.....
Social work teachers	1	(1)	.....	.....	1	(1)
Theology teachers	9	(1)	6	(1)	3	(1)
Trade and industrial teachers	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Home economics teachers	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)
Teachers, Postsecondary, n.e.c.	4	(1)	3	(1)	1	(1)
postsecondary teachers, subject not specified	108	519	75	618	33	(1)
Teachers, except college and university	2,873	412	864	478	2,008	394
Teachers, prekindergarten and kindergarten	216	276	2	(1)	214	277
Teachers, elementary school	1,204	412	206	468	998	403
Teachers, secondary school	1,074	439	526	485	549	408
Teachers, special education	185	393	27	(1)	158	386
Teachers, n.e.c.	193	408	104	460	90	379
Counselors, educational and vocational	146	488	71	549	75	425
Librarians, archivists, and curators	163	398	27	(1)	136	390
Librarians	153	391	21	(1)	132	388
Archivists and curators	10	(1)	6	(1)	4	(1)
Social scientists and urban planners	193	518	114	580	79	447
Economists	82	624	50	715	31	(1)
Psychologists	86	472	45	(1)	41	(1)
Sociologists	1	(1)	1	(1)	0	(1)
Social scientists, n.e.c.	11	(1)	8	(1)	3	(1)
Urban planners	13	(1)	10	(1)	3	(1)
Social, recreation, and religious workers	723	357	413	373	309	342
Social workers	387	376	143	421	244	356
Recreation workers	56	231	23	(1)	33	(1)
Clergy	234	338	224	341	10	(1)
Religious workers, n.e.c.	45	(1)	23	(1)	22	(1)
Lawyers and judges	341	724	251	782	89	557

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Lawyers	317	719	232	776	85	558
Judges	24	(1)	19	(1)	5	(1)
Writers, artists, entertainers, and athletes	955	417	562	490	393	346
Authors	14	(1)	8	(1)	6	(1)
Technical writers	39	(1)	25	(1)	14	(1)
Designers	302	437	167	537	135	296
Musicians and composers	22	(1)	19	(1)	3	(1)
Actors and directors	51	487	32	(1)	19	(1)
Painters, sculptors, craft artists, and artist printmakers	85	400	50	466	35	(1)
Photographers	56	346	43	(1)	12	(1)
Dancers	4	(1)	1	(1)	3	(1)
Artists, performers, and related workers, n.e.c.	28	(1)	13	(1)	15	(1)
Editors and reporters	175	430	92	480	83	397
Public relations specialists	116	460	60	585	56	381
Announcers	33	(1)	26	(1)	7	(1)
Athletes	31	(1)	26	(1)	5	(1)
Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations	23,425	307	8,803	420	14,622	269
Technicians and related support occupations	2,762	398	1,563	472	1,200	331
Health technologists and technicians	841	319	167	381	674	311
Clinical laboratory technologists and technicians	248	376	68	394	180	367
Dental hygienists	19	(1)	.....	.....	19	(1)
Health record technologists and technicians	47	(1)	2	(1)	45	(1)
Radiologic technicians	97	371	26	(1)	70	355
Licensed practical nurses	277	294	11	(1)	266	293
Health technologists and technicians, n.e.c.	153	318	59	350	94	305
Engineering and related technologists and technicians	843	417	700	436	143	344
Electrical and electronic technicians	286	426	252	436	34	(1)
Industrial engineering technicians	6	(1)	5	(1)	1	(1)
Mechanical engineering technicians	15	(1)	14	(1)	1	(1)
Engineering technicians, n.e.c.	198	425	143	468	55	339
Drafting occupations	278	399	229	414	49	(1)
Surveying and mapping technicians	61	371	56	358	4	(1)
Science technicians	187	393	129	417	58	318
Biological technicians	46	(1)	26	(1)	20	(1)
Chemical technicians	89	412	67	420	22	(1)
Science technicians, n.e.c.	52	359	36	(1)	16	(1)
Technicians, except health, engineering, and science	891	486	567	517	324	395
Airplane pilots and navigators	55	738	54	743	1	(1)
Air traffic controllers	33	(1)	28	(1)	5	(1)
Broadcast equipment operators	18	(1)	12	(1)	6	(1)
Computer programmers	500	502	327	519	173	454
Tool programmers, numerical control	4	(1)	4	(1)	1	(1)
Legal assistants	119	347	31	(1)	89	353

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Technicians, n.e.c.	161	437	110	485	51	360
Sales occupations	7,156	335	4,227	431	2,929	226
Supervisors and proprietors	2,010	385	1,371	438	639	276
Sales representatives, finance and business services	1,333	430	760	507	574	332
Insurance sales	365	415	237	478	128	345
Real estate sales	282	406	126	507	157	323
Securities and financial services sales	200	593	144	674	57	425
Advertising and related sales	126	422	59	500	67	357
Sales occupations, other business services	360	397	195	489	165	302
Sales representatives, commodities, except retail, including sales engineer	1,258	481	1,048	499	210	364
Sales workers, retail and personal services	2,539	210	1,041	285	1,498	180
Sales workers, motor vehicles and boats	218	393	203	400	15	(1)
Sales workers, apparel	156	184	34	(1)	123	171
Sales workers, shoes	44	(1)	22	(1)	22	(1)
Sales workers, furniture and home furnishings	98	271	51	311	46	(1)
Sales workers, radio, television, hi-fi, and appliances	105	315	80	334	25	(1)
Sales workers, hardware and building supplies	146	250	121	263	26	(1)
Sales workers, parts	134	255	119	261	15	(1)
Sales workers, other commodities	605	198	184	272	421	179
Sales counter clerks	71	200	21	(1)	50	169
Cashiers	878	178	167	209	711	172
Street and door-to-door sales workers	71	288	30	(1)	41	(1)
News vendors	13	(1)	9	(1)	5	(1)
Sales-related occupations	15	(1)	6	(1)	8	(1)
Demonstrators, promoters, and models, sales	4	(1)	2	(1)	2	(1)
Auctioneers	1	(1)	.....	.....	1	(1)
Sales support occupations, n.e.c.	10	(1)	4	(1)	6	(1)
Administrative support occupations, including clerical	13,507	286	3,013	391	10,494	270
Supervisors, administrative support	697	420	333	514	365	358
Supervisors, general office	404	399	147	550	257	343
Supervisors, computer equipment operators	45	(1)	28	(1)	17	(1)
Supervisors, financial records processing	95	419	31	(1)	64	380
Chief communications operators	3	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Supervisors, distribution, scheduling, and adjusting clerks	151	466	125	485	26	(1)
Computer equipment operators	691	311	253	395	437	278
Computer operators	686	311	251	395	435	278
Peripheral equipment operators	5	(1)	2	(1)	3	(1)
Secretaries, stenographers, and typists	3,938	276	92	341	3,846	275
Secretaries	3,251	279	58	369	3,193	279
Stenographers	41	(1)	6	(1)	35	(1)
Typists	646	259	28	(1)	617	259
Information clerks	827	242	93	352	734	236
Interviewers	123	263	20	(1)	104	258
Hotel clerks	48	(1)	12	(1)	37	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Transportation ticket and reservation agents	92	392	33	(1)	60	309
Receptionists	434	225	13	(1)	421	224
Information clerks, n.e.c.	129	250	16	(1)	113	248
Records processing occupations, except financial	612	274	116	326	497	268
Classified-ad clerks	9	(1)	1	(1)	7	(1)
Correspondence clerks	13	(1)	3	(1)	10	(1)
Order clerks	174	346	36	(1)	138	336
Personnel clerks, except payroll and timekeeping	57	323	4	(1)	53	319
Library clerks	53	246	11	(1)	42	(1)
File clerks	197	234	38	(1)	159	231
Records clerks	110	286	22	(1)	88	274
Financial records processing occupations	1,705	275	195	361	1,510	268
Bookkeepers, accounting, and auditing clerks	1,311	272	133	331	1,178	267
Payroll and timekeeping clerks	161	302	24	(1)	138	296
Billing clerks	126	264	17	(1)	109	256
Cost and rate clerks	73	305	20	(1)	52	265
Billing, posting, and calculating machine operators	35	(1)	1	(1)	34	(1)
Duplicating, mail and other office machine operators	55	244	17	(1)	39	(1)
Duplicating machine operators	23	(1)	10	(1)	13	(1)
Mail preparing and paper handling machine operators	4	(1)	1	(1)	3	(1)
Office machine operators, n.e.c.	28	(1)	5	(1)	23	(1)
Communications equipment operators	182	308	23	(1)	159	295
Telephone operators	177	302	21	(1)	156	292
Telegraphers	5	(1)	2	(1)	2	(1)
Communications equipment operators, n.e.c.	1	(1)	.....	.....	1	(1)
Mail and message distributing occupations	660	429	465	446	196	366
Postal clerks, exc. mail carriers	234	457	146	474	88	437
Mail carriers, postal service	235	466	203	470	32	(1)
Mail clerks, exc. postal service	123	240	62	262	62	223
Messengers	69	224	54	230	14	(1)
Material recording, scheduling, and distributing clerks, n.e.c.	1,504	305	926	332	578	270
Dispatchers	172	321	97	385	75	276
Production coordinators	168	384	87	475	81	328
Traffic, shipping, and receiving clerks	471	287	352	302	119	243
Stock and inventory clerks	475	299	278	324	198	268
Meter readers	40	(1)	39	(1)	1	(1)
Weighers, measurers, and checkers	65	276	33	(1)	32	(1)
Samplers	0	(1)	0	(1)	.....	.....
Expediters	89	318	37	(1)	52	262
Material recording, scheduling, and distributing clerks, n.e.c.	22	(1)	3	(1)	19	(1)
Adjusters and investigators	659	312	174	439	485	286
Insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators	209	339	64	455	145	307
Investigators and adjusters, except insurance	316	311	80	481	236	285
Eligibility clerks, social welfare	59	288	5	(1)	54	276

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Bill and account collectors	75	264	24	(1)	51	256
Miscellaneous administrative support occupations	1,975	261	328	352	1,647	252
General office clerks	489	267	100	322	389	258
Bank tellers	357	219	20	(1)	336	218
Proofreaders	23	(1)	7	(1)	16	(1)
Data-entry keyers	307	277	32	(1)	274	268
Statistical clerks	75	322	21	(1)	54	321
Teachers' aides	165	196	12	(1)	153	192
Administrative support occupations, n.e.c.	560	302	135	392	425	285
Service occupations	7,910	216	3,947	272	3,963	185
Private household occupations	342	132	13	(1)	330	130
Cooks, private household	12	(1)	2	(1)	10	(1)
Housekeepers and butlers	24	(1)	.....	.....	24	(1)
Child care workers, private household	142	88	5	(1)	137	86
Private household cleaners and servants	164	154	5	(1)	159	153
Protective service occupations	1,483	381	1,327	391	156	278
Supervisors, protective service occupations	127	485	121	494	6	(1)
Supervisors, firefighting and fire prevention	25	(1)	25	(1)	.....	.....
Supervisors, police and detectives	70	534	68	540	2	(1)
Supervisors, guards	32	(1)	28	(1)	4	(1)
Firefighting and fire prevention occupations	211	436	208	439	3	(1)
Fire inspection and fire prevention	22	(1)	20	(1)	2	(1)
Firefighting occupations	190	437	188	438	1	(1)
Police and detectives	628	424	565	432	63	352
Police and detectives, public service	416	452	382	455	34	(1)
Sheriffs, bailiffs, and other law enforcement officers	75	390	69	406	6	(1)
Correctional institution officers	137	352	114	364	23	(1)
Guards	516	248	432	257	84	212
Crossing guards	3	(1)	1	(1)	2	(1)
Guards and police, exc. public services	480	252	413	257	68	219
Protective service occupations, n.e.c.	32	(1)	18	(1)	14	(1)
Service occupations, except protective and household	6,085	203	2,607	230	3,477	188
Food preparation and service occupations	2,281	180	1,018	205	1,264	167
Supervisors, food preparation and service	177	231	80	284	97	207
Bartenders	169	202	88	227	81	177
Waiters and waitresses	542	170	119	236	423	159
Cooks, except short order	871	186	478	207	392	168
Short-order cooks	41	(1)	21	(1)	20	(1)
Food counter, fountain and related occupations	71	147	17	(1)	53	143
Kitchen workers, food preparation	66	169	23	(1)	44	(1)
Waiters'/waitresses' assistants	102	165	61	159	41	(1)
Miscellaneous food preparation occupations	244	166	131	163	113	170
Health service occupations	1,219	210	150	242	1,069	207
Dental assistants	107	224	3	(1)	104	223
Health aides, except nursing	247	233	41	(1)	205	230
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants	866	202	106	234	760	199

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Cleaning and building service occupations, except household	1,884	226	1,253	253	630	195
Supervisors, cleaning and building service workers	149	298	102	340	47	(1)
Maids and housemen	361	188	72	235	289	178
Janitors and cleaners	1,329	235	1,039	247	290	205
Elevator operators	15	(1)	12	(1)	2	(1)
Pest control occupations	30	(1)	28	(1)	2	(1)
Personal service occupations	701	203	186	240	514	192
Supervisors, personal service occupations	25	(1)	18	(1)	8	(1)
Barbers	22	(1)	15	(1)	7	(1)
Hairdressers and cosmetologists	277	201	34	(1)	243	195
Attendants, amusement and recreation facilities	63	227	35	(1)	28	(1)
Guides	19	(1)	9	(1)	9	(1)
Ushers	3	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Public transportation attendants	40	(1)	12	(1)	27	(1)
Baggage porters and bellhops	15	(1)	14	(1)	1	(1)
Welfare service aides	36	(1)	3	(1)	33	(1)
Child care workers, except private household	140	169	15	(1)	125	163
Personal service occupations, n.e.c.	60	207	28	(1)	33	(1)
Precision production, craft, and repair occupations	10,932	397	10,026	408	906	268
Mechanics and repairers	3,897	400	3,752	400	144	392
Supervisors, mechanics and repairers	270	520	246	521	24	(1)
Mechanics and repairers, except supervisors	3,627	393	3,506	393	120	378
Vehicle and mobile equipment mechanics and repairers	1,462	351	1,449	352	13	(1)
Automobile mechanics	662	309	658	310	4	(1)
Bus, truck, and stationary engine mechanics	304	384	302	384	2	(1)
Aircraft engine mechanics	86	491	81	496	4	(1)
Small engine repairers	56	286	56	286	.....	.....
Automobile body and related repairers	147	310	147	310	1	(1)
Aircraft mechanics, except engine	14	(1)	13	(1)	1	(1)
Heavy equipment mechanics	160	459	159	459	0	(1)
Farm equipment mechanics	33	(1)	33	(1)	.....	.....
Industrial machinery repairers	524	404	510	406	14	(1)
Machinery maintenance occupations	38	(1)	36	(1)	2	(1)
Electrical and electronic equipment repairers	648	495	588	499	60	455
Electronic repairers, communications and industrial equipment	131	393	122	385	9	(1)
Data processing equipment repairers	115	500	102	508	13	(1)
Household appliance and power tool repairers	33	(1)	32	(1)	1	(1)
Telephone line installers and repairers	68	523	67	521	2	(1)
Telephone installers and repairers	227	530	196	539	31	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Miscellaneous electrical and electronic equipment repairers	74	467	68	482	5	(1)
Heating, air conditioning, and refrigeration mechanics	208	370	208	370		
Miscellaneous mechanics and repairers	747	393	715	399	32	(1)
Camera, watch, and musical instrument repairers	17	(1)	16	(1)	1	(1)
Locksmiths and safe repairers	14	(1)	14	(1)		
Office machine repairers	61	380	58	385	3	(1)
Mechanical controls and valve repairers	25	(1)	25	(1)		
Elevator installers and repairers	22	(1)	22	(1)		
Millwrights	85	497	83	502	3	(1)
Specified mechanics and repairers, n.e.c.	368	365	348	370	20	(1)
Not specified mechanics and repairers	154	369	150	369	5	(1)
Construction trades	3,361	393	3,308	394	53	265
Supervisors, construction occupations	430	504	426	506	5	(1)
Supervisors, brickmasons, stonemasons, and tile setters	4	(1)	4	(1)		
Supervisors, carpenters and related workers	24	(1)	24	(1)		
Supervisors, electricians and power transmission installers	41	(1)	41	(1)		
Supervisors, painters, paperhangers, and plasterers	11	(1)	11	(1)		
Supervisors, plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters	12	(1)	12	(1)		
Supervisors, n.e.c.	338	494	334	496	5	(1)
Construction trades, except supervisors	2,931	377	2,882	378	49	(1)
Brickmasons and stonemasons	108	349	108	350	0	(1)
Tile setters, hard and soft	35	(1)	35	(1)		
Carpent installers	51	295	51	298	1	(1)
Carpenters	812	337	806	338	6	(1)
Drywall installers	101	380	99	383	2	(1)
Electricians	547	456	539	458	8	(1)
Electrical power installers and repairers	102	510	101	508	2	(1)
Painters, construction and maintenance	257	304	242	306	15	(1)
Paperhangers	4	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Plasterers	29	(1)	29	(1)		
Plumbers, pipefitters, steamfitters, and apprentices	361	431	357	431	4	(1)
Concrete and terrazzo finishers	67	334	67	334		
Glaziers	38	(1)	36	(1)	2	(1)
Insulation workers	52	380	50	383	2	(1)
Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment operators	6	(1)	6	(1)		
Roofers	99	272	97	272	3	(1)
Sheet metal duct installers	35	(1)	35	(1)		
Structural metalworkers	58	494	57	495	1	(1)
Drillers, earth	12	(1)	12	(1)		

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Construction trades, n.e.c.	155	299	153	300	2	(1)
Extractive occupations	181	501	179	499	1	(1)
Supervisors, extractive occupations	53	679	53	674	1	(1)
Drillers, oil well	45	(1)	45	(1)	0	(1)
Explosives workers	7	(1)	7	(1)	.....	.....
Mining machine operators	36	(1)	36	(1)	.....	.....
Mining occupations, n.e.c.	38	(1)	38	(1)	0	(1)
Precision production occupations	3,493	394	2,786	429	708	253
Supervisors, production occupations	1,294	468	1,105	490	189	303
Precision metalworking occupations	837	416	787	426	51	264
Tool and die makers	134	491	131	496	3	(1)
Precision assemblers, metal	8	(1)	7	(1)	0	(1)
Machinists	479	409	459	415	19	(1)
Boilermakers	30	(1)	29	(1)	1	(1)
Precision grinders, fitters, and tool sharpeners	14	(1)	13	(1)	2	(1)
Patternmakers and model makers, metal	5	(1)	4	(1)	1	(1)
Lay-out workers	15	(1)	13	(1)	3	(1)
Precious stones and metals workers (jewelers)	26	(1)	17	(1)	9	(1)
Engravers, metal	13	(1)	8	(1)	5	(1)
Sheet metal workers	111	415	104	418	7	(1)
Miscellaneous precision metalworkers	2	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Precision woodworking occupations	69	282	59	294	11	(1)
Patternmakers and model makers, wood	8	(1)	8	(1)	.....	.....
Cabinet makers and bench carpenters	37	(1)	34	(1)	3	(1)
Furniture and wood finishers	23	(1)	16	(1)	8	(1)
Miscellaneous precision woodworkers	1	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)
Precision textile, apparel, and furnishings machine workers	127	242	68	279	59	211
Dressmakers	46	(1)	4	(1)	42	(1)
Tailors	31	(1)	21	(1)	10	(1)
Upholsterers	44	(1)	39	(1)	4	(1)
Shoe repairers	4	(1)	2	(1)	2	(1)
Apparel and fabric patternmakers	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Miscellaneous precision apparel and fabric workers	2	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)
Precision workers, assorted materials	489	273	199	328	290	248
Hand molders and shapers, except jewelers	9	(1)	9	(1)	1	(1)
Patternmakers, lay-out workers, and cutters	19	(1)	15	(1)	4	(1)
Optical goods workers	38	(1)	20	(1)	19	(1)
Dental laboratory and medical appliance technicians	38	(1)	23	(1)	15	(1)
Bookbinders	28	(1)	12	(1)	16	(1)
Electrical and electronic equipment assemblers	319	254	90	281	229	246
Miscellaneous precision workers, n.e.c.	37	(1)	32	(1)	5	(1)
Precision food production occupations	329	286	255	317	74	198
Butchers and meat cutters	235	297	195	323	40	(1)
Bakers	69	267	48	(1)	21	(1)
Food batchmakers	25	(1)	12	(1)	13	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Precision inspectors, testers, and related workers	132	409	102	448	30	(1)
Inspectors, testers, and graders	126	413	99	448	27	(1)
Adjusters and calibrators	6	(1)	3	(1)	3	(1)
Plant and system operators	217	484	211	484	6	(1)
Water and sewage treatment plant operators	48	(1)	47	(1)	1	(1)
Power plant operators	38	(1)	37	(1)	1	(1)
Stationary engineers	99	495	97	493	2	(1)
Miscellaneous plant and system operators	31	(1)	30	(1)	2	(1)
Operators, fabricators, and laborers	14,067	295	10,585	325	3,482	216
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors	7,181	287	4,403	341	2,778	216
Machine operators and tenders, except precision	4,741	272	2,839	326	1,902	207
Metalworking and plastic working machine operators	447	336	370	354	77	265
Lathe and turning machine set-up operators	27	(1)	27	(1)	1	(1)
Lathe and turning machine operators	67	339	60	349	8	(1)
Milling and planing machine operators	13	(1)	12	(1)	1	(1)
Punching and stamping press machine opertors	117	320	85	340	32	(1)
Rolling machine operators	8	(1)	7	(1)	1	(1)
Drilling and boring machine operators	29	(1)	20	(1)	8	(1)
Grinding, abrading, buffing, and polishing machine operators	132	318	115	331	17	(1)
Forging machine operators	16	(1)	14	(1)	2	(1)
Numerical control machine operators	4	(1)	4	(1)	.....	.....
Miscellaneous metal, plastic, stone, and glass working machine operators	35	(1)	27	(1)	8	(1)
Fabricating machine operators, n.e.c.	20	(1)	11	(1)	9	(1)
Metal and plastic processing machine operators	157	304	117	345	39	(1)
Molding and casting machine operators	98	278	63	342	35	(1)
Metal plating machine operators	38	(1)	36	(1)	2	(1)
Heat treating equipment operators	12	(1)	12	(1)	0	(1)
Miscellaneous metal and plastic processing machine operators	8	(1)	7	(1)	2	(1)
Woodworking machine operators	116	244	104	247	12	(1)
Wood lathe, routing, and planing machine operators	11	(1)	10	(1)	2	(1)
Sawing machine operators	77	237	72	239	5	(1)
Shaping and joining machine operators	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)
Nailing and tacking machine operators	1	(1)	1	(1)	0	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

(Numbers in thousands)

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Miscellaneous woodworking machine operators	26	(1)	21	(1)	4	(1)
Printing machine operators	380	329	288	368	92	247
Printing machine operators	258	339	223	362	35	(1)
Photoengravers and lithographers	36	(1)	31	(1)	5	(1)
Typesetters and compositors	57	284	17	(1)	39	(1)
Miscellaneous printing machine operators	29	(1)	17	(1)	13	(1)
Textile, apparel, and furnishings machine operators	1,148	192	240	243	908	182
Winding and twisting machine operators	72	221	16	(1)	56	217
Knitting, looping, taping, and weaving machine operators	43	(1)	14	(1)	29	(1)
Textile cutting machine operators	4	(1)	2	(1)	1	(1)
Textile sewing machine operators	686	178	73	217	613	175
Shoe machine operators	43	(1)	14	(1)	29	(1)
Pressing machine operators	117	198	41	(1)	76	173
Laundering and dry cleaning machine operators	110	195	39	(1)	71	178
Miscellaneous textile machine operators	73	237	40	(1)	33	(1)
Machine operators, assorted materials	2,473	302	1,709	334	764	234
Cementing and gluing machine operators	34	(1)	16	(1)	18	(1)
Packaging and filling machine operators	350	248	139	283	211	230
Extruding and forming machine operators	35	(1)	31	(1)	4	(1)
Mixing and blending machine operators	121	328	113	331	7	(1)
Separating, filtering, and clarifying machine operators	51	441	45	(1)	6	(1)
Compressing and compacting machine operators	19	(1)	15	(1)	4	(1)
Painting and paint spraying machine operators	179	298	151	310	28	(1)
Roasting and baking machine operators, food	5	(1)	4	(1)	1	(1)
Washing, cleaning, and pickling machine operators	16	(1)	14	(1)	2	(1)
Folding machine operators	22	(1)	9	(1)	13	(1)
Furnace, kiln, and oven operators, exc. food	102	406	98	406	4	(1)
Crushing and grinding machine operators	44	(1)	37	(1)	7	(1)
Slicing and cutting machine operators	194	274	152	304	43	(1)
Motion picture projectionists	5	(1)	5	(1)		
Photographic process machine operators	78	261	34	(1)	43	(1)
Miscellaneous machine operators, n.e.c.	892	307	628	343	264	240

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Machine operators, not specified	329	316	220	346	108	263
Fabricators, assemblers, and hand working occupations	1,653	316	1,165	361	488	239
Welders and cutters	533	371	506	377	27	(1)
Solderers and brazers	38	(1)	13	(1)	25	(1)
Assemblers	979	298	583	355	397	243
Hand cutting and trimming occupations	13	(1)	9	(1)	4	(1)
Hand molding, casting, and forming occupations	16	(1)	11	(1)	4	(1)
Hand painting, coating, and decorating occupations	23	(1)	16	(1)	8	(1)
Hand engraving and printing occupations	15	(1)	9	(1)	7	(1)
Hand grinding and polishing occupations	5	(1)	1	(1)	4	(1)
Miscellaneous hand working occupations	30	(1)	18	(1)	13	(1)
Production inspectors, testers, samplers, and weighers	787	311	398	388	389	250
Production inspectors, checkers, and examiners	629	321	313	406	315	255
Production testers	62	354	39	(1)	23	(1)
Production samplers and weighers	10	(1)	9	(1)	1	(1)
Graders and sorters, except agricultural	86	213	37	(1)	49	(1)
Transportation and material moving occupations	3,648	360	3,459	369	189	252
Motor vehicle operators	2,511	343	2,357	353	154	246
Supervisors, motor vehicle operators	48	(1)	41	(1)	7	(1)
Truck drivers, heavy	1,526	363	1,501	366	25	(1)
Truck drivers, light	425	275	395	280	30	(1)
Drivers–sales workers	179	399	170	407	9	(1)
Bus drivers	210	344	136	403	74	262
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs	94	262	87	266	7	(1)
Parking lot attendants	28	(1)	26	(1)	1	(1)
Motor transportation occupations, n.e.c.	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Transportation occupations, except motor vehicles	204	559	201	563	3	(1)
Rail transportation occupations	145	599	143	602	2	(1)
Railroad conductors and yardmasters	38	(1)	38	(1)	.....	.....
Locomotive operating occupations	57	582	56	587	1	(1)
Railroad brake, signal, and switch operators	42	(1)	42	(1)	1	(1)
Rail vehicle operators, n.e.c.	8	(1)	8	(1)	.....	.....
Water transportation occupations	59	463	58	466	1	(1)
Ship captains and mates, except fishing boats	28	(1)	28	(1)	.....	.....
Sailors and deckhands	20	(1)	20	(1)	.....	.....
Marine engineers	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Bridge, lock, and lighthouse tenders	10	(1)	9	(1)	1	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Material moving equipment operators	932	360	900	364	32	(1)
Supervisors, material moving equipment operators	12	(1)	12	(1)	.....	.....
Operating engineers	142	39[illegible]	138	393	4	(1)
Longshore equipment operators	1	(1)	1	(1)	.....	.....
Hoist and winch operators	30	(1)	30	(1)	.....	.....
Crane and tower operators	89	438	89	438	.....	.....
Excavating and loading machine operators	96	385	94	388	1	(1)
Grader, dozer, and scraper operators	82	357	80	362	2	(1)
Industrial truck and tractor equipment operators	369	318	360	319	9	(1)
Miscellaneous material moving equipment operators	111	363	94	383	16	(1)
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers	3,238	251	2,724	261	514	209
Supervisors, handlers, equipment cleaners, and laborers, n.e.c.	8	(1)	7	(1)	1	(1)
Helpers, mechanics and repairers	25	(1)	23	(1)	2	(1)
Helpers, construction and extractive occupations	140	216	137	217	3	(1)
Helpers, construction trades	121	216	118	217	3	(1)
Helpers, surveyor	17	(1)	16	(1)	1	(1)
Helpers, extractive occupations	2	(1)	2	(1)	.....	.....
Construction laborers	583	276	567	279	16	(1)
Production helpers	73	281	57	285	16	(1)
Freight, stock, and material handlers	968	254	818	264	150	205
Garbage collectors	53	247	53	250	1	(1)
Stevedores	12	(1)	12	(1)	.....	.....
Stock handlers and baggers	347	217	263	229	84	181
Machine feeders and offbearers	85	258	58	269	27	(1)
Freight, stock, and material handlers, n.e.c.	471	284	432	285	39	(1)
Garbage and service station related occupations	177	198	170	200	7	(1)
Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners	160	205	144	203	16	(1)
Hand packers and packagers	236	222	86	247	150	215
Laborers, except construction	867	273	715	291	152	207
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations	1,288	212	1,150	216	138	185
Farm operators and managers	65	291	58	309	7	(1)
Farmers	10	(1)	8	(1)	2	(1)
Farm managers	55	303	50	317	5	(1)
Other agricultural and related occupations	1,145	207	1,016	210	129	186
Farm occupations, except managerial	663	195	587	198	76	176
Supervisors, farm workers	35	(1)	33	(1)	2	(1)
Farm workers	606	193	542	195	64	178
Marine life cultivation workers	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)
Nursery workers	20	(1)	11	(1)	10	(1)
Related agricultural occupations	482	228	430	232	53	204
Supervisors, related agricultural occupations	80	300	79	302	1	(1)
Groundskeepers and gardeners, except farm	354	218	333	220	21	(1)
Animal caretakers, except farm	37	(1)	15	(1)	22	(1)
Graders and sorters, agricultural products	11	(1)	3	(1)	8	(1)

TABLE 5.—MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL TIME BY DETAILED (3-DIGIT CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1985—Continued

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation	Both sexes		Men		Women	
	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings	Number of workers	Median weekly earnings
Inspectors, agricultural products	1	(1)			1	(1)
Forestry and logging occupations	55	269	52	276	2	(1)
Supervisors, forestry and logging workers	3	(1)	3	(1)	0	(1)
Forestry workers, except logging	16	(1)	15	(1)	2	(1)
Timber cutting and logging occupations	35	(1)	35	(1)	0	(1)
Fishers, hunters, and trappers	23	(1)	23	(1)		
Captains and other officers, fishing vessels	5	(1)	5	(1)		
Fishers	17	(1)	17	(1)		
Hunters and trappers	1	(1)	1	(1)		

[1] Data not shown where base is less than $50,000.

Note: A zero indicates an estimate of 1-499 workers, which rounds to zero thousand; a dash indicates no observations in the sample for the indicated cell.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Chairman MILLER. But it is a small trend?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, it can be a very large percentage, but when you are starting from a very small base a large percentage doesn't really get you very far. But there is improvement. I don't want to suggest that there isn't. But we have got a long way to go still.

Chairman MILLER. My question is intended to lead to this point. I think there is a popular notion that, for married couples, when the wife is working, that her husband is at relatively high pay level, and that this is almost all spendable income, or excess income to the family. That is not exactly true, is it?

Ms. NORWOOD. No, it certainly isn't. Most women work because they have to work. And women have worked before. What has happened in this country in the 1960's and 1970's, with the tremendous increase of women in the labor force, has been more of a recognition of that need and more of an acceptance among middle income and upper income families that women should work. But women in lower income families have always worked.

Chairman MILLER. What would be—and you can supply the exact figure for the committee—but what would be the median income of married-couple families where women are working full time?

Ms. NORWOOD. I have that here.

I had better supply it for the record.

The wife's earnings I have, which is $14,334 for wives who worked full time, 50–52 weeks. But that is just the wife's earnings. That does not take account of the husband's earnings. We can supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

1984 family income for married-couple familes in which the **wife** worked year-round full-time was $39,838.

1984 family income for married-couple families in which the husband was the only earner was $25,640.

Chairman MILLER. But you mention that she would be supplying about 40 percent of the family's income. If they have two children, and those two children are starting to enter college, that income is very important, just to maintain the household.

Ms. NORWOOD. That is right. Even if the children are not starting college.

Chairman MILLER. Well, we identify from where we are, you know.

Ms. NORWOOD. I know.

Chairman MILLER. In the future, the likelihood of that woman, who is working full-time, being married to a unionized, high-paid worker, is going to be substantially diminished. She may be working and married to a high-paid lawyer. Or, perhaps she won't be in the workforce in that case.

My point is this. As the service sector expands both for men and women as a primary place of employment, can we predict household incomes? You have mentioned that the service sector has undergone substantial increases in compensation. Do we expect that to continue, or are there other factors in the service sector, as there are in the manufacturing sector, that suggest that changes in the service sector will start leading to a leveling of the rate of compensation?

Mrs. NORWOOD. It is quite clear that we are losing jobs in some of the durable manufacturing industries, that have been among the highest paying in the country, and have been heavily unionized. We are gaining jobs in services, with pay at various levels.

As there are more people coming into the labor force there will be increasing pressure for upward wages. The retail trade industry is already concerned about the lack of young people, because our birthrates have declined and there are fewer youngsters entering the labor force. They were the largest source of part-time minimum wage workers, for example, in the retail trade industry. So I think we can expect a number of different kinds of things occurring.

Chairman MILLER. There is pressure from both sides, is that what you are saying?

Ms. NORWOOD. Yes.

Chairman MILLER. Mrs. Johnson?

Mrs. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Dr. Norwood, for your testimony and your concise summary of some of the facts that are very important for policymakers as well as the private sector to be aware.

I have just a couple of questions. You talk about the larger increase in salaries in the service sector.

What is the current average difference in compensation, in a gross sense, between service sector jobs and manufacturing jobs?

Ms. NORWOOD. I will supply that for the record. I don't have it here. But services on average, of course, have lower paying jobs, on average.

[The information follows:]

TABLE B–3.—AVERAGE HOURLY AND WEEKLY EARNINGS OF PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY

Industry	Average hourly earnings				Average weekly earnings			
	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986 [1]	Apr 1986 [1]	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986 [1]	Apr 1986 [1]
Total private	$8.54	$8.75	$8.74	$8.74	$298.05	$302.75	$304.15	$304.15
Seasonally adjusted	8.54	8.72	8.74	8.74	298.90	305.20	305.90	305.90
Mining	11.93	12.27	12.28	12.34	516.57	520.25	520.67	521.98
Construction	12.21	12.29	12.17	12.20	461.54	431.38	444.21	461.16
Manufacturing	9.48	9.68	9.70	9.70	380.15	389.14	394.79	392.85
Durable goods	10.03	10.28	10.29	10.28	410.23	421.48	426.01	423.54
Lumber and wood products	8.04	8.34	8.29	8.29	317.58	327.76	331.60	332.43
Furniture and fixtures	7.08	7.33	7.36	7.36	276.83	285.14	289.98	287.04
Stone, clay, and glass products	9.80	9.93	9.92	9.98	411.60	403.16	411.68	424.15
Primary metal industries	11.64	11.96	11.99	12.01	480.73	503.52	505.98	496.01
Blast furnaces and basic steel products	13.32	13.82	13.84	13.92	547.45	579.06	579.90	570.72
Fabricated metal products	9.64	9.81	9.83	9.81	395.24	402.21	405.98	403.19
Machinery, except electrical	10.17	10.53	10.58	10.57	417.99	435.94	442.24	438.66
Electrical and electronic equipment	9.40	9.60	9.63	9.63	376.00	389.76	395.79	391.94
Transportation equipment	12.63	12.87	12.89	12.86	538.04	544.40	551.69	546.55
Motor vehicles and equipment	13.40	13.62	13.71	13.64	586.92	584.30	597.76	589.25
Instruments and related products	9.11	9.42	9.42	9.39	368.96	386.22	389.99	384.99
Miscellaneous manufacturing	7.22	7.48	7.48	7.46	280.86	293.96	299.20	296.91
Nondurable goods	8.67	8.83	8.85	8.86	337.26	346.14	351.35	349.97
Food and kindred products	8.59	8.68	8.72	8.75	336.73	338.52	343.57	344.75
Tobacco manufactures	12.16	12.48	12.85	13.02	424.38	456.77	481.88	481.74
Textile mill products	6.70	6.83	6.86	6.86	257.28	273.88	278.52	279.20
Apparel and other textile products	5.74	5.78	5.79	5.80	203.20	206.92	211.34	209.96
Paper and allied products	10.72	10.99	11.02	11.04	458.82	473.67	478.27	473.62
Printing and publishing	9.60	9.84	9.90	9.87	360.00	369.00	377.19	373.09
Chemicals and allied products	11.48	11.83	11.79	11.82	481.01	493.31	496.36	495.26
Petroleum and coal products	14.18	14.19	14.23	14.29	595.56	611.59	626.12	635.91
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products	8.48	8.68	8.71	8.68	346.83	355.88	359.72	355.88
Leather and leather products	5.84	5.83	5.86	5.88	215.50	209.88	212.72	212.86
Transportation and public utilities	11.27	11.63	11.60	11.62	441.78	454.73	455.88	455.50
Wholesale trade	9.24	9.42	9.38	9.36	354.82	360.79	361.13	361.30
Retail trade	5.96	6.07	6.06	6.05	175.22	174.21	175.74	175.45
Finance, insurance, and real estate	7.85	8.27	8.27	8.23	285.74	303.51	302.68	298.75
Services	7.89	8.22	8.22	8.18	257.21	268.79	269.62	267.49

[1] Preliminary.

Source: Employment Situation news release May 2, 1986.

TABLE B–4.—HOURLY EARNINGS INDEX FOR PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY

[1977 = 100]

Industry	Not seasonally adjusted					Seasonally adjusted						
	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986 [p]	Apr 1986 [p]	Percent change from Apr 1985–Apr 1986	Apr 1985	Dec 1985	Jan 1986	Feb 1986	Mar 1986 [p]	Apr 1986 [p]	Percent change from Mar 1986–Apr 1986
Total private nonfarm:												
Current dollars	164.7	168.8	168.7	168.8	2.5	164.8	168.4	167.4	168.5	168.9	168.8	(1)
Constant (1977) dollars	94.4	94.8	95.3	NA	(2)	94.4	94.4	93.5	94.6	95.3	NA	(2)
Mining	178.6	180.5	179.7	179.8	.7	150.4	150.5	149.2	150.0	148.8	150.0	0.8
Construction	149.2	149.1	147.8	148.8	-.3							

TABLE B–4.—HOURLY EARNINGS INDEX FOR PRODUCTION OR NONSUPERVISORY WORKERS ON PRIVATE NONAGRICULTURAL PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY—Continued

[1977 = 100]

Industry	Not seasonally adjusted					Seasonally adjusted						
	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986 p	Apr. 1986 p	Percent change from: Apr. 1985–Apr. 1986	Apr. 1985	Dec. 1985	Jan. 1986	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986 p	Apr. 1986 p	Percent change from: Mar. 1986–Apr. 1986
Manufacturing	167.9	171.5	171.9	172.1	2.5	167.9	170.8	170.8	171.4	172.0	172.1	.1
Transportation and public utilities	164.5	170.1	169.6	169.7	3.2	165.0	169.2	168.3	169.6	170.2	170.3	(1)
Wholesale trade	170.7	173.7	173.1	173.0	1.4	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)
Retail trade	156.1	158.3	158.3	158.6	1.6	155.6	158.9	157.1	157.8	158.1	158.1	(1)
Finance, insurance, and real estate	170.0	178.6	178.5	177.7	4.5	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)
Services	168.0	174.6	174.8	174.2	3.7	167.8	173.4	171.8	173.5	174.6	174.0	-.3

[1] Percent change is less than 0.05 percent.
[2] Percent change is 0.7 percent from March 1985 to March 1986, the latest month available.
[3] Percent change is 0.8 percent from February 1986 to March 1986, the latest month available.
[*] These series are not seasonally adjusted since the seasonal component is small relative to the trend-cycle and/or irregular components and consequently cannot be separated with sufficient precision.
NA = not available.
p = preliminary.
Source: Employment Situation news release May 2, 1986.

Mrs. JOHNSON. That is certainly the assumption under which we are operating. But as the mix of service jobs changes and there is an increase in managerial sales, marketing, while manufacturing declines I wonder where that average is now?

Ms. NORWOOD. Yes, in real terms—adjusted for inflation—average earnings in manufacture have declined over the past 7 years.

Mrs. JOHNSON. It may decline even more rapidly in the next decade. I would be interested in those figures.

In terms of your statistical data, do you have any ability to look at women's salaries and female advancement in the work force in growth industries?

I represent Connecticut, and in Connecticut we have a lot of declining industries. Mainstays of our economy are going out and new industries are coming in. The thing that has struck me very keenly among women in business has been that women are advancing very rapidly in salary position, and always where industry is growing.

That wasn't true when industry was growing 10 years ago. Industry is looking differently at female employees now than they were even 5 years ago. In my mind those growth industries where women are, takes a sort of dramatic form of banking versus insurance. Insurance is laying off, and there aren't many positions opening up at the top. Women are not advancing in insurance. Since that is a big employer in my area it makes a lot of difference as to how women see their opportunities.

But any information that you could provide for us from your resources on—instead of looking grossly at average female wages and average female advancement, if we could separate out some of the growth industries, and see whether or not we are beginning to

make a different level of progress would be, I think, very useful to us, and information that would be applicable to many of the things that we have to consider.

Ms. NORWOOD. We will certainly try to do that.

[The information follows:]

TABLE 4.—EMPLOYMENT AND AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS BY INDUSTRY, RANKED BY PROPORTION OF WOMEN WORKERS FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST, JULY 1982

1972 SIC Code	Industry	All employees (thousands)	Women workers (thousands)	Percent of women workers	Rank of proportion of women workers	Average hourly earnings[1]	Rank of average hourly earnings
23	Apparel and other textile products	1,095.9	897.9	81.9	1	$5.18	50
80	Health services	5,820.8	4,732.9	81.3	2	7.01	36
60	Banking	1,667.8	1,180.6	70.8	3	5.80	46
56	Apparel and accessory stores	948.9	664.1	70.0	4	4.85	51
61	Credit agencies other than banks	587.7	409.7	69.7	5	5.99	43
81	Legal services	583.5	404.7	69.3	6	8.75	21
53	General merchandise stores	2,193.8	1,447.9	66.0	7	5.40	47
63	Insurance carriers	1,230.5	745.9	60.6	8	7.70	30
31	Leather and leather products	195.7	117.8	60.2	9	5.31	49
58	Eating and drinking places	4,883.2	2,746.9	56.3	10	4.06	52
59	Miscellaneous retail	1,950.1	1,058.6	54.3	11	5.36	48
22	Textile mill products	727.0	349.0	48.0	12	5.81	45
39	Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	378.4	171.4	45.3	13	6.40	38
48	Communication	1,397.8	627.8	44.9	14	10.01	14
54	Food stores	2,463.2	1,072.7	43.5	15	7.25	34
73	Business services	3,304.1	1,436.7	43.5	16	7.03	35
36	Electric and electronic equipment	2,004.7	852.3	42.5	17	8.18	25
38	Instruments and related products	708.3	299.8	42.3	18	8.30	23
79	Amusement and recreation services	976.3	402.1	41.2	19	5.87	44
78	Motion pictures	227.6	92.5	40.6	20	8.22	24
27	Printing and publishing	1,262.4	511.2	40.5	21	8.72	22
21	Tobacco manufacturing	60.8	22.0	36.2	22	10.32	11
30	Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products	589.8	240.5	34.9	23	7.67	31
57	Furniture and home furnishings stores	586.5	200.3	34.2	24	6.20	41
89	Miscellaneous services	1,069.0	363.0	34.0	25	10.22	13
25	Furniture and fixtures	429.1	129.1	30.1	26	6.33	39
20	Food and kindred products	1,672.9	492.0	29.4	27	7.87	29
51	Wholesale trade-nondurable goods	2,188.0	625.0	28.6	28	8.17	26
28	Chemicals and allied products	1,075.0	280.7	26.1	29	10.01	15
52	Building materials and garden supplies	598.6	155.0	25.9	30	6.02	42
41	Local and interurban passenger transit	230.0	57.4	25.0	31	7.43	33
41	Wholesale trade-durable goods	3,126.0	766.0	24.5	32	7.99	28
26	Paper and allied products	659.4	149.1	22.6	33	9.40	16
35	Machinery, except electrical	2,262.3	476.0	21.0	34	9.31	17
34	Fabricated metal products	1,426.9	299.8	21.0	35	8.85	20
49	Electric, gas, and sanitary services	881.3	174.7	19.8	36	10.70	8
76	Miscellaneous repair services	296.3	58.7	19.8	37	8.00	27
32	Stone, clay, and glass products	598.1	114.1	19.4	38	8.93	19
55	Automotive dealers and service stations	1,659.8	319.8	19.3	39	6.28	40
75	Auto repair, services, and garages	582.0	100.6	17.3	40	6.68	37
37	Transportation equipment	1,738.6	285.5	16.4	41	11.26	7
13	Oil and extraction	710.6	112.7	15.9	42	10.43	9
29	Petroleum and coal products	209.3	32.0	15.3	43	12.40	2
24	Lumber and wood products	630.8	91.3	14.5	44	7.63	32
42	Trucking and warehousing	1,209.6	153.8	12.7	45	10.26	12
15	General building contractors	1,039.5	122.1	11.7	46	10.41	10
33	Primary metal industries	909.1	105.8	11.6	47	11.38	6
10	Metal mining	64.8	6.3	9.7	48	12.24	3
17	Special trade contractor	2,195.4	199.0	9.1	49	12.08	4

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TABLE 4.—EMPLOYMENT AND AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS BY INDUSTRY, RANKED BY PROPORTION OF WOMEN WORKERS FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST, JULY 1982—Continued

1972 SIC Code	Industry	All employees (Thousands)	Women workers (Thousands)	Percent of women workers	Rank of proportion of women workers	Average hourly earnings[1]	Rank of average hourly earnings
14	Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels	118.1	9.5	8.0	50	8.94	18
16	Heavy construction contracting	913.8	66.2	7.2	51	11.47	5
12	Bituminous coal and lignite mining	229.5	11.7	5.1	52	13.05	1

[1] Average hourly earnings are for all production and nonsupervisory workers.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Report No. 671, September 1982

Mrs. JOHNSON. Do you have any way or occasion to come in contact with private sector personnel policies that are responding to the reality that your statistics demonstrate?

Are companies changing their policies because their work force now is heavily female; are they at all responding to the larger implications of a female work force, which is that their male employees are more heavily involved in family responsibilities than they used to be?

It isn't just that we have more women in the work force. It is that the nature of men's lives in the work force have changed as well, as a result. Consequently do you see any changes in personnel policy that reflect this? Any increase in flextime; any increase in allowing people to work 10 hour days?

If employers changed their personnel policies, parents would have to find only 3 days of day care rather than 5 days of day care. Do you see any greater willingness to allow parents time to visit schools; any greater movement toward the way employers treat pregnancy and disability?

Ms. NORWOOD. We will supply some information for the record. We don't study personnel policies per se. But we do have some information on employee benefits.

Also, we have added some questions to supplement the Current Population Survey, and so sometime next year we should have some further information about work schedules and things of that sort.

[The information follows:]

RETIREMENT COVERAGE WIDESPREAD IN MEDIUM AND LARGE FIRMS, 1985

More than 9 in 10 full-time employees in medium and large firms were covered by one or more private retirement plans in 1985, according to a survey of employee benefits by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nearly 3 in 10 employees were covered by plans that allow participants to reduce their taxable income by channeling part of their salary to retirement funds, under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Retirement coverage was provided to employees through a variety of means. Defined benefit (or conventional) pension plans, which have formulas for determining an employee's annuity, covered 8 in 10 employees. Four in 10 workers participated in defined contribution plans also designed to provide retirement income. These plans, which usually predetermine the employer's contribution but not the employee's benefit, include savings and thrift, profit sharing, money purchase pension, and employee stock ownership plans. In addition, 2 in 10 workers with retirement coverage participated in capital accumulation plans (defined contribution plans that allow participants to withdraw the employer's contributions at their discretion). Defined contribution plans typically supplemented defined benefit pension plans.

For the first time, the survey developed information on salary reduction or 401(k) plans. Nearly 40 percent of the white-collar workers (those in professional-administrative or technical-clerical occupations) were in salary reduction plans, while only

16 percent of the blue-collar (or production) workers participated in these tax-deferred plans. Three-fifths of all participants (white- and blue-collar combined) could elect to make their 401(k) contributions to an existing saving and thrift plan where the employer matched at least part of the employee's contribution, another fifth of the participants were in a free standing 401(k) plan (no employer contribution), and the remainder could contribute to profit-sharing (15 percent) or money purchase pension plans (3 percent).

The Bureau's seventh annual survey of employee benefits provides representative data for 20.5 million full-time employees in a cross-section of the nation's private industries in 1985. The survey's scope generally was limited to medium and large establishments employing at least 100 or 205 workers, depending upon the industry.

The study provides information on paid leave, insurance, retirement, and capital accumulation plans, as well as many other benefits that are paid, at least in part, by the employer. It covers both the extent of these benefits and the detailed characteristics of the benefit plans. Information also is provided on several benefits, such as salary reduction plans under section 401(k) and post-retirement health and life insurance, even if not financed by employers. Data are provided for all employees and for three employee groups–professional-administrative, technical-clerical, and production workers.

PAID TIME OFF

Time off with pay is available to employees in several different forms and amounts–from daily rest breaks to annual vacations of several weeks. In 1985, paid lunch time (available to a tenth of the workers) averaged 27 minutes a day, while paid rest periods (covering nearly three-fourths of the workers) averaged 26 minutes per day. The number of paid holidays averaged 10.1 days; the amount of vacation, which typically varied by length of service, averaged 8.6 days after 1 year of service, 15.9 days after 10 years, and 20.7 days after 20 years of service. Where personal leave (multipurpose paid leave) plans were in effect, the average number of days avaiable was 3.7 per year. For three other paid leave benefits, each available to a majority of the employees, funeral leave averaged 3.2 days per occurrence and military leave averaged 11.5 days a year; time off for paid jury duty leave was usually provided as needed.

DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS

Workers may be protected against loss of income during temporary absences from work due to illness or accident through paid sick leave or sickness and accident insurance and, during extended periods of disability, through long-term disability insurance or disability pensions. In 1985, short-term disability protection was provided to 93 percent of workers by sick leave, sickness and accident insurance, or both. Long-term disability insurance was available to 48 percent of the workers, but 41 percent (some with long-term disability insurance) were eligible for immediate disability benefits under their pension plans.

Paid sick leave plans vary greatly in the number of days off available. For example, after 1 year of service, plans specifying a maximum annual benefit allowed an average of 15.9 days off per year with full pay; when days off were specified for each disability, the average was 59.9 days. The number of days of annual sick leave also varied depending on whether the plan was coordinated with sickness and accident insurance benefits and whether it allowed carryover of unused sick leave days from year to year. Sickness and accident insurance pays a portion of an employee's regular earnings, usually for a maximum of 26 weeks.

Long-term disability insurance typically pays 50 to 60 percent of regular earnings when an employee is disabled for a prolonged period. Long-term disability payments usually begin after sick leave and sickness and accident insurance are exhausted and continue as long as the person is disabled or until retirement age. Career-ending disabilities may entitle an employee to an immediate pension, but the pension may be deferred until other forms of income, such as long-term disability insurance, have ceased.

HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE

Health insurance plans continued to add provisions designed to counter rising health care costs. As in 1984, benefits became more common for less expensive alternatives to hospital stays: Coverage for treatment in extended care facilities was available to 67 percent of plan participants in 1985, up from 62 percent in 1984; coverage for home health care rose from 46 percent to 56 percent; and hospice care

coverage increased from 11 percent to 23 percent. In addition, the percentage of participants whose health plans paid for a second surgical opinion increased from 38 percent in 1984 to 50 percent in 1985. A variety of other cost control features were surveyed for the first time in 1985, including pre-hospitalization testing (46 percent of health plan participants); treatment in ambulatory surgical centers (39 percent); and improved benefits for certain types of surgery performed on an outpatient basis (25 percent).

Thirty-five percent of the employees were in plans that required them to pay part of the premiums for their own coverage, the same as in 1984; and 53 percent were in plans requiring contributions for family coverage--the first time this proportion had not increased since first studied in 1980. However, 29 percent of the employees having major medical coverage were under plans requiring them to pay the first $150 or more of expenses before reimbursement by the insurance plan. This was up from 21 percent in 1984 and 12 percent in 1983.

Broadened coverage in other areas was not directly related to cost control. The percentage of health plan participants covered for alcoholism treatment increased from 61 to 68 percent between 1984 and 1985 and, for drug abuse treatment, from 52 to 61 percent. Participation in vision care plans also grew, to 35 percent, up from 30 percent in 1984. Under major medical plans, the most common lifetime maximum benefit shifted to $1 million, from $250,000 in previous years.

Group health insurance coverage continued after retirement in plans covering 70 percent of the employees. Nearly all of these employees were in plans that extended benefits to retirees up to age 65. Sixty-four percent of the employees were in plans that covered retirees 65 and over; 38 percent were in plans where retiree premiums were fully paid by the employer, 16 percent were in plans where the cost was financed by both employer and retiree, and 7 percent were in retiree paid plans. Retirees' benefits were usually the same as those for active workers, though payments were coordinated with Medicare.

Life insurance for 66 percent of the workers covered was based on their earnings, while most of the remainder were provided flat dollar amounts. Earnings-based formulas, typically paying one or two times annual earnings, applied to over four-fifths of the professonal-administrative and technical-clerical workers. Flat amounts were common among production workers, where they applied to half of the plan participants and provided an average benefit of $10,000. Thirteen percent of all 1985 participants were in plans which also provided monthly income to surviving family members for a limited period, typically 24 months.

DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Eighty percent of the workers were covered by defined benefit pension plans in 1985, with the employer usually paying the full cost. Seventy percent of the participants had plans relating benefits to prior earnings; such plans, largely recorded for white-collar workers, frequently coordinate benefits with those from Social Security. Most of the remaining participants--particularly blue-collar workers--received specified dollar amounts of benefits for each year of service, which were rarely coordinated with Social Security benefits.

Sixty-seven percent of pension plan participants could retire with full benefits before age 65--up from 63 percent in 1983 and 1984. The two most common pre-age 65 requirements reported for full retirement benefits were any age, with 30 years service, and age 62, with 10 years service. A reduced pension was available at age 55 to two-thirds of participants, with service requirements ranging from none to 25 years.

Employees are vested when they secure rights to all or a portion of pension benefits earned. Nearly 90 percent of the participants were in plans with cliff vesting provisions, which granted vested status upon satisfaction of a specified service requirement--almost always 10 years. Partial vesting occurred sooner in plans with graduated vesting provisions, covering one-eighth of the participants. Under graduated vesting, participants accure gradually increasing benefit rights, reaching full vesting after 10 to 15 years.

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION AND STOCK PLANS

Forty-one percent of employees participated in one or more defined contribution plans designed for retirement, asset accumulation, or both. Two-thirds of the participants in defined contribution retirement plans, and one-seventh in capital accumulation plans, had their benefits wholly financed by the employer. Among the various plans available, 27 percent of the employees were in savings and thrift plans, 24 percent in employee stock ownership plans, 18 percent in profit sharing plans, 4 per-

cent in money purchase pension plans, and 1 percent in stock bonus plans. Another 3 percent of the employees were eligible to purchase company stock currently at less than market price (stock purchase plans) or in the future at a designated price (stock option plans).

OTHER BENEFITS

In addition to the major benefits described above, BLS colected information on the incidence of 17 other benefit plans, including nonproduction bonuses, employee discounts, recreation facilities, educational assistance, and child care. Benefits new to the survey in 1985 are subsidized commuting, travel accident insurance, financial counseling prepaid, legal services, and employer financed flexible spending accounts. Data are available on the percent of full-time employees eligible for these benefits, although they do not indicate the proportion of employees actually using or receiving the benefits.

AVAILABILITY OF SURVEY RESULTS

Detailed tabulations of the benefit provisions studied will be published by the Bureau this summer in a BLS bulletin, "Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Firms, 1985."

FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES PARTICIPATING IN SELECTED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE INDUSTRY ESTABLISHMENTS, UNITED STATES,[1] 1985

[In percent]

Employee benefit program	All employees	Professional and administrative employees	Technical and clerical employees	Production employees
Paid:				
Holidays	98	99	100	96
Vacations	99	99	100	99
Personal leave	26	33	37	18
Lunch period	10	3	3	17
Rest time	72	58	70	81
Funeral leave	88	87	89	87
Military leave	70	77	75	63
Jury duty leave	92	94	96	89
Sick leave	67	93	92	41
Sickness and accident insurance	52	30	38	70
Long-term disability insurance	48	64	61	32
Health insurance	96	97	96	96
Life insurance	96	97	96	96
Retirement	91	93	93	89
Defined benefit pension	80	81	82	78
Defined contribution plan [2]	41	49	49	32
Capital accumulation [3]	20	28	25	13

[1] The survey excludes data for executives and employees in constant travel status, such as airline pilots, as well as data for Alaska and Hawaii.
[2] Includes money purchase pension, profit sharing, savings and thrift, stock bonus, and employee stock ownership plans in which employer contributions must remain in the participant's account until retirement age, death, disability, separation from service, age 59½, or hardship.
[3] Includes plans in which employer contributions may be withdrawn from the participant's account without regard to the conditions listed in footnote 2.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Thank you, that would be very helpful.

Lastly, after International Harvester left Fort Wayne, many of their former employers ended up in lower-paying service-sector jobs, but reported being happier, that the work was more challenging and more rewarding. That is very interesting.

I just wondered whether there are any materials that you have had the chance to come across as supporting or reflecting on that possibility?

Ms. NORWOOD. We try to stay away from the measure of people's moods. But we do have some information about the labor market

status of workers who have been displaced because of plant closedowns or the elimination of a shift.

We did some work last year based upon the experience of the previous year. We have this January gone out and asked the same kinds of questions again, and within, we hope, a few months those data will be tabulated and we will have some further information.

The material that we had so far showed that, roughly 60 percent of the people who had been displaced for those reasons had found jobs. Many of the women, particularly from the apparel and textile industries, had left the labor force entirely.

Of those who were reemployed in full-time jobs, about half had found jobs at the same or higher wages than the last job. But, of course, many of the factories that had closed down were in the highest paying groups, like steel, for example.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Well, thank you. I am interested in broadening our evaluation of these changes because as important as dollar enumeration is, I think it is misleading to make public policy entirely on the basis of salary changes. It is interesting from this little incident, and I have had occasion to have that kind of feedback from former brass industry workers, and machine tool industry workers, and so on. I am interested in movement toward a broader view through our statistical analysis approaches.

Thank you very much; nice to have you.

[The information follows:]

TABLE 11.—DISPLACED FULL-TIME WORKERS BY INDUSTRY, BY REEMPLOYMENT IN JANUARY 1984, AND BY COMPARISON OF EARNINGS BETWEEN NEW AND OLD JOBS

[In thousands]

Industry of last job	Total reemployed January 1984	Part-time job	Full-time wage and salary job					Self-employment or other full-time job
			Total [1]	Earnings relative to those of last job				
				20 percent or more below	Below, but within 20 percent	Equal or above, but within 20 percent	20 percent or more above	
Displaced after 3 years or more on job [2]	2,841	357	2,266	621	320	571	533	218
Construction	253	26	199	48	30	47	61	28
Manufacturing	1,418	151	1,200	368	171	286	247	67
Durable goods	954	106	797	281	102	181	155	51
Primary metals industries	98	14	77	40	5	22	5	7
Steel [3]	78	14	59	33	3	14	5	4
Other primary metals	20	.....	18	7	2	9	.....	2
Fabricated metal products	102	12	81	30	6	21	16	9
Machinery, except electrical	244	17	215	77	34	39	40	12
Electrical machinery	94	10	84	26	12	14	22	.....
Transportation equipment	219	30	174	68	22	42	34	14
Automobiles	141	19	115	43	16	21	26	7
Other transportation equipment	77	11	59	23	6	21	8	7
Nondurable goods	464	45	403	85	69	105	92	16
Transportation and public utilities	191	15	154	40	22	44	27	22
Wholesale and retail trade	399	72	296	61	41	79	85	31
Finance and service industries	378	58	270	59	35	83	74	50
Public administration	48	4	42	11	5	7	18	2
Other industries [4]	153	31	104	36	16	24	22	18

[1] Includes 221,000 persons who did not report earnings on last job.
[2] Data refer to persons who lost or left a full-time wage and salary job between January 1979 and January 1984 because of plant closings or moves, slack work, or abolishment of their positions or shifts.
[3] Includes blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills, and iron and steel foundries.
[4] Includes a small number who did not report industry.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 2240, July 1985.

TABLE 12.—REEMPLOYED WORKERS BY OCCUPATION IN JANUARY 1984 AND BY OCCUPATION OF JOB LOST IN PRECEDING 5 YEARS [1]

[Numbers in thousands]

Occupation on job lost	Occupation on job held in January 1984											
	Total employed	Managerial and professional specialty		Technical, sales, and administrative support			Service occupations	Precision production, craft, and repair	Operators, fabricators, and laborers			Farming, forestry, and fishing
		Executive, administrative, and managerial	Professional specialty	Technicians and related support	Sales occupations	Administrative support, including clerical			Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors	Transportation and material moving occupations	Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers	
Total, 30 years and over	3,058	282	194	73	359	384	320	621	387	223	183	52
Managerial and professional specialty	525	153	116	16	62	79	31	38	11	11	6	2
Executive, administrative, and managerial	338	141	26	10	43	57	12	27	7	7	3	2
Professional specialty	189	12	91	6	18	22	19	11	4	4	3	.....
Technical, sales, and administrative support	704	70	38	41	197	188	56	50	27	19	16	3
Technicians and related support	83	3	10	39	4	4	6	6	6	1	6	.....
Sales occupations	312	34	15	.....	159	27	18	30	10	11	6	2
Administrative support, including clerical	309	34	13	2	34	157	32	14	11	7	4	1
Service occupations	140	1	6	2	10	8	81	18	4	5	5	.....
Precision production, craft, and repair	642	33	19	4	28	25	15	159	64	27	40	9
Operators, fabricators, and laborers	995	18	14	10	58	64	118	145	277	158	107	26
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors	640	6	10	8	37	44	94	98	248	35	50	9
Transportation and material moving occupations	207	4	2	1	14	7	6	19	12	107	24	9
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers	148	7	2	1	8	13	16	28	16	16	33	8
Farming, forestry, and fishing	47	5	.....	.....	3	0	0	9	4	4	9	13

[1] Data refer to persons with tenure of 3 years or more who lost or left a job between January 1979 and January 1984 because of plant closings or moves, slack work, or the abolishment of their positions or shifts.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin No. 2240, July 1985.

Chairman MILLER. Congresswoman Boggs.

Mrs. BOGGS. Thank you.

Thank you so much, Dr. Norwood, we are very pleased that you have come to share your expert knowledge and your interest with us.

Last night I attended the Mega Marketplace No. 1 meeting. I was highly impressed with the numbers of vibrant, successful, enthusiastic women businessowners and women entrepreneurs who were represented in Mega Marketplace opportunity.

I feel very strongly about small business and small business opportunities, and I always have. Statistically, is it true that small businesses employ a greater percentage of people than the large industries do?

Ms. NORWOOD. But, of course, that depends on how we define small industries. It is certainly true that if we go to 100 or more, and consider that small, that a very large proportion of the labor force is employed in those. The other point that is quite important is that it appears that a good bit of the job creation in this country is coming from smaller establishments.

But again, we can fall into a trap of small being, to some people, 5 or more, and others 200. So we need to define that term.

Mrs. BOGGS. Also, do you agree that small business, even quite small businesses open up opportunities to women who would not otherwise be able to find a job in which they had adequate training, and had hours that were compatible with their home responsibilities?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, I think women have found opportunities in small business. I like to think that they have those opportunities in larger business, too.

Mrs. BOGGS. Of course.

There are industries, service industries, that seem to be great growth industries; for instance, child care. I think that many of these are areas of growth for the very women who are trained in education, and sociology, in the behavioral sciences, and nursing profession and so on care for the elderly, or the semi-ill, in homes, as various government programs are cut back, and as child care needs are increasing so precipitously. When we think of these kinds of jobs as service jobs, then we begin to recognize that women can be in the leadership and executive positions and managerial positions and so on.

I was astonished a week or so ago to discover that many of the vibrant women who were going to be attending Mega Marketplace No. 1 conference, didn't realize that just perhaps, 12 to 13 years ago, the spouse's income was not considered in home mortgages, and that it was an initiative of the Congress so recently.

Of course, when you think about nondiscrimination of sex or marital status in small business loans, and you get to the equal credit opportunity act, and so on, we have been able to lift the opportunities and to make a greater area of stability in the marketplace for women. Now that so many mothers are in the work force, mothers of small children or school-age children, it seems more necessary that women have these opportunities.

Have we caught up in those regards with the needs of women for opportunity and for credit?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, I think it is quite clear that the economy is creating jobs and women are entering the labor force and continuing to do so in increasing numbers. I think it is partly a generational issue.

If you look at the labor force participation rates of younger women, women in the, say, 20- to 34-year age group, they are extraordinarily high. I believe they are going to go higher.

There are a lot of people in this country who believe that women have come into the labor force because of the inflation that we have had in the 1970's, and that as soon as we saw some deceleration in those rates, they would go back home where they really want to be anyhow. It is astounding to me how many people ask me that kind of question. I just don't believe that is true.

I think women are demanding greater opportunities now, and they are going after them. Women are better educated than they have been in the past, but they still have a very long way to go.

Mrs. BOGGS. Let's hear it for title IX.

In each of the wars of our country, of course, women have gone into the work force and taken jobs that were traditionally male jobs to support the war effort. I really think that it was not the inflation so much in the 1960's and early 1970's, but it was the fact that women after World War II didn't go home again.

There has been this great flight back to the homes after most wars, but women after World War II were in the work force, and they were there to stay.

I am very grateful that you are in the position you are in. I thank you very much for being with us.

Mr. LEVIN [presiding]. I believe, Congressman Weiss?

Mr. WEISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a couple of questions. One, do you have any statistics on the number of employer-supplied day care programs? Do you keep those kinds of statistics?

Ms. NORWOOD. We don't. Though we have become increasingly interested in trying to get information of that kind. But we don't have any specific information on it.

Mr. WEISS. Will you be seeking that kind of information?

Ms. NORWOOD. We will try.

Mr. WEISS. You had indicated in your testimony the shift to services does not mean we are becoming a Nation of hamburger makers, since many service sector jobs are neither low paid nor dead end.

Do you have any statistics on what percentage of the service jobs are what you characterize as higher-paying jobs?

Ms. NORWOOD. There is, of course, information by individual industry, and we have average earnings data by industry. But I believe that those data are not really the correct ones to use.

The problem is that at the same time that we are having an industry restructuring, we are having an occupational restructuring. It is quite difficult to take both of those things into account.

That is happening even in manufacturing. We have done some work at the Bureau of Labor Statistics to try to look at the interaction of these changes.

I think a good deal more work needs to be done before there is a really definitive answer. But our work so far has shown that there

seems to be some movement away from the very low-paying group and some increase into the high-paying group.

I think it is important, too, to recognize that while it is true that we are loosing a lot of jobs in the high-paying steel industry, we are loosing an awful lot of jobs, and have been for many years, in the low-paying textile industry.

So there are a whole lot of factors that need to be put together. Most of the work that I have seen on this issue has been good, but it has looked at only particular pieces. There are some problems with the data, frankly.

We have a very good data system in the United States, but it is not perfect, and there are often issues that come up which we would like to have more specific information on, particular industries and particular jobs, and that is very difficult to come by.

Mr. WEISS. That would be helpful to have, because otherwise it seems to me that we are just speculating. In that instance, depending on what viewpoint you start out with, or what viewpoint you want to end up with, you end up tailoring your responses on the basis of speculation.

Ms. NORWOOD. Yes.

Mr. WEISS. Do you have any overall statistics describing the average perworker income today compared to what it was, say, 10 years ago, or 5 years ago, to indicate whether, it is sliding down; whether it is going up; or whether it is holding even?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, it is going up. We do figures on average hourly earnings, of course. The problem is, in part, that the average hourly earnings is an average for everyone. It does not take full account of fringe benefits, and a very large proportion of the compensation of employees now is moving into fringe benefits, rather than into salaries themselves.

The other problem is that we have had a very large increase in the number of part-time workers in this country, and people who are working voluntarily part time, because they want to. Those are average, they are usually at a lower wage rate than the full time permanent worker. When you look at the averages you need to be rather careful about that.

It is for that reason that we at BLS have developed an occupational wage program which attempts to look at wages and fringe benefits by occupation, by industry, and controls for all of these variables. We have a series of those data. They are not as widespread as we would like, but they do give us some information in this area.

Mr. WEISS. Finally what percentage of American workers are receiving minimum wages?

Ms. NORWOOD. I can supply that exact figure for the record.

Mr. WEISS. I would appreciate it.

Ms. NORWOOD. We have it.

[The information follows:]

In 1985, 7 percent of workers paid on an hourly basis earned the minimum wage, and an additional 3 percent earned less than the minumum wage.

Mr. WEISS. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Coats.

Mr. COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Norwood, I apologize for missing your opening statement, although I have read it. I do have some questions that I would like to ask.

You stated that most of the growth in employment in the past few years has been in the service sector, and it looks like that is going to continue into the future. In terms of working women involved in the labor force, have you been able to discern any difference, in terms of flexibility—for working hours, and working conditions for women in the labor force, in the service sector type jobs, as opposed to manufacturing jobs, is there a distinction that can be drawn there?

Ms. NORWOOD. We don't really have information which could be used to look at that by individual industry. We just don't have that kind of information.

Mr. COATS. I am also curious about your statement that unemployment tends to run in families, persons with high levels of educational attainment and good preparation for careers, often marrying each other, and, conversely, persons with more limited market skills doing likewise. Can you elaborate a little bit on that; or is that just evident on its face? How do you arrive at these conclusions?

Ms. NORWOOD. Now, the data, the facts are that the unemployment rate for a wife who has an unemployed husband as well, is about three times the rate of the wife who is unemployed, whose husband is working. As I said in my testimony, that is a small group. It is a few hundred thousand.

Now, I can't quantify the reasons for that. My own belief is that it is because husbands and wives tend to have similar education, similar skill levels, not always, of course, but frequently. In addition, often the problem is in a particular geographic area.

Mr. COATS. You also indicated that the labor force is expected to grow more slowly in the next decade than it has in the past. Many of the experts that have studied the situation indicate that demand for employment will continue at a relatively steady increase.

Do you, as a result of that, agree with those experts who project a potential labor shortage in the 1990's?

Ms. NORWOOD. I am not so much concerned about labor shortage in aggregate terms, as I am about the kind of skill mix that I think we will be needing, and the changes that I think will be coming in the composition of the labor force. We are projecting, for example, just based upon birth rates, there is no sophisticated model behind it, but we are projecting that one in every four, or one in every five, new entrants into the labor force will be minority.

When you think about that, and recognize that back in the 1960's that was about 1 in 10 for new entrants to the labor force, and you recognize that the unemployment rate for the black population, for example, is more than twice that for whites, and the proportion of the population which is at work, which is perhaps for minority groups a better indication of well-being, is extraordinarily low, particularly for younger people, when compared to whites, it seems to me that we will have a higher proportion of the labor force made up of people who, at least in the past, have had a very difficult time in the labor force in part, because they have either

lived in the wrong places, in terms of where the jobs are, or they have had a lack of the kinds of skills that are in demand.

At the same time that we have this demographic change going on, we know that we have an industrial and occupational restructuring going on. It is for that reason, I think, that so much attention is being paid in the Congress and at the Department of Labor, in training issues, to try to train the work force today to be able to do the jobs that will be here in the future.

Mr. COATS. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. I have just a couple of questions. I believe your last comments, Dr. Norwood, summarize an immense challenge for us.

In just the last minute you have in capsule form stated a major challenge to this country. To put it another way, by the year 2020, as I remember the statistics, or thereabouts, about one-third of America will be Hispanic and black, and these are groups that have suffered more unemployment, and have had less training and retraining opportunities.

But if I might ask you just a few specific questions. I am sorry I missed the beginning of your testimony.

What is the percentage of single mothers in the work force today?

Ms. NORWOOD. Single mothers, I can supply that for the record. It has increased enormously.

Do you mean unmarried mothers; women maintaining families?

I guess the number of women maintaining families is about 10 million. I supply the specific numbers for the record.

[The information follows:]

In 1985, there were 10.5 million families maintained by a woman.

Mr. LEVIN. This is 10 million single——

Ms. NORWOOD. Yes; they are households that are maintained by women; they are not all with children.

Mr. LEVIN. What percentage will be in the labor force of that 10 million, do you know?

Ms. NORWOOD. I will supply that also for the record.

I have here some data suggesting that, oh, about—if you look at families with children—there are about 6.4 million children in one-parent families among the white population. About 52 percent of them have mothers in the labor force.

If you look at black children, there are about 3½ million in one-parent families, and about 48 percent have mothers in the labor force.

Mr. LEVIN. So the figures for minority and nonminority one-parent families, that figure is rather close, 52 and 48 percent?

[The information follows:]

FAMILIES MAINTAINED BY WOMEN, 1985

	Total	White	Black
Total (in thousands)	10,524	7,257	3,029
With children under 18 years	6,345	4,190	2,002
With mother in labor force	4,302	2,982	1,226

Note: Percent of single mothers in the labor force: Total, 68 percent; White, 71 percent; Black, 61 percent.

Ms. NORWOOD. Yes. I am sorry I was looking at the 1975 data. I will provide the 1985 figures for the record.

Mr. LEVIN. OK. You mentioned your comment about hamburger makers, it is the kind of comment that picks up attention. And you mentioned that, well, the service jobs aren't all low paying, on the one hand, and also to be remembered is that some of the industrial jobs were not high-paying jobs.

But when you referred to the low-paying jobs in the textiles and shoe production, what was the average wage—is it low-paying compared to making hamburgers; or low-paying compared to making steel?

Ms. NORWOOD. Low paid compared to making steel, although, it is not much above the part-time-minimum wages kinds of jobs either. I can supply that information for the record.

[The information follows:]

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]
Total private		35.0	34.9	34.6	34.9	34.8	-	-	-	-	-
Mining		43.6	43.3	42.4	42.4	42.3	-	-	-	-	-
Metal mining	10	40.8	41.0	41.2	41.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iron ores	101	38.3	39.6	41.2	42.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Copper ores	102	42.9	43.8	41.3	41.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Coal mining	11,12	41.8	41.0	41.3	41.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bituminous coal and lignite mining	12	41.9	41.0	41.4	41.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oil and gas extraction	13	44.4	44.2	43.3	42.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Crude petroleum, natural gas, and natural gas liquids	131,2	42.4	42.0	43.9	43.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oil and gas field services	138	45.3	45.2	43.1	42.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels	14	44.1	44.6	40.6	42.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Crushed and broken stone	142	45.7	46.3	41.2	44.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Construction		37.7	37.8	35.1	38.5	37.8	-	-	-	-	-
General building contractors	15	37.4	37.4	35.0	38.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Residential building construction	152	37.0	37.1	34.3	35.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Operative builders	153	38.9	39.4	37.9	39.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nonresidential building construction	154	37.6	37.5	35.5	37.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Heavy construction contractors	16	41.2	41.5	37.4	39.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Highway and street construction	161	40.3	41.7	35.3	38.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Heavy construction, except highway	162	41.6	41.4	38.2	39.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Special trade contractors	17	38.7	38.9	34.6	35.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Plumbing, heating, and air conditioning	171	38.0	37.8	36.5	37.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Painting, paper hanging, and decorating	172	34.8	34.5	33.1	34.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Electrical work	173	38.6	38.3	37.9	38.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Masonry, stonework, and plastering	174	35.4	35.5	31.9	34.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Carpentering and flooring	175	34.7	35.4	33.1	33.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Roofing and sheet metal work	176	32.7	33.9	29.0	30.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Manufacturing		40.4	40.1	40.2	40.7	40.5	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.3
Durable goods		41.2	40.9	41.0	41.4	41.2	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.4
Lumber and wood products	24	39.4	39.5	39.3	40.0	40.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.2	-
Logging camps and logging contractors	241	37.9	39.2	38.6	39.2	-	3.4	3.1	2.7	3.3	-
Sawmills and planing mills	242	40.3	40.1	40.8	41.4	-	3.5	3.4	3.8	3.9	-
Sawmills and planing mills, general	2421	40.5	40.3	41.2	41.6	-	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.1	-
Hardwood dimension and flooring	2426	40.2	39.5	39.3	41.1	-	2.8	2.4	2.8	3.1	-
Millwork, plywood, and structural members	243	39.5	39.8	39.5	40.3	-	2.5	2.8	2.7	3.1	-
Millwork	2431	38.8	39.7	39.2	40.3	-	1.6	2.3	2.1	2.6	-
Wood kitchen cabinets	2434	39.0	39.1	37.8	38.6	-	2.1	2.1	1.6	2.3	-
Hardwood veneer and plywood	2435	40.8	40.2	40.3	40.6	-	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.5	-
Softwood veneer and plywood	2436	41.1	40.5	42.6	43.3	-	4.3	4.0	5.3	5.3	-
Wood containers	244	38.4	37.8	37.4	38.5	-	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.4	-
Wood buildings and mobile homes	245	37.6	37.5	35.8	36.6	-	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.4	-
Mobile homes	2451	37.9	37.9	36.4	37.4	-	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.4	-
Miscellaneous wood products	249	40.2	39.6	39.6	39.9	-	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.0	-
Furniture and fixtures	25	39.3	39.1	38.9	39.4	39.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.4	-
Household furniture	251	39.0	38.8	38.3	39.0	-	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.4	-
Wood household furniture	2511	39.1	39.0	38.7	39.0	-	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.4	-
Upholstered household furniture	2512	38.8	38.3	37.4	38.1	-	1.9	1.8	1.3	1.8	-
Metal household furniture	2514	40.1	39.3	39.9	41.8	-	3.0	2.9	3.0	4.4	-
Mattresses and bedsprings	2515	38.3	37.8	37.9	38.3	-	1.7	1.7	1.6	2.1	-
Office furniture	252	40.2	39.8	40.2	40.4	-	2.7	2.4	2.9	2.8	-
Public building and related furniture	253	40.1	40.0	38.1	39.0	-	2.3	2.5	1.7	2.2	-
Partitions and fixtures	254	39.4	39.2	40.0	40.5	-	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.7	-
Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures	259	40.0	40.2	40.3	39.7	-	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.0	-
Stone, clay, and glass products	32	41.7	42.0	40.6	41.5	42.5	4.5	4.8	4.2	4.5	-
Flat glass	321	42.2	43.1	43.9	44.5	-	4.3	5.3	5.8	5.9	-
Glass and glassware, pressed or blown	322	41.0	41.4	41.2	41.8	-	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	-

See footnotes at end of table

54 Source Bureau of Labor Statistics
Employment & Earnings
May 1986

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986*	Apr. 1986*	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986*	Apr. 1986*
Total private		$8.52	$8.54	$8.79	$8.74	$8.74	$298.20	$298.05	$302.75	$304.15	$304.15
Mining		11.91	11.90	12.27	12.28	12.34	519.28	518.57	528.28	530.67	527.38
Metal mining	10	13.29	13.43	13.44	13.24	-	542.23	550.63	553.73	554.78	-
Iron ores	101	13.14	13.38	13.95	13.65	-	518.40	531.75	575.92	587.76	-
Copper ores	102	13.47	13.71	12.92	12.73	-	577.98	580.50	533.60	528.30	-
Coal mining	11,12	15.28	15.35	15.28	15.16	-	528.70	529.35	530.24	527.92	-
Bituminous coal and lignite mining	12	15.34	15.41	15.31	15.26	-	542.75	537.81	533.93	529.29	-
Oil and gas extraction	13	10.92	10.94	11.41	11.48	-	484.06	483.59	494.09	496.62	-
Crude petroleum, natural gas, and natural gas liquids	131,2	13.21	13.27	13.79	13.82	-	588.10	587.34	605.28	597.02	-
Oil and gas field services	138	10.01	10.02	10.28	10.27	-	453.46	452.90	443.07	438.49	-
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels	14	10.02	10.04	10.24	10.12	-	441.98	446.79	415.74	432.12	-
Crushed and broken stone	142	9.39	9.41	9.49	9.48	-	424.58	435.68	390.99	419.46	-
Construction		12.27	12.21	12.25	12.17	12.28	466.66	467.54	457.38	444.21	481.16
General building contractors	15	11.19	11.18	11.26	11.17	-	416.94	418.13	394.10	409.59	-
Residential building construction	152	10.69	10.68	10.67	10.61	-	391.53	396.96	366.96	375.59	-
Operative builders	153	9.27	9.38	9.32	9.42	-	360.66	369.79	353.23	375.66	-
Nonresidential building construction	154	11.73	11.61	11.96	11.83	-	441.35	442.68	425.29	437.71	-
Heavy construction contractors	16	11.91	11.92	11.92	11.91	-	498.69	498.53	434.59	443.35	-
Highway and street construction	161	10.39	10.73	10.71	10.33	-	417.11	447.02	378.08	393.57	-
Heavy construction, except highway	162	12.50	12.39	11.98	11.73	-	525.00	511.29	458.67	464.11	-
Special trade contractors	17	12.02	12.01	12.06	12.08	-	470.49	472.69	448.07	461.10	-
Plumbing, heating, and air conditioning	171	13.02	13.02	12.99	13.06	-	494.79	492.18	474.14	489.28	-
Painting, paper hanging, and decorating	172	11.01	11.04	11.11	11.01	-	414.47	411.00	386.59	408.13	-
Electrical work	173	14.38	14.35	14.38	14.28	-	550.44	549.61	541.97	549.54	-
Masonry, stonework, and plastering	174	12.67	12.99	12.89	12.69	-	456.66	468.79	411.51	441.78	-
Carpentering and flooring	175	11.75	11.80	12.00	12.14	-	467.73	423.38	400.18	408.69	-
Roofing and sheet metal work	176	11.18	11.20	11.67	11.44	-	384.83	379.69	338.43	347.78	-
Manufacturing		9.45	9.48	9.68	9.70	9.70	391.79	388.15	399.14	394.79	392.85
Durable goods		10.01	10.03	10.26	10.29	10.28	412.41	410.25	427.48	426.01	423.54
Lumber and wood products	24	8.56	8.54	8.34	8.29	8.29	317.58	317.38	327.76	331.60	332.43
Logging camps and logging contractors	241	10.52	10.54	11.03	10.94	-	388.09	413.17	425.78	428.85	-
Sawmills and planing mills	242	8.43	8.37	8.67	8.58	-	339.73	335.64	353.74	355.21	-
Sawmills and planing mills, general	2421	9.09	9.03	9.19	9.08	-	360.08	356.66	374.92	374.40	-
Hardwood dimension and flooring	2426	6.57	6.58	6.42	6.48	-	244.01	248.16	252.31	256.33	-
Millwork, plywood, and structural members	243	7.99	7.99	8.25	8.23	-	315.61	319.08	325.88	331.67	-
Millwork	2431	8.15	8.23	8.47	8.46	-	319.22	328.73	332.52	340.94	-
Wood kitchen cabinets	2434	7.22	7.20	7.34	7.28	-	281.58	281.52	275.99	283.71	-
Hardwood veneer and plywood	2435	9.10	9.19	9.72	9.82	-	358.42	364.52	370.82	377.28	-
Softwood veneer and plywood	2436	8.98	8.78	9.02	8.85	-	405.25	396.56	422.59	426.51	-
Wood containers	244	5.66	5.63	5.91	5.91	-	222.72	220.37	221.03	227.54	-
Wood buildings and mobile homes	245	7.25	7.22	7.41	7.54	-	272.60	270.75	285.29	275.96	-
Mobile homes	2451	7.23	7.22	7.42	7.57	-	274.02	273.64	270.09	283.12	-
Miscellaneous wood products	249	7.01	7.04	7.10	7.13	-	281.80	278.78	281.16	284.49	-
Furniture and fixtures	25	7.07	7.08	7.25	7.26	7.26	277.68	278.63	284.14	286.96	287.04
Household furniture	251	6.47	6.48	6.75	6.78	-	252.33	251.91	257.78	264.42	-
Wood household furniture	2511	5.97	5.96	6.28	6.33	-	233.43	233.22	242.28	248.97	-
Upholstered household furniture	2512	7.01	7.02	7.27	7.29	-	271.98	268.97	273.39	281.58	-
Metal household furniture	2514	6.58	6.59	6.83	6.88	-	263.66	262.92	272.52	279.22	-
Mattresses and bedsprings	2515	7.18	7.12	7.12	7.18	-	271.93	269.14	269.95	274.99	-
Office furniture	252	7.98	7.98	8.31	8.32	-	321.20	317.98	334.08	336.13	-
Public building and related furniture	253	7.57	7.59	7.97	7.91	-	303.58	303.66	301.42	308.49	-
Partitions and fixtures	254	9.54	9.58	9.74	9.72	-	338.48	338.58	349.66	353.18	-
Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures	259	7.68	7.68	7.84	7.78	-	308.40	303.91	307.99	308.07	-
Stone, clay, and glass products	32	9.71	9.80	9.93	9.92	9.99	404.91	411.60	403.19	411.68	424.15
Flat glass	321	10.41	10.73	10.94	10.98	-	566.90	591.33	610.57	625.87	-
Glass and glassware, pressed or blown	322	10.97	10.99	10.97	10.91	-	437.47	456.85	447.94	458.04	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours			Average overtime hours					
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1984	Feb. 1985	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1984	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1984	Feb. 1985	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1984
Durable goods—Continued											
Stone, clay, and glass products—Continued											
Glass containers	3221	41.1	41.5	41.3	42.1	--	3.2	3.1	3.6	3.8	--
Pressed and blown glass, nec	3229	40.9	41.2	40.6	41.3	--	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	--
Products of purchased glass	323	40.7	40.2	41.9	42.1	--	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.9	--
Cement, hydraulic	324	41.3	41.1	42.2	41.3	--	3.2	3.5	4.0	3.5	--
Structural clay products	325	41.9	42.2	41.2	41.4	--	3.7	3.9	3.6	3.9	--
Pottery and related products	326	39.7	39.3	40.1	40.1	--	2.1	2.1	3.0	2.9	--
Concrete, gypsum, and plaster products	327	42.9	43.6	39.2	41.2	--	6.3	6.6	4.6	5.6	--
Concrete block and brick	3271	44.5	46.3	41.3	43.1	--	6.6	7.3	5.6	6.7	--
Concrete products, nec	3272	43.5	43.7	40.7	42.1	--	6.1	5.8	4.9	5.6	--
Ready-mixed concrete	3273	41.3	42.6	38.2	39.9	--	5.9	6.6	3.6	4.6	--
Misc. nonmetallic mineral products	328	41.2	41.2	41.5	41.8	--	3.4	3.7	3.6	4.0	--
Abrasive products	3291	40.0	39.0	39.1	39.9	--	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.1	--
Asbestos products	3292	42.2	42.0	40.7	43.6	--	3.1	3.6	4.7	4.6	--
Primary metal industries	33	41.3	41.3	42.1	42.2	41.3	3.6	3.6	4.2	4.1	--
Blast furnaces and basic steel products	331	40.7	41.1	41.9	41.9	41.0	3.1	2.9	3.9	3.8	--
Blast furnaces and steel mills	3312	40.4	41.0	41.7	41.6	--	3.1	2.9	3.9	3.4	--
Steel pipe and tubes	3317	42.3	41.7	43.5	43.5	--	3.9	3.9	4.5	4.5	--
Iron and steel foundries	332	40.6	40.4	41.5	41.5	--	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.0	--
Gray iron foundries	3321	40.7	40.5	41.3	41.6	--	3.6	4.1	4.3	4.5	--
Malleable iron foundries	3322	38.5	38.5	40.6	40.4	--	2.1	2.5	2.7	3.4	--
Steel foundries, nec	3325	40.2	40.1	41.0	40.9	--	2.4	2.3	3.2	2.9	--
Primary nonferrous metals	333	41.8	41.8	41.5	41.8	--	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.4	--
Primary aluminum	3334	42.1	41.5	41.2	42.0	--	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.3	--
Nonferrous rolling and drawing	335	42.4	42.2	42.8	43.1	--	4.9	4.9	5.5	5.5	--
Copper rolling and drawing	3351	41.7	41.6	42.6	42.9	--	3.6	3.6	4.7	5.2	--
Aluminum sheet, plate, and foil	3353	42.2	41.6	44.0	44.1	--	5.4	5.3	7.1	7.1	--
Nonferrous wire drawing and insulating	3357	42.8	42.3	42.4	42.8	--	5.5	5.3	5.3	4.9	--
Nonferrous foundries	336	42.0	41.5	41.9	42.1	--	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.9	--
Aluminum foundries	3361	42.1	41.8	42.2	42.4	--	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.2	--
Fabricated metal products	34	41.2	41.0	41.0	41.3	41.1	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	--
Metal cans and shipping containers	341	41.9	42.4	42.1	43.4	--	4.8	5.2	5.4	5.7	--
Metal cans	3411	41.9	42.7	42.3	43.6	--	5.0	5.4	5.7	5.8	--
Cutlery, hand tools, and hardware	342	40.9	40.4	40.5	41.1	--	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.8	--
Hand and edge tools, and hand saws and blades	3423,5	40.5	39.6	40.0	40.5	--	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	--
Hardware, nec	3429	40.7	40.7	40.5	41.2	--	3.6	3.8	3.0	3.1	--
Plumbing and heating, except electric	343	39.9	39.1	39.7	40.0	--	2.1	1.5	2.2	2.1	--
Plumbing fittings and brass goods	3432	41.4	39.6	41.5	41.5	--	3.0	1.8	3.1	2.9	--
Heating equipment, except electric	3433	38.0	37.9	37.7	39.4	--	1.0	.9	1.0	1.1	--
Fabricated structural metal products	344	40.7	40.6	40.0	40.2	--	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	--
Fabricated structural metal	3441	41.7	41.8	40.7	40.8	--	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.0	--
Metal doors, sash, and trim	3442	40.1	40.4	39.7	39.4	--	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.4	--
Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)	3443	41.7	40.6	41.2	41.2	--	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.0	--
Sheet metal work	3444	40.1	40.1	39.3	39.5	--	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.4	--
Architectural metal work	3446	39.6	39.0	38.2	40.0	--	1.9	2.2	2.2	3.3	--
Screw machine products, bolts, etc.	345	42.7	42.3	42.6	43.1	--	4.6	4.3	4.8	4.9	--
Screw machine products	3451	42.2	41.9	41.4	41.8	--	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.9	--
Bolts, nuts, rivets, and washers	3452	43.3	42.7	44.1	44.4	--	5.0	4.8	6.0	5.9	--
Metal forgings and stampings	346	42.5	42.4	43.1	42.9	--	4.5	4.5	4.8	4.7	--
Iron and steel forgings	3462	42.8	42.0	42.4	42.1	--	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.7	--
Automotive stampings	3465	44.5	44.8	44.8	44.6	--	5.3	6.5	5.2	5.1	--
Metal stampings, nec	3469	40.3	39.9	41.4	41.1	--	3.0	2.7	3.5	3.5	--
Metal services, nec	347	40.8	40.4	40.9	40.9	--	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.5	--
Plating and polishing	3471	40.4	39.5	40.3	40.5	--	3.2	2.9	3.2	3.2	--
Metal coating and allied services	3479	41.9	42.6	42.1	41.7	--	4.3	4.7	4.0	4.3	--
Ordnance and accessories, nec	348	41.1	40.9	41.2	41.5	--	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.7	--
Ammunition, except for small arms, nec	3483	40.8	40.1	40.0	40.4	--	1.9	1.8	2.5	2.2	--
Misc. fabricated metal products	349	40.5	40.1	40.1	40.5	--	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.8	--
Valves and pipe fittings	3494	40.8	39.9	39.9	40.1	--	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.9	--
Misc. fabricated wire products	3496	40.2	40.1	40.2	40.5	--	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.7	--
Machinery, except electrical	35	41.8	41.1	41.4	41.8	41.5	3.5	3.1	3.4	3.5	--
Engines and turbines	351	41.4	40.4	41.7	42.8	--	3.6	3.4	4.3	4.7	--
Turbines and turbine generator sets	3511	40.7	40.1	39.7	40.3	--	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.8	--
Internal combustion engines, nec	3519	41.8	40.5	42.5	43.9	--	3.5	3.4	4.6	5.1	--
Farm and garden machinery	352	41.8	41.1	41.4	41.7	--	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.1	--
Farm machinery and equipment	3523	41.0	40.4	41.2	41.4	--	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.9	--

See footnotes at end of table.

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986	Apr. 1986	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986	Apr. 1986
Durable goods—Continued											
Stone, clay, and glass products—Continued											
Glass containers	3221	$11.09	$11.45	$11.23	$11.29	--	$455.80	$475.18	$468.05	$475.31	--
Pressed and blown glass, nec	3229	10.18	10.23	10.40	10.42	--	416.38	421.48	424.32	430.35	--
Products of purchased glass	323	9.42	9.38	9.92	9.86	--	342.69	338.88	372.96	373.01	--
Cement, hydraulic	324	13.10	13.16	13.42	13.22	--	541.03	540.98	568.32	545.09	--
Structural clay products	325	7.99	7.96	8.11	8.13	--	330.59	335.91	334.13	336.59	--
Pottery and related products	326	9.49	9.58	9.63	9.66	--	337.05	337.19	346.08	347.27	--
Concrete, gypsum, and plaster products	327	9.45	9.55	9.51	9.51	--	405.41	418.29	372.79	381.91	--
Concrete block and brick	3271	8.98	9.12	8.97	9.45	--	359.56	375.06	345.68	364.20	--
Concrete products, nec	3272	8.46	8.44	8.53	8.55	--	368.01	368.93	347.17	359.96	--
Ready-mixed concrete	3273	10.45	10.55	10.51	10.47	--	431.59	449.43	380.46	404.95	--
Misc. nonmetallic mineral products	329	9.62	9.89	10.12	10.13	--	404.58	407.47	419.98	423.43	--
Abrasive products	3291	9.29	9.25	9.51	9.61	--	371.60	380.75	371.84	383.44	--
Asbestos products	3292	9.78	9.99	10.08	10.17	--	412.72	415.38	440.50	445.45	--
Primary metal industries	33	11.98	11.94	11.98	11.99	$12.01	481.58	480.73	503.52	505.98	$498.01
Blast furnaces and basic steel products	331	13.27	13.32	13.92	13.84	13.92	540.09	547.45	579.06	579.90	576.72
Blast furnaces and steel mills	3312	13.91	13.91	14.50	14.54	--	561.96	570.31	604.65	604.88	--
Steel pipe and tubes	3317	10.68	11.01	10.90	10.75	--	451.76	458.12	474.15	467.63	--
Iron and steel foundries	332	10.48	10.42	10.70	10.73	--	425.48	420.97	444.05	445.30	--
Gray iron foundries	3321	10.91	10.85	11.21	11.24	--	444.04	440.51	462.97	467.58	--
Malleable iron foundries	3322	11.07	11.03	11.13	10.98	--	428.20	424.66	454.10	443.59	--
Steel foundries, nec	3325	9.70	9.65	9.81	9.95	--	389.94	386.97	402.21	401.88	--
Primary nonferrous metals	333	13.95	13.62	13.79	13.90	--	583.11	569.32	572.29	582.41	--
Primary aluminum	3334	14.63	14.02	14.30	14.45	--	615.92	583.23	589.16	606.90	--
Nonferrous rolling and drawing	335	11.09	10.96	11.20	11.28	--	470.22	462.51	480.48	486.17	--
Copper rolling and drawing	3351	9.82	9.83	10.15	10.34	--	409.49	408.93	432.39	443.59	--
Aluminum sheet, plate, and foil	3353	13.98	13.62	14.07	14.28	--	580.39	566.59	619.08	629.75	--
Nonferrous wire drawing and insulating	3357	10.77	10.74	10.79	10.75	--	460.96	454.30	457.96	457.96	--
Nonferrous foundries	336	9.31	9.38	9.50	9.52	--	391.02	389.39	397.10	400.79	--
Aluminum foundries	3361	9.50	9.58	9.62	9.84	--	398.95	400.44	414.40	417.22	--
Fabricated metal products	34	9.62	9.64	9.81	9.83	9.81	396.34	395.24	402.21	405.09	403.19
Metal cans and shipping containers	341	12.99	13.04	13.20	13.31	--	538.60	552.96	566.72	577.65	--
Metal cans	3411	13.63	13.79	13.95	14.08	--	569.73	588.41	580.09	613.68	--
Cutlery, hand tools, and hardware	342	9.68	9.75	9.98	9.84	--	394.94	392.90	399.33	404.42	--
Hand and edge tools, and hand saws and blades	3423.5	8.70	8.74	8.94	8.98	--	352.35	348.10	357.60	359.64	--
Hardware, nec	3429	10.21	10.29	10.34	10.33	--	415.55	418.60	418.77	425.60	--
Plumbing and heating, except electric	343	8.59	8.53	8.83	8.84	--	341.88	333.52	350.55	353.60	--
Plumbing, fittings and brass goods	3432	8.33	8.27	8.59	8.58	--	344.86	329.15	356.49	356.07	--
Heating equipment, except electric	3433	8.79	8.45	8.62	8.68	--	318.62	319.41	324.97	333.31	--
Fabricated structural metal products	344	9.00	8.98	9.08	9.09	--	386.30	384.59	383.20	385.42	--
Fabricated structural metal	3441	9.25	9.27	9.38	9.38	--	385.73	387.49	381.77	381.99	--
Metal doors, sash, and trim	3442	7.33	7.28	7.54	7.61	--	293.93	294.11	295.67	299.93	--
Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)	3443	10.04	10.07	10.03	10.11	--	418.67	408.84	413.24	416.53	--
Sheet metal work	3444	9.33	9.36	9.45	9.47	--	374.13	375.34	377.28	374.07	--
Architectural metal work	3446	8.88	8.88	8.94	8.95	--	350.90	345.94	339.55	342.00	--
Screw machine products, bolts, etc.	345	9.04	9.05	9.35	9.36	--	386.31	382.92	400.18	403.42	--
Screw machine products	3451	8.38	8.42	8.71	8.74	--	353.64	352.60	380.59	385.33	--
Bolts, nuts, rivets, and washers	3452	9.71	9.69	9.94	9.95	--	420.44	413.75	438.35	441.78	--
Metal forgings and stampings	346	11.42	11.47	11.69	11.73	--	485.35	486.33	503.94	503.22	--
Iron and steel forgings	3462	12.19	12.31	12.35	12.47	--	519.29	517.02	523.64	527.48	--
Automotive stampings	3465	13.53	13.57	13.71	13.80	--	602.09	607.94	614.21	615.48	--
Metal stampings, nec	3469	8.57	8.58	8.95	8.94	--	345.37	342.34	370.53	367.43	--
Metal services, nec	347	7.68	7.72	7.98	7.98	--	313.34	311.99	322.29	322.29	--
Plating and polishing	3471	7.57	7.58	7.70	7.72	--	305.83	298.62	310.31	312.98	--
Metal coating and allied services	3479	7.94	8.08	8.25	8.22	--	332.69	344.21	347.33	342.77	--
Ordnance and accessories, nec	348	10.08	10.07	10.54	10.58	--	414.29	411.96	434.25	443.46	--
Ammunition, except for small arms, nec	3480	9.71	9.86	10.13	10.21	--	398.17	395.19	405.20	412.48	--
Misc. fabricated metal products	349	8.85	8.85	9.01	8.99	--	359.63	354.89	361.30	364.10	--
Valves and pipe fittings	3494	9.48	9.46	9.75	9.79	--	386.78	378.25	389.03	392.18	--
Misc. fabricated wire products	3496	7.93	7.98	8.08	8.03	--	318.79	319.20	324.01	325.22	--
Machinery, except electrical	35	10.15	10.17	10.53	10.58	10.57	424.27	417.89	435.84	442.24	438.66
Engines and turbines	351	12.98	13.02	12.99	13.09	--	537.37	528.01	541.98	561.18	--
Turbines and turbine generator sets	3511	12.55	12.46	12.72	12.71	--	513.79	488.65	504.98	512.21	--
Internal combustion engines, nec	3519	13.13	13.23	13.09	13.23	--	548.21	535.82	556.33	560.60	--
Farm and garden machinery	352	9.62	9.58	10.00	10.09	--	402.12	397.65	414.00	420.75	--
Farm machinery and equipment	3523	10.43	10.58	11.01	11.14	--	427.63	428.62	453.61	461.30	--

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986P	Apr 1986P	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986P	Apr 1986P
Durable goods—Continued											
Machinery, except electrical—Continued											
Construction and related machinery	353	42.0	41.2	41.3	41.5	-	3.0	2.6	2.8	2.7	-
Construction machinery	3531	41.3	40.7	42.6	42.0	-	2.4	2.2	2.8	2.5	-
Mining machinery	3532	41.2	40.9	40.4	41.1	-	2.7	2.3	2.4	2.9	-
Oil field machinery	3533	40.7	42.3	40.9	40.6	-	3.5	3.1	3.0	2.3	-
Conveyors and conveying equipment	3535	40.1	40.5	41.9	41.9	-	3.9	2.9	3.8	4.0	-
Industrial trucks and tractors	3537	41.4	40.4	39.4	39.7	-	3.0	2.7	2.8	2.8	-
Metalworking machinery	354	42.7	42.1	42.5	42.7	-	4.8	4.5	4.9	4.8	-
Machine tools, metal cutting types	3541	42.9	42.0	42.8	42.8	-	4.1	3.8	4.2	4.1	-
Machine tools, metal forming types	3542	42.3	41.8	42.5	42.5	-	3.9	3.9	4.3	4.7	-
Special dies, tools, jigs, and fixtures	3544	43.7	43.1	43.9	43.7	-	6.0	5.8	6.0	6.0	-
Machine tool accessories	3545	42.2	41.9	42.5	41.2	-	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.7	-
Power driven hand tools	3546	39.6	39.1	39.3	40.2	-	2.7	2.4	2.1	2.0	-
Special industry machinery	355	42.1	41.3	41.4	41.7	-	3.9	3.3	3.3	3.7	-
Food products machinery	3551	42.2	41.5	41.7	41.8	-	3.0	2.8	3.1	2.7	-
Textile machinery	3552	41.0	40.4	41.2	41.8	-	2.5	2.1	2.8	2.5	-
Printing trades machinery	3555	42.4	41.1	40.5	40.9	-	4.0	3.4	3.2	4.0	-
General industrial machinery	356	41.5	40.9	41.4	41.6	-	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.1	-
Pumps and pumping equipment	3561	41.0	40.5	41.0	41.3	-	2.7	2.4	2.7	2.7	-
Ball and roller bearings	3562	43.5	42.8	43.0	42.0	-	4.2	4.4	4.9	4.8	-
Air and gas compressors	3563	41.6	40.1	41.2	41.0	-	3.6	2.7	3.7	3.3	-
Blowers and fans	3564	39.9	40.0	40.5	41.1	-	1.9	1.6	2.2	2.2	-
Speed changers, drives, and gears	3568	41.3	40.9	42.3	42.7	-	3.1	3.0	3.8	3.4	-
Power transmission equipment, nec	3569	41.3	40.1	40.9	41.4	-	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.9	-
Office and computing machines	357	41.4	40.1	41.9	42.2	-	2.7	1.5	2.5	2.7	-
Electronic computing equipment	3573	41.5	40.0	41.7	42.1	-	2.7	1.4	2.4	2.7	-
Refrigeration and service machinery	358	40.9	40.7	40.0	40.6	-	3.1	3.2	2.5	2.7	-
Refrigeration and heating equipment	3585	41.2	40.9	40.3	41.2	-	3.0	3.0	2.6	3.2	-
Misc. machinery, except electrical	359	41.9	41.3	42.0	41.1	-	4.0	3.6	3.7	3.7	-
Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves	3592	41.3	41.0	41.9	42.2	-	4.1	3.9	4.4	4.8	-
Machinery, except electrical, nec	3599	41.9	41.3	42.9	40.9	-	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.6	-
Electrical and electronic equipment	36	40.9	40.0	40.9	41.1	40.7	2.7	2.4	2.7	2.8	-
Electric distributing equipment	361	40.9	40.0	41.2	41.4	-	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.8	-
Transformers	3612	41.2	40.8	43.1	43.2	-	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.0	-
Switchgear and switchboard apparatus	3613	40.7	39.5	39.5	39.9	-	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2	-
Electrical industrial apparatus	362	41.0	40.1	40.4	40.9	-	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.8	-
Motors and generators	3621	41.9	40.9	40.7	41.5	-	3.3	3.3	2.8	3.4	-
Industrial controls	3622	39.5	38.1	39.4	39.3	-	2.0	1.5	1.8	1.9	-
Household appliances	363	39.9	38.9	39.7	40.3	-	2.1	1.9	2.6	2.8	-
Household refrigerators and freezers	3632	40.1	39.3	39.7	40.3	-	1.9	1.8	3.2	3.6	-
Household laundry equipment	3633	42.2	39.4	40.9	40.2	-	1.7	.9	2.3	1.7	-
Electric housewares and fans	3634	39.3	39.0	38.7	39.6	-	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	-
Electric lighting and wiring equipment	364	40.0	39.7	40.1	40.4	-	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.7	-
Electric lamps	3641	41.4	41.4	40.4	39.7	-	3.0	2.5	2.7	2.9	-
Current-carrying wiring devices	3643	39.4	39.0	40.7	40.9	-	2.3	1.9	2.4	2.5	-
Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices	3644	40.9	40.1	39.9	40.3	-	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.2	-
Residential lighting fixtures	3645	39.4	38.9	37.9	39.2	-	.8	.8	1.5	1.9	-
Radio and TV receiving equipment	365	39.8	39.6	40.1	41.5	-	2.9	2.7	3.2	3.7	-
Radio and TV receiving sets	3651	39.9	39.9	39.9	41.7	-	2.5	2.7	3.1	3.6	-
Communication equipment	366	41.7	41.0	41.2	41.6	-	3.0	2.5	2.8	2.9	-
Telephone and telegraph apparatus	3661	41.9	41.1	40.7	41.1	-	3.3	3.0	1.9	1.9	-
Radio and TV communication equipment	3662	41.8	40.9	41.3	41.9	-	2.9	2.2	2.8	2.9	-
Electronic components and accessories	367	40.7	39.7	40.9	41.3	-	2.9	2.2	2.9	3.1	-
Electronic tubes	3671-3	43.7	42.9	43.5	43.9	-	2.7	1.9	3.1	3.2	-
Semiconductors and related devices	3674	40.1	38.7	40.5	40.7	-	3.3	2.2	2.9	3.2	-
Electronic components, nec	3679	41.0	40.2	41.0	41.6	-	2.9	2.4	2.9	3.1	-
Misc. electrical equipment and supplies	369	41.0	40.0	40.4	40.7	-	2.9	2.6	2.9	3.0	-
Storage batteries	3691	40.8	38.9	39.8	39.9	-	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.7	-
Engine electrical equipment	3694	41.9	41.3	41.5	41.9	-	4.1	3.8	4.1	4.3	-

See footnotes at end of table.

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[p]	Apr. 1986[p]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[p]	Apr. 1986[p]
Durable goods—Continued											
Machinery, except electrical—Continued											
Construction and related machinery	353	$10.79	$10.74	$11.12	$11.12	-	$453.18	$442.49	$459.28	$481.48	-
Construction machinery	3531	11.70	11.68	12.22	12.22	-	483.21	475.38	526.57	523.02	-
Mining machinery	3532	11.42	11.25	11.38	11.41	-	470.52	460.13	459.75	488.95	-
Oil field machinery	3533	10.91	10.97	11.22	11.24	-	470.22	484.03	467.78	458.34	-
Conveyors and conveying equipment	3535	9.98	9.72	10.10	10.13	-	400.18	393.88	422.19	423.43	-
Industrial trucks and tractors	3537	9.24	9.11	9.71	9.69	-	382.54	388.04	382.57	384.66	-
Metalworking machinery	354	10.91	10.45	10.93	10.96	-	444.51	439.95	464.53	467.57	-
Machine tools, metal cutting types	3541	10.49	10.47	10.90	10.91	-	445.83	439.74	488.52	488.36	-
Machine tools, metal forming types	3542	10.69	10.79	11.32	11.45	-	452.19	451.02	488.75	486.63	-
Special dies, tools, jigs, and fixtures	3544	11.04	11.12	11.85	11.87	-	462.45	479.27	510.27	509.98	-
Machine tool accessories	3545	9.47	9.29	9.80	9.84	-	399.63	392.50	398.12	405.41	-
Power driven hand tools	3546	8.31	8.35	8.52	8.58	-	329.08	318.14	334.84	344.92	-
Special industry machinery	355	10.05	10.06	10.38	10.45	-	423.11	415.48	429.73	435.77	-
Food products machinery	3551	10.32	10.35	10.62	10.57	-	438.50	429.53	442.85	439.71	-
Textile machinery	3552	7.89	7.89	8.21	8.35	-	323.49	318.78	338.28	349.03	-
Printing trades machinery	3555	10.43	10.49	10.80	11.06	-	442.23	437.14	438.62	452.35	-
General industrial machinery	356	9.96	10.01	10.25	10.26	-	414.17	409.41	424.35	426.82	-
Pumps and pumping equipment	3561	10.56	10.59	10.95	10.92	-	432.96	427.88	444.85	448.97	-
Ball and roller bearings	3562	10.24	10.36	10.78	10.81	-	445.44	444.44	462.54	463.75	-
Air and gas compressors	3563	10.26	10.22	9.97	9.98	-	428.62	429.62	410.78	405.09	-
Blowers and fans	3564	8.79	8.79	9.00	9.09	-	350.32	350.40	364.50	373.60	-
Speed changers, drives, and gears	3568	10.48	10.48	10.83	10.54	-	432.06	428.83	449.65	450.08	-
Power transmission equipment, nec	3569	10.06	10.05	10.22	10.26	-	415.48	403.01	418.98	425.59	-
Office and computing machines	357	9.14	9.19	9.81	9.99	-	378.40	389.52	410.08	417.36	-
Electronic computing equipment	3573	9.05	9.11	9.80	9.98	-	375.58	384.40	408.66	418.79	-
Refrigeration and service machinery	358	9.87	9.94	10.20	10.28	-	403.68	404.56	408.00	419.42	-
Refrigeration and heating equipment	3585	10.18	10.25	10.54	10.63	-	419.59	419.25	424.76	437.96	-
Misc. machinery, except electrical	359	9.92	9.91	10.15	10.21	-	414.66	409.28	415.14	419.63	-
Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves	3592	12.47	12.43	12.79	12.77	-	515.01	509.63	532.06	538.89	-
Machinery, except electrical, nec	3599	9.53	9.52	9.75	9.81	-	399.31	390.19	397.80	401.23	-
Electrical and electronic equipment	36	9.39	9.40	9.60	9.63	$9.63	383.11	376.00	389.76	395.79	$391.34
Electric distributing equipment	361	8.79	8.82	8.90	8.90	-	359.51	352.80	366.68	369.48	-
Transformers	3612	8.81	8.84	8.84	8.82	-	362.97	358.90	361.00	361.02	-
Switchgear and switchboard apparatus	3613	8.77	8.79	8.97	8.99	-	358.94	347.21	354.32	357.90	-
Electrical industrial apparatus	362	9.49	9.52	9.64	9.71	-	389.09	381.75	397.48	398.17	-
Motors and generators	3621	9.47	9.51	9.58	9.68	-	395.85	388.01	389.09	401.72	-
Industrial controls	3622	9.27	9.23	9.38	9.40	-	386.17	351.88	386.78	389.42	-
Household appliances	363	9.23	9.22	9.51	9.57	-	387.35	358.88	377.55	385.67	-
Household refrigerators and freezers	3632	10.38	10.36	10.68	10.85	-	418.24	407.15	422.81	438.45	-
Household laundry equipment	3633	10.77	10.79	11.09	11.18	-	454.49	414.34	450.25	448.83	-
Electric housewares and fans	3634	7.19	7.17	7.25	7.19	-	282.57	279.63	278.84	284.72	-
Electric lighting and wiring equipment	364	8.57	8.64	8.75	8.78	-	342.80	340.01	350.68	354.71	-
Electric lamps	3641	9.88	9.92	9.84	9.83	-	409.03	410.69	397.54	398.25	-
Current-carrying wiring devices	3643	7.93	7.95	8.24	8.25	-	312.44	310.05	335.37	337.43	-
Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices	3644	8.84	8.92	9.15	9.21	-	381.58	357.69	385.09	371.18	-
Residential lighting fixtures	3645	8.48	8.45	8.48	8.50	-	248.85	238.01	244.80	254.80	-
Radio and TV receiving equipment	365	9.22	9.31	9.58	9.70	-	385.11	388.88	380.38	402.55	-
Radio and TV receiving sets	3651	9.50	9.91	10.01	10.09	-	379.06	383.44	396.40	420.75	-
Communication equipment	366	11.22	11.26	11.27	11.29	-	467.87	459.26	484.32	489.06	-
Telephone and telegraph apparatus	3661	10.89	10.91	10.82	10.89	-	453.02	448.40	448.37	447.58	-
Radio and TV communication equipment	3662	11.37	11.34	11.43	11.43	-	478.27	483.91	472.09	477.77	-
Electronic components and accessories	367	8.20	8.17	8.51	8.54	-	333.74	324.35	347.21	352.70	-
Electronic tubes	3671-3	10.48	10.42	10.90	10.74	-	457.10	443.99	469.80	468.26	-
Semiconductors and related devices	3674	8.98	8.93	9.78	9.98	-	387.37	389.59	398.09	409.19	-
Electronic components, nec	3679	7.46	7.47	7.58	7.84	-	305.86	300.29	323.08	328.14	-
Misc. electrical equipment and supplies	369	10.19	10.26	10.49	10.51	-	417.38	410.40	423.80	427.76	-
Storage batteries	3691	10.39	10.47	10.87	10.75	-	421.83	407.28	432.63	428.93	-
Engine electrical equipment	3694	10.94	11.04	11.19	11.30	-	458.39	455.95	464.39	473.47	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]
Durable goods—Continued											
Transportation equipment	37	42.7	42.8	42.3	42.8	42.5	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.7	-
Motor vehicles and equipment	371	43.4	43.8	42.9	43.6	43.2	5.3	5.6	5.2	5.2	-
Motor vehicles and car bodies	3711	44.2	44.7	42.4	43.9	-	6.2	6.7	5.1	5.4	-
Truck and bus bodies	3713	40.2	40.6	40.3	41.0	-	3.8	3.4	3.5	3.5	-
Motor vehicle parts and accessories	3714	43.3	43.5	44.0	43.9	-	5.0	5.6	5.7	5.4	-
Truck trailers	3715	39.4	39.4	39.2	39.9	-	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.2	-
Aircraft and parts	372	42.7	41.9	42.3	-	-	4.7	4.2	4.3	-	-
Aircraft	3721	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aircraft engines and engine parts	3724	42.8	41.9	42.6	42.6	-	5.6	5.1	5.0	4.9	-
Aircraft equipment, nec	3728	43.8	42.5	44.2	44.3	-	5.4	4.7	5.3	5.4	-
Ship and boat building and repairing	373	40.9	40.7	39.6	40.2	-	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	-
Ship building and repairing	3731	40.5	40.5	39.7	40.5	-	3.0	2.9	3.9	3.9	-
Boat building and repairing	3732	41.8	41.4	39.3	39.5	-	3.0	3.1	2.3	2.5	-
Railroad equipment	374	39.3	39.7	40.6	39.8	-	1.8	2.2	2.4	1.9	-
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts	376	42.2	41.3	42.1	42.5	-	4.6	4.0	4.8	3.8	-
Guided missiles and space vehicles	3761	42.3	41.3	43.0	43.0	-	5.0	4.3	5.4	4.0	-
Miscellaneous transportation equipment	379	41.4	40.4	40.8	41.1	-	2.9	3.3	2.8	3.4	-
Travel trailers and campers	3792	39.3	39.3	37.7	38.2	-	2.1	2.3	1.8	2.2	-
Instruments and related products	38	41.1	40.5	41.0	41.4	41.0	2.6	2.2	2.8	2.8	-
Engineering and scientific instruments	381	42.1	41.6	42.4	42.9	-	3.0	2.5	3.4	3.5	-
Measuring and controlling devices	382	40.7	39.9	40.8	41.2	-	2.2	1.7	2.1	2.4	-
Environmental controls	3822	39.6	39.0	39.7	40.2	-	1.4	1.2	2.0	2.5	-
Process control instruments	3823	41.8	40.4	40.7	41.8	-	3.1	2.3	2.8	3.1	-
Instruments to measure electricity	3825	41.0	40.0	41.2	41.6	-	2.2	1.5	1.9	2.3	-
Optical instruments and lenses	383	41.9	40.9	41.3	42.2	-	3.1	2.3	3.3	3.3	-
Medical instruments and supplies	384	40.7	39.8	40.7	41.2	-	2.8	2.3	2.8	3.0	-
Surgical and medical instruments	3841	41.3	40.0	40.9	41.5	-	3.0	2.2	2.8	3.1	-
Surgical appliances and supplies	3842	40.4	39.8	40.5	40.9	-	2.6	2.4	2.9	2.9	-
Ophthalmic goods	385	40.0	39.5	39.1	39.3	-	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	-
Photographic equipment and supplies	386	42.8	42.5	42.2	42.1	-	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.2	-
Watches, clocks, and watchcases	387	40.3	40.5	38.6	39.8	-	2.9	2.3	1.3	2.0	-
Miscellaneous manufacturing	39	39.2	38.9	39.3	40.0	39.8	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.4	-
Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware	391	39.1	38.5	37.8	38.6	-	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	-
Jewelry, precious metal	3911	37.2	37.5	36.6	37.5	-	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.6	-
Musical instruments	393	40.4	38.9	38.9	40.2	-	1.2	.7	1.9	2.8	-
Toys and sporting goods	394	39.2	38.9	39.6	40.4	-	1.8	1.5	2.2	2.5	-
Dolls, games, toys, and children's vehicles	3942,4	38.0	38.4	39.0	39.6	-	1.4	1.2	2.1	2.1	-
Sporting and athletic goods, nec	3949	39.3	39.3	40.0	41.1	-	1.7	1.7	2.3	2.9	-
Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies	395	40.8	40.6	39.4	39.9	-	2.8	2.4	1.8	2.1	-
Costume jewelry and notions	396	38.0	37.2	39.5	40.4	-	1.7	1.4	2.3	2.7	-
Costume jewelry	3961	37.1	36.0	39.1	40.0	-	1.3	.6	1.9	2.3	-
Miscellaneous manufactures	399	39.4	39.4	39.6	40.0	-	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.5	-
Signs and advertising displays	3993	39.9	39.9	39.9	40.2	-	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.6	-
Nondurable goods		39.3	38.9	39.2	39.7	39.5	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1
Food and kindred products	20	39.3	39.2	39.0	39.4	39.4	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	-
Meat products	201	38.4	38.3	37.6	38.3	-	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.7	-
Meat packing plants	2011	40.2	39.9	38.9	39.3	-	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.7	-
Sausages and other prepared meats	2013	38.7	38.5	38.7	39.8	-	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.0	-
Poultry dressing plants	2016	39.2	38.5	35.8	37.0	-	1.8	1.8	2.8	2.6	-
Dairy products	202	41.3	41.2	40.9	41.1	-	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.0	-
Cheese, natural and processed	2022	39.9	39.7	39.9	39.3	-	3.4	3.7	3.4	3.4	-
Fluid milk	2026	42.0	42.0	42.0	42.0	-	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.6	-
Preserved fruits and vegetables	203	37.7	37.9	38.2	38.5	-	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6	-
Canned specialties	2032	38.4	37.7	37.7	37.3	-	3.2	3.0	4.4	3.5	-
Canned fruits and vegetables	2033	37.9	38.4	38.5	38.8	-	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.8	-
Frozen fruits and vegetables	2037	38.0	37.7	38.3	37.2	-	2.7	3.5	2.1	1.9	-
Grain mill products	204	42.7	42.7	42.9	43.0	-	4.8	4.9	5.2	5.0	-
Flour and other grain mill products	2041	46.4	45.5	43.9	43.7	-	6.2	5.9	4.6	4.1	-
Prepared feeds, nec	2048	42.2	42.3	42.3	42.5	-	4.8	5.0	4.8	5.1	-
Bakery products	205	39.0	38.5	39.1	39.2	-	3.1	2.8	3.3	3.2	-
Bread, cake, and related products	2051	38.0	38.1	38.4	38.5	-	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.4	-
Cookies and crackers	2052	41.8	39.6	40.8	40.9	-	3.4	2.2	3.1	2.8	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]
Durable goods—Continued											
Transportation equipment	37	$12.59	$12.63	$12.87	$12.89	$12.88	$537.59	$539.04	$544.40	$551.09	$548.55
Motor vehicles and equipment	371	13.29	13.40	13.62	13.71	13.64	576.79	586.92	584.30	597.76	589.25
Motor vehicles and car bodies	3711	14.89	14.75	14.97	15.13	-	649.30	650.33	634.73	664.21	-
Truck and bus bodies	3713	10.47	10.43	10.84	10.90	-	420.69	423.46	436.95	446.90	-
Motor vehicle parts and accessories	3714	12.65	12.80	13.10	13.13	-	547.75	556.80	576.40	578.41	-
Truck trailers	3715	9.20	9.26	9.45	9.52	-	382.48	386.63	370.44	379.85	-
Aircraft and parts	372	12.56	12.51	12.77	-	-	537.17	524.17	540.17	-	-
Aircraft	3721	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aircraft engines and engine parts	3724	12.82	12.77	12.91	12.94	-	548.70	536.08	549.97	551.24	-
Aircraft equipment, nec	3728	11.63	11.51	11.85	11.67	-	509.39	488.19	514.93	516.98	-
Ship and boat building and repairing	373	10.42	10.34	10.58	10.52	-	428.18	420.84	418.97	422.90	-
Ship building and repairing	3731	11.33	11.22	11.48	11.43	-	458.87	454.41	455.78	462.82	-
Boat building and repairing	3732	8.02	8.02	8.09	8.11	-	335.24	332.03	317.94	326.35	-
Railroad equipment	374	12.55	12.58	12.81	12.65	-	493.22	498.63	520.09	503.47	-
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts	376	11.98	11.90	12.22	12.05	-	505.08	491.47	514.48	512.13	-
Guided missiles and space vehicles	3761	12.19	12.10	12.47	12.26	-	515.64	499.73	538.21	527.18	-
Miscellaneous transportation equipment	379	9.88	9.95	10.38	10.34	-	408.20	401.98	423.50	424.97	-
Travel trailers and campers	3792	8.37	8.57	8.87	8.75	-	329.94	338.23	334.40	334.25	-
Instruments and related products	38	9.10	9.11	9.42	9.42	9.39	374.01	368.96	386.22	389.99	384.99
Engineering and scientific instruments	381	9.77	9.78	10.20	10.21	-	411.32	406.85	432.48	438.01	-
Measuring and controlling devices	382	8.92	8.91	9.14	9.18	-	363.04	355.51	372.91	378.22	-
Environmental controls	3822	8.59	8.61	8.75	8.83	-	340.16	335.79	347.38	354.97	-
Process control instruments	3823	8.97	8.97	9.32	9.45	-	374.85	362.39	379.32	395.31	-
Instruments to measure electricity	3825	9.14	9.10	9.32	9.27	-	374.74	364.00	383.98	385.63	-
Optical instruments and lenses	383	10.20	10.26	10.41	10.30	-	427.38	419.63	429.93	434.66	-
Medical instruments and supplies	384	8.02	8.03	8.41	8.40	-	328.41	319.59	342.29	348.06	-
Surgical and medical instruments	3841	8.17	8.19	8.54	8.55	-	337.42	327.20	349.29	354.83	-
Surgical appliances and supplies	3842	7.91	7.92	8.33	8.28	-	319.58	315.22	337.37	338.65	-
Ophthalmic goods	385	6.94	6.87	7.12	7.27	-	277.60	271.37	278.39	285.71	-
Photographic equipment and supplies	386	11.90	11.95	12.51	12.42	-	509.32	507.88	527.92	522.88	-
Watches, clocks, and watchcases	387	6.94	6.89	6.97	6.95	-	279.88	279.05	288.04	276.81	-
Miscellaneous manufacturing	39	7.20	7.22	7.48	7.48	7.48	282.24	280.86	293.96	299.20	296.91
Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware	391	7.72	7.70	8.08	8.05	-	294.13	298.45	304.67	310.73	-
Jewelry, precious metal	3911	7.60	7.72	8.07	8.08	-	290.16	289.50	295.38	303.00	-
Musical instruments	393	6.82	6.98	7.14	7.18	-	275.53	288.17	277.75	288.64	-
Toys and sporting goods	394	6.81	6.98	6.84	6.91	-	259.11	259.07	270.88	279.16	-
Dolls, games, toys, and children's vehicles	3942,4	6.37	6.44	6.84	6.87	-	248.43	247.30	266.76	272.05	-
Sporting and athletic goods, nec	3949	6.81	6.85	6.84	6.95	-	267.63	269.21	273.60	285.65	-
Pens, pencils, office, and art supplies	395	7.64	7.63	7.98	7.72	-	311.71	308.78	301.80	308.03	-
Costume jewelry and notions	396	5.89	5.89	6.10	6.07	-	223.82	219.11	240.95	245.23	-
Costume jewelry	3961	5.48	5.42	5.58	5.50	-	203.31	195.12	216.16	220.00	-
Miscellaneous manufactures	399	7.85	7.85	8.22	8.19	-	308.29	309.29	325.51	328.40	-
Signs and advertising displays	3993	8.41	8.38	8.65	8.51	-	335.56	333.58	345.14	342.10	-
Nondurable goods		8.61	8.67	8.83	8.85	8.86	336.37	337.26	346.14	351.35	349.97
Food and kindred products	20	8.53	8.59	8.68	8.72	8.75	335.23	338.73	338.52	343.57	344.75
Meat products	201	7.19	7.17	7.23	7.27	-	278.10	274.81	271.95	278.44	-
Meat packing plants	2011	7.97	8.05	8.07	8.10	-	320.39	320.39	313.92	318.33	-
Sausages and other prepared meats	2013	8.73	8.84	8.88	8.79	-	337.85	332.84	335.92	349.84	-
Poultry dressing plants	2016	5.89	5.90	5.85	5.90	-	205.96	207.69	209.43	218.30	-
Dairy products	202	9.01	9.07	9.42	9.41	-	372.11	373.68	395.28	386.75	-
Cheese, natural and processed	2022	8.43	8.58	8.89	8.78	-	336.36	340.63	338.04	344.27	-
Fluid milk	2026	9.33	9.38	9.84	9.79	-	391.86	393.96	413.28	411.18	-
Preserved fruits and vegetables	203	8.05	8.10	8.09	8.13	-	303.49	308.99	308.04	313.01	-
Canned specialties	2032	9.59	9.60	9.84	9.86	-	368.26	361.82	370.97	367.41	-
Canned fruits and vegetables	2033	8.21	8.22	8.10	8.13	-	311.18	315.85	311.85	315.44	-
Frozen fruits and vegetables	2037	7.49	7.67	7.48	7.58	-	289.64	299.18	270.80	281.23	-
Grain mill products	204	10.14	10.27	10.51	10.54	-	432.98	436.53	450.88	453.22	-
Flour and other grain mill products	2041	10.08	10.13	10.03	10.11	-	466.78	480.92	439.31	441.81	-
Prepared feeds, nec	2048	7.83	7.95	7.95	8.02	-	330.43	338.29	338.29	340.85	-
Bakery products	205	9.80	9.85	9.73	9.77	-	374.40	372.48	380.44	382.98	-
Bread, cake, and related products	2051	9.57	9.63	9.58	9.59	-	382.64	386.90	370.94	373.07	-
Cookies and crackers	2052	9.67	9.69	9.91	9.96	-	402.27	383.72	404.33	407.36	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]
Nondurable goods—Continued											
Food and kindred products—Continued											
Sugar and confectionery products	206	40.3	39.2	39.5	39.5	-	2.9	2.8	3.2	2.4	-
Cane and beet sugar	2061-3	44.8	42.3	44.4	40.3	-	5.4	5.7	6.6	3.8	-
Confectionery products	2065	38.5	37.5	37.4	39.0	-	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	-
Fats and oils	207	42.8	42.3	43.0	43.3	-	4.8	4.6	5.1	5.1	-
Beverages	208	40.5	40.9	39.8	40.3	-	3.3	4.0	3.8	3.8	-
Malt beverages	2082	43.0	43.0	41.4	42.4	-	4.9	5.8	5.7	6.3	-
Bottled and canned soft drinks	2086	39.5	40.2	38.9	39.5	-	3.1	3.7	3.0	3.2	-
Misc. food and kindred products	209	38.3	38.0	37.6	38.1	-	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6	-
Tobacco manufactures	21	37.7	34.9	36.6	37.5	37.0	7	8	9	1.3	-
Cigarettes	211	37.6	33.8	36.1	37.3	-	6	7	7	1.2	-
Textile mill products	22	39.0	38.4	40.1	40.6	40.7	2.6	2.6	3.5	3.7	-
Weaving mills, cotton	221	39.2	38.9	40.6	40.5	-	2.9	3.9	4.2	4.3	-
Weaving mills, synthetics	222	38.7	37.4	39.5	40.0	-	2.6	2.2	3.0	3.0	-
Weaving and finishing mills, wool	223	41.3	40.9	41.3	41.4	-	2.8	3.3	3.4	3.7	-
Narrow fabric mills	224	39.9	39.5	40.4	41.1	-	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.9	-
Knitting mills	225	37.2	36.6	38.6	39.7	-	1.9	1.8	2.7	3.0	-
Women's hosiery, except socks	2251	38.1	36.4	38.0	39.4	-	2.0	1.8	2.5	3.1	-
Hosiery, nec	2252	36.1	34.7	37.3	38.8	-	1.4	.9	2.2	2.4	-
Knit outerwear mills	2253	36.2	36.0	38.0	38.6	-	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.4	-
Knit underwear mills	2254	35.6	34.9	37.1	39.4	-	.9	1.0	1.4	2.3	-
Circular knit fabric mills	2257	39.7	39.8	41.4	42.3	-	3.0	3.3	4.8	5.1	-
Textile finishing, except wool	226	40.7	39.9	40.5	41.5	-	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.7	-
Finishing plants, cotton	2261	40.9	40.9	41.3	42.7	-	3.4	4.1	4.3	5.2	-
Finishing plants, synthetics	2262	40.8	37.4	40.3	40.4	-	4.2	3.7	4.1	4.2	-
Floor covering mills	227	41.4	40.0	39.9	39.9	-	3.2	3.4	3.9	3.8	-
Yarn and thread mills	228	38.4	38.3	41.5	41.6	-	2.6	3.0	4.2	4.4	-
Yarn mills, except wool	2281	38.1	38.1	42.1	42.3	-	2.8	3.0	4.7	4.8	-
Throwing and winding mills	2282	37.6	38.2	39.1	39.0	-	2.4	3.3	3.3	2.9	-
Miscellaneous textile goods	229	41.6	41.1	43.3	43.1	-	3.1	3.3	4.2	4.3	-
Apparel and other textile products	23	36.1	35.4	35.8	36.5	36.2	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.5	-
Men's and boys' suits and coats	231	35.6	34.1	34.1	35.1	-	.7	.5	.9	.9	-
Men's and boys' furnishings	232	36.0	35.6	36.0	37.1	-	1.0	.9	1.2	1.3	-
Men's and boys' shirts and nightwear	2321	35.3	34.8	36.4	37.7	-	.9	.6	1.5	1.6	-
Men's and boys' separate trousers	2327	35.0	33.8	35.7	35.9	-	.9	1.0	1.1	.8	-
Men's and boys' work clothing	2328	37.2	37.2	34.6	36.2	-	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.1	-
Women's and misses' outerwear	233	35.2	34.1	34.4	33.1	-	1.2	1.0	1.4	1.4	-
Women's and misses' blouses and waists	2331	35.2	33.9	34.4	34.3	-	1.3	.8	1.2	1.2	-
Women's and misses' dresses	2335	34.1	32.9	34.1	35.0	-	.9	.9	1.0	1.2	-
Women's and misses' suits and coats	2337	34.0	33.1	33.6	34.3	-	.6	.6	1.1	1.1	-
Women's and misses' outerwear, nec	2339	36.5	36.3	34.9	35.7	-	1.5	1.2	1.8	1.8	-
Women's and children's undergarments	234	36.0	34.9	36.1	36.7	-	1.5	.8	1.3	1.1	-
Women's and children's underwear	2341	35.8	34.6	36.9	37.0	-	1.5	.7	1.3	1.0	-
Brassieres and allied garments	2342	36.7	36.5	34.4	35.5	-	1.3	1.4	1.1	1.5	-
Children's outerwear	236	35.5	34.6	36.9	38.3	-	1.0	.7	1.7	1.6	-
Children's dresses and blouses	2361	34.4	33.6	35.8	34.9	-	1.1	.7	1.5	1.5	-
Misc. apparel and accessories	238	37.3	36.9	35.5	37.2	-	1.2	1.0	.8	1.1	-
Misc. fabricated textile products	239	38.7	38.5	38.2	38.7	-	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.5	-
Curtains and draperies	2391	36.7	36.7	36.2	36.6	-	.7	.4	.6	.9	-
House furnishings, nec	2392	37.7	37.1	37.0	37.1	-	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.8	-
Automotive and apparel trimmings	2396	41.0	41.2	40.8	41.9	-	3.6	4.2	4.3	5.2	-
Paper and allied products	26	42.7	42.8	43.1	43.4	42.9	4.4	4.6	4.8	4.7	-
Paper and pulp mills	261,2,6	44.8	45.4	45.0	45.1	-	6.1	6.6	6.3	6.3	-
Paper mills, except building paper	262	44.7	45.6	45.0	45.1	-	6.2	6.6	6.4	6.4	-
Paperboard mills	263	44.1	44.3	44.4	44.7	-	5.8	7.3	6.7	6.5	-
Misc. converted paper products	264	41.4	41.4	41.9	42.3	-	3.0	2.9	3.3	3.4	-
Paper coating and glazing	2641	43.0	42.6	43.2	43.6	-	3.2	2.6	3.4	3.4	-
Envelopes	2642	41.9	41.4	42.3	42.2	-	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.3	-
Bags, except textile bags	2643	41.3	41.3	41.8	41.5	-	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.4	-
Paperboard containers and boxes	265	41.8	41.3	42.0	42.5	-	3.6	3.7	3.7	4.0	-
Folding paperboard boxes	2651	42.0	41.6	41.8	43.0	-	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.3	-
Corrugated and solid fiber boxes	2653	42.2	41.7	42.7	43.0	-	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.2	-
Sanitary food containers	2654	42.8	42.0	42.2	42.5	-	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.1	-

See footnotes at end of table

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]
Nondurable goods—Continued											
Food and kindred products—Continued											
Sugar and confectionery products	206	$8.75	$8.85	$8.78	$8.92	-	$352.63	$348.92	$348.81	$352.34	-
Cane and beet sugar	2061-3	10.28	10.35	10.00	10.72	-	458.49	437.81	444.00	432.02	-
Confectionery products	2065	7.60	7.65	7.59	7.74	-	292.60	296.88	283.87	301.86	-
Fats and oils	207	8.73	8.90	8.67	8.72	-	373.64	376.47	372.81	377.56	-
Beverages	208	11.03	11.18	11.57	11.60	-	448.72	457.28	460.49	467.48	-
Malt beverages	2082	15.38	15.65	16.32	16.26	-	680.48	672.95	675.65	690.27	-
Bottled and canned soft drinks	2086	8.44	8.56	8.90	8.99	-	333.38	344.11	346.21	355.11	-
Misc. food and kindred products	209	7.86	7.98	7.87	7.91	-	293.38	291.08	286.91	301.37	-
Tobacco manufactures	21	12.00	12.16	12.49	12.85	$13.02	452.40	424.38	456.77	481.88	$481.74
Cigarettes	211	14.14	14.34	15.17	15.29	-	531.86	484.69	547.84	570.32	-
Textile mill products	22	6.64	6.70	6.83	6.86	6.86	258.96	257.28	273.88	278.52	279.20
Weaving mills, cotton	221	6.92	7.06	7.08	7.10	-	271.26	274.63	287.45	287.55	-
Weaving mills, synthetics	222	7.10	7.15	7.27	7.30	-	274.77	267.41	287.17	292.00	-
Weaving and finishing mills, wool	223	6.98	6.99	7.23	7.24	-	288.27	285.89	298.60	299.74	-
Narrow fabric mills	224	6.27	6.29	6.51	6.54	-	250.17	248.46	263.00	268.79	-
Knitting mills	225	6.12	6.13	6.29	6.34	-	227.66	224.36	242.79	251.70	-
Women's hosiery, except socks	2251	5.92	5.91	6.23	6.32	-	225.55	215.12	236.74	249.01	-
Hosiery, nec	2252	5.76	5.78	6.02	6.02	-	207.94	200.57	224.55	233.58	-
Knit outerwear mills	2253	6.04	6.09	6.12	6.22	-	218.85	219.24	232.56	240.09	-
Knit underwear mills	2254	5.75	5.70	5.88	5.90	-	204.70	198.93	217.41	232.46	-
Circular knit fabric mills	2257	6.85	6.82	6.94	6.91	-	271.95	271.44	287.32	292.29	-
Textile finishing, except wool	226	7.03	7.08	7.18	7.20	-	286.12	282.49	290.79	296.80	-
Finishing plants, cotton	2261	7.09	7.12	7.15	7.22	-	289.98	291.21	295.30	308.29	-
Finishing plants, synthetics	2262	7.43	7.60	7.70	7.85	-	303.14	284.24	310.31	309.08	-
Floor covering mills	227	6.77	6.94	7.11	7.07	-	280.28	277.60	283.89	282.09	-
Yarn and thread mills	228	6.18	6.24	6.42	6.45	-	237.31	238.99	268.43	268.32	-
Yarn mills, except wool	2281	6.17	6.22	6.43	6.43	-	235.08	236.98	270.70	271.99	-
Throwing and winding mills	2282	6.09	6.22	6.44	6.48	-	229.98	237.90	251.80	245.48	-
Miscellaneous textile goods	229	7.41	7.48	7.74	7.80	-	308.26	307.43	335.14	336.18	-
Apparel and other textile products	23	5.73	5.74	5.78	5.79	5.80	206.85	203.20	208.92	211.34	209.98
Men's and boys' suits and coats	231	6.73	6.75	6.70	6.69	-	239.59	230.18	228.47	234.82	-
Men's and boys' furnishings	232	5.27	5.28	5.38	5.38	-	189.72	187.97	193.68	199.60	-
Men's and boys' shirts and nightwear	2321	5.08	5.05	5.14	5.16	-	178.27	175.74	187.10	194.53	-
Men's and boys' separate trousers	2327	5.35	5.39	5.28	5.31	-	187.25	182.18	188.50	190.63	-
Men's and boys' work clothing	2328	5.27	5.30	5.46	5.48	-	196.04	197.16	198.57	198.38	-
Women's and misses' outerwear	233	5.58	5.61	5.58	5.58	-	196.42	191.30	191.95	194.81	-
Women's and misses' blouses and waists	2331	5.13	5.10	5.15	5.12	-	180.58	172.88	177.18	175.62	-
Women's and misses' dresses	2335	5.83	5.90	5.79	5.79	-	198.80	194.11	197.44	202.68	-
Women's and misses' suits and coats	2337	6.35	6.40	6.42	6.44	-	215.90	211.84	217.00	220.89	-
Women's and misses' outerwear, nec	2339	5.34	5.37	5.38	5.30	-	194.91	189.58	187.08	189.21	-
Women's and children's undergarments	234	5.26	5.34	5.38	5.35	-	189.36	186.37	198.37	196.35	-
Women's and children's underwear	2341	5.17	5.23	5.24	5.21	-	186.09	180.96	193.36	192.77	-
Brassieres and allied garments	2342	5.70	5.83	6.11	6.07	-	209.19	212.80	210.18	215.49	-
Children's outerwear	238	5.11	5.08	5.14	5.20	-	181.41	175.08	189.87	188.78	-
Children's dresses and blouses	2361	4.98	4.93	4.97	5.03	-	171.31	165.85	177.93	175.55	-
Misc. apparel and accessories	238	5.54	5.52	5.59	5.63	-	208.84	203.69	198.46	208.44	-
Misc. fabricated textile products	239	6.85	6.88	7.02	7.10	-	265.10	264.11	268.18	274.77	-
Curtains and draperies	2391	5.30	5.33	5.52	5.58	-	194.51	195.61	199.82	203.50	-
House furnishings, nec	2392	5.87	5.88	5.92	5.91	-	221.30	218.15	219.04	219.28	-
Automotive and apparel trimmings	2396	10.70	10.61	11.17	11.31	-	438.70	437.13	455.74	473.89	-
Paper and allied products	26	10.84	10.72	10.99	11.02	11.04	454.33	458.82	473.67	478.27	473.82
Paper and pulp mills	261,2,8	12.79	12.66	13.31	13.36	-	570.43	583.84	598.95	602.54	-
Paper mills, except building paper	262	12.97	12.92	13.42	13.47	-	575.29	588.15	603.90	607.50	-
Paperboard mills	263	13.32	13.47	13.76	13.87	-	587.41	596.72	610.94	619.99	-
Misc. converted paper products	264	9.23	9.25	9.45	9.45	-	382.12	382.95	395.98	398.74	-
Paper coating and glazing	2641	10.58	10.62	10.84	10.88	-	455.37	452.41	468.29	473.50	-
Envelopes	2642	8.45	8.51	8.52	8.54	-	354.08	352.31	360.40	360.38	-
Bags, except textile bags	2643	8.70	8.74	8.92	9.00	-	359.31	360.98	372.84	373.50	-
Paperboard containers and boxes	265	9.08	9.13	9.42	9.48	-	378.28	377.07	395.64	402.06	-
Folding paperboard boxes	2651	9.27	9.38	9.77	9.88	-	389.34	389.38	408.39	423.98	-
Corrugated and solid fiber boxes	2653	9.35	9.42	9.68	9.71	-	394.57	392.81	413.34	417.53	-
Sanitary food containers	2654	8.72	8.88	8.98	8.97	-	373.22	372.12	378.98	381.23	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[r]	Apr. 1986[r]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[r]	Apr. 1986[r]
Manufacturing—Continued											
Printing and publishing	27	37.7	37.5	37.5	38.1	37.8	2.7	2.5	2.7	3.0	-
Newspapers	271	33.5	33.5	33.4	33.8	-	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.8	-
Periodicals	272	38.5	37.8	38.0	38.7	-	2.9	2.6	3.2	3.8	-
Books	273	40.1	39.5	39.4	39.9	-	3.0	2.5	3.2	3.8	-
Book publishing	2731	39.3	39.5	38.2	39.1	-	2.7	2.6	2.8	3.3	-
Book printing	2732	41.4	39.4	41.5	41.4	-	3.8	2.4	4.2	4.8	-
Miscellaneous publishing	274	37.2	37.1	36.2	36.5	-	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.1	-
Commercial printing	275	38.9	38.7	38.9	39.6	-	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.6	-
Commercial printing, letterpress	2751	38.4	38.6	38.3	39.0	-	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.8	-
Commercial printing, lithographic	2752	39.0	38.5	39.1	39.8	-	3.5	3.0	3.4	3.9	-
Manifold business forms	276	40.5	40.1	40.5	40.7	-	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.5	-
Blankbooks and bookbinding	278	38.5	38.1	37.7	38.3	-	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	-
Printing trade services	279	38.6	38.3	38.5	39.2	-	3.6	3.2	3.6	3.5	-
Chemicals and allied products	28	42.1	41.9	41.7	42.1	41.9	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.6	-
Industrial inorganic chemicals	281	41.9	41.9	41.7	42.0	-	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.2	-
Industrial inorganic chemicals, nec	2819	42.2	42.0	42.5	42.8	-	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.3	-
Plastics materials and synthetics	282	42.3	42.3	42.0	42.0	-	3.4	3.4	3.7	3.8	-
Plastics materials and resins	2821	43.5	43.5	43.0	43.4	-	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.8	-
Organic fibers, noncellulosic	2824	41.9	42.1	41.9	41.3	-	2.8	2.9	3.2	3.3	-
Drugs	283	41.3	40.8	41.3	42.2	-	2.7	2.6	3.0	3.3	-
Pharmaceutical preparations	2834	41.4	40.9	40.8	41.9	-	2.6	2.5	2.9	3.3	-
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods	284	41.6	40.6	40.5	40.9	-	2.7	2.5	3.0	2.8	-
Soap and other detergents	2841	43.9	43.7	43.8	44.2	-	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.1	-
Toilet preparations	2844	40.2	38.6	38.3	39.1	-	1.9	1.6	2.2	2.4	-
Polishing, sanitation, and finishing preparations	2842,3	41.7	41.0	40.9	40.8	-	2.8	2.2	2.7	2.2	-
Paints and allied products	285	41.3	41.7	41.2	41.9	-	3.1	3.7	3.3	3.2	-
Industrial organic chemicals	286	43.2	43.5	43.2	43.3	-	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	-
Cyclic crudes and intermediates	2865	42.5	43.4	42.8	42.8	-	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.0	-
Gum, wood, and industrial organic chemicals, nec	2861,9	43.4	43.5	43.3	43.4	-	3.8	3.7	3.9	4.0	-
Agricultural chemicals	287	43.9	43.3	42.2	42.6	-	5.1	4.8	4.2	4.8	-
Miscellaneous chemical products	289	41.8	41.7	41.5	42.2	-	3.2	3.5	3.6	3.8	-
Petroleum and coal products	29	42.8	42.0	43.1	44.0	44.5	3.5	4.1	4.0	4.7	-
Petroleum refining	291	43.1	41.8	43.7	44.9	-	3.4	3.9	3.9	4.8	-
Paving and roofing materials	295	42.4	43.2	41.8	41.8	-	4.3	5.3	5.2	5.2	-
Rubber and misc. plastics products	30	41.1	40.9	41.0	41.3	41.0	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.7	-
Tires and inner tubes	301	42.6	42.8	42.6	42.5	-	4.1	3.6	4.6	4.7	-
Rubber and plastics footwear	302	36.1	33.8	38.1	38.3	-	.9	1.0	1.2	1.1	-
Reclaimed rubber, and rubber and plastics hose and belting	303,4	40.7	40.7	42.6	42.8	-	2.5	2.5	3.4	3.2	-
Fabricated rubber products, nec	306	41.5	41.0	41.0	41.5	-	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.2	-
Miscellaneous plastics products	307	40.9	40.7	40.8	41.2	-	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.8	-
Leather and leather products	31	36.5	36.9	36.0	36.3	36.2	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.3	-
Leather tanning and finishing	311	40.7	41.2	40.7	40.7	-	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	-
Footwear, except rubber	314	35.6	36.4	34.8	35.0	-	.9	1.2	.9	.9	-
Men's footwear, except athletic	3143	36.3	35.9	34.7	35.8	-	1.1	1.0	.7	.9	-
Women's footwear, except athletic	3144	34.4	36.5	34.2	33.6	-	.7	1.4	.9	.9	-
Luggage	316	38.6	38.3	38.8	38.5	-	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	-
Handbags and personal leather goods	317	38.6	38.0	38.3	37.2	-	1.0	.8	.6	.9	-
Transportation and public utilities		39.3	39.2	39.1	39.3	39.2	-	-	-	-	-
Railroad transportation:											
Class I railroads[2]	4011	43.8	42.8	44.3	44.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Local and interurban passenger transit	41	33.7	33.5	33.9	34.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Local and suburban transportation	411	38.2	38.7	38.4	38.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intercity highway transportation	413	38.0	38.5	40.9	39.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trucking and warehousing	42	38.4	38.1	37.3	37.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trucking and trucking terminals	421,3	38.4	38.1	37.3	37.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Public warehousing	422	38.2	38.1	37.6	37.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pipe lines, except natural gas	46	39.6	40.4	44.2	44.0	-	-	-	-	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[p]	Apr. 1986[p]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[p]	Apr. 1986[p]
Nondurable goods—Continued											
Printing and publishing	27	$9.81	$9.80	$9.84	$9.90	$9.87	$382.30	$380.00	$389.00	$377.19	$373.09
Newspapers	271	9.71	9.75	9.97	9.95	-	325.29	326.63	333.00	334.32	-
Periodicals	272	10.11	10.05	10.52	10.67	-	389.24	379.89	399.76	412.93	-
Books	273	8.44	8.38	8.61	8.59	-	338.44	331.01	339.23	342.74	-
Book publishing	2731	7.98	7.90	7.97	7.92	-	312.83	312.05	304.45	309.67	-
Book printing	2732	9.14	9.11	9.63	9.89	-	378.40	358.93	399.65	401.17	-
Miscellaneous publishing	274	8.62	8.65	8.81	8.91	-	320.66	320.92	318.92	321.57	-
Commercial printing	275	9.96	9.92	10.14	10.25	-	387.44	383.90	394.45	405.90	-
Commercial printing, letterpress	2751	9.40	9.42	9.66	9.70	-	360.96	363.61	369.96	378.30	-
Commercial printing, lithographic	2752	10.22	10.15	10.34	10.50	-	398.58	390.78	404.29	417.90	-
Manifold business forms	276	9.91	9.85	10.19	10.19	-	387.31	384.99	412.29	414.73	-
Blankbooks and bookbinding	278	7.58	7.68	7.72	7.74	-	291.06	292.61	291.04	296.44	-
Printing trade services	279	11.63	11.52	11.94	11.89	-	448.92	441.22	459.69	466.09	-
Chemicals and allied products	28	11.37	11.48	11.63	11.79	11.82	478.68	481.01	493.31	496.36	496.26
Industrial inorganic chemicals	281	12.60	12.84	12.97	13.00	-	527.94	529.82	540.85	548.00	-
Industrial inorganic chemicals, nec	2819	12.84	12.84	13.04	13.07	-	533.41	530.88	554.20	559.40	-
Plastics materials and synthetics	282	11.51	11.84	11.98	12.06	-	486.87	492.37	502.32	506.52	-
Plastics materials and resins	2821	12.43	12.58	13.08	13.06	-	540.71	545.93	582.44	588.80	-
Organic fibers, noncellulosic	2824	11.21	11.37	11.82	11.83	-	469.70	478.68	486.68	488.58	-
Drugs	283	10.59	10.68	11.02	11.01	-	437.37	434.93	455.13	464.62	-
Pharmaceutical preparations	2834	10.24	10.30	10.74	10.73	-	423.94	421.27	438.19	449.59	-
Soap, cleaners, and toilet goods	284	10.04	10.18	10.61	10.48	-	417.66	413.31	429.71	428.63	-
Soap and other detergents	2841	12.91	13.03	13.84	13.59	-	566.75	569.41	587.43	600.68	-
Toilet preparations	2844	8.42	8.63	8.89	8.84	-	338.48	333.12	340.49	345.84	-
Polishing, sanitation, and finishing preparations	2842,3	9.68	9.60	9.90	9.71	-	403.68	393.60	404.91	398.17	-
Paints and allied products	285	10.04	10.09	10.29	10.24	-	414.85	420.75	423.95	429.06	-
Industrial organic chemicals	286	13.78	13.97	14.14	14.01	-	595.30	607.70	610.85	606.63	-
Cyclic crudes and intermediates	2865	13.00	13.33	14.01	13.82	-	552.50	578.52	599.63	591.50	-
Gum, wood, and industrial organic chemicals, nec	2861,9	14.02	14.17	14.18	14.07	-	608.47	616.40	613.99	610.84	-
Agricultural chemicals	287	10.64	10.59	11.18	11.05	-	487.10	458.55	471.80	470.73	-
Miscellaneous chemical products	289	10.39	10.53	11.02	11.04	-	432.22	439.10	457.33	465.89	-
Petroleum and coal products	29	14.08	14.19	14.19	14.23	14.29	601.77	595.58	611.59	626.12	635.91
Petroleum refining	291	15.25	15.51	15.30	15.36	-	667.28	648.32	668.81	689.66	-
Paving and roofing materials	295	10.13	10.30	10.45	10.37	-	429.51	444.96	436.91	433.47	-
Rubber and misc. plastics products	30	8.48	8.48	8.68	8.71	8.68	347.71	348.83	355.88	359.72	355.88
Tires and inner tubes	301	13.00	12.90	13.51	13.61	-	553.80	553.12	575.53	578.43	-
Rubber and plastics footwear	302	5.45	5.41	5.96	5.99	-	196.75	192.89	229.70	229.03	-
Reclaimed rubber, and rubber and plastics hose and belting	303,4	9.24	9.29	9.49	9.48	-	336.37	337.00	361.87	362.94	-
Fabricated rubber products, nec	308	9.33	9.34	9.54	9.50	-	348.70	341.94	350.14	352.75	-
Miscellaneous plastics products	307	7.93	7.87	8.09	8.11	-	320.25	320.31	330.07	334.13	-
Leather and leather products	31	5.82	5.84	5.83	5.86	5.88	212.43	213.90	209.88	212.78	212.88
Leather tanning and finishing	311	7.68	7.72	7.48	7.55	-	311.76	318.08	304.44	307.29	-
Footwear, except rubber	314	5.55	5.54	5.55	5.57	-	197.58	201.88	193.14	194.95	-
Men's footwear, except athletic	3143	5.88	5.93	5.91	5.94	-	212.73	212.89	205.08	212.66	-
Women's footwear, except athletic	3144	5.32	5.28	5.32	5.31	-	183.01	191.99	181.94	178.42	-
Luggage	316	6.37	6.53	6.18	6.15	-	245.88	250.10	239.78	238.78	-
Handbags and personal leather goods	317	5.51	5.52	5.52	5.63	-	201.87	198.72	200.38	208.44	-
Transportation and public utilities		11.24	11.27	11.63	11.60	11.62	441.73	441.78	484.73	488.88	488.50
Railroad transportation:											
Class I railroads[2]	4011	13.38	13.62	13.91	13.84	-	586.04	582.94	619.21	606.98	-
Local and interurban passenger transit	41	7.50	7.63	7.91	7.92	-	252.75	255.61	269.15	269.28	-
Local and suburban transportation	411	8.00	8.04	8.30	8.33	-	305.60	311.15	319.72	319.21	-
Intercity highway transportation	413	11.07	11.25	11.59	11.74	-	420.66	433.13	474.03	481.34	-
Trucking and warehousing	42	10.52	10.49	10.88	10.88	-	403.97	399.87	398.74	404.08	-
Trucking and trucking terminals	421,3	10.70	10.66	10.97	10.95	-	410.88	408.15	406.45	410.13	-
Public warehousing	422	8.10	8.13	8.33	8.39	-	309.42	309.75	313.21	317.14	-
Pipe lines, except natural gas	46	15.40	15.18	15.12	15.09	-	609.84	613.27	669.30	663.96	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]
Transportation and public utilities—Continued											
Communication	48	38.6	39.7	40.2	40.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Telephone communication	481	40.2	40.5	41.4	41.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Radio and television broadcasting	483	37.0	36.9	37.1	37.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Electric, gas, and sanitary services	49	41.6	41.6	41.7	41.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Electric services	491	41.6	41.7	41.8	41.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gas production and distribution	492	40.3	40.6	40.6	40.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Combination utility services	493	42.7	42.4	42.4	42.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sanitary services	495	41.8	41.3	42.8	43.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wholesale trade		38.5	38.4	38.3	38.5	38.6	-	-	-	-	-
Durable goods	50	39.1	39.0	39.0	39.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motor vehicles and automotive equipment	501	38.4	38.4	38.2	38.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furniture and home furnishings	502	37.2	37.0	36.8	36.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lumber and construction materials	503	39.1	39.4	38.4	39.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sporting goods, toys, and hobby goods	504	38.5	37.8	38.1	38.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Metals and minerals, except petroleum	505	40.4	40.2	40.8	40.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Electrical goods	506	39.1	38.9	38.9	39.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hardware, plumbing, and heating equipment	507	38.8	38.4	38.5	38.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Machinery, equipment, and supplies	508	39.8	39.8	39.6	39.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous durable goods	509	38.4	37.8	37.8	38.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nondurable goods	51	37.6	37.6	37.4	37.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paper and paper products	511	38.2	37.8	38.7	37.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drugs, proprietaries, and sundries	512	37.1	37.1	36.1	36.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Apparel, piece goods, and notions	513	36.0	35.8	36.0	36.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Groceries and related products	514	38.1	38.0	37.9	38.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chemicals and allied products	516	39.0	39.0	39.5	39.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Petroleum and petroleum products	517	38.5	39.8	39.5	39.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beer, wine, and distilled beverages	518	35.9	36.1	35.7	36.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous nondurable goods	519	37.8	37.3	37.5	37.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Retail trade		29.4	29.4	28.7	29.0	29.0	-	-	-	-	-
Building materials and garden supplies	52	36.1	36.2	35.5	35.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lumber and other building materials	521	38.1	38.2	37.5	38.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hardware stores	525	32.8	32.9	32.6	32.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
General merchandise stores	53	28.7	28.8	27.0	27.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Department stores	531	28.6	28.5	26.9	27.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Variety stores	533	29.0	29.3	27.7	28.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misc. general merchandise stores	539	29.8	29.4	28.8	29.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Food stores	54	29.9	29.8	29.6	29.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grocery stores	541	30.1	29.9	29.8	29.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Retail bakeries	546	28.5	28.2	28.9	28.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Automotive dealers and service stations	55	37.0	37.1	36.2	36.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
New and used car dealers	551,2	38.0	37.9	37.2	37.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Auto and home supply stores	553	40.1	40.4	38.7	39.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Gasoline service stations	554	34.2	34.4	33.8	33.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Apparel and accessory stores	56	27.6	27.5	26.4	27.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Men's and boys' clothing and furnishings	561	30.4	30.5	29.7	29.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Women's ready-to-wear stores	562	26.7	26.9	25.0	26.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Family clothing stores	565	27.8	27.4	26.3	26.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Shoe stores	566	27.0	26.6	27.2	27.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furniture and home furnishings stores	57	33.8	33.7	33.2	33.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Furniture and home furnishings stores	571	34.1	33.9	33.0	33.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Household appliance stores	572	33.6	34.3	32.9	33.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Radio, television, and music stores	573	33.4	33.3	33.9	33.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eating and drinking places[7]	58	25.7	25.7	25.1	25.3	-	-	-	-	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]	Mar. 1985	Apr. 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar. 1986[P]	Apr. 1986[P]
Transportation and public utilities—Continued											
Communication	48	$11.49	$11.52	$12.03	$12.02	-	$455.00	$457.34	$483.61	$482.00	-
Telephone communication	481	12.23	12.22	12.75	12.74	-	491.66	494.91	527.86	526.18	-
Radio and television broadcasting	483	9.93	10.11	10.82	10.83	-	367.41	373.06	401.42	401.79	-
Electric, gas, and sanitary services	49	12.72	12.67	13.29	13.29	-	529.15	527.07	554.19	552.86	-
Electric services	491	12.79	12.78	13.25	13.30	-	532.06	532.93	561.20	563.29	-
Gas production and distribution	492	11.90	11.80	12.39	12.45	-	467.48	470.98	503.03	502.98	-
Combination utility services	493	14.88	14.76	15.66	15.63	-	634.52	625.82	683.98	681.15	-
Sanitary services	495	9.49	9.33	9.63	9.49	-	398.68	385.33	412.18	408.97	-
Wholesale trade		9.19	9.24	9.42	9.38	$9.38	353.82	354.82	380.79	381.13	$381.30
Durable goods	50	9.23	9.30	9.51	9.47	-	380.89	382.70	370.89	371.22	-
Motor vehicles and automotive equipment	501	8.38	8.42	8.57	8.58	-	321.02	323.33	327.37	329.54	-
Furniture and home furnishings	502	8.02	8.22	8.45	8.48	-	298.34	304.14	310.96	312.91	-
Lumber and construction materials	503	8.74	8.87	8.78	8.70	-	341.73	341.60	337.15	341.91	-
Sporting goods, toys, and hobby goods	504	9.89	10.00	9.97	10.09	-	380.77	378.00	379.88	383.42	-
Metals and minerals, except petroleum	505	9.97	9.92	10.26	10.20	-	402.79	398.78	418.58	412.08	-
Electrical goods	506	9.63	9.74	9.94	9.78	-	376.53	378.89	386.97	384.35	-
Hardware, plumbing, and heating equipment	507	8.61	8.70	8.96	8.92	-	354.07	334.08	344.96	348.10	-
Machinery, equipment, and supplies	508	9.78	9.83	10.08	10.06	-	386.50	386.27	399.17	399.38	-
Miscellaneous durable goods	509	7.50	7.57	7.58	7.57	-	288.00	286.15	285.01	287.66	-
Nondurable goods	51	9.14	9.15	9.28	9.25	-	343.66	344.04	347.07	347.80	-
Paper and paper products	511	9.93	9.89	9.89	9.87	-	379.33	373.84	382.98	387.18	-
Drugs, proprietaries, and sundries	512	9.96	9.95	10.23	10.09	-	389.52	389.15	389.30	371.31	-
Apparel, piece goods, and notions	513	8.93	8.98	9.04	8.94	-	321.48	319.09	325.44	323.63	-
Groceries and related products	514	9.38	9.38	9.47	9.47	-	358.82	358.44	358.91	360.81	-
Chemicals and allied products	516	11.23	11.24	11.47	11.46	-	437.97	438.36	453.07	452.67	-
Petroleum and petroleum products	517	9.90	9.89	10.07	10.12	-	391.05	391.64	397.77	398.73	-
Beer, wine, and distilled beverages	518	10.77	10.97	10.72	10.66	-	398.64	392.41	382.70	392.05	-
Miscellaneous nondurable goods	519	7.38	7.41	7.64	7.53	-	277.49	278.39	288.50	285.39	-
Retail trade		5.97	5.98	6.07	6.08	6.05	175.52	175.22	174.21	175.74	175.45
Building materials and garden supplies	52	6.58	6.57	6.80	6.80	-	237.54	237.83	241.40	242.78	-
Lumber and other building materials	521	6.89	6.89	7.06	7.06	-	262.51	263.20	264.75	264.28	-
Hardware stores	525	5.73	5.73	5.80	5.77	-	187.94	188.52	189.08	188.68	-
General merchandise stores	53	5.83	5.85	6.21	6.25	-	167.32	167.31	167.67	174.38	-
Department stores	531	6.04	6.06	6.47	6.52	-	172.74	172.71	173.40	181.26	-
Variety stores	533	4.81	4.82	4.70	4.85	-	133.69	135.37	130.19	133.48	-
Misc. general merchandise stores	539	4.71	4.73	4.85	4.87	-	140.38	139.08	139.69	143.67	-
Food stores	54	7.50	7.43	7.22	7.20	-	224.25	221.41	213.71	213.84	-
Grocery stores	541	7.72	7.68	7.41	7.39	-	232.37	229.03	220.62	220.96	-
Retail bakeries	546	5.33	5.30	5.35	5.33	-	151.91	148.48	154.82	152.97	-
Automotive dealers and service stations	55	7.30	7.35	7.48	7.47	-	270.10	272.69	270.05	272.66	-
New and used car dealers	551,2	8.85	8.94	9.02	9.05	-	338.30	338.83	335.54	338.47	-
Auto and home supply stores	553	6.39	6.41	6.56	6.55	-	256.24	258.98	253.87	255.45	-
Gasoline service stations	554	5.30	5.32	5.39	5.39	-	181.26	183.01	182.19	182.72	-
Apparel and accessory stores	56	5.27	5.30	5.40	5.38	-	145.45	145.75	142.58	145.26	-
Men's and boys' clothing and furnishings	561	6.14	6.34	6.45	6.38	-	186.88	193.37	191.57	187.57	-
Women's ready-to-wear stores	562	5.02	5.05	5.11	5.10	-	134.03	135.34	127.75	132.60	-
Family clothing stores	565	5.19	5.14	5.34	5.33	-	144.28	140.84	140.44	143.38	-
Shoe stores	566	5.22	5.29	5.29	5.31	-	140.94	140.71	143.88	148.58	-
Furniture and home furnishings stores	57	7.19	7.29	7.42	7.40	-	243.02	245.87	246.34	249.64	-
Furniture and home furnishings stores	571	7.14	7.27	7.39	7.42	-	243.47	245.73	243.87	247.83	-
Household appliance stores	572	7.14	7.22	7.29	7.33	-	239.90	247.85	239.11	248.29	-
Radio, television, and music stores	573	7.31	7.38	7.52	7.41	-	244.15	245.09	254.18	251.20	-
Eating and drinking places[7]	58	4.38	4.38	4.40	4.38	-	112.05	112.05	110.44	110.81	-

See footnotes at end of table.

ESTABLISHMENT DATA
HOURS AND EARNINGS
NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average weekly hours					Average overtime hours				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[P]	Apr 1986[P]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb 1986	Mar 1986[P]	Apr 1986[P]
Retail trade—Continued											
Miscellaneous retail	59	30.8	30.8	30.1	30.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drug stores and proprietary stores	591	29.8	29.8	29.4	28.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous shopping goods stores	594	28.5	28.5	29.1	29.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nonstore retailers	596	33.6	33.2	31.5	32.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fuel and ice dealers	598	38.1	38.1	39.5	38.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Retail stores, nec	599	31.8	32.3	33.4	31.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finance, insurance, and real estate[7]		38.4	38.4	38.7	38.9	38.3	-	-	-	-	-
Banking	60	36.3	36.5	36.8	36.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commercial and stock savings banks	602	36.3	36.5	36.9	36.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Credit agencies other than banks	61	37.3	37.3	37.7	37.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Savings and loan associations	612	36.9	37.0	36.7	36.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Personal credit institutions	614	37.2	37.4	37.8	37.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Insurance carriers	63	37.3	37.2	37.9	38.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Life insurance	631	37.0	37.0	37.3	37.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medical service and health insurance	632	38.2	38.1	38.1	38.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fire, marine, and casualty insurance	633	37.1	37.0	38.0	38.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services		32.6	32.6	32.7	32.9	32.7	-	-	-	-	-
Hotels and other lodging places:											
Hotels, motels, and tourist courts[7]	701	30.3	30.3	30.6	30.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Personal services:											
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services	721	34.2	34.1	33.4	33.9	-	-	-	-	-	-
Beauty shops[7]	723	30.7	30.5	30.0	30.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Business services	73	33.7	33.6	33.7	33.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Advertising	731	36.0	35.9	36.4	36.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services to buildings	734	28.9	28.7	28.6	28.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Computer and data processing services	737	37.9	38.3	38.8	39.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Auto repair, services, and garages	75	37.8	37.5	38.9	37.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Automotive repair shops	753	39.3	38.9	37.9	38.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous repair services	76	38.4	38.1	38.0	38.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motion pictures	78	29.1	29.2	29.5	29.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Motion picture production and services	781	37.8	37.1	39.0	37.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Amusement and recreation services	79	28.5	28.7	28.5	28.2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health services	80	32.4	32.4	32.7	32.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Offices of physicians	801	30.8	30.4	30.9	31.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Offices of dentists	802	28.5	28.4	28.5	28.6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nursing and personal care facilities	805	31.0	31.3	31.4	31.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hospitals	806	34.1	34.2	34.8	34.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Legal services	81	34.3	34.4	34.5	34.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Miscellaneous services	89	40.0	39.9	39.5	39.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
Engineering and architectural services	891	40.2	40.0	39.7	40.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping	893	40.7	41.0	40.1	40.0	-	-	-	-	-	-

See footnotes at end of table.

C-2. Average hours and earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers[1] on private nonagricultural payrolls by detailed industry—Continued

Industry	1972 SIC Code	Average hourly earnings					Average weekly earnings				
		Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr. 1986[p]	Mar 1985	Apr 1985	Feb. 1986	Mar 1986[p]	Apr 1986[p]
Retail trade—Continued											
Miscellaneous retail	59	$5.98	$5.97	$6.15	$6.15	-	$182.39	$182.68	$185.12	$184.50	-
Drug stores and proprietary stores	591	5.45	5.45	5.58	5.56	-	161.32	161.32	157.90	159.46	-
Miscellaneous shopping goods stores	594	5.71	5.68	5.87	5.86	-	162.74	161.88	164.95	165.64	-
Nonstore retailers	596	6.38	6.49	6.87	6.89	-	214.37	215.47	216.41	222.55	-
Fuel and ice dealers	598	8.47	8.40	9.01	8.83	-	322.71	320.04	356.90	337.31	-
Retail stores, nec	599	6.29	6.32	6.20	6.33	-	197.82	204.14	207.08	200.03	-
Finance, insurance, and real estate[2]		7.87	7.85	8.27	8.27	$8.23	286.47	285.74	303.51	302.69	$298.75
Banking	60	6.75	6.75	7.08	7.13	-	245.03	248.38	260.54	261.67	-
Commercial and stock savings banks	602	6.60	6.60	6.93	6.97	-	239.58	240.90	255.72	255.80	-
Credit agencies other than banks	61	7.07	7.09	7.57	7.52	-	283.71	284.48	285.39	285.01	-
Savings and loan associations	612	6.48	6.51	7.13	7.07	-	239.48	240.87	261.67	260.68	-
Personal credit institutions	614	6.67	6.68	7.28	7.26	-	255.58	257.31	275.18	275.15	-
Insurance carriers	63	8.57	8.55	8.87	8.95	-	319.66	318.08	339.98	340.10	-
Life insurance	631	8.05	8.03	8.43	8.39	-	297.85	297.11	314.44	312.95	-
Medical service and health insurance	632	8.54	8.61	9.05	9.07	-	326.25	328.04	344.81	352.62	-
Fire, marine, and casualty insurance	633	8.98	8.91	9.34	9.31	-	332.42	329.67	354.92	353.78	-
Services		7.87	7.89	8.22	8.22	8.18	256.58	257.21	268.79	269.62	267.48
Hotels and other lodging places:											
Hotels, motels, and tourist courts[3]	701	5.70	5.73	5.90	5.83	-	172.71	173.62	180.54	179.58	-
Personal services:											
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services	721	5.75	5.77	5.99	6.00	-	196.65	196.78	200.07	203.40	-
Beauty shops[3]	723	5.92	5.94	6.01	6.28	-	181.74	181.17	180.30	189.68	-
Business services	73	8.11	8.16	8.48	8.48	-	273.31	274.18	288.11	288.62	-
Advertising	731	10.68	10.65	11.26	11.40	-	384.64	382.34	408.86	413.62	-
Services to buildings	734	6.21	6.26	6.45	6.45	-	178.65	179.66	185.76	185.76	-
Computer and data processing services	737	10.91	10.90	11.37	11.40	-	413.49	417.47	441.16	442.32	-
Auto repair, services, and garages	75	7.38	7.38	7.53	7.56	-	276.74	276.75	277.66	280.49	-
Automotive repair shops	753	7.95	8.00	8.18	8.21	-	312.44	311.20	310.02	312.90	-
Miscellaneous repair services	76	8.71	8.81	8.99	9.02	-	334.48	335.66	341.62	345.47	-
Motion pictures	78	12.30	11.72	11.92	12.74	-	357.93	342.22	351.64	370.73	-
Motion picture production and services	781	16.95	16.56	16.23	17.24	-	640.71	614.38	632.97	651.67	-
Amusement and recreation services	79	7.17	7.38	7.45	7.54	-	204.35	211.23	212.33	212.83	-
Health services	80	8.00	8.03	8.30	8.32	-	259.20	260.17	271.41	272.06	-
Offices of physicians	801	7.90	7.92	8.35	8.40	-	243.32	240.77	258.02	261.24	-
Offices of dentists	802	7.67	7.58	8.25	8.27	-	218.60	218.11	235.13	236.52	-
Nursing and personal care facilities	805	5.53	5.55	5.77	5.76	-	171.43	173.72	181.18	180.29	-
Hospitals	806	8.89	8.93	9.24	9.25	-	303.15	305.41	321.55	321.90	-
Legal services	81	10.28	10.30	11.11	11.13	-	352.60	354.32	383.30	386.21	-
Miscellaneous services	89	11.41	11.39	11.99	11.97	-	458.40	454.46	473.61	475.21	-
Engineering and architectural services	891	12.52	12.46	12.95	12.93	-	503.30	498.40	514.12	518.49	-
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping	893	9.33	9.38	10.08	10.11	-	379.73	383.76	404.21	404.40	-

[1] Data relate to production workers in mining and manufacturing, construction workers in construction, and nonsupervisory workers in transportation and public utilities; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.

[2] Beginning in January 1978, data relate to line haul railroads with operating revenues of $50,000,000 or more.

[3] Money payments only; tips not included.

[4] Data for nonoffice sales agents are excluded from all series in this division.

- Data not available.

[p] = preliminary.

NOTE: Establishment survey estimates are currently projected from March 1984 benchmark levels. When more recent benchmark data are introduced, all unadjusted data from April 1984 forward are subject to revision.

Mr. LEVIN. I think that would be interesting because the statement has the potential implication that jobs in apparel, textiles and shoes were $3.50 an hour jobs.

Ms. NORWOOD. No; they were more than that.

Mr. LEVIN. I am not sure that if you look at the textile towns in the south today that the jobs being lost were $4 an hour jobs.

Ms. NORWOOD. You are quite right about that.

Mr. LEVIN. So if you could supply that for the record.

I am going to try to keep within the 5-minute rule. If we don't do that, I see a note here on the chairman's desk, if we don't keep that within the 5-minute rule, with potential rollcalls we are going to be in trouble.

So one last question. The gap, the income gap among families is today what compared to 10 years and 30 years ago; has there been a diminishing distribution differential or an increase anywhere?

Ms. NORWOOD. Well, I don't have that information here. Clearly, the dollar figures have gone up. The distribution has probably not changed enormously, although many more women are contributing to the work force.

I would prefer to submit something for the record on that.

[The information follows:]

SHARE OF AGGREGATE INCOME RECEIVED BY FAMILIES IN HIGHEST AND LOWEST QUINTILE, SELECTED YEARS

	1954	1964	1974	1984
Highest quintile	41.8	41.2	41.0	42.9
Lowest quintile	4.5	5.1	5.5	4.7

Mr. LEVIN. Well, on behalf of all of us, as usual, your testimony has been very stimulating. Do you—you might not want to answer this on the record—have the resources to undertake the studies that you think are essential for committees like this to operate and the Department to operate?

Ms. NORWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that you never have a witness here who thinks that there is enough——

Mr. LEVIN. Sometimes we do.

Ms. NORWOOD [continuing]. Because there is so much to be done. We do the very best we can. I think we do a pretty job of it. Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. All right. Thank you on behalf of all of us.

The chairman had to leave for another meeting and hopes to be back soon. In the meanwhile, if I might, let me call, on the behalf of the entire committee, everybody on panel 2.

Drs. Matthaei, Mead, Blau, Bowman, Hopkins, and Rayman.

Now, let's see, we will go in the order on the list.

I think that Dr. Bowman, is on his way.

Are you in the order?

Dr. Matthaei.

So you are not in the order.

We will go in this order.

Dr. Matthaei, Dr. Mead, Dr. Blau, Kevin Hopkins, and last Dr. Rayman.

As mentioned, and you knew this in advance, we are anxious to hear your testimony, it will be placed in the record. We often say that for two reasons: No. 1, so that everybody will know that. No. 2, so that you won't feel compelled to read the whole thing, unless you want to.

Take whatever from that you would like. But if you could try to finish in 5 minutes so your colleagues can continue and we can have a crack at you.

Dr. Matthaei, and the rest of your colleagues on this broad and important field, you are welcome.

Why don't you begin.

STATEMENT OF JULIE A. MATTHAEI, PH.D., CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WELLESLEY COLLEGE, WELLESLEY, MA

Ms. MATTHAEI. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. From an historical perspective, today's social policy dilemmas in the area of family life have their roots in the changing relationship between economy and family, and in the changing sexual division of labor within the family.

Today I will be giving you a very brief and simplified overview of these complex transformations to help shed light on the policies your committee is discussing.

For our purposes, U.S. history divides into three periods, which I will characterize as the family economy, the era of separate sexual spheres, and the era of the egalitarian family.

In the family economy, family and economic life were merged; this economic form was in its heyday in colonial times. The area of separate sexual spheres developed in the 19th century as commodity production left the household. The egalitarian family, in which spouses have similar work and family responsibilities, and in which there is growing concern for the rights and well-being of children, emerged in the mid-20th century.

In the family economy of colonial times, the household was the major unit of production, whether as a family farm or as a craft or merchant business. The household produced both for the market and for its own, direct consumption.

At the center of the household was a nuclear family. Marriages were primarily economic partnerships, and were arranged by parents with this in mind. The husband was the property owner, focused in production for the market. The wife's work, defined by her family's needs, could vary from helping her husband in the family business or taking its helm, if he were unavailable, to filling the family's subsistence needs of food and clothing, if they were a poor-frontier family, to supervising servants or slaves if the family was wealthy.

Children in the family economy were treated as little workers. Parenting was understood, first and foremost, as preparing them for adult work. And it could include apprenticeship to other families at very early ages.

Wealthy households often included many nonfamily members, from servants and slaves to apprentices. Conversely, those without wealth to establish farms or businesses, and those blacks brought

or born into slavery, worked for and lived with propertied households, and had difficulty establishing families of their own. So families were not the same as households in this period.

Now, in the era of sexual spheres, the factory system moved commodity production and nonfamily workers out of the household into a separate economic sphere. Family firms were gradually replaced by corporations, and family workers by hired wage workers. The household became a personal, familial sphere, a home, seen as a caring, a warm refuge from the harsh and competitive economy.

Home and economy became women's and men's spheres, respectively. In the ideal marriage, an economy-centered, competitive, breadwinning husband earned enough wages to support his wife as a homebound, other-serving, homemaker.

Childhood became a separate life stage, during which the child was separated off from the world of work and nurtured and taught in the home and school. Familial relationships became increasingly personal and emotional as arranged marriages were replaced with love matches, and parental love, especially motherly love and nurturing, superceded the family economy view of one's children as little workers.

However, many families were unable to achieve this separate sphere ideal. When husbands were unemployed or unable to earn family wages, or were absent altogether, homemakers adjusted by sending their older children into the labor force, by taking in boarders, lodgers, or other homework for income, or by entering the labor force themselves.

Labor force participation of wives was especially high among black families after Abolition, since whites used discrimination and Jim Crow laws to keep black men from entering family-wage jobs.

Since women entered the labor force temporarily before marriage, as working girls, or in the case of family emergencies, girls and women were segregated into low-wage, dead-end jobs which often involved serving others. To further the separate spheres ideal, child labor laws and protective legislation were enacted to keep women and young children from damaging themselves in the harsh masculine world of work.

Policymakers responded to the biggest casualty of the separate spheres ideal—mothers and children who had lost their husband-providers—by developing mothers' pensions which allowed mothers to stay home from work with their children, if at less than poverty standards.

In the 20th century we see the rise of the egalitarian family. The separate sphere idea was eroded by the increasing labor force participation of married women which rose from 6 percent in 1900 to over 50 precent in 1980. Married women were drawn into the labor force to fill the needs of the family for more commodities in an increasingly consumption-oriented society, and/or to utilize the abilities they were developing in higher education.

These trends were aided by the availability of housework-saving commodities and by the recruitment of women into the labor force during the two World Wars.

The stagnation in men's real wages and the growth of structural unemployment in the smokestack industries which had provided so many family wage jobs, gave further impetus to married women's

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wage work in the 1970's. By the late 1970's the husband-wage earner, wife-homemaker arrangement only characterized one-third of husband-wife families; in the majority of the latter, both adults were in the labor force.

The entrance of married women into the labor force has put pressure on other aspects of the sexual division of labor. As women spend more of their lives in the labor force and take on more earning responsibilities, they have begun to demand better wages and jobs.

The double day of the wage-earning homemaker has put pressure on husbands to share in the housework and child rearing. A more egalitarian marriage, in which spouses participate more equally in home and market work, and stay together out of love rather than financial or other needs, is emerging as a reality and as an increasingly valued ideal.

Greater equality within marriage has allowed women to speak out against wife battering, and has inspired social concern as to the extent of spouse and child physical and sexual abuse within the family.

Increasing numbers are also daring to live in nontraditional family forms, from living together without marriage, to living alone, or collectively, to living with a member of one's own sex.

However, those seeking more egalitarian families come up against an economy structured to complement the separate spheres marriage. First, to have equal earning power women must have access to male dominated jobs and the pay of female dominated jobs must be raised. Second, since full-time jobs have been structured for workers without child-care responsibilities (traditional men or single women) these jobs need to change in order to accommodate workers who have family responsibilities.

Finally, the development of the more egalitarian marriage may have exacerbated the former problem of poverty among female-headed households. Decreased financial dependency and increased desire for love within marriage have brought rising divorce and remarriage rates.

Most divorces still, according to separate sphere notions, award custody and hence financial responsibility to mothers, many of whom are still without access to family-wage jobs.

Due to the high poverty risk in female-headed households, and the growing number of these households, about half of all poor today live in female-headed households. This presents a challenge to policymakers to strengthen traditional policy responses and to develop new remedies more consistent with the egalitarian family.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Julie Matthaei follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JULIE A. MATTHAEI, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, WELLESLEY COLLEGE, WELLESLEY, MA

From an historical perspective, today's social policy dilemmas in the area of family life have their roots in the changing relationship between economy and family, and in the changing sexual division of labor within the family. Today I will

be giving you a very brief and simplified overview of these complex transformations to help shed light on the policies your committee is discussing.[1]

For our purposes, U.S. history divides into three periods, each characterized by a major type of family/economy, husband/wife, and parent/child interaction. The family economy, during which family and economic life were merged, was at its heyday during colonial times. Separate sexual spheres developed in the nineteenth century, as commodity production left the household. And the egalitarian family, in which spouses have similar work and family responsibilities, and in which there is growing concern for the rights and well-being of children, emerged in the mid-twentieth century.

The Family Economy.—In colonial times, the household was the major unit of production, whether as a family farm or as a craft or merchant business. The household produced both for the market, and for its own, direct consumption.

At the center of the household was a nuclear family. Marriages were primarily economic partnerships, and were arranged by parents with this in mind. The husband was the property owner, focused in production for the market. The wife's work, defined by her family's needs, could vary from helping her husband in the family business or taking its helm if he were unavailable, to filling the family's subsistence needs of food and clothing if they were a poor frontier family trying to establish a cash crop, to supervising servants or slaves if they were wealthy.

Children in the family economy were treated as little workers. Parenting was understood, first and foremost, as preparing them for adult work, and could mean apprenticeship to other families at early ages.

Hence, in the family economy, wealthy households often included many non-family members, from servants and slaves to apprentices. Conversely, those without the wealth to establish farms or businesses, and those blacks brought or born into slavery, worked for and lived with propertied households, and had difficulty establishing families of their own.

The era of separate sexual spheres.—The factory system moved commodity production and non-family workers out of the household into a separate, economic sphere. Family firms were gradually replaced by corporations, and family workers by hired, wage workers. Devoid of commodity production, the household became a personal, familial sphere—a home—seen as a caring, warm refuge from the harsh and competitive economy.

Home and economy became women's and men's spheres, respectively. The ideal marriage was between an economy-centered, competitive, "bread-winning" husband, who earned enough wages to support his wife as a homebound, other-serving, homemaker. At the same time, childhood became a separate life stage, during which the child was separated off from the world of work, nurtured and taught in home and school. Familial relationships became increasingly personal and emotional as arranged marriages were replaced with love matches, and parental love—especially motherly love and nurturing—superceded the family/economy view of one's children as little workers.

However, many families were unable to achieve this separate sphere ideal. When husbands were unemployed or unable to earn family wages, or were absent altogether, homemakers adjusted by sending their older children into the labor force, by taking in boarders, lodgers, or other homework for income, or by entering the labor force themselves. Labor force participation of wives was especially high among black families after Abolition, since whites used discrimination and Jim Crow laws to keep black men from entering family wage jobs.

Since women entered the labor force temporarily before marriage, or in the case of family emergencies, girls and women were segregated into low-wage, dead-end jobs which often involved serving others. To further the separate spheres ideal, child labor laws and "protective legislation" were enacted to keep women and young children from damaging themselves in the harsh masculine world of work. Policymakers responded to the biggest casualty of the separate spheres ideal, the mother and children who lost their husband/provider, by developing mothers' pensions which allowed mothers to stay home from work with their children, if at less than poverty standards.

The rise of egalitarian family.—In the early twentieth century, this separate sphere ideal was eroded by the increasing labor force participation of married women, which rose from 6 percent in 1900 to over 50 percent in 1980. Married women were drawn into the labor force to fill the needs of the family for more com-

[1] For a more complete treatment, see Julie Matthaei, "An Economic History of Women in America: Women's Work, the Sexual Division of Labor, and the Development of Capitalism" (New York: Schocken Books, 1982).

modities in an increasingly consumption-oriented society, and/or to utilize the abilities they were developing in higher education. These trends were aided by the availability of housework-saving commodities, and by the recruiting of women into the labor force during the two World Wars. The stagnation in men's real wages and the growth of structural unemployment in the smokestack industries which had provided so many family wage jobs, gave further impetus to married women's wage work in the nineteen seventies. By the late seventies, the separate sphere husband/wage-earner, wife/homemaker arrangement only characterized one third of husband/wife families; in the majority of the latter, both adults were in the labor force.

The entrance of married women into the labor force has put pressure on other aspects of the sexual division of labor. As women expect to spend more of their lives in the labor force, and to take on more of the earning responsibilities, they have begun to demand better wages and jobs—either by admission to male-dominated jobs, or by upgrading wages and working conditions in female-dominated jobs. The double-day of the wage-earning homemaker has put pressure on husbands to share in the housework and child-rearing. A more egalitarian marriage, in which spouses participate more equally in home and market work, and stay together out of love rather than financial or other needs, is emerging as a reality, and as an increasingly valued ideal. More equality within marriage has helped women speak out against wife-battering, and has inspired social concern as to the extent of spouse and child physical and sexual abuse within the family. Increasing numbers are daring to live in non-traditional family forms, from living together without marriage, to living alone or collectively, to living with a member of one's own sex.

However, those seeking more egalitarian families come up against an economy structured to complement the "separate spheres" marriage. First, to have equal earning power, women must have their access to male-dominated jobs assured by anti-discrimination/affirmative action legislation, and have the pay of female-dominated jobs upgraded by comparable worth initiatives. Second, since full-time jobs have been structured for workers without child-care responsibilities (traditional men or single women), they need to be made compatible with family responsibilities by shorter work weeks, more flexible work hours, accessible and affordable quality day care, and paid parental leaves.

Finally, the development of the more egalitarian marriage may have exacerbated the former problem of poverty among female-headed households. Decreased financial dependency and increased desire for love within marriage have brought rising divorce and remarriage rates, and great instability into childrens' lives. Most divorces still, according to separate sphere notions, award custody and hence financial responsibility to mothers, many of whom are still without access to family-wage jobs. Due to the high poverty risk in female-headed households, and the growing numbers of these households, about half of all poor today live in female-headed households. To solve this problem, the traditional remedies of alimony and child-support awards and enforcement must be strengthened, and AFDC support must be increased to the poverty level, and the penalty for supplementary work reduced. New remedies more consistent with the egalitarian family include joint custody, day care, job training and full employment legislation, and anti sex- and race-discrimination efforts.

[Pamphlet entitled "Capitalism and the Sexual Division of Labor: An Essay in U.S. Economic History," is retained in committee files.]

Mrs. BOGGS [presiding]. I am sorry, Mr. Levin was called to the telephone.

We are very, very happy to have your testimony. I am especially happy because my daughter, Cokey Roberts is a graduate of Wellesley.

Ms. MATTHAEI. I am glad to hear that.

Mrs. BOGGS. Dr. Mead, we will be happy to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE M. MEAD PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Mr. MEAD. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. The group of women that I would like to talk about is one that is having par-

ticular difficulties in the labor market. I mean welfare mothers and others who are dependent on the Government.

They work at much lower levels than other women. Probably only a quarter of the AFDC mothers are working or looking for work at any given time, compared to twice that proportion for other women with children. Of course, a great many people on welfare do work intermittently, and among the poverty population we also have a great number of working women and other workers. But in AFDC itself, the proportion that is measured as working is very low indeed, about 15 percent, and another 10 percent who are looking for work.

This creates a problem for them. It also creates a problem for social policy. It is embarrassing at a time when so many women are working to have a much lower proportion working among those who are dependent upon Government.

The thing I want to emphasize is that as far as we can determine this is not explained by conditions in the labor market, nor other economic factors. It is more plausibly explained by the character of welfare programs themselves.

Now there is a standard approach to the question of nonwork and welfare which emphasizes economic disincentives. Conservatives traditionally say that welfare sets up reasons for the poor not to work and not to stay together and take care of families. The Government allegedly pays people not to work and to split up. On the other hand, liberals say stronger work incentives, that is a greater capability to keep your earnings while you are on welfare, might well enable more people to work.

Unfortunately, research has not supported these theories. It doesn't look as if the incentives inherent in welfare either for or against work are very effective at motivating the poor one way or the other. They don't seem to respond very strongly.

Then there is another argument that is entertained mainly by liberals, that the economy doesn't generate enough employment for the poor and dependent. Thus, it simply isn't possible for them to find jobs in the economy, or if they can, they need more child care, more training, more other services than are presently available. So again, the assumption is that there is some barrier that must be keeping them out of work.

Well, it doesn't look this way. There are several forms of evidence to indicate that low-wage employment is widely available in the cities and elsewhere in the country. The presence of 5 million to 10 million aliens in the country is one sign of this. They are doing jobs for which Americans are apparently unavailable. Also, studies have shown that most of the unemployment amongst the poor and the dependent is due to turnover rather than lack of employment. These groups tend to enter and leave jobs very rapidly.

Earlier mention was made of the high-tech economy and the change in character of employment. Nevertheless because of the service sector it looks like the share of all jobs which are low skilled and therefore accessible to these groups has dropped hardly at all. According to one study in New York City, the proportion has dropped from 58 percent to 57 percent in the last 12 years. This is at the center of the so-called information economy. So it isn't nec-

essary for everybody to be a computer programmer in order to work today.

Nor is it the case that training is necessary for welfare women to work. Studies show that their own employability by measurable criteria such as education is not related to the probability of their getting off welfare by means of work.

Nor is the child care problem as great a barrier as is often indicated, because it looks on aggregate that most women who want to work arrange child care informally and prefer that. Government child care programs are a minor factor in supporting child care in this country and there is no indication of any great unmet need for child care.

So the economic theories for work and nonwork are really not persuasive. We really don't understand why these women work at much lower levels than the population in general.

I think a stronger case can be made that nonwork is due predominately to the fact that welfare and other programs on which these groups rely are permissive in character. Until very recently they simply have not required work of those who rely on their support.

We know from studies of the poor that they have mainstream desires. They want to work, they express the same goals as other women. However, they are markedly less resolute in actually working, in actually doing things required to go work, such as finding a job, arranging child care, and so on. Therefore, long-term welfare women, anyway, seem to require work requirements in order to get motivated and mobilized, to get out of the house, and to change their lifestyles so that they regularly are involved in work or training.

Some of the new workfare programs which have been instituted in AFDC since 1981 have been markedly effective in raising the levels of employment on welfare. This, it seems to me, is the way to go.

We have to institute work requirements as part of welfare in order to cause these women to work more actively. They themselves wish to, and their response to these work requirements has, in fact, been positive.

So we should look at that as an aspect of the employment strategy for families, especially for the dependent. The key to welfare work is for Government to support people but also require that they fulfill certain minimum expectations which are routine in this society.

The solution then is really governmental rather than through changes in benefits, income, or the character of the labor market. We simply have to view work as an aspect of dependency for these women in order to get them involved more fully in the labor market, and also to minimize the long-term problems of unemployment amongst the low skilled.

I would be glad to elaborate on these points.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Lawrence M. Mead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE M. MEAD, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

SUMMARY

Low levels of work effort among the welfare poor are a major cause of poverty and an embarrasment for social policy. The American people will not support greater benefits for the needy until more of the employable poor work regularly.

Conventional explantions of nonwork are unpersuasive. Conservative critics claim that welfare deters recipients from working. Liberals claim that stronger work incentives can overcome nonwork, and also that there is too little employment, day care, and training available to permit the dependent to work. But research has shown that welfare incentives affect work effort little either way, and that opportunities to work are widely available.

A better reason for nonwork is simply the permissive character of government policy. Welfare and other social programs seldom expect recipients to work. The poor want to work but are irresolute about doing so. Government must require as well as help them to work if it wants greater effort from them.

My name is Lawrence M. Mead. I am an Associate Professor of Politics at New York University. I have been researching federal welfare and employment programs for about ten years. Much of what I will say is drawn from my book, "Beyond Entitlement recently published by The Free Press."[1]

I. THE WORK PROBLEM

Nonwork by the poor themselves is a major cause of poverty in the U.S. A majority of today's poor live in families headed by employable adults, either female-headed families or single men. These families are usually needy, at least in the first instance, because the adults in them work irregularly at best. One recent estimate is that only 10% of all poor families include a full-time year-round worker.[2]

Nonwork is especially serious among welfare recipients. The main welfare program is Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). According to government surveys, only about 15% of AFDC mothers work at any given time. Only a quarter are working or looking for work, compared to well over half of single mothers with young children in the general population.[3]

Nonwork is embarrassing for social policy. A recent documentary by Bill Moyers dramatized this and other functioning problems among the dependent black poor.[4] We may believe that nonwork, illegitimacy, and crime are due ultimately to social causes. But since they arise initially from the behavior of the poor themselves, they undercut support for a humane antipoverty policy. The poor must do more for themselves before government will be able, politically, to do more to help them. Above all else, the employable poor must work more steadily than they do.

Why do they not work regularly? This testimony explores the usual answers and proposes a new one. My focus is on long-term AFDC welfare mothers, their teenage children, and on the low-skilled single men who usually father the children and often depend on the mothers for support. All these, unless disabled or in school, society commonly views as employable, yet they typically work much less consistently than the better-off.

The long-term dependent, meaning those who stay on the rolls five years or more, comprise only 38% of all AFDC cases.[5] And the long-term poor, of which they are a large part, comprise only a small percentage of all those who experience poverty.

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[1] Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Free Press, 1986).

[2] Marvin H. Kosters, "An Increase Would Hurt Teen-Agers," New York Times, March 30, 1986, p. F2.

[3] Beyond Entitlement pp. 74–5. The proportion of welfare mothers working anytime in the year is higher, perhaps a third or more. In addition, many welfare women work without reporting the income to welfare. While these facts indicate a capacity to work, they do not solve the welfare work problem, since the effort is seldom sustained and working "off-the-books" involves cheating on welfare. See Mildred Rein, Dilemmas of Welfare Policy: Why Work Strategies Haven't Worked (New York: Praeger, 1982), chs. 5–6.

[4] "The Vanishing Black Family," CBS–TV, January 25, 1986.

[5] Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood, "The Dynamics of Dependence: The Routes to Self-Sufficiency," study prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services (Cambridge, Mass.: Urban Systems Research and Engineering, June 1983), ch.2.

But is these groups are limited in number, they make up most of the group that federal social policymakers worry most about—those who are both poor and have serious problems in social functioning, what is increasingly called the lower or underclass.[6]

The traditional view of the right has been that welfare benefits tempt their recipients to nonwork, of the left that more government benefits could improve work effort. Liberals also contend that government must provide many more jobs and services before the poor can work consistently.

Experience and reseach does not support these contentions. The incentives generated by welfare do not seem to affect work levels much either way, and the opportunity to work seems widely available in the private sector. Rather, nonwork seems rooted in the irresolute attitudes the persistently poor have toward work and in the permissive character of antipoverty policy. Welfare and other programs seldom demand that their recipients work in return for support. This allows the recipients' own ambivalence toward work to go unchallenged. Requirements that enforce work for the dependent seem essential to raise their work levels.

II. THE CONSERVATIVE VIEW

Conservative critics of welfare have long argued that AFDC sets up incentives for recipients not to marry and not to work. Allegedly, fathers abandon their families in order to qualify them for benefits, since eligibility is limited mostly to single parents with children. Recipients decline to work because any earnings would be deducted from their grants, leaving them no incentive to work.[7] Charles Murray contends that the expansion of welfare and other benefits for the poor in the late 1960's actually reversed the progress the country was making against poverty.[8] Hence, welfare for working-aged adults should be abolished or sharply limited, in order to force them to work and be responsible parents. Only the needy elderly and disabled truly deserve government support because they cannot support themselves.

It sounds plausible that individuals will avoid marriage and work if government pays them to do so. It is true that states with higher AFDC benefits do tend to have lower levels of work among welfare recipients. The experiments in income maintenance that the government ran during 1968-78 showed that giving poor families money did depress their work levels somewhat.[9] Unquestionably, as Murray says, functioning among the seriously poor deteriorated sharply from the late 1960s, the period when social spending boomed.

However, these incentive effects are slight. So are the effects of welfare on the prevalence of illegitimacy and family breakup among recipients. A recent study found that about the only clearcut incentive effect of higher benefits was to encourage young welfare mothers to leave home and set up their own households.[10] And if dysfunction rose with social spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it did not fall in the years after, a period when, allowing for inflation, welfare benefits fell by a third. This line of research only begins to explain the massive growth in female-headedness and dependency among the poor in the last generation.[11]

III. THE LIBERAL VIEW

Liberals, by contrast, say government benefits are inadequate, rather than too generous. They think that nonwork and family breakup on welfare can be overcome, not by reducing benefits, but by strengthening work incentives and covering two-parent families. Rather than throw the employable off the rolls to fend for

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[6] Greg J. Duncan et al., Years of Poverty, Years of Plenty: The Changing Fortunes of American Workers and Families (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1984), ch.2.

[7] Martin Anderson, Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the United States (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); George Gilder, Welfare and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981).

[8] Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[9] Rein, Dilemmas of Welfare Policy, ch. 3; Leonard J. Hausman, "The Impact of Welfare on the Work Effort of AFDC Mothers," in President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs (Heineman Commission), Technical Studies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1969), pp. 83–100; Sheldon Danziger et al., "How Income Transfer Programs Affect Work, Savaings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 19, no. 3 (September 1981), pp. 983–99.

[10] David T. Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, "The Impact of AFDC on Family Structure and Living Arrangements," report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under Grant 92A-82, Harvard University, 1984.

[11] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Family and Nation" (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 141.

themselves, allow them to keep more of their earnings while on welfare, and they will have more reason to work. Allow benefits for intact families, and the incentive for families to divide is removed. Reasoning like this lay behind the welfare reform plans proposed by Presidents Nixon and Carter. [12]

Liberals also blame rising social dysfunction on the economy or government rather than the poor themselves. They say that declining welfare and other benefits, along with economic recession, mostly accounts for the recent growth in poverty.[13] Nonwork arises from insufficient employment and from government's failure to provide the child care and training needed for the poor to work. While traditional racial discrimination has declined, blacks are still victimized because their skills no longer fit a changing economy. Manufacturing has collapsed and been replaced by a "high-tech" economy demanding extensive education, while most of the poor have only manual skills.[14] Thus, if government wants the poor to work, it must create jobs for them.[15]

Research has not supported these theories either. Stronger work incentives were incorporated in AFDC in 1967, then largely withdrawn in 1981, Neither step much affected work levels among recipients, which remained low throughout. The income maintenance experiments offered their clients work incentives of varying strength, and these too had little effect. Furthermore, far from stemming family breakup, coverage of intact families may actually increase marital disruption.[16]

The idea that employment is inaccessible to the poor conflicts with evidence that work, at least in low-paid jobs, is available in most areas of the country. The mere presence of unemployment as the government measures it—the percentage of those working or seeking work who have no jobs—is often taken as proof that some jobseekers cannot find positions. But those numbers cannot be taken at face value.[17]

The nation has not known a true job shortage for at least a generation. The number of jobs in the economy rose by 20% in the 1960s, then by 26% in the 1970s, even though economic performance in other respects (inflation, productivity, real income growth) deteriorated. While many positions today do demand advanced skills, the "high-tech" economy seems to create at least as may low-skilled jobs. Literacy and the ability to get to work on time are sufficient to do many of them, for example data entry for computers or restaurant or hotel jobs in the proliferating service sector. At least in New York—a center of the "information economy"—the share of jobs that were low-skilled dropped only from 58% to 57% between 1972 and 1981.[18]

Some Midwestern and inner-city areas may still be depressed, but in general the low-wage labor market is tight and getting tighter. While one reason for rising unemployment in the 1970s was the massive "baby boom generation," then seeking jobs for the first time, the cohorts entering the market now are much smaller. This has created labor shortages in exactly the kind of entry-level jobs that should be most accessible to the low-skilled, especially in the suburbs.[19]

The rapid progress of many recent immigrants is proof that at least low-skilled employment is easy to get in most localities. Such is the demand that some 5 to 10 million illegal aliens have entered the country to take jobs that unemployed Americans do not want. The illegals number between a half and 1.5 million in and around New York City alone. They are needed to operate restaurants, factories, and laudries, in part, because over 300,000 employable adults are subsisting on welfare in

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[12] For a classic statement, see Michael C. Barth et al., "Toward an Effective Income Support System: Problems, Prospects, and Choices" (Madison, WI: Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

[13] David Ellwood and Lawrence Summers, "Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the Problem?" and Sheldon Danziger et al., "Antipoverty Policy: Effects on the Poor and the Nonpoor," papers written for the Conference on Poverty and Policy: Retrospect and Prospects, Institute for Research on Poverty and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Williamsburg, VA, December 6–8, 1984.

[14] William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions, 2nd Ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[15] Leonard Goodwin, Causes and Cures of Welfare: New Evidence on the Social Psychology of the Poor (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983), ch. 7.

[16] "Measuring the Effects of the Reagan Welfare Changes on the Work Effort and Well-Being of Single Parents," Focus (Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin), vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1985), pp. 1–8; John H. Bishop, "Jobs, Cash Transfers and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis of the Evidence," Journal of Human Resources, vol. 15, no. 3 (summer 1980), pp. 301–34. See also note 9.

[17] The rest of this section relies heavily on Beyond Entitlement, ch. 4.

[18] Thomas Bailey and Roger Weldinger, "A Skills Mismatch in New York's Labor Market?" *New York Affairs*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 1984). pp. 3–18.

[19] William E. Schmidt, "Growing Job Problem: Finding People to Work," New York Times, October 28, 1984, p. 26; Dirk Johnson, "Labor Scarcity Is Forcing Up Low-Level Pay," New York Times, March 17, 1986, pp. B1–B2.

the city. The proportion of adults working or seeking work in New York is only 51%, well below the national average of 61%, and nonwork on welfare is a major reason.[20]

Despite high measured unemployment among blacks, women, and youth, the groups of greatest concern to social policy, studies have shown that they actually have little more difficulty finding jobs than the better-off. Some members of these groups experience prolonged joblessness, but the usual pattern is rapid turnover in jobs.[21] The low-skilled both enter and leave work quickly. On surveys they say that finding low-paid jobs is fairly easy, but the jobs are unacceptable in pay or conditions. Thus, they tend to be dismissed, or simply to leave.[22]

Of course, if the turnover stopped and all the jobless accepted work at once, there might finally be too few jobs to go around. It is also true that "good" or "decent" jobs—those that are not "dirty" and pay middle-class incomes—are still scarce, especially for the low-skilled. But to say the dependent should have "good" jobs is very different than to say no jobs are available. It raises an issue more of social standards than of economics. There may be an argument for improving the wages or benefits of the "working poor" in some way. But the notion that lack of employment bars the poor from working cannot be sustained.

Nor is the presence of children a definite barrier to work. It was once thought that having preschool children made a welfare mother unemployable. That presumption has weakened as work has become usual for mothers in the general population. Bane and Ellwood found that mothers with young children were if anything more likely to earn their way off welfare than those with older children. Two-thirds of all women who escaped welfare through work had children under school age.[23]

Nor is child care the barrier it is often said to be. The idea that massive day care programs are needed before welfare women can work is based on the presumption that only government can arrange the care, and only in public day care centers. In reality, single mothers who want to work typically arrange their own care with friends and relatives. They generally prefer informal arrangments as cheaper and more convenient than centers, even when the latter are available. Only about 8% of working mothers use day care centers, and only 10% of mothers say that their decision to work turns on the availability of care. These findings are, if anything, more true of poor than better-off women; it is the latter who most often lack contacts in their neighborhoods and thus need center care.[24]

Nor are welfare recipients barred from work by a lack of skills. Welfare mothers are more employable than is commonly realized. Compared to a generation ago, the average mother is younger, better educated, and burdened with fewer children. By 1979, only 26% of AFDC mothers were over 35, at least 22% were high school graduates, and only 29% had more than two children.[25] The trends make it all the more puzzling why recorded work levels on AFDC have not risen. More important, research has shown that these measurable characteristics of mothers has little to do with whether and how much they work. Women who look less employable are almost as likely to go to work as those with skills.[26] That suggests that the mother's commitment to work is really primary.

Of course, training programs might qualify recipients for "better" jobs that they would be more likely to keep. But the evaluation history shows that the impact of training on skills and earnings is quite limited for most recipients. This is true even for welfare mothers, who have shown some response to intensive training efforts

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[20] Miriam Ostow and Anna B. Dutka, Work and Welfare in New York City (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 8; Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton, "Koch Should Help Poor New Yorkers," New York Times, January 11, 1986, p. 23.

[21] Robert E. Hall, "Why Is the Unemployment Rate So High at Full Employment?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1970, no. 3, pp. 369–402; Kim B. Clark and Lawrence H. Summers, "Labor Market Dynamics and Unemployment: A Reconsideration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1979, no. 1, pp. 13–72.

[22] Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, The "Deserving Poor": A Study of Welfare Administration (New York: Academic Press, 1971), found that of mothers who leave welfare by working, "three-fourths claimed it was easy to find a job" (p. 182). About the same proportion of black youth say this, according to Richard B. Freemand and Harry J. Holzer, "Young Blacks and Jobs: What We Now Know," The Public Interest no. 78 (Winter 1985), pp. 18–31.

[23] Bane and Ellwood, "Dynamics of Dependence," pp. 29–47.

[24] Suzanne H. Woolsey, "Pied-Piper Politics and the Child-Care Debate," Deedalus, vol. 106, no. 2 (Spring 1977), pp. 127–45; B. Bruce-Briggs, "Child Care': The Fiscal Time Bomb," The Public Interest no. 49 (Fall 1977), pp. 87–102.

[25] Beyond Entitlement table 4.

[26] Bane and Ellwood, "Dynamics of Dependence," ch. 3; Judith Mayo, Work and Welfare: Employment and Employability of Women in the AFDC Program (Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, 1975), p. 65.

such as supported work.[27] For most recipients, the best hope for raising their incomes is simply to work more hours in the elementary jobs they are already able to get. In practice, much of what training programs do is try to motivate them to do this. Thus, while training efforts may be worthwhile, they are unlikely by themselves to elevate work levels on welfare.

As a last resort, government might create "better" jobs for the dependent. The Carter Administration funded some 750,000 "public service employment" (PSE) positions in local government and nonprofit agencies under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). The jobs offered better pay and conditions than most of their recipients could command in the private sector. The trouble was that few clients "transitioned" to unsubsidized jobs when their PSE ended; more often, they went on unemployment or welfare or withdrew from the labor force.[28] Government jobs could not overcome their reluctance to work steadily at the jobs normally available to them.

Government could of course maintain government jobs for the poor indefinitely, in effect a separate economic sector for the least skilled and committed workers. But this would raise questions of cost and, more important, of justice. It is difficult to see why government should provide "better" jobs to the dependent while many non-dependent Americans, often recent immigrants, do "dirty" jobs every day. That feeling, as much as cost, contributed to the abolition of PSE in 1981.

IV. THE NEED FOR OBLIGATION

Thus, the traditional viewpoints substantially fail to explain nonwork. The reason may be, as Ken Auletta has noted, that they are so relentlessly economic.[29] They assume that the poor behave in an economic way, that is that they act "rationally" in response to economic incentives. If they fail to work, the reason must be that it is not worth their while.

But, to put it bluntly, if the dependent were this sensitive to economic payoffs, they would not be poor in the first place. Nonwork, illegitimacy, and the other dysfunctions of the underclass are not "rational" from any viewpoint—that of the individual or society, short- or long-term. The long-term poor seem in fact to be extremely unresponsive. Neither the opportunities already available to them nor the persuasions of a train of government programs have reached them. Social dysfunction, including nonwork, remains a mystery.

If nonworkers were rational, they would accept the low-paid jobs they are able to get and then search for better ones while working, rather than not working at all. If welfare recipients were rational, most would presumably work themselves off welfare. Those who do are better off economically and from every other viewpoint. Nor is it rational not to work unless one can earn enough to get entirely off welfare, as is often claimed. A mother may work and still receive some assistance, until she is able to get entirely off. Economists find that voluntary nonwork is simply inexplicable in economic terms.[30]

Of course, work makes demands. Jobseekers must acquire the needed skills, find a job, plan transportation, arrange child care if necessary. The nonworking poor, and those who speak for them, commonly say that these tasks are "barriers" to work. But, as we have seen, the barriers are not notably higher for them than for other people. Do the logistics of working make it "rational" not to work—or unreasonable? The real issue is again one of social standards: what degree of competence is normally expected of citizens? Americans tend to assume that individuals should at least act consistently to achieve their goals—that is, do what is necessary to reach them.

The long-term poor are apparently not consistent in this sense. They profess the same mainstream values as the better-off; they want to work, succeed, maintain their families, obey the law, etc. But their behavior diverges much further from these norms than is usual. In the "culture of poverty," values are orthodox but are understand as aspirations, to be fulfilled if possible, rather than as binding obligations. The poor have apparently been socialized, but not to the point where norms

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[27] Henry J. Aaron, "Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1978), pp. 125–8; "Summary and Findings of the National Supported Work" Demonstration (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, 1980).

[28] Congressional Budget Office CETA Reauthorization Issues (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1978), pp. 17–19.

[29] Ken Auletta, The Underclass (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. xiii–xviii, 268–97, 319.

[30] Clark and Summers, "Labor Market Dynamics and Unemployment," pp. 46–60; Lester C. Thurow, Dangerous Currents: The State of Economics (New York: Random House, 1983), ch. 7.

closely govern actual conduct. This pattern, in turn, reflects the erratic parenting common among the poor.[31]

Specifically, the poor say they want to work as much as the better-off, yet in practice many accept welfare in place of low-skilled employment. Welfare mothers profess a desire to work but often reject the menial jobs offered to them, for instance work as domestics. They see little point in accepting "dirty" jobs since they have failed to succeed in the workplace in the past.[32]

Typically, the poor feel barred from work by forces beyond their control. They say government must arrange for jobs, training, child care, and so on, before they can work. They lack a sense of personal efficacy—the belief that they can achieve things on their own, and that success will be due mainly to their own efforts. Individuals who are motivated in this sense tend to be more successful. Whether these attitudes actually cause success is disputed among researchers, but a connection is probable for the groups of greatest interest here—welfare mothers and black female family heads.[33]

Thus, the key to elevating work levels on welfare is to close the gap between the professed ideals of the poor and their actual behavior. Somehow, they must be brought to view as obligatory the norms of work and self-reliance that they already have in their heads. They would then usually be able to work, given the evidence that opportunities are accessible. They would finally be "rational"—able to act according to their goals.

If the gap is not closed, the reason may simply be that social programs do not seriously expect the dependent to function better than they do. Welfare has embodied no serious work requirements, except recently in a few states, and federal training programs have never required that recipients work in available jobs as a condition of eligibility. No federal antipoverty program has ever set clearcut performance standards for its clients. The permissive character of programs, that is, may be a much more important problem than how much is done for the poor, the usual subject of liberal-conservative debate.

The refusal of programs to demand that recipients help themselves may actually have entrenched the "welfare mentality"—the tendency of the dependent to expect all solutions to come from outside themselves. Liberal social analysis, which emphasizes the supposed barriers to work, fatally mimics the world view of the dependent themselves. Such reasoning can never overcome dependency, because whatever is done for the poor, they remain only recipients. Permissive programs never confront the passivity of the dependent, and thus achieve little change.[34]

The evidence is that simply to require work could raise work levels on welfare as nothing else can. My own studies of the Work Incentive (WIN) program, which is supposed to put employable AFDC recipients to work, showed that the most important thing a WIN office can do to move recipients into jobs is to obligate them to participate in job search or training. This had more influence on office performance than anything else, even the skills of the clients and the number of jobs available in the locality. The AFDC law was changed in 1981 to allow tougher work requirements; welfare mothers could now be required to work on pain of losing benefits. Some of the states with new welfare work programs have sharply raised the share of mothers participation in work or training, in some cases to well over half.[35]

Obligation, in other words, elicits a much stronger response than the merely economic benefits and incentives that have traditionally been offered to the dependent. Their reaction expresses more than a fear of benefit cuts. The new work requirements have not been implemented punitively, and the great majority of participants accept them as fair. Advocates for the poor usually oppose work tests, but they are not speaking for the recipients themselves. Many working recipients express pride that they are at last satisfying the work norm in which they always, in principle believed.[36] By closing that gap, work requirements fill a social need, but also the

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[31] Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives from the Social Sciences (New York: Basic Books, 1969), chs. 2, 7–9; Hyman Rodman, "The Lower-Class Value Stretch," Social Forces, vol. 42, no. 2 (December 1963), pp. 205–15.

[32] Leonard Goodwin, Do the Poor Want to Work? A Social-Psychological Study of Work Orientations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1972), pp. 46, 82–4, 101, 112.

[33] For a recent discussion and references to the debate, see Mary Corcoran et al., "Myth and Reality: The Causes and Persistence of Poverty," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1985), pp. 526–9

[34] Beyond Entitlement ch. 3; Auletta, The Underclass, chs. 3–15.

[35] Beyond Entitlement, ch. 7; Judith M. Gueron, Work Initiatives For Welfare Recipients: Lessons from a Multi-State Experiment (New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, March 1986), pp. 10–11.

[36] Gueron, Work Initiatives for Welfare Recipients, pp. 13–14.

need of the poor themselves. Far from punishing them, the stipulations take them at their word, that they seek to function like other Americans.

Thus, the solution to the work problem seems to lie in requirements for work or training attached to welfare and, perhaps, other antipoverty programs. To make welfare more demanding will achieve much more than further fiddlings with benefits and incentives. The extent and details of those requirements are another subject, and to implement them is difficult. Continued battles between conservatives and liberals over the scale of government will only get in the way.[37]

Mr. LEVIN [presiding]. Dr. Blau.

STATEMENT OF FRANCINE D. BLAU, PH.D., PROFESSOR, ECONOMICS AND LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Ms. BLAU. Yes; I would like to turn to an overview and talk about the impact of the economic status of women on family well-being.

Previous witnesses have already sketched out the most revolutionary changes that have occurred in the economic roles of women in recent years. The two most important for the family are the enormous increase in the labor force participation rates of married women to the point that the majority of married couples are, indeed, two-earner families, and the large increase in the number of families maintained by women.

As a result of these developments, an increasing proportion of American families have come to rely on the contribution of the woman or the wife or the mother, as a substantial determinant of their level of economic well-being. But at the same time, despite some improvements that I would like to mention, women continue to earn relatively low wages in the labor market and remain concentrated in traditionally female jobs.

This calls, in my opinion, for public policy attention to raising the wages of women workers in order to enhance the well-being of families.

Let's look at the earnings of women in a little more detail. The most widely used measure of the earnings gap between male and female workers is the earnings of full-time year-round workers. In 1984 women earned 64 percent of what men earned. This is a relatively low figure, but I would like to mention that it does represent some improvement dating from the late 1970's.

In 1977 women earned 59 percent of what men earned. And again, today, it is about 64 percent. So we are seeing some increase, that has been particularly marked as mentioned by Dr. Norwood, for the younger group of women, those aged 25 to 34, who increased their relative earnings by 10 percentage points between 1973 and 1983, from 63 percent of what men earned to 73 percent of what men earned.

Well, if we are going to address the problem of relatively low earnings that nonetheless remains, we have to look at the causes of this lower income. There are essentially two broad sets of causes that research by economists and sociologists have demonstrated to be of importance in explaining the earnings gap.

[37] Beyond Entitlement, chs. 6, 8.

First of all, women have lower earnings on average than men because, on average, they are less well qualified, for a variety of reasons that I will talk about in a minute. But also, nonetheless, even when we adjust for qualifications, differences in qualifications between men and women, a substantial gap remains that appears to be due to discrimination in the labor market. That is, women continue to fare less well than men, with similar qualifications.

First looking at the issue of qualifications itself. Why are women on average less well qualified than men?

Women who adhere to traditional roles within the family tend to accumulate less labor market experience than men and to be more loosely attached to the labor force. Thus, they have fewer incentives as well as less opportunity to acquire on-the-job training. As a result they will be less skilled and will receive lower earnings than men.

Also, to the extent that women are less likely to remain with a particular employer than are men, their incentive to acquire skills that are specific to the firm is reduced, as well as the employer's incentive to provide such training to them. That such factors are important is suggested by the fact that, on average, women have about 3 to 6 years less work experience. Women in the labor force have about 3 to 6 years less work experience than men, and also about a year to half a year less job tenure, which is the length of time they spend with a particular employer.

In addition, some researchers have shown that the recent decrease in the earnings gap, although it is modest, the recent decrease in the earnings gap that has occurred in the 1970's and early 1980's, has been tied to the growing work experience of women, the growing commitment of women to the labor force.

However, it is important to emphasize that these differences in qualifications do not tell the full story of the male/female earnings differential. The proportion of the earnings differential between men and women that cannot be explained by differences in qualifications is often used as a measure of labor market discrimination.

By this measure a variety of studies indicate that labor market discrimination accounts for about half of the earnings differential. One problem that has been particularly singled out and identified is the continued tendency of women to be concentrated in low wage, traditionally female jobs. In 1980 about half of all women worked in jobs that were 80 percent or more female. As I just noted predominantly female jobs also tend to be low paying jobs.

This occupational segregation, as it is sometimes called, also reflects the choices of women and the discrimination that they face in the labor market. Some have argued, and I am sure there is some element of truth to it, that women tend to avoid jobs with lengthy training requirements.

At the same time, however, employer discrimination in recruitment and training, and hiring and promotion continues to keep women concentrated in their traditional areas.

Nonetheless here, too, we have seen some heartening progress, particularly in the 1970's, where this extensive occupational segregation has declined. This decrease has been particularly marked for younger women.

This in turn probably reflects some success of antidiscrimination policies and also the growing workforce attachment of women where it now pays them to train for these traditionally male jobs.

We have seen then even as families have come more and more to rely on women's contributions, we have, indeed, achieved some progress in the labor market, but nonetheless their economic status is such that it keeps down their contribution to family income. This is particularly serious in female-headed families where the women may well be the only potential earner.

It is just the case that the typical earnings available to women in the labor market simply do not afford their families a decent standard of living in many instances. It is not only the case that this results in a large and growing poverty population or one that is disproportionately comprised of families maintained by women, but it is also not realized that all women and their children are at risk of spending some period of time in a female-headed family.

Current estimates indicate that of children born in the early 1970's, one third of white children, and fully three-quarters of black children are expected to spend some time in families maintained or headed by women.

The only real way to enhance the economic status of such families is to enhance the economic status of women as a group, since we can't accurately predict when and which women will for some period of their lives be heading families.

At the same time, as we have seen, in a growing proportion of married couple families, the family has come to rely on the income of both parents to meet their consumption needs. So I think it is becoming foolish, as one of the questions elicited earlier, to view one's contribution as frivolous for extras, and unnecessary, and that is the wife's, and then view the husband's contribution in some sense as more important and necessary. I think very few of us would easily countenance a decline in our family income of 30 percent, or think that only frivolous or trivial things would have to go if such a decline occurred.

Well, how do we address from a policy perspective the low earnings of women? I think we have to look at both of these broad sets of causes that I mentioned earlier.

On the one hand, we have the lower qualifications of women, that is for women as a group, due primarily to their lower labor force attachment.

Two, we have to look at labor market discrimination. The discrimination issue is addressed by the continued enforcement of our antidiscrimination legislation. I think the concerns of this family are more addressed by the consideration of policies that would assist families in meshing work and family responsibilities.

Such policies include a wider and less costly provision of adequate child care, flextime work schedules, parental leaves, and things of this sort. Such policies would be enormously beneficial to families in a variety of ways.

First, they would directly increase the quality of family life and improve the care of children in light of the new and, as Dr. Norwood said, unchanging realities of the working mother.

Second, they would make it easier for women who still tend to bear the major responsibility for housework and child care, to see

to these tasks and still succeed on the job. This would also facilitate a more permanent attachment of women to the labor force and to particular employers. So these policies could enhance the labor market status of women and thus enhance family well-being.

Finally, they would encourage men to share more fully in homemaking and child care by making such activities more compatible with market work. Representative Johnson mentioned this point earlier, the revolution in roles that we are seeing is not just the movement of women out into the labor force, but the increasing involvement of men in child care and other homemaking responsibilities.

So far, the one change has been much larger than the other. But we are seeing an increase in men's involvement.

Addressing these issues would involve both the private and the public sector. I believe, and I think there is evidence to substantiate this in a growing number of studies, that as the work force is more increasingly comprised of workers with family responsibilities, that is not only women, but men who are taking a more active role, it is to the benefit of employers to institute policies that address these responsibilities. The benefits to the employer include a greater ease in recruiting workers, reductions in turnover and absenteeism, and tardiness of workers, and higher morale and productivity of workers.

Studies have been done, for example, of employers who have child care facilities or have supported child care among the workers and they found these advantages. So, I think, increasingly employers will perceive these advantages.

For example, in 1985, 2,000 corporations provided some child care assistance to their workers. Now, this is out of a total of 6 million employers, it is a very small relative amount. On the other hand, it was triple the number of 3 years previously. So, I think employers are increasingly coming to realize these advantages.

According to one study, 95 percent of major corporations provide short-term disability for pregnancy, and 90 percent provide some form of unpaid parental leave for a 3- to 6-month period for their female workers. Only 40 percent, however, provided parental leave opportunities for their male employees. I would emphasize that these are studies primarily of major corporations and these programs may not be as prevalent in smaller firms.

So, I think that there is still, in light of the desirability of these policies from a social perspective, there is still reason for the examination of possible Government intervention to achieve these ends.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Francine D. Blau follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCINE D. BLAU, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, IL

The post-World War II period has witnessed a rapid growth in female labor force participation and a steady narrowing of sex differences in the extent of participa-

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Portions of this testimony draw upon work done in collaboration with Marianne A. Ferber, especially in our book, "The Economics of Women, Men and Work" (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986)

tion in work outside the home. In 1940, 83 percent of men participated in the labor force as compared to 28 percent of women. By January 1985, 77 percent of men and 55 percent of women were labor force participants.[1] In 1940, women comprised 25 percent of the paid labor force. Today 44 percent of labor force participants are female.

The overall increase in female labor force participation over the past 40 years is in large part a reflection of the changing economic role of married women. The proportion of married women who worked outside the home has risen from 15 percent in 1940 to 54 percent in 1985. Thus, the two-earner family is increasingly becoming the norm among married couples. In addition, there has been a sharp increase in the number of families maintained by women. Such families now comprise a substantial proportion of American families—in 1984, one in six families were maintained by women.

As a result of these developments, an increasing proportion of American children have mothers who work outside the home. In 1985, 62 percent of mothers were in the labor force, in comparison to 36 percent in 1966. Thus, American families have come to increasingly rely on the economic contribution of women through market work as a significant determinant of their level of economic well-being.

In the first section of this testimony, we review the economic contribution of women to family well-being. In the second section, we examine gender differences in labor market outcomes and the reasons for these differences. In the final section, we discuss our conclusions and the implications for policy of these findings.

I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN TO THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FAMILIES

Married women

In 1940, the typical female worker was young and single. Women tended to leave the labor force permanently upon marriage and childbearing. Between 1940 and 1960, growing numbers of older married women began to enter or reenter the labor force when their children reached school age. Since 1960, a new pattern of labor force participation has been emerging in which a substantial portion of married women remain in the labor force continuously, or with only brief interruptions, throughout the childbearing years. This is indicated by the sharp rise in the percentage of married women with children under 6 years of age who were labor force participants from 19 percent in 1960 to 54 percent in 1985. As may be seen in Table 1, 51 percent of married mothers with children under 3 worked outside the home, including nearly half of mothers of infants. Among married women with children 3 to 5 years old, 59 percent were in the labor force. The figures were considerably higher among black families, where 69 percent of married women with children under 6 were in the labor force.

The substantial economic contribution of working wives is suggested by the data in Table 2. The median income of married couples in which the wife worked was 47 percent higher than in married couples in which the wife was not in the paid labor force. Among minorities the income gain was considerably larger. Couples in which the wife worked outside the home were also less likely to have incomes below the poverty line than other married couples.[2] Two-earner families also enjoy greater protection from the ups-and-downs of the business cycle to the extent that the impact of a job loss or an hours cut-back for one spouse may be cushioned by the continued employment of the other spouse.

Women maintaining families

Families maintained by women are primarily comprised of women and dependent children. Their numbers have increased in recent years primarily due to rising divorce rates, with the greater proportion of births to unmarried women also a contributing factor. Currently, such families comprise 16 percent of all families, with considerably higher proportions among minorities (Table 3). Moreover, three-quar-

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[1] The statistics in this testimony are from a variety of government sources, including various issues of "Employment and Earnings" and the "Current Population Reports," Series P-60 of the Census Department. For a fuller discussion of many of these trends, see Blau and Ferber (1986a).

[2] Of course, couples in which the wife works outside the home may differ in a variety of other respects from those in which she is not employed. Thus, not all of the income difference between the two types of families is necessarily due to the wife's employment. However, similar conclusions regarding the wife's contribution are reached when we look directly at her earnings contribution. In 1983, among families in which both the husband and wife had earnings, the ratio of their median earnings was 44 percent.

ters of black and one-third of white children born in the 1970's are now expected to spend at least some time in a female-headed household.

Table 3 also shows that families maintained by women have considerably lower median incomes and a considerably higher incidence of poverty than other families. Thus, as the number of such families has risen, they have come to comprise an increasing proportion of the poverty population, especially when children are present. In 1984, 48 percent of poor families were maintained by women. Of children living in families with incomes below the poverty line, 53 percent were in families maintained by women, up from 24 percent in 1959. Among blacks, in 1984, fully three-quarters of children living in poverty were in families maintained by women.

Both public transfer payments (e.g., welfare programs) and private transfers (e.g., child support, alimony) have a role to play in improving the economic status of families maintained by women. However, these have not in the past and are not likely in the future to be sufficient to solve the poverty problem among this group.[3] Thus, measures which would raise the market earning of these women are most likely necessary. A substantial proportion of female heads participate in the labor force, 71 percent of white heads with children and 61 percent of black heads (see Table 1). However, at present their market earnings are simply too low to enable many of these families to achieve a decent standard of living. And for many of those outside the labor force the money that they could earn may be too little to make market work worthwhile, especially after taking into account the costs of child care and other work-related expenses. Since all women (and their children) are at risk of living in a female-headed household, policies to benefit female heads are, in the last analysis, the same as those needed to raise the earnings of women in general.

II. THE LABOR MARKET STATUS OF WOMEN

Occupations of women workers

The most casual inspection of the labor market reveals that men and women tend to be employed in different occupations. This is evident even for the major occupation groups shown in Table 4. In both 1972 and 1984, women were heavily concentrated in the administrative support (including clerical) and service occupations. Together these two categories accounted for 48 percent of women workers in 1984. Men were more heavily represented in executive administrative and managerial positions, and even more so in precision production, craft and repair occupations, which are the strongholds of skilled blue collar workers, as well as farming, forestry and fishing.

While the situation was roughly similar in both years, Table 4 reveals some improvements over the period. Women were less concentrated in administrative support and service occupations in 1984 than they had been in 1972 when 53 percent held such jobs. They also made considerable inroads into executive and managerial jobs, increasing their share of such positions from 20 percent in 1972 to 34 percent in 1984. Nonetheless, the figures in Table 4 amply demonstrate that considerable sex differences in occupational distribution remained.

These occupational differences between men and women are often referred to as "occupational segregation" by sex. The data on major occupations presented in Table 4 do not reveal the full extent of such occupational segregation by sex. For example, among sales workers, women tend to be employed as retail sales clerks while men are more likely to be manufacturing sales representatives. Among professionals, women tend to be concentrated in the traditionally female professions, like librarian, nurse, prekindergarten, kindergarten and elementary school teacher. Men are more likely to be in the traditionally male professions, including engineer, lawyer and physician. A listing of jobs in which women comprised more than 90 percent of workers in 1980 is shown in Table 5. When sex differences in occupations are examined using data on detailed occupational categories such as these, it is found that, in 1980, almost half of all employed women worked in occupations that were at least 80 percent female (Rytina, 1981). The extent of gender differences in occupational distributions is also indicated by the finding that 6 out of 10 women (or men) in the work force would have had to change jobs in order for the occupational distribution of the two groups to be the same (Beller, 1984).

As substantial as this estimate of segregation is, it does represent some progress in reducing segregation, especially since 1970 (Beller, 1984). This decrease in segregation was larger for younger women. The gains have been concentrated in the pro-

[3] Evidence of the potential effectiveness of these approaches is reported in Bergmann and Roberts (1984).

fessional and managerial categories, where some remarkable increases in the representation of women in traditionally male occupations have occurred. However, little progress has been made in integrating male blue collar jobs. Examples of both the former and the latter are shown in Table 6.

In evaluating this progress, it is important to bear in mind that there is actually considerably more segregation than is indicated by any measure that focuses even on such detailed occupational categories. This is the case because there tend to be substantial differences in the specific jobs men and women do within such classifications, and where they do them. There are, in many cases, male and female subspecialties. There is a great deal of "vertical" segregation, with men at the top of the hierarchy, having more status, more autonomy and often more authority, while women tend to be at the bottom (Blau and Ferber, 1986a). Additionally, men and women are frequently segregated by industry and even by firm (Blau, 1977). The impact of these factors is illustrated in the findings of Bielby and Baron (1984). Using the employer's own extremely detailed job classifications, they reported that of over 400 work organizations in their sample, 59 percent were perfectly segregated by sex—no men and women shared the same job title. In the remainder of firms the median amount of segregation was 84.1 percent—that is, 84 percent of the women (or men) would have had to change jobs for the occupational distribution of the two sexes to have been the same.

In view of all these facts there is some questions of how meaningful the observed decline in occupational segregation is, without evidence that these other types of segregation are also diminishing. Beyond that, there is some concern that occupations which have become integrated as a result of an influx of women may once again become segregated as men increasingly move out or at least no longer choose to enter them. There have been such instances before. Among the best known historical examples are primary school teachers, secretaries, and, more recently, bank tellers. Current examples of occupations that have become predominantly female include computer operators, where women increased their proportion from 33.9 percent in 1970 to 59.1 percent in 1980, and insurance adjusters, where the proportion of females increased from 29.6 to 60.2 percent over the period.

Nonetheless, it is highly likely that the recent gains in reducing segregation do represent some measure of real progress for women. In light of the growing tendency, especially among young women and men, to acquire more similar amounts and kinds of education and work experience (Blau and Ferber, 1986a; O'Neill, 1985; and Smith and Ward, 1984), there is room for cautious optimism that segregation will continue to decline in the future.

The earnings gap

The most widely used measure of the earnings gap is the ratio of annual earnings of full-time, year-round female as compared to male workers. Table 7 shows the relevant data since 1955 when this information first became available. There are at least two ways of looking at these facts. One is that, though there have been some modest fluctuations during the intervening years, the ratio was virtually the same in 1984 as in 1955. Alternatively it may be noted that there was an increase albeit a slow and unsteady one from 58.9 percent in 1977 to 63.7 percent in 1984.

The latter interpretation gains further credence from the second series in Table 7, which shows the ratio of the usual weekly earnings of women relative to men's. These data have only become available more recently. It will be noted that in each year, the earnings ratio computed on the basis of weekly earnings is slightly higher than the annual figure. More important, there was a fairly steady upward trend from 61.3 percent in 1978 to 68.2 percent in 1985, averaging about one percentage point per year.

On the basis of these data, we tentatively conclude that there has been a trend towards a narrowing of sex differentials in earnings beginning in the late 1970's or early 1980's (see also, Blau and Beller, 1986; O'Neill, 1985; and Smith and Ward, 1984). The data on trends in income ratios by age shown in Table 8 provide clues to the expected behavior of the male-female earnings gap in the future.

As may be seen in the Table, the earnings gains, like the declines in occupational segregation, have been particularly pronounced among younger workers. The relative income of women aged 25 to 34 as compared to men increased by almost 11 percentage points between 1973 and 1983. The data also suggest that younger women are likely to retain a substantial amount of the improvement in their relative earnings as they age. The relative income of women aged 35 to 44 in 1983 was only slightly less than that of those aged 25 to 34 ten years previously, while the income ratio of 45 to 54 year old women was actually somewhat higher than the figure for 35 to 44 year old women in 1973. Moreover, the fact that young women

are increasingly entering less traditional occupations and are spending more time in the labor market reinforces our conclusion that they are likely to continue to fare better than their predecessors at each point in the life cycle. As this occurs, the overall sex gap in income should decline considerably more as earlier cohorts of women with relatively lower earnings are replaced by more recent cohorts with relatively higher earnings.

Reasons for women's lower earnings

Women may have lower average earnings than men either because they are less well qualified than men, on average, or because, due to labor market discrimination, they fare less well than men with similar qualifications. The available evidence suggests that both factors play a role in producing the earnings differential. Let us consider each of these causes in turn.

The human capital model provides the most cogent explanation for gender differences in qualifications and their relationship to earnings (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). In this view, women who adhere to traditional roles within the family will accumulate less labor market experience than men and be more loosely attached to the labor force. They will thus have fewer incentives as well as less opportunity to acquire on-the-job training. As a result, they will be less skilled and will receive lower earnings than men. Also, to the extent that women are less likely to remain with a particular employer than men, their incentive to acquire skills that are specific to the firm is reduced as is the employer's incentive to provide such training to them.

That such factors are important is suggested by the fact that, on average, women have less work experience and job tenure (length of time with a specific employer) than men. For example, among workers aged 18 to 64 in 1975, average work experience was 14 years for white women and 16 years for black women, compared to 20 years for white men and 19 years for black men (Corcoran and Duncan, 1979). Among workers 16 years and older in January 1981, the median job tenure among women was 2.4 years for white women and 3.3 years for black women, in comparison to 4 years among white and black men. Evidence suggests that such differences in labor force attachment and other qualifications explain a substantial portion of the earnings gap between men and women—perhaps as much as half (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Corcoran and Duncan, 1979; Blau, 1984). Moreover, the recent decrease in the earnings gap has been tied to the increase in the work experience of employed women that began to occur during the 1970's (O'Neil, 1985; Smith and Ward, 1984). The increase in the labor force attachment of women may have also increased their incentive to enter traditionally male professional and managerial occupations where considerable specialized education and on-the-job training is often required.

The portion of the earnings differential between men and women that cannot be explained by gender differences in qualifications is often used as a measure of the importance of labor market discrimination. By this measure, the research cited above implies that discrimination would account for about half the earnings differential (see also Treiman and Hartmann, 1981). While some debate may attach to the specific quantitative magnitude to be attached to discrimination, the bulk of the evidence suggests that it is of considerable importance. This finding is impressive in that newly available data sets have permitted researchers to control for an impressive array of productivity-related factors in reaching this conclusion, including measures of formal education, work history, and commitment to the labor force.

The evidence also suggests that occupational segregation is of concern in that it plays a role in lowering women's earnings. Both male and female workers in predominantly female occupations tend to earn less than their counterparts in predominantly male occupations (Treiman and Hartmann, 1981; Blau, 1984; Reskin and Hartmann, 1986).

In terms of recent trends, the federal government's anti-discrimination effort may well have been a factor in reducing the earnings gap in recent years and in enabling women to gain access to higher paying male occupations (Beller, 1979; Beller, 1981).

Part-time work

Women are considerably more likely to be part-time workers than men. Of women who worked some time during 1984, 32 percent were part-time workers in

comparison to 14 percent for men (Smith, 1986).[4] The incidence of part-time work among women has not changed appreciably since 1960 for women, but has increased slightly for men—from 12 to 14 percent. Part-time work is in some respects an attractive alternative for women in that it allows them to more easily combine job and family responsibilities. However, the quality of opportunities available to part-time workers is a problem. Part-time workers frequently receive lower fringe benefits and often are excluded from opportunities to be hired for or promoted into high-level jobs. Emphasis needs to be placed on improving the long-term career opportunities associated with part-time employment.

Benefit levels

Above, we focused on the earnings of women relative to men. However, it is important to recognize that employee benefits (e.g., pensions, health insurance) comprise a substantial proportion of the total compensation of workers, and further that this form of compensation has expanded greatly since the 1940's (Root, 1985).

Unfortunately, data on the value of employee benefits by sex is not readily available. However, it is fairly certain that women's average level of benefits is lower than men's (Root, 1985). This is the case because (1) women have lower wages and levels of certain benefits tend to be proportional to wages, (2) they are more likely to be part-time workers than men, (3) they tend to work in smaller establishments where coverage by benefit programs is considerably less prevalent, and (4) they are more likely to be employed in the service sector where employer expenditures for employee benefits are lower than in manufacturing.

An additional problem in this area is that two-earner families may receive redundant or unwanted benefits, such as double health insurance coverage (Root, 1985). So-called "cafeteria plans" would solve this problem by allowing employees to choose among alternative benefit packages that are equally costly to the employer.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We have seen that the increase in married women's labor force participation and the growth in the female-headed family in recent years has greatly increased the importance of women's economic contribution to the well-being of the family. At the same time, while some progress has been achieved, women continue to earn substantially less than men. In 1984, the median earnings of women who worked full-time year-round were only 64 percent of those of men. Similarly, while women have made gains in entering traditionally male professional and managerial occupations, they remain concentrated to a great extent in traditionally female jobs.

Policies directed at raising the earnings of women workers will increase their contribution to family income. The evidence suggests that both gender differences in labor force attachment and labor market discrimination play a role in reducing women's earnings. Thus both of these aspects must be addressed.

The continued enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation is an important part of any effort to enhance the labor market status of women. Of possibly greater relevance to this committee would be policies which would assist families in meshing work and family responsibilities.[5] These include, for example, wider and less costly provision of adequate child-care, flextime work schedules, and parental leaves (available to mothers or fathers) for a period of time after childbirth. Such policies would be beneficial to families in a variety of ways. First, they would directly increase the quality of family life and improve the care of children. Second, they would make it easier for women—who still tend to bear the major responsibility for housework and child-care—to see to these tasks and still succeed on the job. They would also facilitate a more permanent attachment of women to the labor force (and to particular employers). Thus, such policies would increase the earnings of women workers and hence their economic contribution to the family. Finally, they would encourage men to share more fully in homemaking and child-care by making such activities more compatible with market work.

In general, employers will be motivated to institute such policies voluntarily, possibly to some extent in lieu of other worker benefits, to the extent that the resulting benefits to them exceed costs. For the individual employer, possible benefits include greater ease in recruiting workers, reductions in turnover, absenteeism and tardi-

[4] A smaller proportion of workers in the labor force at a point in time (as opposed to at some time during the year) are part-time workers. For example, in 1984, this figure was 12 percent for men and 28 percent for women, in comparison to 8 percent and 26 percent for men and women respectively in 1968 (Blau and Ferber, 1986a).

[5] For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Blau and Ferber (1986a).

ness of workers, and higher morale and productivity of workers. As more women take market jobs, and particularly as they move into higher level positions, employers' concern over the retention and job performance of women should become more urgent. Further, as men increasingly share in housework and childcare the pool of potential beneficiaries will be further increased. Thus it seems reasonable to expect growing interest on the part of employers in such policies. In light of the desirability of these policies from a social perspective, government intervention may also be deemed desirable to achieve these ends.

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TABLE 1.—LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF WOMEN BY FAMILY TYPE, PRESENCE AND SINGLE YEAR OF AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD AND RACE, MARCH 1985

Presence and age of child	Wives, husbands present			Women maintaining families		
	Total	White	Black	Total	White	Black
Total	54.3	53.4	64.2	61.0	63.0	56.3
No children under 18	48.2	47.5	56.1	50.7	51.9	46.6
With children under 18	61.0	60.0	71.5	67.8	71.2	61.2
Under 6 years, total	53.7	52.3	69.3	53.2	55.5	50.1
Under 3 years, total	50.7	49.8	65.7	44.5	45.7	43.5
1 year or under	49.4	48.6	63.7	38.0	39.2	38.4
2 years	54.0	52.7	69.9	55.7	55.9	54.0
3 to 5 years, total	58.6	56.6	73.8	61.2	64.6	56.0
3 years	55.1	52.7	72.3	54.8	55.1	55.0
4 years	59.7	58.4	70.6	61.8	66.1	53.6
5 years	62.1	59.9	79.1	66.7	71.7	59.4
6 to 17 years, total	67.8	67.2	73.7	76.6	79.5	70.2
6 to 13 years, total	68.1	67.7	73.5	75.7	78.1	70.9
6 years	64.5	63.3	79.4	76.0	76.7	73.2
7 years	67.3	66.5	74.3	75.5	73.9	78.6
8 years	69.2	68.4	(1)	69.8	73.6	64.0
9 years	66.2	65.9	(1)	78.8	82.3	70.9
10 years	68.2	68.3	70.9	79.6	82.5	73.5
11 years	69.2	69.7	(1)	72.9	77.0	63.4
12 years	71.4	70.2	80.2	75.5	79.3	65.7
13 years	69.5	69.8	60.7	76.8	78.9	75.8
14 to 17 years, total	67.0	66.3	74.1	78.5	82.1	68.4
14 years	70.3	69.2	79.7	78.6	83.7	68.0
15 years	67.9	68.1	63.6	73.5	75.3	65.5
16 years old	64.2	62.5	(1)	81.1	86.7	(1)
17 years	64.9	64.6	(1)	80.7	82.4	73.7

[1] Rate not shown where base is less than 75,000.

Note: Due to rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. Children are defined as "own" children of householder and include never-married sons, daughters, stepchildren, and adopted children. Excluded are other related children such as nieces, nephews, or grandchildren, and unrelated children.

Source: Howard Hayghe, "Rise in Mothers' Labor Force Activity Includes those with Infants," Monthly Labor Review 109 (February 1986), p. 44.

TABLE 2.—WIFE'S WORK STATUS AND THE MEDIAN INCOME OF MARRIED COUPLE FAMILIES, 1984

	Wife in paid labor force		Wife not in paid labor force		Difference in median income	
	Percent of couples	Median income	Percent of couples	Median income	Amount	Percent
All races	53.5	$34,668	46.5	$23,582	$11,086	47.0
Whites	52.5	35,176	47.5	24,246	10,930	45.1
Blacks	64.0	28,775	36.0	14,502	14,273	98.4
Spanish origin	49.1	27,609	50.9	17,160	10,449	60.9

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, series P-60, No. 149, August 1985.

TABLE 3.—ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AND INCIDENCE OF POVERTY BY TYPE OF FAMILY, 1984

	Number (thousands)	Median income	Percent below poverty level	Family type as a percent of all families	Family type as a percent of families in poverty
All races					
All families	62,706	$26,433	11.6	100.0	100.0
Married couple families	50,350	29,612	6.9	80.3	47.9
Male householder, no wife present	2,228	23,325	13.1	3.6	4.0
Female householder, no husband present	10,129	12,803	34.5	16.2	48.1

TABLE 3.—ECONOMIC WELL-BEING AND INCIDENCE OF POVERTY BY TYPE OF FAMILY, 1984—Continued

	Number (thousands)	Median income	Percent below poverty level	Family type as a percent of all families	Family type as a percent of families in poverty
Whites:					
All families	54,400	27,686	9.1	100.0	100.0
Married couple families	45,643	30,058	6.3	83.9	58.0
Male householder, no wife present	1,816	25,110	10.4	3.3	3.8
Female householder, no husband present	6,941	15,134	27.1	12.8	38.1
Blacks:					
All families	6,778	15,432	30.9	100.0	100.0
Married couple families	3,469	23,418	13.8	51.2	22.9
Male householder, no wife present	344	15,724	23.8	5.1	3.9
Female householder, no husband present	2,964	8,648	51.7	43.7	73.2
Spanish origin:					
All families	3,939	18,833	25.2	100.0	100.0
Married couple families	2,824	22,599	16.6	71.7	47.3
Male householder, no wife present	210	18,578	18.4	5.3	5.3
Female householder, no husband present	905	8,452	53.4	23.0	48.7

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, series P-60, No. 149, August 1985

TABLE 4.—OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND WOMEN 1972 AND 1984

[Annual averages]

Occupational category	1972			1984		
	Percent of male labor force in occupation	Percent of female labor force in occupation	Women as a percent of workers in occupation	Percent of male labor force in occupation	Percent of female labor force in occupation	Women as a percent of workers in occupation
Executive, administrative, and managerial	11.5	4.6	19.7	13.0	8.5	33.6
Professional specialty	9.7	12.4	44.0	11.6	14.0	48.5
Technicians and related support	2.3	2.4	38.4	2.8	3.3	48.1
Sales occupations	10.0	11.1	40.5	11.1	13.1	47.9
Administrative support, including clerical	6.4	31.5	75.0	5.7	29.1	79.9
Service occupations	8.3	21.2	61.1	9.4	18.7	60.8
Precision, production, craft, and repair	19.4	1.7	4.8	20.2	2.4	8.5
Operators, fabricators, and laborers	25.9	13.4	24.1	21.1	9.6	26.0
Farming, forestry and fishing	6.4	1.9	15.4	5.1	1.2	15.6
Total employed	100.0	100.0	38.0	100.0	100.0	43.7

Source: Employment and Earnings 31, no. 1 (January 1984), table 1, pp. 14–16 and Employment and Earnings 32, No. 1 (January 1985), table 21, p. 175 and table 22, pp. 176–80. Reprinted from Francine D. Blau and Marianne A. Ferber, "Occupations and Earnings of Women Workers," Women and Work: Industrial Relations Research Association Research Volume (1986).

TABLE 5.—SELECTED OCCUPATIONS MORE THAN 90 PERCENT FEMALE, 1980[1]

Bank tellers	91.1
Child care workers, except private household	93.2
Data entry keyers	92.4
Dental hygienists	98.5
Health record technologists and technicians	91.3
Licensed practical nurses	96.6
Private household occupations	95.3
Receptionists	95.8
Registered nurses	95.9
Secretaries, stenographers, and typists	98.3

TABLE 5.—SELECTED OCCUPATIONS MORE THAN 90 PERCENT FEMALE, 1980[1]—Continued

Teachers' aides	92.5
Teachers, prekindergarten and kindergarten	96.4
Telephone operators	91.0

[1]Data are for the experienced and civilian labor force aged 16 and over. Not all occupations are at the same level of aggregation.

Source: Bureau of the Census, Detailed Occupation of the Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Sex for the United States and Regions: 1980 and 1970, Supplementary Report PC80-S1-15, March 1984. Reprinted from Francine D. Blau and Marianne A. Ferber, The Economics of Women, Men, and Work (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, © 1986).

TABLE 6.—PERCENT FEMALE IN SELECTED TRADITIONALLY MALE OCCUPATIONS, 1970 AND 1980[1]

	1970	1980
Executive, administrative and managerial:		
Legislators, chief executive, general administrators, public administration	0	25.6
Financial managers	19.4	31.4
Personnel and labor relations managers	21.2	36.0
Purchasing managers	8.5	21.2
Managers, marketing, advertising and public relations	7.9	17.6
Management related:		
Accountants and auditors	22.7	38.2
Underwriters	0.0	58.5
Management analysts	10.3	25.2
Purchasing agents and buyers, n.e.c.	15.3	31.8
Inspectors and compliance officers, except construction	7.1	17.8
Professional specialty:		
Architects	4.0	8.3
Engineers	1.7	4.6
Computer systems analysts and scientists	13.6	22.5
Chemists, except biochemists	11.7	20.1
Atmospheric and space scientists	9.0	17.0
Physicians	9.7	13.4
Dentists	3.5	6.7
Veterinarians	5.3	13.3
Pharmacists	12.1	24.0
Teachers, post secondary	29.1	36.6
Economists	15.9	29.7
Lawyers	4.9	13.8
Precision production, craft, and repair:		
Mechanics and repairers	2.5	3.4
Construction trades	1.7	2.1
Tool and die makers	1.4	1.8
Machinists	3.0	4.9
Sheet metal workers	1.9	4.0
Operators, fabricators, and laborers:		
Welders and cutters	6.2	5.9
Truck drivers	2.2	3.3
Rail transportation occupations	1.2	1.6
Material moving equipment operators, other than miscellaneous	1.4	3.0
Construction laborers	1.9	3.2
Garbage collectors	1.6	3.0

[1]Data are for the experienced civilian labor force aged 16 and over. Not all categories are at the same level of aggregation.

Source: Bureau of the Census, Detailed Occupations of the Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Sex for the United States and Regions: 1980 and 1970, Supplementary Report PC80-S1-15, March 1984.

TABLE 7.—MEDIAN ANNUAL AND USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WOMEN WORKERS AS PERCENT OF MEN'S EARNINGS SELECTED YEARS, 1955–85

	Annual [1]	Weekly [2]
1955	63.9	.....
1960	60.8	.....
1965	60.0	.....
1970	59.4	62.3
1975	58.8	62.0
1976	60.2	62.2
1977	58.9	61.9
1978	59.7	61.3
1979	60.0	62.4
1980	60.2	63.4
1981	59.2	64.6
1982	61.7	65.0
1983	63.6	65.6
1984	63.7	67.8
1985		68.2

[1] Includes year-round, full-time workers only. Includes income from self-employment.
[2] Includes all full-time workers, regardless of weeks worked. Excludes income from self-employment.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 1977, U.S. Working Women: A Databook (1955–1975); Earl F. Mellor, "Investigating the Differences in Weekly Earnings of Women and Men," Monthly Labor Review, 107, No. 6 (June 1984), 17–28 (weekly earnings 1970–1983); Bureau of the Census, Population reports, Consumer Income Series P–60, Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States (annual earnings 1976–84), various issues; Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Labor Report, No. 23 (Feb. 4, 1986), p. B–6 (weekly earnings 1984–1985). Reprinted from Francine D. Blau and Marianne A. Ferber, "Occupations and Earnings of Women Workers," Women and Work: Industrial Relations Research Association Research Volume, K. Koziara, M. Moskow and L. Tanner, eds. (1986).

TABLE 8.—MEDIAN INCOME FOR WOMEN WORKING YEAR–ROUND, FULL–TIME AS PERCENT OF MEN'S INCOME, BY AGE

	1967	1973	1983
Age:			
25 to 34	62.2	62.6	73.3
35 to 44	55.1	52.5	61.3
45 to 54	54.0	52.3	56.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census: Current Population Reports, Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States, various issues. Reprinted from Francine D. Blau and Marianne A. Ferber, the Economics of Women, Men, and Work (Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, © 1986).

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Bowman, if you would like to proceed as mentioned, we know that you were delayed. Your entire testimony will be placed in the record. That is the normal procedure of the committee.

If you would like we are asking all the participants to limit themselves to 5 minutes, so there will be ample time for back and forth.

We welcome you here.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. BOWMAN PH.D., VISITING SCHOLAR, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR; ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Mr. BOWMAN. Thank you.

Basically, I am involved in a program of research that looks——

Mr. LEVIN. Put the mike a little closer to you, if you would.

Mr. BOWMAN. Basically, I am involved in a program of research that looks at the social/psychological aspects of unemployment, based on analysis of unique sets of national data on black Ameri-

cans, collected at the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan.

In this work I share the committee's interest in the value of work, recent changes in the types of jobs available, and the implications of who gets them or who fails to get them, on the economic security and psychological well-being of family members.

My studies on black Americans focus on a group which has serious difficulty finding and maintaining employment, and even worse, is at alarming risk for becoming even more economically marginal by massive reindustrialization and related labor market trends.

In the next few minutes, I will focus the crucial relationship between rapid displacement of unskilled industrial jobs, growing role strains within black families and related psychosocial consequences. This issue is not only theoretically interesting to me as a social psychologist but also raises some crucial policy questions since reindustrialization and displacement will continue at an accelerated pace throughout the 1980's, 1990's, and into the 21st century.

In the interest of time I will briefly highlight major concerns which are discussed in greater detail in two recent papers which are currently under review for publication. Specifically, I would like to emphasize the urgency of four related questions:

One, what differential impact are reindustrialization and displacement having on jobless black workers?

Two, how are the ripple effects of such displacement within the black families mediated by the diffusion of provider role strains?

Three, do such family provider role strains have harmful psychosocial consequences for black men, women, and children?

Finally, are there public policy implications that need to be addressed?

First of all with regard to the impact of reindustrialization on black workers. Historical data show that the industrial revolution marked blacks transition from agricultural to industrial worker, and black males have largely depended on unskilled labor and operatives jobs to support themselves and their families since that transition.

However, industrial planners now envision massive reindustrialization, particularly in the automotive and steel manufacturing sectors, where robotics and other computer controlled machines will virtually eliminate such jobs.

Black joblessness increases disproportionately as reindustrialization increases the number of plant relocations, plant closings, indefinite layoffs, and decreases the number of unskilled young black workers hired.

Although reindustrialization creates jobs, it eliminates more than it creates. Black workers, especially males, are hurt worse for two primary reasons: First of all, they are grossly overrepresented in the unskilled jobs eliminated, and B, they fail to compete well for highly technical jobs created, largely because of poor educational preparation.

Evidence also suggests that the differential impact of new industrial technology on black workers may be exacerbated by economic recession, increasing isolation in depressed urban communities, and

racial antagonism. Beyond official rates, trends in job search discouragement and labor force attrition among blacks may also be linked to differential displacement and related difficulty experienced in making successful employment transitions.

For example, while blacks have comprised about 10 percent of the population, they constitute about 20 percent of the unemployed, but have been known to make up as much as 40 percent of discouraged workers who become frustrated in job search, so frustrated in job search that they stop looking. Moreover, census data reveal dramatic drops in the proportion of black males employed between 1950 and 1980, from 74 percent in 1950, to 55 percent in 1980.

I might add that this dramatic decrease in labor force participation is not as widely noted as the increase in labor force participation among white women.

Black males have long experienced difficulties as primary economic providers for their families, because of restrictions to relatively low-paying unskilled jobs. However, as suggested in research I am involved in, which is highlighted in a figure that I have in the paper, black males may find it even more difficult to meet expectations as primary, or even secondary breadwinners, as reindustrialization accelerates their displacement from unskilled jobs.

Hence, provider role strain produced by related discouragement in job search, labor force attrition, and loss in employment income may not only impact on black males as individuals, but may also ripple through black families. The model that I am involved in suggests that provider role difficulties within black families defuses further into the family, and creates intense pressures on black women and children, who often are forced and compelled to seek work as a matter of economic survival.

We need to better understand the link between provider role difficulties among displaced black males and, one, the alarming numbers of households headed by females who must alone attempt to juggle primary caretaking and work in efforts to avoid welfare dependencies, and two, the crisis among jobless black youth who too often are compelled by family economic hardship to enter the labor market early but become discouraged because of diminishing opportunities.

A basic here that is not too often mentioned in discussions of, say, youth unemployment, is the critical role of increasing displacement and marginality among black fathers within the context of families, and the degree to which unemployment and supply of black youth and the labor market is at some level of consequence to this displacement.

The research models that I basically have conducted research around also suggest that the diffusion of provider role strains within black families carry clear psychological risks for black men, women, and children. Initial analysis of national data suggests that among black husband-fathers, objective provider role difficulties and related beliefs about their lack of success are both associated with intense psychological distress.

Among black mothers who work to contribute to family income both provider role demands and work demands are associated with distress but perceived difficulty in the mother role appears to be

particularly harmful. Among jobless black youth, many feel hopeless in their job search which increases their psychological risks for distress but does not reduce active job search efforts.

Other evidence suggests that, despite objective difficulties, black males maintain strong values for the provider role which may exacerbate the adverse psychological effects it has. Moreover, there is evidence that psychological distress is only partially offset by coping resources and is exacerbated when provider role problems are blamed on deficiencies in one's character, or produce a general sense of helplessness.

Future research should explore the degree to which failure, stress, and strain in the family provider role is associated with the higher risk among black males for familial estrangement, physical and mental health problems as well as substance abuse, crime, and other psychosocial problems often linked to an emerging black underclass.

I might mention in terms of policy implications that many of the policy implications for blacks as a consequence of reindustrialization tend to also to be true of other high-risk groups, for example, those presiding in industrial States or in areas that are hard hit by displacement of unskilled jobs particularly in the automotive and steel industries.

The adverse psychosocial consequences of provider role difficulties resulting from the differential impact of the reindustrialization on black men however, are not only costly to black women and children but also to American society in general. Responsive public policy should include short-run preventive intervention programs to promote effective individual and familial functioning, as well as long-term policies that address the increasing risk of black males for rapid displacement.

In response to the rapid displacement of black males from the labor force, short-run intervention could incorporate elements that address immediate psychosocial distress into more comprehensive employment transition programs that also include retraining, career development, and job placement. To increase effectiveness, such preventive intervention should build on exemplary employment transition programs being developed and evaluated by mental health professionals and researchers at the University of Michigan's Prevention Intervention Research Center.

Long-run industrial policy should be devised to address the differential impact of massive reindustrialization on black males who disproportionately depend on displaced jobs to support themselves and their families. Without such policies, provider role difficulties will likely be further exacerbated by the growing structural dislocation of black males from the labor market and related problems including job search discouragement, labor force dropout rates, entrapment in a growing urban underclass, and fractured black families.

Hence, if trends continue without responsive public policy, the long-run economic and social costs may well be far greater than the short-run cost of such initiatives.

[Prepared statement of Phillip J. Bowman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. BOWMAN, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

INTRODUCTION

I am an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and am currently on leave at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research [ISR]. During my leave, I am consolidating a program of research on social psychological aspects of unemployment based on analysis of a unique set of national data on black Americans collected by the Program for Research on Black Americans at ISR. This work provides an opportunity to go beyond the often disturbing official governmental statistics on black joblessness for a more penetrating examination of human consequences on black families, adults and children. In this work, I have shared the committee's interests in the value of work, recent changes in the types of jobs available and the implications of who gets them (or fails to get them) on the economic security and psychological well-being of family members. My studies on black Americans focus on a group which has had serious difficulty finding and maintaining employment and, even worse, is at alarming risk to become even more economically marginal by massive reindustrialization and related labor market trends.

In the next few minutes, I will focus on the crucial relationship between rapid displacement of unskilled industrial jobs, growing role strains within black families and related psychosocial consequences. This issue not only has theoretical interest to me as a social psychologist but also raises some critical policy questions since reindustrialization and displacement will continue at an accelerated pace throughout the 1980's, 1990's and into the 21st century. In the interest of time, I will briefly highlight major concerns which are discussed in greater detail in two recent papers which are currently under review for publication. Specifically, I would like to emphasize the urgency of four related questions: (a) What differential impact are reindustrialization and displacement having on jobless black workers? (b) How are the ripple effects of such displacement within black families mediated by the diffusion of provider role strains? (c) Do such family provider role strains have harmful psychosocial consequences for black men, women and children? (d) Are there public policy implications that need to be addressed?

IMPACT OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION ON BLACK WORKERS—JOBLESSNESS, DISCOURAGEMENT AND LABOR FORCE DROPOUT

Historical data show that the Industrial Revolution marked blacks' transition from argricultural to industrial worker and black males have largely depended on unskilled labor and operatives jobs to support themselves and their families since that transition. However, industrial planners now envision massive reindustrialization, particularly in automotive and steel manufacturing where robotics and other computer controlled machines will virturally eliminate such jobs. Black joblessness increases disproportionately as reindustrialization increases the number of plant relocations, plant closings, indefinite layoffs and decreases the number of unskilled young black workers hired.

Although reindustrialization creates jobs, it eliminates more jobs than it creates. Black workers, especially males, are hurt worst for two primary reasons: (a) they are grossly overrepresented in the unskilled jobs eliminated, and (b) they fail to compete well for highly technical jobs created largely because of poor educational preparation. Evidence also suggests that the differential impact of new industrial technology on black workers may be exacerbated by economic recession, increasing isolation in depressed urban communities, and racial antagonism. Beyond official unemployment rates, trends in job search discouragement and labor force attrition among blacks may also be linked to differential displacement and related difficulty experienced in making successful employment transitions. For example, while blacks have comprised about 10 percent of the population, they constitute about 20 percent of the unemployed but have been found to make up as much as 40 percent of discouraged workers who become so frustated in job search that they stop looking. Moreover, census data reveal dramatic drops in the proportion of black males employed between 1950 and 1980 from 74 percent to 55 percent respectively.

RIPPLE EFFECTS WITHIN BLACK FAMILIES—ROLE STRAINS

Black males have long experienced difficulties as primary economic providers for their families because of restrictions to relatively low paying, unskilled jobs. However, as suggested in figure 1, black males may find it even more difficult to meet

expectations as primary or even secondary breadwinners as reindustrialization accelerates their displacement from unskilled jobs. Hence, provider role strain produced by related discouragement in job search, labor force attrition and loss in employment income may not only impact on black males as individuals but may also ripple through black families. The model presented in figure 2 suggests that difficulties of black males in the provider diffuses further into black families to place intense pressure on black women and children who often seek work as matters of family economic survival. We need to better understand the link between provider role difficulties among displaced black males and: (a) the alarming numbers of households headed by females who must alone juggle primary caretaking and work in efforts to avoid welfare dependency; (b) the crisis among jobless black youth who too often are compelled by family economic hardships to enter the labor market early but become discouraged because of diminishing opportunities.


PSYCHOSOCIAL CONSEQUENCES—BLACK MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN

The research models in figures 1 and 2, which are guiding ongoing studies, also suggest that the diffusion of provider role strains within black families carries clear psychological risks for black men, women and children. Initial analysis of national data suggests that: (a) among black husband-fathers, objective provider role difficulties and related beliefs about their lack of success are both associated with psychological distress; (b) among black mothers who work to contribute to family income, both provider role demands and work demands are associated with distress but perceived difficulty in the mother role may be particularly harmful; (c) among jobless black youth, many feel hopeless in their job search which increases the risks for psychological distress but does not reduce active job search efforts. Other evidence suggests that, despite objective difficulties, black males maintain strong values for the provider role which may exacerbate adverse psychological effects. Moreover, there is evidence that psychological distress is only partially offset by coping resources and is exacerbated if provider role problems are blamed on deficiencies in one's character, or produce a general sense of helplessness. Future research should explore the degree to which failure, stress and strain in the family provider role are associated with the higher risk among black males for familial estrangement, physical and mental health problems as well as substance abuse, crime and other psychosocial problems often linked to an emerging black underclass.

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Figure 1


Psychosocial Consequences of Provider Role Strain:
A Heuristic Model



See: Bowman, P. J. "Provider role strain among black males:
Research issues, directions and implications". (under review)

Figure 2

Post-Industrial Displacement and Family Role Strains:
A Heuristic Model



See: Bowman, P. J. "Post-industrial displacement and family role strains: Challenges to the black family." (under review, P. Voydanoff (Ed.) Economic Distress and Families: Coping Strategies and Social Policy)

POLICY IMPLICATIONS—SHORT RUN AND LONG RUN

Adverse psychosocial consequences of provider role difficulties resulting from the differential impact of massive reindustrialization on black men are not only costly to black women and children but also to American society in general. Responsive public policy should include short run preventive intervention programs to promote effective individual and family functioning as well as long run policies that address the increasing risk of black males for rapid displacement. In response to the rapid displacement of black males from the labor force, short run intervention could incorporate elements that address immediate psychosocial distress into more comprehensive employment transition programs that also include retraining, career development and job placement. To increase effectiveness, such preventive intervention could build on the exemplary employment transition programs being developed and evaluated by mental health professionals and researchers at The University of Michigan's Prevention Intervention Research Center.

Long run industrial policy initiatives should be devised to address the differential impact of massive reindustrialization on black males who disproportionately depend on displaced jobs to support themselves and their families. Without such policies, existing provider role difficulties will likely be further exacerbated by the growing structural dislocation of black males from the labor market and related problems, including job search discouragement, labor force drop-out rates, entrapment in a growing urban underclass and fractured black families. Hence, if trends continue without responsive public policy, the long run economic and social costs may well be far greater than the short run cost of such initiatives.

RELATED MATERIAL

Bowman, P.J., Jackson, J.S., Hatchett, S.J., & Gurin, G. (1982). Joblessness and discouragement among black Americans. *Economic Outlook U.S.A.*, Autumn, 85–88.

Bowman, P.J. (1985). Black fathers and the provider role: Role strain, informal coping resource and life happiness. In A.W. Boykin (Ed.) *Empirical Research in Black Psychology* (pp. 9–19). Rochester, MI: Oakland University.

Harrison, A.O., Beale, R.L., Bowman, P.J. (1985). Role strain, coping resources, and psychological well-being among black working mothers. In A.W. Boykin (Ed.) *Empirical Research in Black Psychology* (pp. 21–27). Rochester, MI: Oakland University.

Bowman, P.J. (1984). A discouragement-centered approach to studying unemployment among black youth: Hopelessness, attributions and psychological distress. *International Journal of Mental Health*, pp. 13, 68–91.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hopkins.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN R. HOPKINS, SENIOR FELLOW, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE, ALEXANDRIA, VA

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the—a key factor in the prospects—work for families, especially for families among the poor, specifically, the effect of welfare on work and dependency.

The Hudson Institute recently began a year-long review of the existing research on this issue. Our preliminary conclusion is that about all that can be said with certainty about dependency is that nothing can be said with certainty. On nearly every critical question there is a widespread divergence of views. We are hopeful that a more extensive analysis, such as we plan to conduct, will be able to resolve some of these differences. We will be happy to report to you on what we find at that time, if you wish.

For now, let me summarize our approach to this problem, which I have explained in greater detail in the written testimony I have submitted. We begin by placing the current welfare debate in its historical context. Put simply, nothing has seemed to work or to work very well. Despite a decade and a half of vigorous support for

Federal antipoverty efforts, including both liberal and conservative approaches to the problem, the poverty level by 1980 was no lower than it was in 1969 when the Great Society programs were just getting into full swing.

The array of social programs begun in the 1960's and the 1970's certainly alleviated many of the effects of poverty but they did not end poverty itself nor did they provide real opportunity to the poor.

I offer this observation as a caution against suggestions that all that is needed is a little more money in the Federal budget for this program or that. It is true, of course, that giving more money to people will make them financially better off. And it certainly should be our goal to provide the necessary help to those who through no fault of their own are unable to meet their basic needs.

But our larger purpose should be the one that President Johnson set forth two decades ago, to create the conditions whereby the poor can become economically self-sufficient. And we cannot achieve this goal until we have a much better understanding of why people become poor, in particular why many poor people do not work or are unable to work, and by contrast why some people though poor are able to escape poverty.

I focus in my written testimony on the problem of poverty and nonwork among unmarried mothers. A preliminary review of the evidence suggests two major sets of factors may be involved in leading women to choose single motherhood and hence to greatly increase their chances of becoming or remaining poor and dependent.

First is a set of economic factors. The conventional argument concerns the relative attractiveness of welfare compared to the wage an unmarried women could earn if she worked. This finding has led many analysts to justifiably insist on work requirements for women who receive AFDC in order to ensure effective work performance.

However, this response misses the greater part of the problem. The main reason that unskilled-unmarried mothers are poor is not so much that they do not work, although that is indeed a serious problem at times, but that they do not marry before having children. Here there are two possible sets of economic calculations.

Some childless women may look at their own job prospects and find them inadequate and choose to have a child so that they may qualify for welfare, rather than continuing their education or taking a job. While this is a problem at times, however, far more often poor unmarried women with or without a child may look at the earnings capacity of their potential husbands and decide that welfare will provide their future or existing child with more reliable financial support than the potential husband could. Therefore, nonmarriage as an economic decision may depend heavily on the earnings capacity of generally poor-young males.

Why is their earnings capacity so low? One reason, of course, is a lack of opportunity. Without question, many poor-young males have fewer earning opportunities than other Americans, at least partially because they have less education, less work experience, and fewer job skills.

Unfortunately, this is where too many analyses end. But merely offering the education, job training and jobs is not enough, as the experience of the 1960's and 1970's demonstrated. If those pro-

grams and initiatives had worked we would have much lower-unemployment rates and higher-work-performance rates today among the unskilled minority and other young men. The existence of opportunities, however, does no good if the young men do not take advantage of them. Why don't they? There are a number of possible reasons—more than I have time to go into now. But we must endeavor to understand these reasons before we can design effective responses or even the best opportunities may go unclaimed.

A second set of influences that contributes to unmarried motherhood and, hence, to poverty and low incomes among unmarried mothers, involves psychological considerations. It appears that welfare may psychologically discourage marriage in two respects.

For women, welfare may offer an opportunity for a limited degree of financial security without their having to be dependent on what they may perceive as unreliable men or husbands. For men, welfare may serve to replace them as family providers and thus make them feel unnecessary to their potential or existing family.

Psychological factors also may affect the decision to bear or father a child, at least according to some of the case study evidence conducted so far. For a women in poverty, having a child, by qualifying her for AFDC, may give her a means of leaving an unpleasant home environment. Having a child also may be a way of providing her something tangible to be proud of in an otherwise dreary life. Similarly for poor men, fathering a child may demonstrate their masculinity and provide a tangible accomplishment in their own dreary lives.

Obviously, more study is needed on all of these questions. Much of what I have suggested is clearly tentative at best and the evidence in many cases is provisional and not entirely supportive of any proposition. But these trends can be drawn from some of the research, and I hope that they serve to underline four major points:

First, despite two decades of work, we don't know, for sure what causes dependency or poor work performance or how to end it.

Second, the dependency and work-performance problem are extremely complex. They include both the conventional economic problems and also psychological aspects. And we must consider all of these in designing responses or those responses will be ineffective.

Third, solutions beyond the conventional ones are called for if we are to be serious about solving this problem, since most conventional approaches tried so far have not worked or have not worked all that well.

And fourth, simply giving more money or Government guaranteed jobs to the poor is not enough. We must create the conditions whereby the poor can and will seek to achieve economic self-sufficiency, or we have made very little progress toward ending dependency.

Thank you very much.

[Prepared statement of Kevin R. Hopkins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN R. HOPKINS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE, ALEXANDRIA, VA

BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES
OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 17, 1986

"EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF WELFARE ON WORK AND DEPENDENCY:
SOME FACTORS TO KEEP IN MIND"

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the effect of welfare on work and dependency. We at the Hudson Institute recently began a year-long review of the research conducted to date on this important issue. Our preliminary findings, unfortunately, are not optimistic. About all that can be said with certainty with regard to dependency is that nothing can be said with certainty. On nearly every question of importance to policymaking, there is a widespread divergence of views, as the brief research summary I have included with my testimony indicates. We are hopeful that the more intensive analysis we plan to conduct throughout the year will help resolve some of these seemingly irreconcilable differences. I would be happy to report back to you on our findings at that time.

For now, I think it is important to appreciate the historical backdrop to the current attempt at welfare reform. Put simply, nothing has seemed to work, or at least work very well. Despite a decade and a half of vigorous and committed support for the federal anti-poverty effort, the poverty level by 1980 was no lower than the rate in 1969, when the Great Society programs were just getting into full swing. Some may quibble with a statistic here and there, but there is no denying that poverty is still with us -- and was still with us even before the economic turbulence of 1979-1982. The array of social programs begun in the 1960s and 1970s certainly alleviated many of the effects of poverty, but they did not end poverty itself, nor did they provide the opportunity for the "forgotten fifth" of the population that President Johnson had sought.

At the same time, many of the more "conservative" oriented approaches have failed as well to end poverty. Neither the work incentives incorporated into AFDC nor the WIN program did much to encourage work among welfare recipients. The training and employment programs of the 1970s placed only about 15 percent of their clients in permanent, private sector jobs. And even the steady economic growth of the post-1982 period has failed to reach all segments of society.

I offer this observation as a caution against suggestions that all that is needed is a little more money in the federal budget for this program or that. It is true, of course, that giving more money to people will make them financially better off. And it certainly should be our goal to provide the necessary help to those who, through no fault of their own, are unable to meet their most basic needs. But our larger purpose should be the one President Johnson set forth two decades ago: to create the conditions whereby the poor can become economically self-sufficient. And we cannot achieve this latter goal until we have a much better understanding of why people become poor, and why some people, though poor, are able to escape poverty.

The studies cited in the research review provide some insight into these questions, but their usefulness to policymaking is limited because they focus on the correlates of dependency, not the causes. Unfortunately, in dealing with time series data as these studies do, correlations are all one can establish. In order to determine causes of poverty, one needs to understand the world from the viewpoint of a poor person -- in particular, what choices, opportunities and obligations she perceives herself as facing. The critical word here is "perceives". It does no good to ask ourselves how we would react when confronted by a certain set of circumstances; we must ask how a poor person would respond. As Michael Harrington observed nearly a quarter century ago, many of the poor face a profoundly different world than most of us do -- a world of frustration, of hopelessness and of misery.

Of course, as Harrington also pointed out, there are many types of poverty; and there is too little time to go into each of them here. So I would like to briefly apply this approach to perhaps the most vexing poverty problem -- that of the single mother. The research by Bane and Ellwood demonstrates that 75 percent of the unmarried women with children who enter AFDC do so through changes in family composition. Either an unmarried, childless woman has her first child, or her husband or lover departs. This breakdown in family structure is particularly damaging to blacks; poverty and income levels for blacks and for whites would be highly similar if the percentage of intact families were the same.

As important as this information is, however, all it tells us is how women become poor. It does not tell us why. Investigating this aspect of the problem is far more difficult, since there are fewer good data available, but we can sketch out some possible hypotheses. A preliminary review of the evidence, especially the case study evidence such as Leon Dash's excellent series of articles in the Washington Post earlier this year on teenage pregnancy, suggests two major sets of factors may be involved in leading women to choose single motherhood, and hence to greatly increase their susceptibility to poverty and dependency.

First is a set of economic factors. For whatever reason, it appears that welfare may be more economically attractive to some poor women than their alternatives of marriage and work. As Duncan and Hoffman recently concluded, "income and welfare trends notwithstanding, the relative attractiveness of AFDC has increased. If that were not true, AFDC rates would now be lower rather than higher than before."

The conventional economic consideration applied to this problem has been the relative attractiveness of welfare compared to the wage an unmarried mother could earn if she worked. Hence, many analysts have long insisted on work incentives or work requirements for women who receive AFDC. But while these steps are necessary to encourage unmarried mothers to work their way to economic self-sufficiency, they miss the greatest part of the problem. The most important reason unskilled, unmarried mothers are poor is not that they do not work, but that they do not marry before having children.

Here, there are two possible sets of economic calculations. Some childless women may look at their own job prospects, find them inadequate, and choose to have a child in order to join the AFDC rolls rather than continuing their education or taking a job. This undoubtedly happens, but it is probably only a minor factor in the overall constellation of influences. More importantly, poor unmarried women, with or without a child, may look at the earnings capacity of their potential husbands and decide that welfare will provide their existing or future child with more reliable financial support than the potential husband could. Hence, they may choose welfare not so much over work as they choose it over marriage. This preference for welfare over marriage may be further encouraged by requirements in some half the states that AFDC be provided only to families where no father is present.

Therefore, nonmarriage as an economic decision depends heavily on the earnings capacity of potential husbands -- that is, of generally poor young males. Why is their earnings capacity so low? One reason, of course, is a lack of opportunity. Without question, many poor young males have fewer income-earning opportunities than other Americans -- they have lower education levels, less work experience and fewer job skills. Even when economic growth provides a steady increase in jobs, they may not be qualified for the jobs that are available.

Unfortunately, this is where too many analyses end. But merely offering the education, job training and jobs is not enough, as the experience of the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated. The existence of opportunities does no good if the young men are unwilling to take advantage of them. Why don't they take these opportunities? One possible reason is that, to the extent these young men can rely for support on the AFDC payments that women receive, as some apparently do, then nonwork may be more economically attractive to them than any job or training

opportunities that might be available. There certainly are other possible reasons for these young men's nonwork or inconsistent work, and hence their unattractiveness as potential marriage partners. We must understand these reasons before we can design effective responses, or even the best opportunities may go unclaimed.

A second set of influences that contribute to a poor woman's becoming an unmarried mother, and hence making her poverty and dependency more likely, involve psychological considerations. Here, the evidence is both tentative and anecdotal, but the case study research does tend to support a few generalizations with regard to both the decision not to marry and the decision to conceive a child. It appears that the availability of welfare may psychologically discourage marriage in two respects. For women, welfare may offer an opportunity for a limited degree of financial security without their having to be dependent on what they may perceive as unreliable men. And for men, welfare may serve to replace them as family providers, and thus make them feel unnecessary to their potential or existing family.

Further, certain psychological factors may affect the decision to bear or father a child. For a woman in poverty, having a child may give her a means, through the availability of welfare, of leaving an unpleasant home environment. Having a child also may be a way of demonstrating her femininity, and of providing her something tangible to be proud of in an otherwise dreary life. Similarly, for poor men, fathering a child may serve to demonstrate their masculinity and provide a tangible accomplishment in their own dreary lives.

Obviously, more study is needed on all of these questions. However, there is good reason to suspect these or similar influences operate to a nontrivial extent in the generation of dependency. As such, they imply certain policy considerations and prescriptions not necessarily consonant with either conventional liberal or conventional conservative wisdom. I would be happy to discuss some of these policy prescriptions with you, if you wish.

In any case, however, it should be clear that policymakers must bear in mind the full range of influences on dependency if they are to design effective welfare programs that not only will meet the basic current needs of the poor, but also will create the conditions whereby they eventually can provide for their own needs. As the income maintenance experiments demonstrated, even the most compassionately conceived program, if built without regard for these factors, can produce unintended and damaging effects. After two decades of concerted effort that, distressingly, have left poverty in place, we cannot -- for the sake of the poor -- afford to make the same mistake again.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

A Preliminary Review of Research on Welfare Dependency

by Kevin R. Hopkins, Senior Research Fellow, Hudson Institute

In August 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson inaugurated the Great Society's "War on Poverty," declaring that:

> We are not content to accept endless growth of relief or welfare rolls. We want to offer the forgotten fifth of our population opportunity and not doles. ... The days of the dole in our country are numbered. (New York Times, 1964)

Unfortunately, President Johnson was wrong. Not only has poverty persisted and the welfare rolls remained, but in recent years the associated phenomenon of "welfare dependency" has emerged as a serious personal and social ill in itself. By one estimate, more than one-twelfth of the U.S. population, and nearly one-half of all black Americans, depended upon welfare-type payments for at least half their family income in one or more years of the 1969-1978 decade. (Coe, 1981) More recently, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that fully one in three children live in households that receive at least one means-tested benefit, while 14% live in families that receive cash public assistance. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1986) Not only is the budgetary cost of such dependency substantial, but, as President Reagan has acknowledged, this outlay "...pales before the sinful waste of human potential..." (Reagan, 1986) For while dependency, for some, represents but a few rough years in otherwise gainful lives, for far too many others the inability to meet their economic needs is a prison of deficiency from which they may never escape.

The challenge confronting policymakers for the remainder of the century is to better isolate the causes of this dependency — to understand its roots, its means of propagation and the reasons for its persistence — in order to craft policies that will reduce both its incidence and severity — and, in particular, to create the conditions under which these Americans can become financially self-sufficient.

The task will not be easy. When Michael Harrington (1962) first called public attention to the plight of the "Other Americans," the policy horizon was broad and virtually limitless. It was this nearly unrestricted range of options that led the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to embark confidently on a massive "socialization" effort, employing the best minds and ideas of the time, geared toward ending poverty not just by giving the poor money, but by fully integrating them into the American economic and social mainstream.

If Charles Murray's Losing Ground did nothing else, it demonstrated that these efforts generally did not succeed. For whatever reason, from the late 1960s onward, incomes of the poor, overall employment rates, general educational attainment, urban safety and family structures all deteriorated. And by 1980, the official poverty rate was higher than it had been in 1969 — and was rising. (Murray, 1984) The condition of the poor might have been far worse without the programs of the Great Society, but even with them it was too little improved.

Some, including Harrington and Sar A. Levitan, have contended recently that the remedy to this enduring problem is to build even Greater Societies modeled and enlarging on the social experiments of the 1960s and 1970s. (Harrington, 1984; Levitan and Johnson, 1984) But their arguments miss an essential point: it was largely the structure and orientation of programs, not the financial commitment to them, that proved deficient. (Moynihan, 1969; Anderson, 1978; Mead, 1986). As former Budget Director David Stockman repeatedly argued before Congress, the federal income maintenance arsenal has not suffered from an overall shortage of dollars. (Stockman, 1983) Indeed, the celebrated SIME/DIME demonstrations, among others, suggest that even more comprehensive income support schemes could worsen many of the social conditions they are intended to repair. (Groeneveld et. al., 1983; Bishop, 1980; Danziger et. al., 1981) And prevailing budget constraints probably would not permit such undertakings even if they were deemed wise.

In a sense, many of the more "conservative" approaches to curing dependency have lost much of their credibility as well. The work incentives incorporated into AFDC in 1967 failed to substantially encourage work among recipients, and were pared in 1981. (Anderson, 1978; Levy, 1979) The Work Incentive (WIN) program, also initiated in 1967 and made mandatory in 1971, has been only marginally effective. (Mead, 1986; Garvin et. al., 1978; Chadwin et. al., 1981) The training and employment programs of the Nixon and Ford Administrations brought too few previously "unemployable" clients into private, unsubsidized work, and have been largely disbanded. (OMB, 1982) Workfare-type programs, at least as they were initially implemented, showed decidedly mixed results in reducing long-term dependency. (Gueron and Goldman, 1983; Germanis, 1982; Rodgers, 1981) And even the steady economic growth of the post-1982 recession has proven to date to be an economic tide

that has not "lifted all boats". As the Committee on the Next Agenda (1985) has noted, "What will work — if anything — remains to be discovered."

A. The State of Dependency Research

In an effort to isolate the factors most highly correlated with welfare dependency, a number of scholars in recent years have undertaken sophisticated analyses of the personal, programmatic and environmental characteristics attending aid receipt. The results of these studies are well summarized in two excellent surveys by Duncan and Hoffman (1985, 1986). The major findings of this research will be highlighted here.

1. The dominant analytical approach

The most systematic research to date on the correlates of dependency has relied on statistical and econometric analysis of longitudinal and case record data for AFDC recipients. The principal sources of longitudinal data are the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides information on representative samples of recipients and non-recipients beginning in 1968, and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), which provides such information beginning in 1969 (although data are missing for 1974, 1976 and 1979). A third set of data derives from AFDC caseload statistics, beginning with cases opened in 1965. O'Neill et. al. (1984) reviews the technical imperfections in these data sets. Despite these flaws, however, the data have allowed most researchers to identify with a high degree of confidence many of the factors closely associated with welfare receipt.

Researchers have approached these receipt data in three principal ways. Earlier studies (e.g., Harrison, 1977; Rein and Rainwater, 1978; Coe, 1981; Duncan et. al., 1984) conducted point-in-time and fixed multi-year analyses of time on welfare. Subsequently, a number of researchers, most prominently Bane and Ellwood (1983), O'Neill et. al. (1984) and Ellwood (1985), have sought to analyze the duration of receipt of AFDC by the isolation of "spells," or continuous periods, of welfare use. Finally, these and other authors have attempted to determine the factors associated with entry to and exit from welfare spells. (Hutchens, 1981; Bane and Ellwood, 1983; O'Neill et. al., 1984; Ellwood, 1985)

2. Time pattern of dependency

The time pattern of dependency is well established. Most spells of AFDC receipt are short, with from 48% to 69% of periods of dependency lasting two years or less. (Ellwood, 1985; O'Neill et. al., 1984) By contrast, at any point in time, roughly half (49%) of AFDC recipients are involved in spells that will last eight or more years. (Ellwood, 1985) While some authors (e.g., Duncan and Hoffman, 1985) label these results as "seemingly paradoxical," there is no real mystery. The divergence is but a statistical artifact of the wide distribution of spell lengths among recipients, and reflects the fact that those with longer spell lengths will show up in a greater number of point-in-time caseload snapshots, increasing their average representation in any given sample. (See Table 1)

However, these spell patterns cannot necessarily be taken as representative of total time on welfare. Bane and Ellwood (1983) estimate that some one-third of recipients return to welfare after they leave, while Ellwood (1985) concludes that 40% of those ending their first spells of welfare eventually return. (These figures probably understate the true rate of recidivism, or return to dependency, since the annual PSID and NLS data cannot capture breaks in receipt that occur and terminate within the same or the subsequent year.) Most recidivism apparently takes place within two years of last receipt; Bane and Ellwood (1983) note that those who remain independent of welfare for six years or more almost never return.

TABLE 1.
THE TIME PATTERN OF DEPENDENCY ON AFDC

(Percent)	1-2 years	3-7 years	8+ years	Total
Length of individual spell				
Persons beginning a spell				
PSID: Ellwood (1985)	48	35	17	100
NLS: O'Neill et. al. (1984)	61	27	12	100
AFDC case records: O'Neill et. al. (1984)				
1965 cohort	59	25	16	100
1975 cohort	69	24	7	100
...on AFDC at point-in-time				
PSID: Ellwood (1985)	15	36	49	100
Total time on AFDC[1]				
Persons beginning first spell				
PSID: Ellwood (1985)	30	40	30	100
...on AFDC at point-in-time				
PSID: Ellwood (1985)	7	28	65	100

1. Including multiple spells.

Sources: Ellwood (1985); O'Neill et. al. (1984)
Table adapated from: Duncan and Hoffman (1985)

3. Correlates of dependency

Bane and Ellwood (1983), O'Neill et. al. (1984) and Ellwood (1985) have conducted the most extensive analysis to date of the factors associated with welfare receipt and spell length, with O'Neill et. al. relying primarily on NLS data (though analyzing PSID and caseload statistics as well), and the others exclusively on PSID data. These studies have revealed that the probability of receipt, spell length and recidivism varies markedly accordingly to a number of recipient characteristics.

Age of female head. Neither O'Neill et. al. (1984) nor Ellwood (1985) found a significant effect of the age of the female head of household on the duration of her welfare receipt.

Teen-age motherhood. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that "...early childbearing does not appear to be associated with longer spell duration, although ... women starting welfare spells are more likely to have had a child as a teenager than the general population."

Number of children. Ellwood (1985) found a significant positive correlation between the number of children and both spell length and recidivism. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found this correlation with spell duration only for the number of children under age six, and also found that women who give birth while on AFDC tend to remain on the rolls longer.

Age of children. As noted, O'Neill et. al. (1984) determined that women with children under age six were likely to have longer welfare spells. Bane and Ellwood (1983) and Ellwood (1985) found no such correlation, although Ellwood (1985) found that women whose youngest child was under age six were less likely to return to welfare once leaving the rolls.

Race. Bane and Ellwood (1983) found non-whites to have longer AFDC spells, but Ellwood (1985), in reanalyzing the PSID data, found no significant correlation. However, he determined that blacks were significantly more likely to return to welfare. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found a significant association with race and duration, noting that some 68% of blacks but only 42% of whites remained on AFDC for longer than one year, while 31% of blacks and 13% of whites remained on for five or more years. By contrast, Hutchens (1981), studying a subsample of the PSID data including only low-income blacks and whites, found essentially no race effects.

Schooling. Both O'Neill et. al. (1984) and Ellwood (1985) found education highly correlated with spell length, with high school dropouts much more likely to experience long spells than those who completed high school.

Work experience. Both O'Neill et. al. (1984) and Ellwood (1985) found the female head's work experience to be strongly associated with spell length, with lower work experience leading to longer stays.

Income. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that the lower the female head's wage rate prior to her receiving welfare, the longer her expected stay. Indeed, Bane and Ellwood (1983) found that almost half of recipients had incomes below the poverty line in the year prior to welfare receipt.

Health. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that poor health leads to longer welfare stays.

Social-psychological factors. O'Neill et. al. (1984) conducted five separate tests of the correlation between AFDC receipt and social-psychological factors: two on NLS data for different periods using recipient scores on the Rotter efficacy test (measuring the extent to which one feels in control of one's environment), and three on PSID data, one using a different measure of efficacy, one a measure of future orientation and one a measure of need achievement. In no case did the researchers find a significant correlation between the given social-psychological factor and spell length. In a separate study, Hill et. al. (1985) similarly found no significant correlation between motivation and spell length.

AFDC benefit levels. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that higher AFDC benefit levels generally but not always associated with longer stays, while Ellwood (1985) found a strong correlation between benefit levels and spell length.

State administrative practices. In analyzing case records, O'Neill et. al. (1984) found some evidence that state administrative practices, as measured by error rates, can affect spell length, with tighter administration reducing duration.

State economic conditions. State economic conditions, as measured by the state manufacturing wage and unemployment rate, appear generally to affect duration on welfare, with higher wages and lower unemployment usually

associated with shorter stays. However, the effects are not always consistent. (O'Neill et. al., 1984)

4. Entry into and exit from AFDC

Three-quarters of all entries onto AFDC take place because of major relationship changes: 45% due to divorce or separation and 30% due to birth of a child to an unmarried childless woman. Only 12% of entries occur because the female head's earnings fell. (Bane and Ellwood, 1983) By contrast, 35% of all women exit from AFDC due to marriage, 11% due to loss of eligibility because the children leave home and 21% due to an increase in the female head's earnings. (Ellwood, 1985) These results are summarized in Table 2.

Exits by marriage are relatively constant during the years of welfare spells, but exits by earnings become more difficult the longer one stays on welfare (O'Neill et. al., 1984), with some two-thirds of all earnings exits occurring within the first three years of receipt (Bane and Ellwood, 1983). Both marriage and earnings exits constitute roughly equivalent percentages of permanent exits (about 30% each) and of exits followed by returns to welfare (about 40% each). (Bane and Ellwood, 1983) Nonetheless, some 40% of those who exit continue to earn incomes below the poverty line in the year after their exit, although by the second year those who left by marriage are somewhat more likely to be poor than those who left via a earnings increase. (Bane and Ellwood, 1983)

Various demographic factors affect one's ability to earn or marry one's way off welfare, generally operating as one would expect; these factors are discussed in detail in O'Neill et. al. (1984). Two factors merit particular attention. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that older children inhibit exits via marriage more than younger children, while younger children are a greater hindrance to exits via earnings. Bane and Ellwood (1983) found results of marginal significance, but in the opposite direction. They did find, however, that women with only one child at the start of their receipt were twice as likely to exit within two years via earnings as women who started their spells with three children.

Moreover, both Bane and Ellwood (1983) and O'Neill et. al. (1984), using PSID data, found that blacks were no less likely to earn their way off welfare, but were considerably less likely to marry their way off. (Using NLS

TABLE 2.
ENTRY TO AND EXIT FROM AFDC

(Percent)	Entry to AFDC	Exit from AFDC
Change in:		
Family relationships		
Marital status[1]	45	35
Having AFDC-eligible child[2]	30	11
Earnings		
Of female head	12	21
Of other family member(s)	3	5
Other income (including transfers	1	14
Other (including unidentified	9	14
Total	100	100

1. Entry: divorce/separation; exit: marriage.
2. Entry: Unmarried woman gives birth to first child; exit: children no longer eligible or leave parental home.

Sources: Entry - Bane and Ellwood (1983); Exit - Ellwood (1985)
Table adapted from: Duncan and Hoffman (1985)

data, O'Neill et. al. found blacks less likely to exit by either means.) In fact, according to the PSID analysis, "the entire effect of race on the probability of exit seems to be generated by a difference in the probability of exit via marriage across races." (O'Neill et. al., 1984)

B. Principal Issues Confronting Dependency Research

Most of the findings recorded in the previous section are as one would expect, and occasion little dispute. However, in a number of areas related to dependency research there remains no general agreement among observers, with the result that some questions continue to spark controversy. Other issues broach not so much discord as confusion, as they encompass results that are difficult to explain. Finally, in some areas there appear to be serious gaps in the existing analysis. In any case, these issues, outlined here, require much more extensive study.

1. Major controversies

Effect of welfare on work effort. Analysts for some time have alleged that welfare payments create substantial disincentives to work. Anderson (1978) points to effective marginal tax rates of 100% or more on income earned by recipients as constituting a "poverty wall" that traps in poverty those who otherwise would work their way out. Similarly, Murray (1984) argues that of the options facing a potential recipient, work has become one of the least attractive, a situation, he contends, that is responsible for the decline in black labor force participation.

The most potent evidence of the existence of such disincentives came in the income maintenance tests operated between 1968 and 1978 in various parts of the country, with those in Seattle and Denver (SIME/DIME) being the most highly publicized. In the SIME/DIME experiments, the provision of a guaranteed income reduced "desired hours of work" by 9% among husbands, 20% among wives (Robins and West, 1980), 33% for non-family heads who married during the course of the test and 43% for those who remained nonheads (West, 1980). Of course, actual AFDC benefits are below the payment standards used in SIME/DIME (Cain, 1985), but even these lower levels appear to be associated with longer stays on welfare (Hutchens, 1981; Plotnick, 1983). Bane and Ellwood (1983) caution that since AFDC benefit levels have little effect on

poverty spell dynamics per se, changes in exits via earnings may reflect the lowered income thresholds rather than real effects on work behavior. However, Plotnick (1984) found that aid payments reduce pre-transfer earned incomes substantially, perhaps by as much as half, indicating a real effect.

Others contend that the work disincentives argument is overblown. Storey (1982) argues that the income maintenance experiments overall showed only "modest" disincentive effects. Coe and Duncan (1985) point to the relatively rapid movement off welfare and the frequent mixing, by recipients, of income from both work and AFDC as evidence that disincentives, if they exist, cannot be too powerful. Further, Plant (1984) concludes that even among long-term recipients the failure to exit the rolls via earnings was a result primarily of persistently low wages rather than disincentives within the system. And Parsons (1980a, 1980b) found declines in labor force participation due to factors other than welfare benefits. Moreover, the reduction in 1981 of the "thirty and a third" and other work incentives (the "OBRA reforms") clearly increased marginal tax rates on recipients who earned income through work; if the disincentives theory were correct, work effort should have declined and welfare rolls increased in response. Yet in an early, detailed evaluation of the effect of these reforms, the Research Triangle Institute (1983) found that those without earnings in the base year were somewhat less likely (though insignificantly so) to be on the welfare rolls in the year after the program changes, while those with earnings in the base year were twice as likely to have left the rolls. This issue is now clouded, however; in analyzing data for 1983 and 1984, Moffitt (1985) found that when unemployment rates were taken into account, OBRA did produce significant reductions in work effort, and that the effect appears to be increasing over time.

Effect of welfare on marriage. Gilder (1978), among others, has argued that welfare induces marital break-up or prevents marriage in the first place by making the role of the husband financially unnecessary. This thesis seems to have been confirmed by the SIME/DIME experiments, in which marital dissolution was 36% higher for whites and 42% higher for blacks receiving the guaranteed income payments than for the respective groups that did not. In a similar experiment in New Jersey, there was no significant effect on marriages among whites, but a 66% increase in break-up among blacks. (Bishop, 1980) When benefits more in line with AFDC levels were studied, Bahr (1979),

Hutchens (1979), and Hoffman and Holmes (1976) still found a significant impact of welfare payments on marital stability. Ellwood and Bane (1984) estimated that a $100 increase in maximum AFDC benefits could increase divorce and separation by 10% overall and by 50% among very young mothers. Similarly, Honig (1974) estimated that a 10% increase in AFDC benefits would increase the number of beneficiaries due to marital break-up among whites by some 15% and among blacks by some 7%.

However, Gilbert (1983) argues that when the SIME/DIME experiments are examined more closely, the results do not uniformly support the theory that welfare promotes marital break-up. For instance, dissolution rates were lower at the high support level ($5,600) than at the lower support levels. Other studies, such as Sawhill et. al. (1975), have found little effect of AFDC payment levels on marital dissolution, while Ross and Sawhill (1975) found some effect on remarriage, but none on divorce or separation. Moreover, according to data from the Current Population Survey, the steepest decline in the percentage of intact families, at least among blacks, occurred over the 13-year period 1967 through 1980, yet during much of this time inflation-adjusted AFDC benefits were falling, and by 1980 such benefits were nearly one-third lower on average than they had been a decade earlier; thus, marital break-up appears to have been inversely related to the real level of AFDC benefits, at least during the 1970s.

Effect of welfare on illegitimacy. Some scholars, such as Janowitz (1976), Vining (1983) and Gilder (1983), have asserted that AFDC increases illegitimacy, especially among teenagers, by providing them with a means of escape from unpleasant home environments that they otherwise could have little hope of leaving. As Gilder notes, AFDC payments come with "one crucial condition: [the woman] must bear an illegitimate child." The rise in illegitimacy over the last 20 years, particularly among young black women, appears to lend some support to this explanation. Further, Janowitz (1976) found a positive relationship between welfare benefits and illegitimacy among non-whites, although not among whites. Also, the residual effects from the study by Honig (1974) suggest a 7% increase in AFDC recipients among blacks and 4% among whites due to factors other than marital dissolution, at least some of which is illegitimacy.

On the other hand, Cutright (1970, 1971, 1972), Moore and Caldwell (1977) and Moore and Burt (1982) found no relationship between the level of welfare

benefits and illegitimacy, while McLanahan (1985) points out that the illegitimacy rate was declining during most of the time welfare benefits were increasing. In the most sophisticated study on the issue, Ellwood and Bane (1984) found no significant effect of AFDC benefit levels on illegitimacy, postulating that because the decision to have a child was so consequential, the availability of AFDC for a few years was unlikely to have a substantial influence on this decision. However, they did find a substantial effect of benefit levels on living arrangements, projecting that a $100 increase in the maximum payment would produce an increase in women with children living away from their parental home of 30% in general and of 50% to 100% among very young women. Since most young unmarried women who have a child while still living in the parental home remain there for some time before setting up their own household, it may be that young women decide to have babies at least partially on the expectation of eventually receiving AFDC, but the data cannot be used to support such a determination at this point.

Effect of welfare on attitudes. Each of the above effects, to the extent they exist, could come about in one of two ways. The interaction of intrinsic disincentives in welfare with a recipient's existing attitudes could cause the recipient to change her behavior (e.g., quit work). Or, welfare could alter the recipient's underlying attitudes themselves. There is little statistical evidence bearing on this latter possibility, and what evidence exists is contradictory. Duncan and Hoffman (1985) note that events such as wage or employment changes generally lead to changes in one's perception of control over her environment (e.g., Andrisani, 1978; Hill et. al., 1985). On the other hand, O'Neill et. al. (1984) found no effect of welfare receipt on recipients' attitudes. Similarly, Goodwin (1972) found no effect of welfare on attitudes toward work.

Effect of welfare on poverty. Working together or independently, the four effects cited above, to the extent they exist, could tend to reduce the recipient's ability and/or inclination to become self-sufficient, and thus prolong her period of impoverishment. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found such a "duration dependence," meaning that the longer one's welfare spell at a

particular point in time the longer her total spell could be expected to be, but they were unable to explain this effect. Ellwood (1985) derived a similar result. More recently, Galloway (1986) concluded that the apparently increasing attractiveness of welfare benefits during the 1970s increased poverty among children by more than 20%. Of course, the welfare-poverty link is a primary thesis of Losing Ground. (Murray, 1984). Others contend, however, that the causal connection is overstated (Coe and Duncan, 1985; AWPA Symposium, 1985; McLanahan et. al., 1985) or incorrect (Harrington, 1984; Danziger and Feaster, 1985).

Intergenerational transmission of dependency. Regardless of whether dependent attitudes are pre-existing or are produced by welfare receipt, such receipt could catalyze the formation of dependent attitudes among children. Such hypothesized intergenerational transmission of dependency is, in fact, a recurrent theme in the literature on the causes of poverty. Lewis (1961, 1965, 1970), among others, has argued that children of neighborhoods characterized by widespread parental dependency absorb attitudes that discourage them from taking advantage of future opportunities, and thus tend to be dependent in their adult lives. Poverty, he says "is a way of life ... passed down from generation to generation along family lines." (Lewis, 1961) Others, such as Sheehan (1976), have used case studies of individual families to make much the same point. There is some statistical evidence to support such a claim. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that women who grew up in female-headed households were more likely themselves to have longer welfare spells as adults, and that black women on AFDC were twice as likely as their white counterparts to have grown up in a female-headed household.

However, a series of systematic tests by Hill (1981, 1985), Hill et. al. (1985) and Hill and Ponza (1983, 1984), examining 14 years of PSID data on young adults and their parents, found that only a small proportion of women growing up in heavily welfare-dependent homes themselves became heavily dependent on welfare as adults and, indeed, that there was no significant link at all for blacks between the welfare dependency of parent and child.

The existence of an underclass. Closely related to the question of the intergenerational transmission of dependency is the notion of the existence of an "underclass" or a "culture of poverty". Although the concept had existed for at least a century, Harrington (1962) gave it public

prominence in The Other America, asserting, with Lewis, that "Poverty in the United States is a culture, an institution, a way of life." Banfield (1970) concurred, arguing that among the lower classes, the inability to function in society was "probably culturally given in most cases..." More than a decade later, Auletta (1982) observed that "...among students of poverty there is little disagreement that a fairly distinct black and white underclass does exist; that this underclass generally feels excluded from society, rejects commonly accepted values, suffers from behavioral as well as income deficiencies. They don't just tend to be poor; to most Americans their behavior seems aberrant." More recently, Mead (1986) has argued that this inability to function in society is a defining characteristic of the persistently poor.

The existence of an actual underclass has been challenged by, among others, Roach and Gursslin (1967). Miller et. al. (1976) survey behavioral patterns among the poor and suggest such patterns are not as defining as some underclass theorists assert. Other analysts, such as Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Clark (1974), contend that the underclass, to the extent it exists, is a product of society's foreclosure of opportunity rather than of the character of the individuals themselves. Unfortunately, there is little statistical information to inform either set of claims, although the absence of strong social-psychological correlations to dependency, noted above, seems to imply that any such "culture" cannot have very powerful effects. On the other hand, the fact that the exit probability differences between blacks and whites derived by O'Neill et. al. (1984) in analyzing the complete PSID data base disappeared in the Hutchens (1981) study of the low-income subsample of the PSID suggests that there may be some commonality of behavior among the poor.

2. Major paradoxes

The failures of the Great Society. As noted, the programs of the Great Society largely failed to achieve their purpose of integrating the "forgotten fifth" of the population into the economic and social mainstream. Yet more effort and study was devoted to preparing, implementing and evaluating these programs than has been committed to probably any other domestic initiative since the 1930s. Theoretically, such extensive efforts should have borne more fruit in practice, particularly since the Johnson Administration had an atypically free hand in designing programs to its

liking. The fact that they did not bear such fruit, apparently because of flawed programmatic structures, suggests that either the designers badly misunderstood the character and motivations of their intended clients or that many of the clients were not subject to what amounted to middle class socialization. In either case, a fuller understanding than presently exists of the reasons for these widespread failures seems essential to properly designing future responses to the problem of dependency.

The breakdown of the incentives model. The more conservative-oriented economists and sociologists, notably Friedman (1962), Becker (1974, 1976, 1978, 1981), Anderson (1978) and Murray (1984), long have emphasized the primacy of economic factors in individual decision-making. Evidence from the various work incentives programs provide some support for this thesis, but less than one might hope. In particular, it appears that many persons work and otherwise function socially even when it is not economically advantageous for them to do so. (Goodwin, 1972; Gilder, 1981; Research Triangle Institute, 1983) Thus, either the economic models need to be specified in greater detail or, perhaps more likely, non-economic factors play a more important role in individual decision-making than has been commonly assumed.

The absence of social-psychological effects. Observers of the lives and character of lower class, ranging from Miller (1959), Moynihan (1969) and Banfield (1970) to Gilder (1981) and Herrnstein (1983), consistently have noted that the most dependent and/or delinquent of lower-class individuals conduct their lives according to a psychology that, while largely self-consistent, differs markedly from that of most members of the middle class. Among the dysfunctional aspects of this psychology most frequently cited are hostility, improvidence, irresponsibility, an excessive emphasis among young males on sexuality and masculinity, and, in particular, a lack of future orientation, what Dash (1986) describes as a culture of "living for the moment." This extensive body of case-study research, combined with the more general observations, cited above, of a culture of poverty, would seem to imply beyond question that psychological make-up constitutes a principal distinction between the profoundly dependent and the remainder of society. Yet, as noted, what statistical evidence exists typically shows no strong distinction. This result is indeed paradoxical, since even if psychological

make-up were not a powerful causative factor in dependency, it at least should show up as an associative element.

Variations in success of escaping dependency. O'Neill et. al. (1984) found that "even with the same expected wage rate of the recipients, the same potential husband's income, and the same state welfare benefits, one person may be more likely to remain on welfare than another." Moreover, while many poor single female heads become dependent, others avoid dependency on AFDC altogether. Bane and Ellwood (1983) found that only one-third of female heads who were poor for a single year received AFDC payments, while up to 30% of those who were poor for four or more years still managed to avoid reliance on AFDC. They note that such findings "are difficult to interpret".

Black-white divergences. As noted above, Bane and Ellwood (1983), Ellwood (1985) and O'Neill et. al. (1984) observed at least some strong correlations between race and dependency. In addition, black women are more than twice as likely as whites to bear a child before age 18 and nearly seven times as likely to give birth before age 16 (O'Neill et. al., 1984), more than four times as likely to bear an illegitimate child (Vital Statistics, 1984), more than twice as likely to remain unmarried or to separate or divorce (Current Population Survey, 1984), more likely to separate from their husbands than middle-class whites, who tend to divorce (Ellwood and Bane, 1984), apparently more likely to drop out of school or cut classes (Murray et. al., 1981), some 8% less likely to participate in the labor force (Employment and Training Report of the President, 1981), and some three times more likely to commit property crimes and nearly seven times more likely to commit murder (FBI, 1984). These stark divergences in behavior, many of which bear on a person's probability of becoming dependent, have no obvious explanation.

The marriage gap. Perhaps the most startling black-white divergence, however, is the sharply lower probability of a black woman's marrying off welfare. As indicated, O'Neill et. al. (1984), in analyzing the PSID data, found this distinction to account for essentially all of the difference between whites and blacks in welfare exit probabilities. Since this relationship persisted even when the analysis was controlled for the other characteristics of black and white single mothers, the researchers could offer no ready explanation for its existence.

The persistence of unexplained effects. Despite the sophistication and completeness of the analyses performed by Bane, Ellwood, O'Neill et. al., and others, there remains a substantial portion of dependency left unexplained. "One of the persistent findings of this study is that although we were able to account for many of the personal characteristics associated with long term duration, we could not explain away 'duration dependence.' That is, ... the longer a person had been on welfare, the less likely she was to exit in a particular year. One interpretation of this finding is that we have omitted important explanatory variables. Another is that welfare itself produces effects that induce longer duration. ... These preliminary findings, however, suggest that commonly used measures ... do not indicate meaningful changes in attitudes among welfare recipients." (O'Neill et. at., 1984) Thus, O'Neill et. al. appear to settle on the explanation that key variables have been omitted, a posture buttressed by a test in which they analyzed the NLS data for black and white women separately, first using the "black" coefficients and then the "white" coefficients. In the first case, the probability of a welfare spell lasting more than two years was some 60% for both groups; in the second, it was less than 40% for both groups. Thus, "it is largely the unmeasured variables that are creating the difference in welfare dependency between blacks and whites."

Similarly, in their analysis of the effect of AFDC on family structure, Ellwood and Bane (1984) were unable to obtain consistently significant coefficients in their equations until they adjusted their specifications for "unmeasured state differences." Moreover, even when the researchers were able to isolate particular causes, unexplained variables at times still dominated. For instance, they found that work experience during a term of AFDC receipt shortened the time of receipt, but they could not determine whether the spell-shortening was due to the experience itself, the recipient's motivation or other factors. Further, well-identified "causes" may not be causal factors at all. Race, for example, is generally correlated with dependency, but "(u)nexamined, race has no obvious behavioral meaning at all. And even when examined..., race can mean several things, each of which has (at present) only thin empirical support." (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985) Given this prominent role played by such unexplained variables, the absence of social-psychological effects, noted above, is all the more surprising.

3. Major gaps in analysis

Identification of unmeasured variables. Even though much research into the correlates of dependency has revealed the presence of substantial effects from unmeasured variables, dependency researchers typically appear little bothered by the existence of these variables, and proceed with their analysis apparently under an implicit assumption that since these variables cannot be identified, they can only be ignored. But if the variations in success in escaping dependency can be explained in no other way, it strikes one that identification of such variables, however pursued, should be a top priority in dependency research. To date, however, there has been little systematic study of this question.

Analysis of the effects of human nature. Closely related to the first issue is the question of the effects of human nature on welfare dependency. As Murray (1984) has observed, much welfare policymaking has essentially "homogenized" the poor. But each AFDC recipient is a different person with different motivations, value structures, opportunities and ways of looking at the world. It may be that the failure to take these differing human natures into account, in at least some small way, could seriously undermine the effectiveness of welfare programs in much the same way as a doctor's failure to take physiological differences among his patients into account in applying treatment could undermine his medical efforts. Yet most dependency research, particularly that of a statistical variety, considers recipients as essentially identical decision-making units, with only the external characteristics of the units (e.g., number of children, race, work experience) permitted to vary. Moreover, most research fails to take account of such broad-based aspects of human nature as morality (Banfield, 1970; Light, 1972), conscience (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985), status (Murray, 1984), faith and optimism (Gilder, 1981; Tiger, 1979), and family (Gilder, 1974; Moynihan, 1986) that some analysts have identified as potentially having a significant effect on one's degree of dependency.

Collation of case-study research. One area of dependency research in which individual differences are extensively observed is in the case-study

literature, both in terms of individual recipients (e.g., Duncan and Morgan, 1978; Hewitt, 1975; Sheehan, 1976; Auletta, 1982; Dash, 1986) and poverty cultures (e.g., Miller, 1958; Harrington, 1961, 1984; Lewis, 1961, 1965, 1968; Banfield, 1970). Yet there has been little effort to date to collate the descriptions of the varying perspectives of welfare recipients that are readily available from this incredibly rich source of information.

The marriage market. Most dependency research focuses largely or exclusively on factors intrinsic to the recipient (usually unmarried women), and fails, as Duncan and Hoffman (1985) note, to explicitly characterize the full range of alternatives available to these recipients. One area where this is particularly true is in regard to the so-called "marriage market". Some scholars, such as Bernstam and Swan (1986) and Wilson and Neckerman (1984), have pointed to the inability of young black women to find a suitable marriage partner as a prime factor in these women's widespread dependency and illegitimacy. Unfortunately, the precise nature of these women's marriage prospects and, more importantly, the reasons for the thinness of their prospects, rarely have been analyzed in great detail.

Male labor markets. Both Murray (1984) and Bernstam and Swan (1986) have suggested that the widespread unemployment of young black males may be a principal reason young black women have the poor marriage prospects cited above. Thus, if the dependency problem, at least among blacks, is to be resolved, it may be that this evident malfunctioning of labor markets for young black males will have to be addressed explicitly. While some excellent studies have been conducted of these markets (e.g., Keeley, 1981; Williams, 1982; Cogan, 1982; Freeman and Wise, 1982; Ferleger, 1983; Dooley and Gottschalk, 1984), the results of the research generally have not been applied to investigations of the causes of dependency. In particular, the failure to consider the importance to female dependency of male labor markets may be one reason why workfare may not have been as universally effective as some had hoped in reducing dependency, since poor women often have great difficulty e rning enough money on their own to lift themselves out of poverty, even if they learn adequate work skills. (Smeeding, 1983)

Effects of administrative practices. As with differences among individual recipients, differences in administrative aspects of aid programs across both programs and localities are a potentially hidden factor in the

genesis or avoidance of dependency. (Moynihan, 1969; Newitt, 1979; Groeneveld et. al., 1980; Mead, 1983, 1985, 1986; Gueron, 1986) Bernstein (1982), for instance, found that the loose administration of welfare for more than a decade in New York encouraged unnecessary dependency, at least in the short term. Here, too, there has been too little systematic attention paid to the possible effects of these factors.

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Mr. LEVIN. Dr. Rayman, you will end the panel and then we will have a chance at all of you.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF PAULA RAYMAN, PH.D., FELLOW, BUNTING INSTITUTE, RADCLIFFE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, MA

Ms. RAYMAN. Last but not least.

I am going to give a brief version of my full research report, available to the committee, that explores the relationship between economic dislocation and children's lives.

It is a pleasure to be here today, and I would like to thank Representative George Miller, for inviting me to join you.

During the past 8 years I have directed a number of research projects concerned with the private and public costs of unemployment in the United States. Two, by the way, were in districts represented by some of you: I did a large research project on United Technologies in Connecticut. And another of the decline in the auto industry in Flint and Detroit.

But today I shall concentrate on the effects of unemployment on families, especially focused on research on children done at Children's Hospital in Boston, MA.

First, in order to comprehend the meaning of unemployment for the jobless and its impact on children we must first be aware of the importance of working in our culture. From the beginning days of our Nation, great value was placed on the work ethic which links the individual to a secure place in the community.

In the early 1900's Sigmund Freud recognized that love and work are the two primary pillars which constitute a person's foundation, shaping self-esteem and well-being. More recently, the United States' Bishops Pastoral, "Catholic Social Teaching in the U.S. Economy," emphasizes that work in a just economic order is an individual right not merely a privilege.

All of these sources would agree that when unemployment occurs far more than a paycheck is lost. Instead the unweaving of the individual, family and community health has begun.

The studies of individuals and families during the Depression provided ground-breaking evidence of how economic distress affects family and child health. In the research of people like Bakke, Angell, and Kamarovsky, among others, a theoretical "chain-reaction" analysis was established: Unemployment event, leads to parental distress, leads to family disruption, results in child stress.

Two examples demonstrate this analysis. Dr. Mirra Kamarovsky found that job loss caused the erosion of the father's authority, affecting pain and stress in family relations, finally resulting in the shattering of a child's secure home and a belief in the work process.

In another classic study, by Marienthal, a "breakdown of social personality structure" translated into parental inability to be a breadwinner and properly take care of a family. Children's response in this family "skidding" pattern was resignation to a world of scarcity.

Unemployment, unfortunately, did not end in this country in the 1930's. In the last 5 years unemployment rates reached levels not

experienced since the Depression, with the so-called natural rate of unemployment doubling from 3.5 percent to 7 percent of the labor force.

These offical rates, moreover, do not include those termed, "discouraged workers," and those involuntarily working part-time, which by the way, include a large proportion of women. They also do not uncover the number of persons affected in a given household by a wage-earner's job loss.

Following are a few statistics to help us understand the scope of unemployed families in America and the number of children involved. With 100 million people in the United States in our labor force, each 1 percent rise in unemployment rate translates into 1 million more people out of work.

Dr. Lewis Margolis, who is a pediatrician, estimated that during the 1982 recession, with nearly one out of five workers experiencing some unemployment that year, the number of children affected was substantially over 10 million children.

Comparing the 1930's with the 1980's, the terrain in which unemployment exists in America has greatly shifted. Maternal employment is common, with a majority of women with pre-school children in the labor force. Moreover, there are increasing numbers of children living in single-parent households.

It is projected that by the time children born during 1975 to 1980 reach 17 years of age, over 40 percent of white children and over twice that for black children will be in households without two natural parents present. Half of all black children and more than half of all children living in female headed households today live in poverty.

For those who became unemployed in the last decade, and I think this is important given some of the recent testimony just given, for those who became unemployed in the last decade only 47 percent received unemployment compensation, and only 5 percent received welfare or AFDC benefits. In fact, the majority of families coming to the family development unit at Children's Hospital during 1982 to 1984 admissions were not receiving unemployment benefits.

As a postdoctoral fellow at the unit, working often with medical colleagues from the family trauma team, the sexual abuse team and the emergency room services, my research was focused on the relationship of job loss with family stress and child health.

The research made use of the concept of pediatric social illness, which includes child abuse and neglect, failure to thrive and accident rates. I paid attention to a broad range of childhood pathologies in which family functioning and social context play a significant etiological role.

For purposes of analysis, I divided the families demonstrating severe economic hardship into three categories: the unemployed male families; the feminization of poverty families; and the couples-in-struggle families.

Here are two snapshots of the families that came into the unit to give you a better idea of who they were.

Case 1: The mother is in her late thirties, the father has been out of work for 2 years. The 1-year-old child became too much for the

mother to deal with, she tried to get help, and there is no extended family nearby.

The father has begun to drink as a result of unemployment and is intolerant of the toddler's playing. The mother fears for the child and asks for him to be temporarily placed in foster care until the father finds work.

Case 2: The mother is a single parent with four children. She has no job training. She and the children have lived in temporary shelters in the Boston area for 1 year. The children have been going to school with inappropriate clothes. It was the school guidance counselor who sent them to the clinic.

The mother reports that she has no money for bringing the children to a doctor. The question of whether to remove the children from the mother is what is facing the unit. The mother wants to keep them, but she knows that she can't give them proper care.

It can be seen from these cases that unemployment takes on different faces. One young mother cannot even enter the labor force, not having the skills to find a job.

Unemployment also was often a precipitating factor in alcoholism, which had severe rippling negative effects on the entire family. A father's alcoholic behavior resulted in depression for the spouse, fear, guilt, and abuse for the child.

The absence of available job training programs, especially for women, prevented the parents from the opportunity to establish a secure and independent environment for their children.

The consequences of economic distress for the children in the Children's Hospital case studies varied from the very grave accidental death of a baby to a more diffuse continual neglect pattern. The emergency room service at Children's Hospital noted the rise in accident rates in the 2 years following the rise of unemployment in the metropolitan area, 1981-83, with reported cases of physical and sexual abuse also on the increase. They also found that there was an increase in reports of stress-related illness among young children, including higher incidence of asthma.

There are a number of central social policy considerations coming out of the research. First, the hospital itself and many referral institutions and social service agencies have been experiencing financial strain, laying off their own staff, curtailing service and making it very difficult to provide decent followup services for unemployed families and children.

Second, a genuine primary prevention program would necessarily be based on a call for full employment policies, attached to a national health care program guaranteeing all children access to decent medical attention regardless of class standing.

Finally, from the case studies it is evident that the existence of good job training and retraining programs, which may include relocating funds and child care allowances, would help parents reassume lost self-esteem and economic security. This would mediate the negative chain reaction which results in the scarring of children's lives.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Paula Rayman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PAULA RAYMAN, BUNTING INSTITUTE, RADCLIFFE COLLEGE

I am going to give a brief version of my full research report, available to the committee, that explores the relationship between economic dislocation and children's lives.

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Comparing the 1930's with the 1980's, the terrain in which unemployment exists in America has greatly shifted. Maternal employment is common, with a majority of women with pre-school children in the labor force. Families in which there are two parents working are reliant on both incomes for support. Moreover, there are increasing numbers of children living in single-parent households. It is projected that by the time children born during 1975–1980 reach age 17, over 40 percent of white children and nearly twice that for black children will be in households without two natural parents present. Half of all black children and more than half of all children living in female headed households today live in poverty. For those who became unemployed in the last decade only 47 percent received unemployment compensation and only 5 percent received welfare/AFDC benefits.

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It can be seen from these cases that unemployment takes on different faces. One young mother cannot even enter the labor force, not having the skills to find a job. Unemployment also was often a precipitating factor in alcoholism, which had severe rippling negative effects on the entire family structure. A father's alcoholic behavior resulted in depression for the spouse, fear, guilt, and abuse for the child. The absence of available job training programs, especially for women, prevented parents from the opportunity to establish a secure and independent environment for their children.

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There were a number of central social policy considerations coming out of the research. First, the hospital itself and many referral institutions and social service agencies have been experiencing financial strain, laying off staff, curtailing service and making it difficult to provide decent followup services for the families and children. Second, a genuine primary prevention program would necessarily be based on a call for full employment policies, attached to a national health care program guaranteeing all children access to decent medical attention regardless of class standing. Finally, from the case-studies it is evident that the existence of good job training and re-training programs which may include relocating funds and child care allowances, would help parents re-assume lost self-esteem and economic security. This would mediate the negative chain reaction which results in the scarring of children's lives.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much.

We will find out in a minute, I think, whether we have a roll call on the journal.

Thanks to all of you.

Why don't we start in any event.

I wonder if the chairman would like to lead off.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Hopkins, I am not quite sure of the conclusion of your testimony. Let me just ask you about one point. That is, it seems to me that you are suggesting that young women in the low-income community may be making a very rational choice in terms of marriage, in the sense that marriage doesn't look like a very bright future, and when they look at the earnings capacity and the ability of their potential spouse to increase that earning capacity, it is pretty dismal.

Would you say that is a logical choice, that is the logical decision?

Mr. HOPKINS. In many cases it may be. That is very difficult to document from statistical work, because statistics——

Chairman MILLER. Well, if you look at the statistics in the low-income community, if you look at the statistics in the low-income minority community—if my daughter came home and told me that this was a fellow that she was thinking of marrying, I would probably say, that doesn't look like a very bright future for you, why don't you wait awhile or find somebody else.

And when you see the unemployment statistics, the discouraged worker statistics, you start to think that the choices start to be rather restricted at this point in terms of successful spouses.

Mr. HOPKINS. That is absolutely right. In many cases, at least according to some of the case study evidence—we haven't obviously completed our research on this, so I can't give you any final judgments on that—but there are indications from some case study research, such as the series run in the Washington Post in January, written by Leon Dash on the illegitimacy in Washington, that many young women do make that decision in at least a largely rational fashion.

Chairman MILLER. So as a corollary to that, it would seem to me that if you thought you were going to address the problem of single women with children, you would obviously then have to look at increasing the potential for gainful employment, among young men in that same community?

Mr. HOPKINS. It is absolutely true that the male unemployment problem is a large hidden factor in the female poverty problem. But as I indicated, we have to study that male unemployment problem and find out why the young males are unemployed or unemployable. It may be in some cases a lack of opportunity, and in certain cases it certainly is. But as Dr. Mead suggested, there may be other factors as well that account for the fact that these men do have lower earnings capacity.

Chairman MILLER. I understand that fully. The point of matter is the fact that you have such rampant unemployment, underemployment, depression, if you will, about the future in some communities, that marriage is not a logical alternative for a number of young women, either with or without children.

Mr. HOPKINS. Yes.

Chairman MILLER. Now, if the statistics we heard earlier this morning are true, even if that women decides not to turn to AFDC, there is a great likelihood that she is going to end up poor, even if she goes to work everyday.

Mr. HOPKINS. Many low-skilled women, even if they have a job, will struggle along at or slightly above the poverty line, that is true.

Chairman MILLER. So it is—go ahead.

Mr. MEAD. I just wanted to say that when these women decide to go on welfare and have an illegitimate child, we may model that as a rational act, but when you talk to them, in surveys, they don't say that is what they wanted. They don't say they wanted to be pregnant. They don't say they wanted to go on welfare. It is really hard to understand the behavior in economic terms.

Chairman MILLER. I understand that. That is not my point. My point is that the number of assets within a community that a woman can attach herself to, in terms of what we consider to be a

successful marriage and household income, are rather limited. It is not a question of what they want.

The point is, if you are looking for an employed male in a poor minority community with a future for advancement in long-term employment, the numbers are rather small.

Mr. MEAD. But that is not due to problems in the labor market. That is the point that I am trying to make.

We can't explain the behavior of this group, namely, the welfare mothers and their men, with reference to the labor market, because it looks as if there are a lot of jobs.

They are not well-paying jobs. They are not jobs that pay middle class incomes, but there is no reason to regard them as dead end or menial in the sense that you are going to be working at the minimum wage your entire life.

That is simply not the case. That is not the experience of the illegal aliens coming to the country.

When you talk to the black youth themselves, maybe 70 percent of them say it is easy to find a job. The welfare mothers also say it is easy to find a job.

The problem is that the jobs are not acceptable to them, because they pay low wages and have difficult conditions. The problem is one of work discipline.

Those same jobs are taken by the aliens and by the recent immigrants to this country. They don't stay in them long, they develop a job history and then they go on up the ladder. The mystery is why the more dependent groups are not able to muster the discipline necessary to begin their careers.

Now, I am not saying that it isn't a very serious problem, but it is not a problem attributable to the labor market per se.

Ms. RAYMAN. Excuse me, could I——

Ms. MATTHAEI. Well, I did want to say that the argument that the higher the AFDC payments, the more women are going to choose to live on AFDC, has not been shown to hold in any study, either across States, or across time. Those States with lower AFDC payments do not have lower rates of women forming female-headed households without marriage.

I think it is much more of what Mr. Miller was saying in terms of the lack of other resources in the community. But the claim that cutting AFDC payments might stop the formation of female-headed households is not borne out by either cross-sectional or longitudinal studies.

Chairman MILLER. That is true.

You are misconstruing my question. My point was that if you were to play the marriage game, and you were to just simply to match people in the community, the opportunity to match people who would have sufficient household income outside of public assistance is rather limited. Now, as for the reasons, that is a different question.

But if you simply took all of the men and women in the community and matched them, for the moment, for whatever reason, you would not have households with sufficient income based on the earnings of those people.

Now why young males aren't working and young females aren't working, are not taking these jobs, is a different issue. All I am

suggesting is there is a mismatch here as opposed to if you went to the suburbs of my district and you matched everybody up you probably would have an average household income for those people because of educational attainment, training, what have you, that is all I am suggesting here.

Mr. LEVIN. Why don't we do this, if we might, before Dr. Rayman joins in—we better recess. We will be back quickly.

[Recess.]

Mr. LEVIN. The chairman will be back shortly. I think he had finished his questioning.

Dr. Rayman, I think you had a comment. Why don't you comment briefly, and then we will go to the ranking minority member, and then perhaps to me.

Or Mrs. Johnson, maybe you would like to go next and then myself.

Yes, Dr. Rayman?

Ms. RAYMAN. Yes; we have been debating the question, I think ever since you left.

Mr. LEVIN. That is why we wanted a rollcall, so that you could, during the interim, debate it and resolve it.

Ms. RAYMAN. I think a major question that comes out of disagreement among the people that have testified on this panel, is really one of prior assumptions that we make about the characteristics of the people that find themselves unemployed, that find themselves either recipients of AFDC or welfare, et cetera.

I want to clarify that there is a major disagreement among some of us on the panel in terms of what, in fact, precipitates the reality, the phenomenon, of unemployment in our society. I disagree with some of my colleagues here on the panel on the assumption that there is something about the behavioral characteristics of the unemployed population that makes them not seriously go after or take jobs, et cetera.

I think basic assumptions about our economy and about the populations are in question. A main reason that many female heads of households do not find secure paid jobs is because the appropriate support systems—for instance, child care, decent child care that is affordable for them, if they went into the labor market—are simply not available.

I know it is an issue that many of you on the committee are aware of. Unemployed women are not lazier than the general population, nor do they not want to work, nor is there some cultural or racial characteristic that makes them separate from the general labor force. There are clearly some basic philosophic and political differences that you have been hearing today, which are important to point out.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Coats.

Mr. COATS. I am going to defer to Mrs. Johnson; there has to be some reward for being here first.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

I am the sponsor of a welfare reform bill in Congress which tries to take a comprehensive view. It grows out of my experience in small urban communities where we have seen radical changes in the structure of our economy. We have seen a lot of dislocation; a lot of industries dying.

There is always a terrible lag when a new industry develops. It is a period of transition that is very tough on people and on families. But I do believe, from my experience, that Dr. Mead makes a very legitimate point in his testimony.

I would like you all to discuss it a little bit more. My bill would establish a halftime program that addresses all the Medicare, the Medicaid, the health care, day care problems that we have seen affecting people's decision about whether to get off welfare. While it may not be a major motivator in the gross sense, I have seen too many women who have pulled themselves off of welfare only to have a child get sick and have to return in order to get the medical coverage that they need.

In my area at least, a lot of jobs, especially in the small towns, don't carry health benefits, for at least the first 6 months or year of employment. Health care is a very real factor in people's lives, as well as the cost of day care.

These are practical problems, and they are problems that are measurable, that are definable, and that Government could respond to if we wanted to put the right kind of program in place.

The program requires a participant to get a high school certificate before anything else. It provides a lot of options. It is greatly career-oriented. It is very upward-mobility-oriented. But there has been tremendous opposition to making the program mandatory even though it is only a half-time program.

As the mother of three daughters, I really feel that had I not required them to iron, they absolutely wouldn't haven't ironed. That is not irrelevant to what we are talking about, particularly in regard to teenage parents.

A young woman doesn't know what she is capable of. If she sees around her people who are not using their talents, how is she to determine what her talents are and how she can use them? How is she ever going to have the experience of being powerful in her own life?

So I think mandatory participation has some real benefits to offer individual young girls who, through it, can find out that they can have a place. And equally important for young men, because if you haven't been able to go to work because you are black, and teenage, and living in the Hartford ghetto, it may be the most valuable experience you can have to be able to have that opportunity.

I would just like you to talk about the mandatory aspect of participation. I think we have to decouple that from the assumption that it is hostile, because it doesn't have to prevail in a hostile format.

That means disassociating it from workfare. In other words, take the concept of workfare, and putting a welfare recipient to work doing whatever is available. Many towns and cities take a very enlightened attitude toward workfare and combine it also with training opportunities and more constructive work environments.

However, I think that if we don't address the issue of mandatory participation, we are not going to achieve the kind of change that we want. I would just like your comments on this.

Ms. MATTHAEI. Can I just respond quickly, because I have to leave for a plane?

I just wanted to say it is so interesting what you are saying, especially around single mothers, the importance of developing a work experience. I think that just reflects the way in which we have really started to think, that a paid work experience is very important part of adulthood for men and women, that reflects this new idea of a family and this idea that women, in a way, have the right to work.

What I would say around the mandatory issue was that it does reflect that kind of conception, and also that I think the real issue would be the kind of jobs that are provided. I think the points that Professor Blau brought up about getting women access to the better jobs and raising the wages of women's jobs when they are clearly being underpaid, will really help in giving women hope that they can earn enough income to allow them to raise children, that they can get pushed into and move into a labor market that really has some promise.

I think that is an interesting proposal you have.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Thank you. Hooking that into the change in the family is very useful.

Mr. LEVIN. Anybody else?

Mrs. JOHNSON. I would like Dr. Mead to remark on his position on this.

Mr. MEAD. I would like to just make a comment about the way in which a work obligation suits the psychology of the long-term poor, as we understand it. This group is in favor of work. It believes in the work ethic, everyone says this.

Researchers say it. I certainly say it. But at the same time we have to reckon with the fact that this group seldom actually works consistently. Now, that disparity is the fundamental mystery in dealing with the underclass. They have orthodox values, but their behavior is unorthodox.

It seems as if they respond positively to a work requirement mainly because it allows them to live by the values which they themselves hold. By making their aspiration into a requirement, we turn it into what it normally isn't for them, namely an obligation, something that they really have to do, and which they then actually do.

Now, when we say, as some critics do, well, this is punitive, or we should respect the mother's choice not to work, and so on, that projects onto the mother the middle class psychology of rational economic self-reliance, which on the whole, this group lacks.

And equally, if we say that this group is making a cynical decision to exploit the public, that they should be punished and thrown off welfare, as some other critics say, they also are projecting onto the poor their own psychology. Because, indeed, if self-reliant, maximizing individuals such as themselves refused to work, it would indeed be a cynical act exploitative of the public.

But we shouldn't do this. We shouldn't assume that this group behaves in the way that we do. They have the same goals that we do. But as far as we can tell, they are profoundly defeated and demoralized. These are people who on the whole believe that they can't accomplish anything in life. And much of the behavior which strikes us as irrational is a response to that disillusionment.

One of the ways that we can deal with this, I think, is precisely to obligate these people to function in certain minimal ways that other Americans expect. Then they discover that, in fact, they are not incompetent, and a wider world opens. This is really the only way we can mobilize these people to begin functioning in the ways that are routinely expected.

Mr. LEVIN. Maybe Mr. Coats wants to ask a question on this.

We should try to finish the testimony from this panel in the next few minutes so that the third panel—why don't you follow up and then I would like to. This seems to be if not the core, a core of some of the issue.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Could I just say that if there is anyone who would like to counter what Mr. Mead just said. I think what is different about this panel is that they do hold different views.

Mr. LEVIN. I think we will obtain that variety if Mr. Coats can ask a question. I am sure if his doesn't, mine—

Mrs. JOHNSON. Are you suggesting that we think alike? And we do, as you and I do.

Mr. LEVIN. Say it again.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Never mind.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Coats' question might stimulate that further; mine will.

Mr. COATS. I will skip the question I was going to ask and let you pick it up on yours. Because I have another question which I want to ask of Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. LEVIN. Well, then let me chime in, if I might, which will continue this. Then you will finish up, Mr. Coats, you will have the last question.

Let me then ask Dr. Mead, if I might. The statistics for a lot of cities, urban centers, show that 40 to 45 percent of minority youth are unemployed. Does your analysis about women on welfare likely apply to the 40 to 45 percent of unemployed youth; why are they unemployed?

Mr. MEAD. There are some similarities. This group is not, on the whole, on welfare, although some of them are in welfare families. But the basic reason why they are unemployed is quite similar.

This group, it is true, has catastrophic levels of unemployment, yet, when they are interviewed they do not say they cannot find work. I would mention a survey by the National Bureau of Economic Research at Harvard, whose authors I would venture to say devoutly wished to find the opposite: 71 percent of the youth said that it was easy to find a job, even though they were unemployed at such high rates.

The reason is that what they want from work is simply unavailable to people of their skills. They want payment at $5, $6, $7 an hour or above, which they usually can get only in the underground economy. They are not ready to accept low-skilled jobs paying them the minimum wage. They also have difficulties accepting work discipline, direction from superiors, getting to work on time, and so on.

The usual pattern is that they drop in and out of work because they find the regime of work intolerable. And that reflects their own lack of confidence, and their own upbringing, which is often

erratic and which doesn't involve a successful socialization to all aspects of the work ethic.

It involves the goal of work, which they treat as an aspiration, something they definitely want to achieve, but they don't act by it consistently. So this group also, it seems, has to be faced with something like a work requirement in order to accept the initial jobs which are available, and thus acquire the work history to be able to move on up the ladder. This is what the aliens are able to do.

Mr. LEVIN. Anybody on the panel want to comment on this? That essentially you have taken your analysis to welfare mothers and applied it to——

Mr. MEAD. No, I am not just applying it, there is independent information on the youth that supports it.

Mr. LEVIN. But do you think it essentially relates to the large number of minority youth who are unemployed, not everybody.

Does anybody on the panel want to comment on that?

Mr. BOWMAN. I would like to ask one question. What did that survey probe ask as to why they would not accept?

Mr. MEAD. The wages were not high enough, and they didn't offer opportunity for upward mobility. The jobs were dead end in the literal sense that there could not be advancement in that position.

Mr. BOWMAN. I think one of the things that tends not be addressed in these studies, there is an assumption on the part of researchers often times that the reasons are inherent in the individuals. There is a tendency not to raise questions specifically about the kind of situation or imperatives that might, in fact, make that choice very rational.

For example, I have mentioned several times that based on studies, both in the national survey studies, as well as more intensive and informal interviews with black youth in urban areas, you tend to have black youth enter the labor market seeking employment with very, very compelling economic motivations in terms of the family economic situation. And where it might be reasonable, say, for one seeking work casually for an entry level experience, to accept a position at a lower wage, it might not be as realistic for a black youth in a situation where they are in a single parent home, a large family situation with very pressing economic needs and economic insufficiency in the family to ritualistically involve themselves in minimum wage type employment.

Second, I think there is a tendency not to look at the kind of youth, you disassociate the responses from the labor market when, in fact, if you look at most urban areas, particularly those areas that are in the industrial belt, those same black youth 10 to 15 years ago were readily taking jobs in the automotive industry, and also tended to readily assume positions and jobs that were undesirable to almost all other sectors in the labor force. It is not an accident that those trained jobs are no longer available at this point, yet, there is no notion that that has any bearing on their responses——

Mr. MEAD. But other jobs are available. They are, as they were before, the bottom jobs in the hierarchy.

What has changed is that this group of youth will no longer take the worst jobs in the economy. They feel they deserve better. I am not saying they are wrong. Rather, I am saying that this is an issue of social standards and not of economic structure. We simply cannot support the contention that jobs are unavailable for these people.

Mr. BOWMAN. But it is not true that the same jobs are available to black youth than it was 10 years ago.

Mr. MEAD. No; it is a different kind job. It is usually a service job, which more often requires literacy. But unless we are prepared to view literacy as an advanced skill, we can't say that the economy is substantially more high skilled today than before. The one study I know on this, of New York, the center of the new economy, is that the proportion of all jobs that are low skilled has fallen from 58 percent to 57 percent in the last 12 years. That is not exactly a catastrophic drop.

The idea of a mismatch between the labor force and the available jobs is not supported from this evidence.

Mr. LEVIN. Well, all right.

Mr. Coats will have the last word after I just give you a reaction.

The easiest—in lieu of a question, beyond my original one—the easiest path for anybody to fall into is the expected path. We fall into ruts on this issue so readily.

I just wanted to say that I think, Dr. Mead, while you acknowledge complexity, your message ends up denying it. While you talk about a number of factors, in the end your remedy is a very simple one, the way most people will hear it, and that is mandate workfare.

The result is you dismiss the relevance of child care, people can get it if they want or if they prefer, have their kids raised by a God-aunt—I hear the images, I hear the way most people will hear it.

Literacy—you just essentially make it, illiteracy, irrelevant. As I walk up and down neighborhoods where there are unemployed youth, discipline is a factor. I come from a family which believes in it deeply. But in fact there isn't literacy among most of these unemployed youth, you just say, well, forget it, tell them to get a job. The fact——

Mr. MEAD. I am not sure that is quite what I would say. Literacy is a problem. I am not saying that it isn't. I am saying that the character of the labor market is not substantially more high skilled, unless we say literacy is a high skill.

I entirely agree with you, literacy is a problem.

Mr. LEVIN. It doesn't come off that way. You essentially say in your testimony—I will just finish off—the subtle use of words. Some midwestern and inner city areas may still be depressed.

If you just go to one, I guess you have been to one, I don't think you would have any doubt about them, that they are still depressed. Essentially, your message is let all Americans do what immigrants have done in the last 10 to 20 years, oblige them to do it, and that is all we have to worry about.

That is why you get polarization, I think, because in my judgment the quality—you see it is interesting, those who ridiculed government service, the kind of mechanistic solutions that weren't as

mechanistic as made out to be, but there was some of that in the 1960's, are now saying to people, don't care about the quality, the nature of job, where it is going to take you, take that service job. And you don't care that the service job may be 20 miles away, there isn't transportation, that it is in an area that is essentially alien to a lot of those kids, all of these factors, and that literacy—I saw a program on literacy—I am taking too long—but it was poignant how uncomfortable people who aren't literate feel pretending they are literate.

You need literacy, even for—everybody talks about MacDonalds, I will say Burger King—literacy is relevant. And it comes off that the commitment to work is really primary, as you say here, and it is not for welfare mothers, but it is for everybody who is unemployed.

And the word primary fades away and it becomes the entire answer. I don't think it is the only explanation by any means, but essentially you make all other answers irrelevant. I think that is the resistance to—I think this gets back to what Dr. Rayman said about assumptions.

This comes off reading, to me, like it isn't only the assumptions that you make, but it is the conclusions you are really after, and that is oblige, mandate, and we can forget about the rest.

It is interesting in the Sunday Times, the argument about the California work experience, and the President said they put 76,000 people off of welfare because of the mandatory program, and that is all it did was mandate. And the present director of the State legislative analyst office hasn't the slightest idea where that figure comes from. It is not true; it is 7,000.

Let me ask Mr. Coats to take over.

You may want to change the subject or maybe my comments stimulated you to stay on this subject.

Mr. COATS. I think Dr. Mead ought to respond.

Mr. MEAD. Two very brief replies.

One is that my research did not come out where I expected. I thought initially that the solution to welfare might well be simply reduce the benefits and by that means force people to cope by dealing with the labor market by themselves.

I did not come out there. My prescription is quite different. It is that we should indeed require work but at the same time go on supporting people and provide the necessary services.

Mr. LEVIN. Support services?

Mr. MEAD. Oh, yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Literacy; child care?

Mr. MEAD. Absolutely.

My only problem with child care provision is that it not become something that the Government only has to arrange, because then it becomes a barrier to work. It must be something the mother should normally arrange. Government should pay for it.

And second, I want to reassure you, this prescription is not one of no concern. The message is not let us not do anything to help these people, absolutely not. In fact, requiring them to work and providing the necessary support is the very best thing we can do to help them.

Mr. LEVIN. OK.

Mr. Coats, now that the differences have been narrowed a bit, you wanted to ask a different question?

Mr. COATS. I want to ask a question of Mr. Hopkins.

In your testimony, which I think is a really good piece of work, you draw some interesting observations. You, however, were not able in the time allowed or in the paper you submitted to draw what you call certain policy considerations and prescriptions. You said they weren't necessarily consistent with either conventional liberal or conventional conservative wisdom, but you would be happy to discuss these prescriptions. I would be very, very interested in knowing what those policy prescriptions are?

Mr. HOPKINS. I would be happy to. Let me make one prefatory statement on the notion of mandatory versus nonmandatory requirements that, I think, is essential to what I am going to say in a moment.

The question that should be troubling all of us certainly is making available the opportunities. But perhaps an even more troubling question that should be troubling us is where these opportunities are available, why aren't they being taken advantage of?

We can provide every single Government service program in the world. We can provide job training. We can provide education. We can provide Government guaranteed jobs. We can provide day care.

We did a lot of that in the 1960's and 1970's. Yet we still have 12, 13, 14 percent poverty rates. Somewhere something went wrong. And one of the things that happened is that even when these opportunities were available, people did not take advantage of them.

Now, we can't place blame on these people by saying these people are lazy, they are irresponsible. We don't know why they didn't take these opportunities. But until we understand why opportunities, when they are available, are not taken advantage of, we can provide all the opportunities in the world and we still will have poverty, and we still will have high unemployment, and we still will have low labor force participation.

So it is important that we understand why opportunities are not taken advantage of when they are made available.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me interject. When you say people didn't take advantage of them, you don't mean no one did?

Mr. HOPKINS. No, no, many people did, and many people did not. Absolutely, a lot of people did. A lot of people used these services as a catapult to self-sufficiency.

For these people the programs operated as they were intended to, and operated very effectively. For many, many others, they did not. That should be the one of the main focuses of our concerns.

Mr. COATS. Before you go on to your policy considerations. Let me just reinforce that.

I have a situation that currently exists in my own congressional district where the unemployment rate is running about 6 percent yet a number of manufacturers of higher than minimum wage jobs have come to me and said, "I cannot get anybody to take these jobs." They are going into Michigan and busing—actually, renting a bus, going up every morning—and importing people to work in this facility. Yet the unemployment rate in that county continues to run at 6 percent.

It is baffling to these employers. It is baffling to me. And the point you and Dr. Mead have made this morning is certainly one that we have to consider when we are devising programs.

Now if you want to go ahead.

Mr. HOPKINS. That having been said, what kind of policies can we undertake with the caveat that, first of all, before we can undertake specific service policies, we have to do a great deal more work in investigating why existing opportunities are not taken?

I think there are four things that we need to do. The first has to do with these opportunities. We have to make sure the opportunities are available.

One of the most important things we can do is maintain economic growth, and to not do anything to bring the country back into a recession, because if we have a recession, that is the worst thing that could happen to the poor who are seeking work. If we have a resurgence of inflation, that is the worst thing that could happen to poor people living on AFDC payments, or working in a low-wage job. We have to make sure the opportunities are available in general.

And where opportunities are available, we have to structure programs so that they give the poor a sense of worth and value. Let me just suggest one approach we can do on this. That is, where we have service or aid programs we should structure them so that they are empowerment programs, so that they give the poor people who receive these benefits a choice in their lives, give them some greater control over their lives.

That means for housing aid programs, for compensatory education aid programs and the like, we should structure those programs in a sense similar to food stamps, so that these people can choose the kind of housing that they want, rather than being condemned to a ghetto housing project, so that they choose the kind of education they want, rather than being condemned to a low-quality inner-city school.

The first thing we should do is structure aid programs so that they provide empowerment to the poor, so that they give them the extra incentive to gain control over their lives, and to take advantage of the opportunities that exist.

The other three steps. Well, for people who——

Mr. LEVIN. Let me just break in, because I am a bit concerned about time.

Mr. HOPKINS. I won't take long.

Mr. LEVIN. If you would try to wrap up. This is such an important subject we could——

Mrs. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. HOPKINS. I will try to do so very quickly.

Mrs. JOHNSON. I really think that would be penny wise and pound foolish. We have spent a long time listening to people give their papers. This is probably the most valuable exchange that we could have on this subject.

I really think that we have taken time to be here and listen through, and I would hate to see this cut off.

Mr. LEVIN. The only concern I have is I am not sure how long the third panel—you are keeping a third panel waiting. I am not sure they will still be here if we take much longer.

Mr. HOPKINS. In deference to the third panel and the time, I will try to finish up very quickly.

Thank you, Mrs. Johnson, for your concern on this. I think it is important that we get through the policy prescriptions.

We know the behaviors that we want on the part of the poor and dependent people. We hope they will work. We want them to work.

We want marriage and family stability. How can we use public policies, and in particular welfare policies, to encourage these kind of behaviors?

The first thing we have to do is make sure we continue AFDC and other kinds of aid payments for welfare mothers at an adequate level, so that these women do get enough money to survive, so they do have the adequate medical care for their children. We must make sure payments are adequate.

The notion that we should cut off welfare to people to force them to work is totally wrongheaded. It is not compassionate. Perhaps, in some theoretical world, it would work in the long term, but in the short term it is going to cause a great amount of devastation and harm to these people. We shouldn't even entertain that notion.

But what we have to do is to enforce the work requirement when we provide these benefits. The fact is that people, when young people are growing up, they acquire their values, generally, if they are in an intact family, from their parents. But people who grow up in broken families, whose support is primarily from the Government, gain their values partially from their mothers, but partially from the Government. And now the Government says: "Here is your money. You don't have to do a thing for that." That creates an adverse value that lowers the emphasis on work.

So we have to—as Dr. Mead, has stated, time and time again—we have to have a mandatory work requirement simply to serve as a bridge for these people, so that they will gain the self-confidence and self-worth, so that can become financially self-sufficient. That is one thing we should do.

However, the problem with traditional workfare mandatory job training programs, is that they reach only the women in society, the women who receive AFDC. But as I pointed out in my testimony, a very, very serious problem is the poor work performance and the poor earnings capacity of young males, sometimes young black males, but young white males as well.

There is no practical way to get at these people through the normal workfare type programs, or the normal work requirement type programs. I would like to suggest that a two-part approach to this that would enforce or help encourage better work behavior, and also reduce any disincentives to marriage that may be either economic or psychological that exist in the current aid programs is the following:

Instead of providing AFDC payments only to broken families, as we do in half the States now, I think we ought to consider, and at least study in a demonstration project, the provision of aid payments to intact families as well, and perhaps, providing an even greater "marriage bonus" to families that do stay together over and above what the two individuals might get as separate recipients of aid.

However, what we saw in the sime/dime experiments of the 1970's, and other income maintenance experiments, was that when you just provide aid to intact families, as in that situation, you lower work performance, and you increase marital instability—that is, you cause greater divorce among intact families.

So what you want to do is in providing this aid to intact families is to attach work requirements to both partners—perhaps "one and one half work requirement", so that one spouse has to work full time, and the other spouse has to work part time.

This does two things. First, it encourages marital stability because it eliminates whatever disincentives exist in the current welfare system for family breakup. And the most important thing we can do for promoting the health and well-being of children is to encourage family stability. I think that is an essential step.

But the second thing it does, by bringing young males under the authority of the work requirement, is that it can help increase the marriageability of these young males, which will do two things. It will increase the prospects for family stability because poor women will have a greater pool of men, as it were, to choose from who can support their children. Second, it will provide both young men and young women, but particularly their children, with a greater amount of income to provide for their welfare and their family security.

Mr. COATS. Did you get all four of those in there?

Mr. HOPKINS. Yes; finished.

Ms. BLAU. May I just make one comment, I know we are late.

I agree with a lot of what Mr. Hopkins said, but I think a misimpression is being generated here that the vast majority of people on welfare kind of spend their lives on welfare and what not.

The studies, all the studies that I have seen, show an enormous turnover in the welfare population. Welfare seems to be something that the vast majority of participants rely on for a relatively short period of time until they get back on their feet, and then they do indeed leave the welfare rolls.

I think one problem we have to address is where do they go when they leave, and very often it is to very near poverty levels of income. So we have to look at ways not just of integrating the welfare population to the economic mainstream, but the types of jobs and earnings that people have.

Mr. MEAD. I can speak to that directly. About 38 percent of the AFDC cases remain on the rolls longer than 2 years. The majority do move off quickly. And for those women it is appropriate to view their labor market problems as not fundamentally different from those of the general population, or women on general, as we heard earlier in the morning.

But for the 38 percent, there is a serious problem. They really are different. They are dependent for long periods. They have larger families. They are less educated. All of the aspects of disadvantage are more serious for them.

Since only 15 percent of AFDC mothers are working, including all of the mothers, we can be sure that for this long-term group work is even less likely, even less prevalent. That group is our most acute social problem, even if, indeed, they are a minority of the AFDC cases.

Ms. RAYMAN. I have another comment, that offers another perspective. I am very opposed to any kind of legislation that mandates a certain image of what the family is like, or should be.

I think many people coming from the white middle class, have an ideal image of a mother, a father, and two children, living in a nice house with a picket fence, somewhere in suburbia, as the ideal model.

I speak here on behalf of my black and Hispanic sisters, on this issue, that, many women are very proud parents, being single heads-of-household.

It is also a positive choice for some of them; it is not only a negative choice. I think that there are very many social scientists—I speak here as a sociologist who will document that there are many different types of families that can exist in America at one time.

I think that the idea of giving government incentives is a moral issue around preserving certain types of families to the exclusion of other types of families. That is one point.

A second point is that unemployed women are very resourceful and work quite hard. Here again, I speak from the position of having personally interviewed and spent time with single heads-of-household families, and with unemployed workers and their families in Flint, in Detroit, in Munt Valley, in Connecticut, et cetera. I don't know how many of the committee members, particularly my male colleagues here, have ever really spent much time witnessing every day life, with a single head-of-household and her family and children. You would then really see what the quality and shape of life is like for these women.

I want to make a very strong point here that these women are among the most brave, courageous, resilient women, that I have ever seen. The kind of sense that one might get from some of the testimony today is that that they are lazy, inept, not taking opportunities, et cetera. This is a false view.

I think we need to expose the untruth, the underlying racism and sexism that pervades the notion that there is a kind of a "mystery" as to why single women household heads, especially women of color do not work. Dr. Mead has used this idea, a "mystery," as a cover rationale of why don't these people take the opportunity to do X, Y, Z, to be good citizens in his terms.

In a round about way this "mystery position" results in blaming the victim and putting the issue on why aren't these people performing on personal rather than structured perspective: what is the matter with them that they are not taking the correct opportunity rather than what is wrong with our social system.

For me, that is the backwards way of asking the question. I think that we have to look at very different types of questions if we are going to get at the right answers.

I think we are all interested in the right answers, and improving our society. But I think we have to really look and examine what the assumptions are, at the questions that we are asking.

One last point, about Representative Johnson's proposed legislation: I think there are major problems with the view that women have to be forced to work. In Massachussets we have the ET program which makes participation voluntary. It is seen as being one

of the best types of models for training workers in the United States.

Many public officials who tend to support involuntary workfare have not at the same time supported the kind of support mechanisms that would make programs effective: medical care, child care, et cetera.

An underlying assumption, again, of what is the matter with these women that you kind of have to hold a gun to their head to get them to work must be overturned. Instead the issue should be what are some of the other systemic problems, social structural problems that contribute to keeping these people out of a productive labor force?

Mr. LEVIN. All right, let's take stock here. We have another panel, and a critical set of issues. Should we go on or should we hear the third panel.

I just don't want us to be impolite. I am not sure what time the third panel was told it would start, but I am sure it was not 12:15.

Mr. COATS. I would be happy if I could just wrap up my question here with a comment, not another question.

I think, perhaps, Mrs. Johnson wants to comment on the last question. Then I think we would be through on our side.

Mr. LEVIN. OK.

Mr. COATS. Dr. Rayman, without responding to everything that you said. Let me just make two points.

I think we would be making a tragic mistake if we continued to adopt public policy simply on the basis of the criteria which you outlined, and not include the criteria which Dr. Mead and Dr. Hopkins described. We must find out why some percentage of the people who are in poverty and are dependent on government programs do not take advantage of opportunities when they are presented. If we don't answer that question, we are doomed to failure, doomed to repeat the programs that we tried in abundance in the 1960's and 1970's without ever cracking the problem.

Second, I have to take exception to your point that our programs should be devoid of any incentives to encourage families to stay together. This committee has heard eloquent testimony, tragic testimony, about the economic and social consequences of breaking up a family.

The burdens fall on that courageous mother, who I admit is courageous, but who many times wishes she didn't have to be that courageous. She wishes she had the support of a paying father. But the fathers do not pay child support, and that places a tremendous financial burden on that mother, and a tremendous burden upon the children who have to suffer through that.

Let's not glorify the courage of those single mothers to the extent that we neglect government policies and programs which provide incentives to keep families together. At the very least, we should make people aware of the consequences of not being together before they decide to make the plunge, have children, and then all of sudden decide that is not the way that they want to go. So, I want to make those two points, without belaboring it, have Mrs. Johnson respond, and then perhaps, we can move on.

Mrs. JOHNSON. I won't belabor it either. It is just that I feel very strongly that unless researchers begin to consider all aspects of the

problem, we will never overcome the political problem of the two parties having traditionally different stances on participation and program support. I think that is a false dichotomy. It is what has prevented us from getting on board a decent program that could help people.

I just think that you have a responsibility to help meld those issues, and address the things that you have identified this morning as clearly as possible so that we won't be divided by unproductive political divisions.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me just say that I, for one, have never accepted the dichotomy of permissiveness versus anything else. I very, very much believe in the contrary.

But I think there are these divisions, that we are not always sure of the reasons for them, they are complicated. This panel, if you haven't resolved the differences, I think, you have shed some light on them, including the depth of them, but hopefully their resolution.

We all thank you very, very much. Not only has the third panel been delayed but you have given us more time than expected, and we appreciate that.

My colleague Mr. Sikorski, has joined us and has also benefited. He is going to hold his questions though, to the third panel.

Thank you very much.

We are taking stock, I hope the third panel has been able to stick with us.

June Wallace; Mr. Waters.

Is Mr. Waters accompanied by—no.

Mr. Waters; Beverly Thomas.

Is Beverly Thomas here?

Yes; if you would join us please.

Is Virginia Deal here?

And Mr. Avakian?

Welcome.

Now the order I have them—June Wallace, just join us at the table.

You are June Wallace?

Mr. Waters?

All right.

STATEMENT OF JUNE WALLACE, TEACHER, CREATIVE CHILD CARE, SALISBURY, MD, ACCOMPANIED BY ANDREW KARTEN, DIRECTOR, BASIC EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAM

Ms. WALLACE. My name is June Wallace. I am a 38-year-old mother of three children ages 14, 8, and 6. I enrolled in the BET-WIN program, volunteer which is run by the Maryland Department of Human Resources, as a volunteer on November 8, 1982, after reading information on the program.

I had completed the 11th grade and had been an AFDC recipient for at least 2 years prior to enrolling in BET-WIN.

My only employment history consisted of housekeeping jobs. BET arranged for me to find a reliable day care home for my 4-year-old daughter by having me apply for purchase of day care at Social Services.

After completing a 3 week job search in January 1983, but not finding employment, BET enrolled me in the local adult learning center in November 1983.

After 9 months I received my GED diploma. The BET program gave me $5 allowance each day to assist with transportation to school.

The joy I felt in receiving that diploma meant that I had accomplished something. I could give my children help with their homework when needed.

On December 21, 1983, I began an unpaid work experience at a local head start day care center as a day care aide. The BET program again gave me an allowance of $5 per day to help with transportation. The 6 months I spent at the head start center were very rewarding.

I learned what a day care aide's job duties were: Supervising small groups of children; going to work daily; and learning to be responsible. It gave me more confidence in myself and the feeling that I could do a good job.

I also enrolled in the day care I and day care II courses offered by the local community college, to become certified to work with young children, which day care centers now require as a condition of employment.

The BET program paid for my tuition, registration and books as well as an allowance to go back and forth to class. Without their assistance I would not have been able to take the required courses.

I remained in work experience for 26 weeks even though I was required to stay there only 13 weeks. I volunteered to stay the 13 additional weeks because I knew it would help me.

After my 6 months of work experience was completed on May 31, 1984, I was placed in an individual job search, and attempted to locate a job as a day care aid. A BET job developer worked with me.

In August of 1984, BET learned of an opening at a local day care center privately owned and operated, set up an appointment for me and gave me transportation there. BET offered their employer tax credits and an OTJ contract.

I was hired as a day care aide. I completed on-job training on January 9, 1985, as an aide, and was given a teaching position in August 1985, and supervision of 1 aide. My AFDC case for $281 monthly was closed February 1985 due to my earnings. I now earn $152 weekly.

BET gave me the opportunity to make something out of myself and get my children and myself off of welfare. If it weren't for BET, I would probably be still on AFDC. BET works; it helped get me here today.

[The prepared statement of June Wallace follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUNE WALLACE, TEACHER, CREATIVE CHILD CARE, SALISBURY, MD

My name is June Wallace. I am a 38 year old mother of three children ages 14, 8, and 6. I enrolled in the BET Program as a volunteer on November 8, 1982 after reading information on the program. I had completed the 11th grade and had been an AFDC recipient for at least 2 years prior to enrolling in BET. My only employment history consisted of housekeeping jobs. BET arranged for me to find a reliable

day care home for my 4-year-old daughter by having me apply for purchase of day care at Social Services.

After completing a three week job search class in January 1983 but not finding employment, BET enrolled me in the local Adult Learning Center in November 1983. After nine months, I received my GED diploma. The BET Program gave me a $5 allowance each day to assist with transportation to school. The joy I felt in receiving that diploma meant I had accomplished something. I could give my children help with their homework when needed. On December 21, 1983 I began an unpaid work experience at a head start day care center as a Day Care Aide. The BET Program again gave me an allowance of $5 per day to help with transportation. The 6 months I spent at the head start center were very rewarding. I learned what a Day Care Aide's job duties were: supervising small groups of children, going to work daily and being responsible. It gave me more confidence in myself and that I could do a good job. I also enrolled in Day Care I and Day Care II courses offered by the local community college to become certified to work with young children, which day care centers now require as a condition of employment.

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BET gave me the opportunity to make something out of myself, to get my children and myself off of welfare. If it weren't for BET, I'd probably still be on AFDC.

Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you for joining us.

We will now hear from Mr. Waters and then there will be questions for all of you.

Thank you so much Mr. Waters for your presence.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. WATERS, M.S.W.; DIRECTOR, EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND ENTERPRISE CENTER [EDTEC], CAMDEN, NJ

Mr. WATERS. First of all I think I wrote the wrong speech because I would like to respond to some of the issues that were raised by the first panel. But maybe we will have some time to do that.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Usually I am not included in hearings of this nature, because these forums are usually limited to researchers and theoreticians. So, first of all I would like to thank the staff for inviting me as a practitioner.

As indicated in my written testimony, I have worked with youth for 20 years in a variety of human service settings. And through all of my work experience I have consistently seen one barrier block the path of progress for the young disadvantaged, and that is how to involve them economically in the mainstream of society.

There are thousands of young people growing up in our society, without having actually worked or earned an honest dollar in their life. And you don't have to have a Ph.D. in sociology to understand what happens to youth and their families when they never experience the world of work in our society.

I didn't come here from Camden this afternoon to simply identify problems associated with young people and work. I am here to offer two specific program suggestions for dealing with the issue of providing more jobs and more work opportunities for young people, especially in our inner cities.

The first thing I would like to suggest is that U.S. policymakers seek ways to encourage entrepreneurship among not-for-profit community-based groups. My colleague, Aaron Bocage, who couldn't be here, and I were both employed by the Juvenile Resource Center which is a not-for-profit agency that works with juvenile offenders in Camden County, NJ. While we were employed there we developed five youth-operated businesses.

It is located, JRC is, in one of the poorest cities in the Nation, where youth unemployment runs consistently at over 20 percent. JRC works primarily with the youth in the areas of education counseling, job training, and employment.

In 1981, we started our first youth operated business, called the Lunchbox. The Lunchbox was a downtown luncheonette. We basically started to create real jobs and real work for young people in our community. Our goal was to begin to break the cycle of dependency that exists in many families.

For a first year investment of $25,000, the Lunchbox trained 16 youth in all aspects of food service and restaurant work, paid them $21,000 in wages, hired one adult Camden resident, and pumped $50,000 into the local economy by using city-based vendors. Our experience with the Lunchbox led us to start several new ventures. We opened Little Bo Pizza, a sit down pizzeria restaurant; New Ventures Management, a real estate management company that owns and operates the agency's main facility; the Plant Co., a commercial greenhouse; and Perfect Pastries, a commercial bakery.

Over the years we have closed two of these businesses and have added one which is called the Country Kitchen. But for the purpose of this discussion, the economic details of each venture are less important than the broad picture. Through these businesses that were created in this very small not-for-profit youth agency, 66 youth were involved in work training; 28 youth were employed; and 10 adults were employed, thus we like to think that a total of 104 families in Camden were a little more self-sufficient because someone in their household was involved in the real world of work.

We have also examples of other projects similar to ours around the country, and those models are included in my written testimony, and I won't get into them.

I have also made some references to other youth enterprise projects if you are interested in more on that topic. My colleague and I have also coauthored an article about our experience in this as well.

But again, we suggest as policymakers you look to encourage more opportunities to create jobs, youth enterprises and work experience at the local level by utilizing not-for-profit youth agencies, churches, civic assocations and schools as economic developers.

Our second suggestion is that we, meaning adults, must teach youth how to create work for themselves. One of the things that we often forget is that one can participate in the world of work without having a job. For the past 6 months my colleague and I have

worked on a curriculum which teaches kids how to start their own neighborhood business. Our motto is that "If you can't find a job, create one."

The curriculum is called New Entrepreneurs and it is completed, and I have some brochures here about that if you are interested.

But basically we teach youth how to create a small business in their own community with little or no resources. It teaches kids how to deal with the issue of work and what we call the old fashioned way. We became curious about youth self-employment as a work alternative when youth in our businesses became fascinated with the idea of business ownership.

Many of them did not have the kind of self-employment experiences that we enjoyed as youngsters many years ago.

For example, in my case, as a young man growing up in rural Virginia and later in the inner city of Philadelphia, I would have been considered another unemployed black teenager by today's standards. Although I had money and plenty of work to do I was among the self-employed.

At the age of 8, I delivered newspapers in my hometown in Virginia. And I continued to be self-employed when my family moved to Philadelphia by contracting to cut grass at a nursing home, shining shoes at the barber shop, delivering groceries, and one summer I even had subcontracted, with a tiny borough outside of Phildelphia called Millbourne, to paint the lines in their streets.

It could be said that these were insignificant little tasks that were no more than busy work. However, I think these early experiences taught me a lot about the world of work. The most important thing that I learned was that were opportunities to make money in my own neighborhood.

Entrepreneurship should be encouraged among youth in our cities and towns all across this great Nation of ours. It is definitely a hot item among adults.

Young adults should not have to wait until their adult years to find out that self-employment is an alternative work option. It is an option that you as Government policymakers should seriously consider for putting young America back to work.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of George E. Waters, Jr., follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. WATERS, JR., M.S.W.; DIRECTOR, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND ENTERPRISE CENTER [EDTEC], CAMDEN, NJ

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families. Usually I am not included in hearings of this nature. These forums are usually limited to researchers and theoreticians. So, first of all I would like to thank the staff for inviting a practitioner.

Aaron Bocage, my friend and associate of 20 years, and I became involved with youth many years ago when we were college students working at a settlement house in South Philadelphia. Since that time, we have worked with "regular" teenagers, high risk youth, special education students, gangs and emotionally disturbed young people. And during the 20 years in the field, we have consistently seen one barrier block the path of progress for the young disadvantaged. And that is how to involve them economically in the mainstream of our society.

There are thousands of young people growing up in our society without having actually worked or earned an honest dollar in their life. You don't need a Ph.D. in sociology to understand what happens to youth and their families when they never experience the world of work in our society.

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I didn't come here from Camden, NJ, this afternoon to simply identify problems associated with young people and work. I am here to offer two specific program suggestions for dealing with the issue of providing more jobs and work opportunities for young people.

The first thing I would like to suggest is that policymakers seek ways to encourage entrepreneurship among nonprofit community based groups. While Aaron and I were both employed by the Juvenile Resource Center [JRC], a nonprofit youth agency that works with juvenile offenders in Camden County, New Jersey, we developed five businesses. JRC is located in one of the poorest cities in the nation where youth unemployment runs consistently at over 20 percent. JRC works primarily with youth in the areas of education, counseling, job training, and employment.

In 1981, we started our first youth-operated business, The Lunchbox. The Lunchbox was a downtown luncheonette. We started the business to create real jobs and real work for young people in our community. Our goal was to begin to break the cycle of dependency that exists in many families. For a first year investment of $25,000, The Lunchbox trained 16 youth in all aspects of food services and restaurant work, paid them $21,000 in wages, hired one adult Camden resident, pumped $50,000 into the local economy by using city-based vendors.

Our experience with The Lunchbox led us to start several other ventures. We opened Little Bo Pizza, a sit-down pizzeria restaurant; New Ventures Management, a real estate management company that owns and operates the agency's main facility; the Plant Company, a commercial greenhouse; and Perfect Pastries, a commercial bakery. (We have closed two and have added one, The Country Kitchen). For the purpose of this discussion, the economic details of each venture are less important than the broad picture. Through the businesses that were created in this very small nonprofit youth agency, 66 youths were involved in work training, 28 youth were employed and 10 adults were employed. Thus, we would like to think that a total of 104 families in Camden were a little more self-sufficient because someone in their household was involved in the real world of work.

Creative work opportunities have been developed in other communities as well. We have done extensive research in the area of youth enterprise in nonprofit organizations and have found a few other examples—youth make ramps for the handicapped and wood pallets in Cincinnati; sell office supplies and operate a delivery service in Chicago; recycle bottle and cans in Ames (clothing center in planning); and started a firewood business, a construction crew and a print shop in Seattle

If you are interested in more information on this topic, I would like to refer you to a article we wrote called "Creating Youth Enterprise in the Nonprofit Sector" which appeared in [New Designs for Youth Development], published by Associates for Youth Development, Tucson, Arizona, in August 1984.

We suggest that as policymakers you look to encourage more opportunities to create jobs, youth enterprises and work experiences at the local level by utilizing nonprofit youth agencies, churches, civic associations and schools as economic developers.

Our second suggestion is that we (adults) must teach youth how to create work for themselves. One of the things we often forget is that one can participate in the world of work without having a job. There are thousands of people in this country who are self employed. For the past 6 months Aaron and I have worked on a curriculum which actually teaches kids how to start their own neighborhood business. Our motto is "if you can't find a job, then make one". The curriculum is called New Entrepreneurs and is now completed. I have a few brochures about the program I would like to share.

We teach youth how to create a small business in their own neighborhood with little or no resources. It is a 12 unit, 20 hr. curriculum with a series of well-illustrated workbooks. It is a soups-to-nuts guide for the young entrepreneur. One section, called, "easy in and easy out—youth business ideas for all neigborhoods," should be owned by every youth in America. It is appropriate for youth who live on farms as well as young people who grow up in urban housing projects. New Entrepreneurs teaches kids how to deal with the issue of work the old fashioned way.

We became curious about youth self-employment as a work alternative when youth in our businesses became fascinated with the idea of business ownership. Many of them did not have the same kind of self employment experiences that we enjoyed as youngsters many years ago.

As a young man growing in rural Virginia and Philadelphia, I would have been considered another black unemployed teenager by today's standards. Although I had money and plenty of work to do, I was among the self employed. At the age of 8 I delivered the "Afro-American" newspaper in and around my hometown of Nassawadox, VA. I continued to be self-employed when our family moved to Philadelphia by

contracting to cut grass at a West Philadelphia nursing home, shining shoes at the neighborhood barber shop and using my wagon to deliver groceries at the local supermarket. One summer the tiny borough of Millbourne (right outside of Philadelphia) subcontracted with me to paint the lines in the middle of their streets.

These early experiences taught me alot about the world of work. The most important thing I learned was that there were many opportunities to make money in my own neighborhood.

Entrepreneurship should be encouraged among our youth in cities and towns all across this great Nation of ours. It is definitely a hot item among adults. Young adults should not have to wait until their adult years to find out that self-employment is an alternative work option. It is an option that you as Government policymakers should seriously consider for putting young America back to work.

Thank you.

Mr. LEVIN. Next Beverly Thomas and Michael Hickey.

Welcome to both of you. We have read with interest about the work at GE's Reemployment Center. Tell us more.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. HICKEY, DIRECTOR, GE REEMPLOYMENT CENTER

Mr. HICKEY. Can you hear me OK?

Mr. LEVIN. Yes; thank you.

Mr. HICKEY. We have submitted six pages of testimony, and I will spare you from reading the testimony.

Mr. LEVIN. OK.

Mr. HICKEY. But I would like to start off by giving you an overview of the rather ambitious and important program, at least from our perspective.

The General Electric Reemployment Center was created about a year ago, April 1, 1985, with the operations and services fully in effect on April 29, 1985. It was set up as a joint effort of the General Electric Co., Maryland State Department of Employment and Training, and the Howard County Department of Citizen Services.

It was set up to help displaced people who were going to be displaced as a result of a phaseout of microwave oven production at the Columbia, MD plant.

In total, the dislocation will be 700 employees when it is all finished. At this point in time, about 550 people have been displaced since we have been in operation.

Over 500 have registered at our center. We have had over 4,500 individual visits of the 500 people at the center. We think it has been successful.

An important early step was developing an advisory board which is made up of the employees at the plant. A cross-section of the employees, hourly employees, salary employees, women, men, minorities, people who would advise me, advise the staff and give us input into the operations and the services that we needed to provide. And also to be a sounding board for the plant, because one of the early things that must be done is develop credibility with the people who will need the services because one can have the best program possible but unless the displaced employees take advantage it won't be very effective.

I think a significant development through our process was when G.E. applied for and received certification under the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program on behalf of the employees. All benefits that emanate from this act go directly to the employees. Certification became effective in July of 1985. A direct result has been a

shifting of priorities of the employees, from immediate job placement to long-term training.

I think that any long-term training is very significant in that if any future displacements occur in any other manufacturing or other jobs then the trained individuals will be much more marketable and more likely to find other opportunities after that.

The services that are provided are probably one of the most comprehensive network of services that are available to displaced people. And in terms of some of the statistics, I indicated that we have had over 500 people actually participate and register through the program. We currently have had 182 job placements, with the average placement wage of about $7 an hour, and we have over 250 people enrolled in long-term training programs.

We have had over 1,300 people participate in individual counseling sessions.

I can return and respond to any questions, but I wanted to give you an overview of things we are doing to give you a better understanding. Ms. Thomas will talk about some of the specific issues and concerns of the individual employees who are being affected by the displacement.

STATEMENT OF BEVERLY THOMAS, COORDINATOR, COUNSELING AND TRAINING, GE REEMPLOYMENT CENTER, COLUMBIA, MD

Ms. THOMAS. Thank you. My name is Beverly Thomas, and as Mr. Hickey just related, I am going to summarize what we see in terms of personal and counseling issues in dealing with a lot of the dislocated workers at GE.

While it would appear that the most immediate need for all of these displaced workers, or dislocated workers, would be to secure immediate and satisfying employment, we found that there are a lot of other personal, emotional, educational, and logistical issues that seem to take priority over that immediate goal. We have found that production-line workers generally have narrowly focused employment skills. In fact, many of them have minimal formal education and training. So as a result, we feel that other future employment opportunities will be limited if they do not receive some extensive assistance.

When employees learned about the possibility of losing their jobs and a significant part of their income—and these are workers, I might add, who have an extensive work history—they still experienced a variety of feelings. They tend to become afraid, frustrated, confused and many of them display a tremendous lack of confidence.

Many of the workers had not searched for jobs in several years and were feeling quite inadequate in terms of beginning a job search campaign.

So to address these reactions and these personal issues the center incorporated sessions on coping with life changes and stress management in our job search workshop program. Of course, in individual counseling sessions the staff always encourages the workers to expand and to discuss any of their own reactions to the layoff experience.

We also found that many employees did not possess a high school diploma or GED, so one of the first projects that we began was to start onsite GED classes. Many of the workers, particularly those at midlife or older felt unable to compete in the job market, and yet they were very resistant to going back to the classroom for retraining or for acquiring their high school diploma.

We found that since many of them were reluctant to join in group activities, our core service still revolves around personal time and attention to individual needs. In other words, the staff spends a considerable amount of time one on one with these folks to determine what direction they want to go in.

The primary barriers we have encountered with manufacturing workers in transition from dislocation, and working toward new employment are a general lack of confidence, and of course, a lack of financial resources. Their income immediately drops, and it can become worse down the road. A lack of adequate and inexpensive child care; a lack of reliable transportation; enough information and patience in dealing with government programs and with training institutions, and a lack of job search skills to compete in today's labor market. And for jobs beyond the manufacturing realm, certainly a lack of marketable job skills.

The center has addressed the lack of confidence that we seem to find pervasive through personal and group support, and also working with individuals to help them become aware of their own skills; more education, particularly the basic education, training, and some strategies for overcoming some of the negative attitudes regarding age barriers.

To assist with the lack of financial resources and adequate child care, we make appropriate referrals and try to assist individually wherever we can. And in terms of financial planning we also make referrals individually and have group sessions on strategies that will help in that area.

We also provide coordination with JTPA title III, support payments on site at the center.

In dealing with transportation problems we as much possible try to coordinate ride sharing and car pooling. To deal with Government programs and training institutions we have coordinated activities, and we often find that we must intercede on a case-by-case basis as advocates for a particular worker.

We also disseminate as much information as we have available individually and in newsletters regarding training and Government policies.

From our perspective, it is clear that assistance is essential, for without the support services and advocacy of the reemployment center, many displaced workers now gainfully employed would probably still be unemployed or underemployed. Assistance, again, personal assessment, decisionmaking, and retraining are also available, and we place a lot of emphasis on those areas to increase workers marketable job skills.

To cope with the lack of job search skills for today's market, we also provide workshops which include resume development, interviewing skills, completing job applications and telephone techniques to approach employers.

We found clearly from our point of view that assistance is essential, for without a lot of the support services and advocacy of the staff at the center many of the displaced workers that we know are employed we feel would still be unemployed or certainly underemployed.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Michael P. Hickey, and Beverly C. Thomas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. HICKEY, DIRECTOR, BEVERLY C. THOMAS, COORDINATOR, COUNSELING AND TRAINING, GE RE-EMPLOYMENT CENTER, COLUMBIA, MD

GENERAL ELECTRIC
RE-EMPLOYMENT CENTER
APPLIANCE PARK-EAST
COLUMBIA, MARYLAND

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

The General Electric Re-Employment Center (R.E.C.) was created on April 1, 1985, through the joint efforts of the General Electric Company, Maryland Dept. of Employment and Training, and the Howard County Dept. of Citizen Services. The Center's program and service operations officially began April 29, 1985.

The Re-Employment Center was established to help GE Appliance Park-East, Columbia, MD. employees who had been laid off, or were soon to be laid off, as a result of the phase out of Microwave Oven production. The Center provides a comprehensive network of employment and training related services to assist the displaced GE employees find new career and training opportunities.

During the first program year of operations, over 450 people have registered for Center services, resulting in over 4,500 individual visits, not inclusive of telephone and letter contacts.

As a first step in the development; a professional, experienced staff, well seasoned in employment programs, was recruited. An Advisory Board was then created, consisting of GE employees; 6 Hourly and 6 Salary, to provide guidance and input into the R.E.C. activities, and to promote the services to the plant population. The Advisory Board was crucial to the success of the Center, in that, it became the vehicle for direct employment involvement and input into the Center's policies and service mix, and established early credibility with the Columbia employees. It became the Sounding Board for the Center Director and Staff.

The Dept. of Labor Trade Adjustment Assistance (TRA/TAA) Certification for displaced GE employees was received in July 1985. This became very significant to the current high percentage of employees enrolled in re-training programs. The TRA/TAA shifted the emphasis and priorities of the displaced employees from immediate job search, to new training opportunities, out of the recognition that a new vocational skill would be learned and developed, enhancing current and future employment marketability.

This indeed was a significant development, in that prior to certification, the overwhelming concern was immediate re-employment into similar jobs, whereas after certification, the employees became more concerned with new training and career opportunities. The impact on the Center has been obvious, with fewer than anticipated immediate job placements, but a much higher than anticipated demand for training, along with all of the counseling, coordination, and assessment that accompanies pre-training referrals.

The longer term effect is significant and positive, in that, people will be trained for occupations that have projected growth, whereas in their old line of work of assembly production, future projections are for diminished opportunities. Also market trends and fluctuations are more severe for the less skilled work force, mainly because if subsequent displacements occur, it becomes more and more difficult with each occurrence for these people to find other suitable employment. Whereas, if one develops a trade that is in demand, then future displacements will be less profound, due to the fact that the market will be more capable of absorbing those who have a marketable skill. The long term benefits are obvious; future demand for skilled labor will be met along with less future displacements, both of which add to the local economic stability and reduce the future costs to taxpayers and employers.

The GE Re-Employment Center has met the needs of the displaced employees by offering the following programs and services:

CORE SERVICES

- Employment Counseling
- Labor Market Information
- Assessment - APTICOM System (GATB)
- Job Search Workshops - (Post & Pre Layoff)
- Job Clubs
- Benefits Counseling
- Resume Writing Assistance
- Interviewing Skills
- Skill Re-Training Programs
- GED Preparation Courses
- Job Development
- On-The-Job Training
- On-Site Unemployment Insurance Registration
- Special Programs
- Other Agency Referrals
- Project Inform
- Videotape Show of Services (Promotional material to encourage employee participation at the Center)

- Follow-up Services
  (weekly letters sent to training participants and displaced employees who have not used the Center, in an attempt to further encourage participation)
- R.E.C. Brochure
- Pre-Layoff Briefings & Orientations
- Bi-weekly R.E.C. Highlights
  (Re-Employment Center tabloid describing Center's current and upcoming activities)

SPECIAL SERVICES (ONGOING) AND AGENCY REFERRALS

- Financial Counseling
- Family Counseling
- Psychological Counseling
- Relocation Assistance
- Out-of-Area Job Search

SPECIAL SERVICES/WORKSHOPS/PROGRAMS

- Job Fairs
- Roundtables - 1600 employees given a guided tour of the Center
- Trade Adjustment Assistance Seminar & Registration meetings
- Presentations By Training Schools On Available Programs

SEMINARS

- Career Days
- How To Start & Manage Your Own Business
- Financial Resources While In Training
- How To Budget & Make Your Money Go Further
- Over 40 - Where Do I Go From Here?
- Postal Exam Preparation
- SF171 Preparation and How to Apply for Government Jobs

R.E.C. SPONSORED CLASS SIZE TRAINING

- Electronic Technology
- Word Processing/Modern Office Skills
- Printed Circuit Board Soldering
- Baltimore County Occupational Training Centers
- Local Community Colleges
- Local Vocational/Proprietary Schools

COUNSELING ISSUES

While the most immediate need of the dislocated GE workers would appear to be secure, satisfying employment; many other personal, emotional, educational, and logistical issues often take priority.

Production line workers generally have narrowly focused employment skills with the majority possessing minimal formal education and training. As a result, other future employment opportunities will be limited if they do not receive extensive assistance.

When employees learn of the possibility of losing their jobs, coupled with a loss of a significant portion of their income, what then occurs, even if they locate another job in manufacturing, is that they usually experience an array of intense feelings and emotions. People become angry, afraid, confused, frustrated, and quickly lose confidence. Many workers have not searched for jobs in several years and feel inadequate to begin a job search campaign.

To address these reactions, the Center has incorporated sessions on coping with life changes and stress into Job Search Workshops. Also, in individual counseling sessions, workers are always encouraged to discuss and expand on their personal reactions to their layoff experience.

In addition to providing an individual and group forum for expressing feelings, the Center immediately established education and training programs to increase the confidence level and marketability of GE workers. Since some employees do not possess a High School diploma or GED, one of the first projects was to start on-site GED classes. Many individuals, particularly those in their 40's and 50's, feel unable to compete in the job market and yet are very resistant to going back to the classroom.

In order to provide support and encouragement for entering GED classes, and/or job search workshops, and re-training; Center staff spends a majority of its time in individual and telephone counseling. Many people are reluctant to join any type of group activity or training. Therefore, the Center core service still revolves around personal time and attention to individual needs.

The primary barriers we encounter with manufacturing workers in transition from dislocation to new employment are a lack of:

- confidence
- financial resources
- adequate and inexpensive child care
- job search skills
- marketable job skills

- reliable transportation
- information and patience when dealing with government programs

The R.E.C. addresses the employee's general lack of confidence through the process of personal and group support, increased awareness of individual skills, education, training, and strategies for overcoming negative feelings regarding age barriers.

To assist with the lack of financial resources and adequate child care, the center makes appropriate referrals and provides information individually and in groups on financial planning and coordination with JTPA Title III Support Payments.
To cope with transportation problems, center staff coordinates ride sharing or car pooling whenever possible.

In dealing with government programs and training institutions, the center coordinates activities and often intercedes as an advocate for the displaced worker as well as disseminating information individually and in newsletters regarding training and government policies.

Assistance with personal assessment, decision making, and training is available to increase workers marketable job skills.

The lack of job search skills such as resume development, interviewing skills, writing cover letters, completing job applications, and proper use of the telephone is addressed in the job search workshop.

Many people on lay-off would clearly admit that "they didn't feel anyone would hire them with the skills they had," or "that they felt uneducated and unable to learn new things." Folks who have been employed for many years at manufacturing jobs said "I've never had to have a resume before and don't know how to do one."

In addition, when individuals encounter special personal or financial crises, such as divorce, eviction, etc., R.E.C. staff members make referrals to appropriate service agencies or if needed, intervene as advocates.

From our perspective, it is clear that assistance is essential, for without the support services and advocacy of the Re-Employment Center, many displaced workers now gainfully employed would probably still be unemployed or underemployed.

FINAL ANALYSIS

Viewed from any perspective, the GE Re-Employment Center has been an overwhelming success. The majority of the displaced employees have been assisted, resulting in positive outcomes for most of them. The program service and training mix available is comprehensive and addresses the needs of the employees.

The unique and critical asset of the Center's development and success is found in the approach by GE management. The company came forward to make sure the employees were given the best service possible by providing the necessary financial and supportive resources along with the comprehensive programs and services.

It can be stated, that perhaps the single most important reason for the current level of success has been the support provided by all parties concerned. The coordination and cooperation of the General Electric Company, MD. Department of Employment and Training, Howard County Government, Howard Community College, the local SDA's and all other service providers have been important.

The Federal Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) was established as a mechanism to create a public/private partnership, joining Government and Business forces to help displaced and unemployed people find new career and training opportunities. Neither business nor government can do it alone.

The General Electric Re-Employment Center epitomizes the spirit and intent of the legislation, through the resource, support and financial commitment of General Electric, the State of Maryland, and the County Government. The ideal partnership exists in Howard County and in the State of Maryland, one which could be duplicated as a National Model of Success.

Mr. LEVIN. Another vote.

Let me ask—we maybe have another 5 minutes if we scoot to the vote.

So, perhaps Virginia Deal you would like to at least begin.

Mr. Avakian, I am not sure who is going to go first?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AVAKIAN, SENIOR STAFF ATTORNEY, CENTER ON NATIONAL LABOR POLICY, NORTH SPRINGFIELD, VA

Mr. AVAKIAN. Mr. Chairman, I am just making an opening comment and Mrs. Deal will provide all the testimony.

I am an attorney with the Center on National Labor Policy. As a profession, I represent employees and have witnessed the impact of work on their individual situations. Mrs. Deal has come here to discuss a problem that is developing throughout the country, in terms of dealing with the value of work and its impact on the family.

We have a trend now and in the future for a movement of workers based upon our technological advances and other reasons, out of the factories and into the homes. The Government currently has some regulations which prohibit a certain amount of this type of homework, and its impact on the family right now is very significant. Mrs. Deal would like to go into this more specifically with you.

STATEMENT OF VIRGINIA DEAL, PARENT, EMPLOYEE, TOM THUMB GLOVE CO., WILKESBORO, NC

Ms. DEAL. I am Virginia Deal, I was a homeworker. I am no longer a home worker because the Government came in and told me it was against regulations to sew gloves in the home.

This is what I did. [Display.] I have a finished product and the product before anything is done to it before I took it home. We sewed the thumbs in, fingers on, and closed these gloves, which takes a lot of skill to do all of this. Some gloves we sewed bands on, others we did not.

It takes 6 months to learn to sew a glove. To sew one well, and do well on it, it takes at least 2 years. A child could not do it. Someone who is not trained could not do it.

This is how they look when I take them back.

I would go and pick up my work, and then when I finished my work I would take it back. The most I made was $7 an hour. I kept my time to know exactly what I made. I timed myself. The least I made was approximately $4.70 an hour.

When the glove is completely finished, they turn them in to the factory.

We have 85 ladies who were doing these in their homes. Many of these ladies could not get to work.

They had no transportation. They had maybe one vehicle, maybe their husband would be going one direction to work, they would have to go another direction several miles out of the way to get to the factory.

Many of these ladies had children that they would like to stay home with to take care of them. Myself, my daughter is 12 years old, in going into the factory she is home by herself from approxi-

mately 6:30 in the morning until 8 o'clock of the morning. Of the afternoon she is home, right now, until about 5:30 from about 2:30.

My daughter, while I was working in my home, was an A student. Before I started working in my home she was an A–B student. Her grades came up. She has improved tremendously because I have more time to spend with her and help her with her work.

Our family time together in working in the factory is very limited. When I was working in the home I could take off any time I wished to take off.

If my husband happened to have a day off, we could spend it as I chose. I did not have to be in the factory.

This is true of a lot of the ladies. If my daughter has a day off from school, I can spend that day with her, make up the work later on. We could work anytime that we wanted to at our own rate or our own pace.

Some of these ladies that were working in their home have truck drivers for husbands. While their husbands were gone they could work. While their husbands were home they could spend their time with their husbands, therefore they have a better home life.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me just break in for a moment because I am afraid we have to answer the bells again.

If we just vote and come right back, can all of you wait?

While those of you who can, whoever can be back, will be back. Just give us 10 minutes, we will try to make it quickly.

We will stand in recess then.

[Recess.]

Mr. LEVIN. All right, we will reconvene.

I don't know if you had quite finished. I am sorry for the interruption.

Ms. DEAL. Thank you.

Working at home gives people the opportunity to be with their families, I have already established that.

When I started to work in the factory myself, about 2 months ago, I had to go 46 miles per day to work, if I drove for myself. When I was working at home all I had to do was walk across the yard.

I did not have my job in my home, a lot of the ladies did, but mine was in a building separate and apart from my house. I had all the things that I would have had in the house, to help me out, the conveniences and things.

When I was working at home I didn't have a transportation problem. We only had one car. My husband takes it to work to Taylorsville, which is 4 miles away. I was going to Wilkesboro to work every day after going into the factory.

I could only work 20 hours. For 20 hours work I took home approximately $76 dollars a week. You can't make production very well just running into the factory for a few minutes.

The majority of the ladies that were working at home could not even make it into the factory, therefore, they didn't have the income that they had.

Ten people are working regular hours out of 85. The ladies that did make it into the factory, the majority of them, I think, there were about 25, and 15 of them are working from 3 to 6 hours a day.

That doesn't even pay for the babysitting fees that we would have to have. Babysitting had just gone up to $40 per child per week, whether you take your child to the babysitter or not. If you miss taking your child one day, you pay anyway. That runs into a lot of expense for people especially when they have two and three children and take home $100 or less. It doesn't pay for them to work.

Working in the homes we averaged $6 an hour, out of all of the workers that worked. We have already checked into that to be sure. The Labor Department came into my home and they timed me sewing and said I made well above minimum wage.

Everything was fine. Then they went back to Tom Thumb Glove in Wilkesboro, told them we were illegal because of title 29, of the Federal regulations, part 530. Gloves and mittens, ladies apparel, handkerchiefs, embroidering, buttons and buckles and jewelry making were the only things that were restricted.

Jobs in our area are kind of hard to find, for home workers. We do have some upholstery sewers who do work at home. And we have a lot a furniture factories in our area, but if you are not trained in that, you cannot work at home in that. You have to buy your machine.

We rented our machines for $1 a year; that was very cheap. We furnished our own electricity. We paid our own taxes and Social Security; we were encouraged to do that.

And it was an ideal situation for all of us. However, if we do not get our machines back home, Tom Thumb Glove will be forced to go to Red China to import, and these ladies who have been working will be out of jobs. The ones in the factory, which amount in all to about 240 people, will be out of jobs.

To me that is pretty silly to take American jobs and send them to Red China when we have quality products that we make ourselves. That doesn't make good sense to me.

We all want to work. If the jobs were available we would work. Some of these ladies will have to go on welfare. That is something else I can't understand, if somebody wants to work, why put them on welfare; why not let them work?

They are trained to do these jobs, and maybe not other jobs. Some of these ladies, the only thing they have ever done is sew gloves. They don't want to go into another factory maybe to get a job.

Some of them could go into upholstery factories, but when they could work at home; why not? It is much simpler for everybody concerned.

In Wilkes County just in the last 2 or 3 months there have been two or three factories that have shut down because they didn't have workers. They were in these restricted areas in the ladies' garments.

If they had been permitted, they could have sent machines home with ladies that were trained in these jobs and they wouldn't have had to shut down, therefore, a lot of people would be employed that are not employed today.

Most of these ladies that worked in these factories were not given any notice either as to the plants being shut down. And we were certainly not given notice in our situation. We had 8 days to

turn our machines in. We didn't have a choice of whether to get other employment right away either.

The elderly people who are affected in this, some of these ladies have elderly parents who they care for. My mother has passed away since I have been working at home. Had it not have been that I was working at home, I couldn't have spent the last week of her life with her.

My daddy right now, my brother lives with him, but he depends on me to take him everywhere he goes, to the doctors, and stuff. I have to take off work to go.

If I was working at home, all I would have to do is stop for a little while and that would be it, I could make it up later on. Some of these ladies have people who live in the homes with them who are old and some of them are in wheelchairs, but that cannot get an exemption on this because the law states that they have to be complete invalids or be invalids themselves in order to have exemptions. If they were able to work at home they could look out for these people and maybe they wouldn't have to hire somebody to look after them, and not have to pay that out, therefore, their income would be greater, and everybody would be happy in the situation.

The roads are another problem for us. We live in basically mountainous country, around Wilkes and Alexander County. In the wintertime the roads get impassable, especially for the ones that live on dirt roads.

It is impossible for a lot of them to get out to go to jobs every day. They just need something they can maybe go one time a week and pick up and take back one time a week.

Some ladies go as far as 10 miles on those roads a day each way, that is lot of traveling over these roads. In the bad weather, we couldn't stay in the factory to wait and see what the conditions were going to get to be. We would have to take off work, if we hadn't been there but an hour, if it had started snowing. That took away from income, too.

One lady was using this income totally to buy heart medicine. She is 69 years old. She sewed when she wanted to sew. The only income she has right now is Social Security.

She has tried to get other means of support and has been turned down for any kind of relief at all. If I am correct, I think her Social Security was $265 a month. Her medicine was $235 a month. That doesn't leave much for living expenses.

Nancy Adams, who is with me today, has a child with a severe learning disability. She has to go to a lot of meetings pertaining to her child. She helps in the school that he attends. Working in the factory is not very suitable for her, because she has to take off to go to all of these meetings. It forms a hardship for her in having to travel to the factory, then back, and then back to the factory if she gets through with her meeting in time.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me just mention, I am concerned a bit about time, and adequate time to question the panel. The members here may have to leave including myself, for markups or the like. So if I could ask you if you just finish and there may be some questions. We may get another bite at the apple yet.

Ms. DEAL. That will be just fine.

We think that if the Government would step aside on these regulations, that more jobs would be created, therefore, more families would have more income; the children would be better taken care of; the elderly would be better taken care of; and I think the economy would be much better off.

Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Virginia Deal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIRGINIA DEAL, HOMEWORKER FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Virginia Deal, and I am a homeworker from the state of North Carolina. With me today is Nancy Adams who also works from her home and Michael Avakian of the Center on National Labor Policy, Inc.

Nancy and I are from Wilkesboro and Taylorsville, North Carolina respectively which are small communities located in the western part of the State approximately 70 miles from Charlotte. I live with my husband and my young child while Nancy and her husband have four children, one of whom is an 8-year-old with a severe learning disability.

We appreciate this opportunity to express our views and recommendtions on the value of homework to the economic and overall personal well-being of our families. I speak on behalf of 83 other women like myself who, until 2 months ago, were employed as homeworkers for the Tom Thumb Glove Co. in Wilkesboro. In addition I am also representing the interests of my local chapters of the 4H Club and North Carolina Agriculture Extension Service who believe that earning a living from home is an idea that should be encouraged as a remedial response to the break-up of the American family.

I have a modest, but continuous, sewing background. I have been making dolls, stuffed animals, and some of my own clothes since high school and over the years have picked up most of my sewing ability through practice and experience. I also make home decorator items such as quilts, pillows, wall hangings, tailored baskets, etc.

I started working for Tom Thumb 13 years ago in its Wilkesboro factory as a glove stitcher. As I began having children I realized that factory work was no longer a viable means of earning a living. I felt that my presence at home at all times was essential to the proper upbringing of my children. However, I also knew that the income I gave up to be a stay-at-home mother was sorely being missed until Tom Thumb offered me the opportunity to work at home doing the same glove stitchwork that I performed in its factory. For several years, Nancy, myself and 83 other women in our area took advantage of this great opportunity to combine employment and child rearing.

My experience over these years led me to the conclusion that the benefits of working at home are many. I worked when I wanted to and as fast or slow as I wanted to. Many times when my husband or my daughter had days off, I didn't work at all. On the other hand, if I wanted to sew while my husband watched Sunday afternoon football I was free to do so. I was always there when my daughter needed me. When she called from school and said "I don't feel well and can you come get me," I was there. When she came home excited and couldn't wait to share her good news, I was there. This was extremely important to me, and the major reason for my wanting to work at home.

My homework earnings fluctuated with the amount of work I did, but averaged between $5 and $6 an hour on the average day, depending on what kind of work I was doing and how many interruptions I had. In an uninterrupted hour I could easily make $7. My situation was not uncommon. Many of my fellow homeworkers in and around Taylorsville earned as much as I did.

Suddenly, however, my perfect homework setup was abruptly ended last month by the U.S. Department of Labor. I was informed that a forty year old department regulation (29 C.F.R. Part 530) prohibits all homework involving my glovemaking as well as women's apparel, buttons and buckles, jewelry, handkerchiefs, and embroidery. The Labor Department actually enforced these homework restrictions by closing down that part of Tom Thumb's operation which it said was illegally using my services and those of other homeworking seamstresses.

Needless to say, this has imposed a hardship on my family, myself and all of the other homeworkers in the area. The loss of my homework income from Tom Thumb has made things difficult for all of us, and has certainly changed our prospects for

the future and for our children's future. I have been forced back into a factory environment where I am limited to just 20 hours a week.

It is my feeling that these restrictions are totally unfair. I can stay in my home and sew a batter's or golf glove but not a work glove. It is legal to make buttons for furniture but not for women's apparel. The worker exploitation conditions that existed in 1940 that brought about the imposition of these restrictions no longer are so rampant so as to justify their continuance. It is not right to completely ban homework because some homeworkers may not be making minimum wage. That's somewhat like banning the game of football just because an occasional player gets hurt.

Those who oppose easing the homework restrictions contend that homeworkers receive no benefits, such as vacation pay, job security, pension, social security, or decent working conditions. I disagree most emphatically. Homeworkers need no expensive clothing. I sew in jeans and T-shirts. We need not own and maintain our own car. We have the time and freedom to do our own housework and cooking, like homemade soups and stews. We have excellent working conditions in our own comfortable homes. I pay Social Security along with my taxes and I maintain my own retirement plan. Many of my homeworking friends also do the same.

In fact, some of my homeworking friends were formerly factory sewers who like myself finally said "no" to the noise, speed, and routine of assembly line work so heralded by the labor unions. For years we enjoyed the serenity, comfort and pride from creating our own products at home but now we are told that our government forbids this.

It is my contention that homework creates jobs. For instance, homework accommodates the current growth of home-based workers and the increasingly popular trend toward this employment practice, especially in high technology industries. There are currently 5.5 million home-based workers in the United States and nearly half of all home-based businesses are less than 2 years old.[1] There may be as many as 10 million homeworkers by 1990.[2] Such companies as American Express, Mountain Bell Telephone, and Control Data have already implemented pilot projects. Sadly the AFL-CIO has already called upon the Labor Department to "immediately ban computer homework," except in cases involving handicapped workers.

For the elderly, women with children or those with other family obligations in the Taylorsville area, homework provides an opportunity to earn a living. I believe everyone should have the opportunity to work at home if it is their choice, even if there is a factory or other industry nearby. Taylorsville provides limited opportunities for women to go into the workplace but for many of us, our homes and families take precedence and we want to be allowed to stay where we are, working in the comfort of our homes.

Representatives, I agree with those who say that the government is to blame for much of the unemployment and resulting poverty experienced by many families in this country. I fix this blame, however, not because the government has not done enough through job creation programs but because it has taken an active role in eliminating thousands of jobs that currently exist. The answer is to get out of the way. Homework is a phenomenon that should not and cannot be discouraged. It is the wave of the future and can be the salvation of many poverty stricken families. Labor Secretary Brock stated this last April in his confirmation hearings but unfortunately he has yet to act to ease the restrictions.

With the help of Michael Avakian and the Center on National Labor Policy, I have petitioned the Labor Department to engage in emergency rule making to eliminate these resrictions. Your support for my efforts would benefit thousands now suffering from these harmful regulations.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Coats; Mrs. Johnson—whoever wants to go first.

Mr. COATS. Go ahead.

Mrs. JOHNSON. I had a chance to talk with the panel a bit before you all came back. I just want to thank you for your excellent testimony and I will say that GE Services are extraordinarily better than most companies.

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[1] According to a report on "Home Office Market Study for American Greeting," Lemont Consulting Group, New York, N.Y., January 31, 1984. The Lemont Group found that out of 102.3 million total workers, 5.4% are non-farm, full time homeworkers.

[2] National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council, as reported in Daily Labor Report, Bureau of National Affairs, November 18, 1983, p. C-1.

I appreciate the good work you are doing, and have gained some better insight and some projects of importance to work. I appreciate your being here.

Mr. COATS. I also want to add my thanks and congratulations to the GE people. They have a work-training program in the area that I represent. It is a model and it is operating very well.

I also want to ask a question of Mr. Waters. I am just curious, I was impressed with your testimony which I didn't hear you give, but I read it over.

Have you done any followup? For instance, your first youth-operated business, the Lunchbox, employed 16 youths who were trained in all aspects of food service and restaurant management. Has there been any followup? Do you know where those 16 are now, what they are doing?

Mr. WATERS. Not in a formal sense, which is one of the limitations that we have at that level. Not the kind of money to do the kind of followup that we would like. But we do get kids coming back and talking about what they are doing now, and most of them have gone on to other restaurant work.

One of those youngsters, however, has decided to open up a hot dog stand, himself. Some are probably after the experience unemployed. We haven't done anything in a formal way. But what we feel is important with kids in this particular area, is that by the not for profit agency having a business, we can expose them to some things that ordinarily they wouldn't get exposed to.

So our hope is that one or two, three or four, or five will get some sense of something that he hasn't received before, and that he might use that later on in his or her life. Most of them, though, will leave and go on to another job in the same field.

We would like to do some followup because we have had enough numbers now to kind of go through.

Mr. COATS. Some questions for Virginia Deal.

Let me see if I understand this correctly. The Department of Labor regulation that currently is on the books, is just limited to production of certain types of items, is that correct?

Ms. DEAL. Correct.

Mr. COATS. So if I read your testimony right, you can make some kinds of gloves, but not other kinds of gloves?

Ms. DEAL. That is right. You can make baseball gloves for the little batters, any kind of athletic gloves, but you cannot make industrial gloves or any other kind of gloves.

Mr. COATS. Your understanding is that regulation was imposed some 40 years ago because there was a situation of businesses exploiting workers; Is that why?

Ms. DEAL. That is my understanding.

Mr. COATS. I think you also mentioned that you have petitioned, or some of the company has petitioned, the Department of Labor for a review of that provision?

Ms. DEAL. Yes, sir, we have.

Mr. COATS. But you haven't heard anything?

Ms. DEAL. Not yet.

Mr. COATS. I think you make a good case, an excellent case for homework and the benefits it can provide for certain individuals that don't have the means or the desire to leave home everyday for

an extended period of time. I assume you are paid on a piece rate basis?

Ms. DEAL. Yes, sir, we are.

Mr. COATS. The company provides the machines?

Ms. DEAL. That is right.

Mr. COATS. Well, hopefully, we can help look into that for you, and see if we can get some answers. It doesn't appear, at least it escapes me, what the logic of prohibiting that kind of work is.

Ms. DEAL. Thank you.

Mr. COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LEVIN. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Hickey, do you know what the sources of funding are for the program? It has received some excellent and I think, very well-deserved publicity. I, for one, cite it very often as an example of a comprehensive program. What are the sources of funding?

Mr. HICKEY. Well, the majority of the actual funding commitment comes from General Electric Corp. There is also some funding and expertise provided through the State of Maryland from the Job Training Partnership Act, Title III, Dislocated Worker Program. There is also funding provided directly to the training institutions through the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program.

Mr. LEVIN. So there is Federal, State, as well as private funding?

Mr. HICKEY. Yes, sir. And actually the State funding is from the Federal Government through the Job Training Partnership Training Act, Title III.

In terms of actual cash outlays to run the reemployment center, General Electric has committed $400,000 over 2 years, and the State, through the Job Training Partnership Act, has committed $200,000 over 2 years.

General Electric has also committed a great deal of in-kind services such as space, utilities, other type of professional help and expertise.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me ask, Mrs. Wallace, I understand that Mr. Karten, is here?

Mr. WATERS. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Karten is the director of the BET Program.

We also welcome you here, Mr. Karten.

Ms. Wallace, I understand you began the day very early.

Mr. WATERS. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you. We won't keep anybody much longer.

But let me just ask the same question, if I might, of the two of you for the sources of funding for your program.

Mr. KARTEN. We are a WIN demo program, so some of our money is obviously Federal, and State, and then we utilize JTPA funds for training to send AFDC recipients for advanced skills training and certificates and advanced programs like nurse aide, day care, secretarial.

Mr. LEVIN. You are one of the 22, I think, WIN demo programs?

Mr. KARTEN. Yes.

Mr. LEVIN. About what percentage of the money comes through that, just roughly?

Mr. KARTEN. We only get from JTPA, a grant of $52,000, and we service just one county, so it is a very small percentage.

Mr. LEVIN. Of WIN money? How much WIN money do you get?

Mr. KARTEN. I don't have that information. We could provide it for the record.

[The information follows:]

The program receives $101,272 in WIN as well as $48,304 in funds to operate the AFDC grant diversion program.

Mr. LEVIN. All right. I think if we are done——

Mr. COATS. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask for unanimous consent to insert my opening statement in the record, and also, to keep the record open for a 2-week period of time for additional written testimony. We had a witness who had to cancel at the last minute due to scheduling difficulties, but said she would be willing to submit written testimony.

So if we could keep the record open for 2 weeks for that, it would be appreciated.

Mr. LEVIN. So ordered.

[Opening statement of Congressman Dan Coats follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

I am very happy to be able to attend this hearing today. I thank the Chairman, Congressman Miller, for calling the hearing; and I thank especially our witnesses. I know that many of you have come here at some inconvenience to yourselves.

Our subject today is Work In America: Implications for Families. The relationship between work and families is a close one. It is impossible for one to be affected without the other being affected also. This is very clear in our nation today.

Indeed, looking at the problems around us, it might have been even more appropriate to call this hearing, "Families In America: Implications for Work." The impact of changing family structure on work patterns is dramatic. Our welfare system alone speaks volumes about this impact. Over half of the families receiving AFDC today are in the midst of a span of welfare dependency which will last at least 8 years.

Almost 90 percent of the children receiving AFDC have able-bodied, but absent, fathers. In more than half of these cases, the parents were never married.

Why do young women choose to have children before they marry?

Why do young men choose to become fathers before they can support children?

It is not difficult to understand the hardships which keep many young mothers from even attempting to enter the work force, but why aren't the men working to support them?

These are some of the questions that I hope our panels will address today. I believe that they are some of the most important questions which face us as policymakers today.

I would also like to request that the record be kept open for 2 weeks in order to receive the written testimony of a witness who was unable to appear today.

FAMILY AND WORK FACT SHEET—PREPARED BY THE MINORITY STAFF SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES APRIL 17, 1986

THE FAMILY AND WORK

Labor force participation for married women with husbands present and children under six increased from 30 percent in 1970 to 48 percent in 1984. (Children, Youth, and Families, 1984)

About 25 percent of married women with children under six work full-year, full-time, while about 35 percent of single women with children under six work full-year, full-time. (Ellwood, 1985)

Median family income (in constant dollars) increased 34 percent between 1960 and 1984. The increase was greatest for 2-earner families, which saw a 38 percent gain. Median incomes for female single heads of household and for one-earner, two-parent families both increased 22 percent. However, median income for single heads of household has remained slightly more than half of the median income for two-parent, one-earner families. (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1986)

For working mothers of children under six, care in the child's home or in the home of another are the most widely used child care arrangements. Child care centers were used by 18.8 percent of children under six with mothers working full-time and 7.5 percent of mothers working part-time in 1982. (CYF, 1984).

WELFARE AND WORK

Maximum combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefits for a single mother with two children are comparable with a starting wage income in many States.

Current minimum wage is $3.35 per hour, or about $590 per month.

The maximum AFDC/Food Stamp benefit in a median state is $524 per month. In California the combined benefit is $693 per month; in New York City, it is $645. (Ways and Means, 1986)

In addition, AFDC recipients are usually eligible for a number of other programs, including housing assistance, Medicaid, SSI, and several nutrition programs.

Higher benefit levels for AFDC have been linked with higher rates of children in poverty. In the ten states with the highest AFDC benefit levels, poverty among children increased an average of 27.9 percent. In the ten states with the lowest benefit levels, poverty rates decreased 17.4 percent. (Gallaway and Vedder, 1985)

Although most "spells" on AFDC last less than two years, 50.2 percent of the persons enrolled at any point in time are in the midst of episodes lasting at least 8 years. (National Governors Association, 1986)

In 1954, 85 percent of black males 16 years and older were participating in the labor force, at a rate only 0.4 percentage points lower than white males of the same age. By 1965, the difference between black and white labor force participation rates was still less than a percentage point. By 1976, the gap was 7.7 percentage points. From 1954 to 1965, the black reduction in labor force participation was 17 percent larger than for whites. From 1965 to 1976, it was 271 percent larger. (Murray, 1984)

TEEN PREGNANCY, FAMILY STABILITY, AND WELFARE

Never-married young mothers are the most likely to be long term welfare recipients (Ellwood, 1985)

In 1975, half of families receiving AFDC were families begun when the mother was still a teenager. (Baldwin, 1983)

In 1983, 88.2 percent of children receiving AFDC were eligible for the program because one parent was absent. For 48.1 percent of AFDC children, the parents were never married. (HHS, 1985)

Almost 90 percent of children on AFDC have able-bodied but absent fathers (Kondratas, 1985)

The number of babies born to unmarried women has risen from 100,000 in 1960 to almost 200,000 in 1970, to over 270,000 in 1980. In 1980, 48 percent of births to teens were out-of-wedlock, as contrasted with 15 percent in 1960 (Baldwin, 1983)

Both black and white children with never-married mothers can expect to spend about six years in poverty (6 years for black, 6.2 for non-black). (Duncan and Rogers, 1984)

Young women who marry prior to childbirth, whether the conception is premarital or postmarital, experience greater marital stability than do those who delay marriage. (McLaughlin, et. al., 1986)

The largest and best evaluated experiments on the guaranteed income are the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments performed in Denver and Seattle, from 1971 to 1978 (SINE/DIME sites). In the SINE/DIME sites, the dissolution of marriages was 36 percent higher for whites receiving the NIT payments than for those who did not; for blacks, marriage dissolution was 42 percent higher among those receiving NIT payments. (Murray, 1984)

According to the 1940 U.S. Census, 10.1 percent of white families and 14.9 percent of black families were female headed. According to historian Herbert Gutman, 85 percent of black families living in Harlem in 1925 were intact, with teenage mothers raising children alone being virtually unknown. (Loury, 1986)

In 1985, 14.7 percent of white families and 48.8 percent of black families were female headed. (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1984)

WELFARE REFORM AND WORK OPPORTUNITIES

In 1981, OBRA allowed states to require able-bodied AFDC recipients who did not have young children to participate in the Community Work Experience Programs (CWEP). OBRA also created the WIN Demonstration Program, which allowed state welfare agencies to take over administration of Work Incentive Programs (WIN). By

July, 1985, twenty two states had implemented CWEP, seven of those on a statewide basis. Twenty three states had elected to transfer WIN from the employment agency to the social service agency. (Ross, 1985)

In 1982, TEFRA provided states with the options of requiring Job Search of AFDC applicants and recipients. By July, 1985, twelve states operated Job Search programs for recipients, and nine states required applicants to participate. (Ross, 1985)

In 1984, DEFRA allowed States to operate Grant Diversion programs which pool the welfare benefits of a number of recipients to provide wage subsidies. By July, 1985, eleven states operated Grant Diversion Programs. (Ross, 1985)

In 1985, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) released preliminary findings of its ongoing Demonstration of State Work/Welfare Initiatives. These findings show considerable success in a number of areas.

Job Search

AFDC applicants and recipients responded positively to group job search, when it was mandatory as well as when it was optional;

In San Diego, where participation was mandatory, 80 percent of applicants interviewed thought the requirement was fair.

Impacts of the program were much larger for women in the harder to employ subgroups.

Mandatory Unpaid Work Experience

A very high proportion of the participants interviewed responded positively to the work experience. They were satisfied with their assignments, felt positive about coming to work, believed that they were making a useful contribution, and felt that they were treated as part of their workforce.

Many felt that the employer got the better end of the bargain, or that they were underpaid for their work.

The majority felt that the work requirement was fair.

Grant Diversion

Grant diversion had substantial political and popular appeal as a means of "turning a welfare check into a paycheck."

The technical difficulties of administering a grant diversion program have been greatly smoothed by changes in law and regulations since the passage of the OBRA in 1981.

Nevertheless, early data from the demonstration indicate that states are encountering serious problems in implementing the program on a large scale, and are experiencing many of the same operational constraints that have traditionally limited the use of OJT by manpower agencies.

Supported Work

The supported work approach was most effective for the AFDC recipients, who showed significant increases in employment, earnings, wages, and reductions in welfare dependency.

Earnings among the enrollees increased by 50 percent (compared to control group). The increase resulted not only from the fact that more women got jobs, but also that the jobs they got paid higher wages and were for longer hours than the jobs of the control group.

Mr. LEVIN. And also since the chairman and others who had to leave, they will reserve the right as well as anybody else to submit questions to the witnesses in writing.

Once again, many thanks. If I might say to both staffs, thank you for all of your efforts.

To my colleague, Mr. Coats, it has been enjoyable holding this hearing on this vital subject.

So, while the record stays open; the hearing, this part of it is closed.

Thank you to all of you.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELLIE WEGENER

Employment Support Center testimony, An unemployed person slowly becomes isolated from society. This includes friends and family, who often blame him/her for not getting a job. "You keep getting turned down for jobs you know you can do," one unemployed woman told me. "You may be surrounded by people, but you are all alone. After a while, you doubt yourself. You retreat to maintain a little control over a smaller turf. Everything becomes magnified and threatening. Finally, it's an all-day struggle to get out of bed and to make one telephone call." How many families can support a person like this—understand a person with these problems?

The Employment Support Center sets up self-help support groups to give refuge to such people who find in the group people with similar problems. The unemployed, the under-employed, and people who are unsatisfied in their jobs visit these weekly groups and help each other with their problems. Even more important, they become "instant networks" for each other. Who knows where the jobs are better than those who are looking for jobs?

The Employment Support Center trains leaders for these groups and provides technical assistance, such as providing speakers on job-search skills, stress, time management, etc. The Center has been operating for the last two years, and has set up sixteen groups in various parts of the metropolitan area. For two years before this time, the Director headed a national clearinghouse on unemployment programs for the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. An evaluation of programs illustrated that the self-help support group is both effective and cost-effective. Family members can also attend and learn in more depth what the unemployed member is experiencing. They may not hear their own unemployed spouse, parent, or child, but they often hear the trials and tribulations when they are expressed by other participants in the self-help group.

The self-help group puts structure back in the life of the unemployed. Members regain their self-esteem as they reach out and help each other, give programs, bolster each other by phone during the week.

Some of our self-help support groups are professional, formed by people who already work with certain unemployed people, such as veterans. Most are voluntary, sponsored by congregations and community organizations. This brings forth whole new networks of jobs, as the sponsoring organizations make efforts to collect job leads from their people during services and meetings. The sponsors also provide volunteers and space for meetings. For them, it is a form of ministry, or a project that helps people with problems.

In addition, the Employment Support Center has organized a metropolitan network of employment professionals, clergy, community leaders, volunteers, people who work in social services needed by the unemployed, and the unemployed themselves. This network has been meeting monthly for over two years to exchange employment infomation and hear programs from which all could adapt in their work. To our knowledge, no such network exists in any other part of the country.

In fact, the Employment Support Center is unique. According to the National Self-help Computer in New York, there is no other organization that sets up self-help groups for the unemployed. People from many cities are asking us for information and advice on how to start similar programs.

The Employment Support Center is dealing with more unemployed people per week than it can handle. The demand is there. The support is needed to double and triple the program, as well as helping others to duplicate it in other cities.

The daily newspapers are full of stories of unemployed people who, in desperation, committed suicide, or killed their families and themselves, or in some cases, went berzerk, and tried to kill officials in their last working place. Such tragedies can be avoided when people in the same situations share their problems and their solutions, help each other, and make friends. The bottom line is still getting the job, and the best thing about this program is that it is a new, successful way to bring jobs to the people who need them. Please call 783-4747 for more information.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAROLINE ZINSSER, DIRECTOR, DAY CARE POLICY STUDY, CENTER FOR PUBLIC ADVOCACY RESEARCH, NEW YORK, NY

The fact that working mothers need quality day care for their children has been repeatedly documented in public testimony before legislators and in the press. What is seldom reported, however, is how inadequate and inequitable day care worker compensation—in a field dominated by women workers, many themselves working mothers—has produced a state of crisis throughout the day care system. Staff shortages and turnover of qualified personnel have begun to undermine the quality of

programs and to cause serious consequences both for children in care and for their working parents.

The Center for Public Advocacy Research, a not-for-profit organization concerned with policy issues affecting women, children, and youth, has just completed the first state-wide survey of New York State day care center worker salaries and benefits. We sent questionnaires to all licensed or registered child care programs outside of New York City, including voluntary and proprietary day care centers, Head Start programs, and nursery schools. (We did not survey family day care providers.) We have now analyzed the data received from 341 programs representing 3490 employees, 31% of the 1100 programs.

Although we were aware that day care workers are underpaid, the actual figures are, in the words of one day care center director, "shockingly low." In day care centers, head teachers—those who are in charge of groups of children—earn an average of only $4.98 per hour, or $10,358 per year. Assistant teachers earn an average of $4.14 per hour, or $8611 a year. And classroom aides are paid only $3.69 an hour, with many earning the minimum wage. Less than half of the day care employees receive an annual cost-of-living increase. For many of these workers, especially those who are heads of households and often the sole support of their families, wages are below poverty level.

The benefits picture is equally disastrous. Only 54% of the programs offered any kind of individual health insurance. Day care workers devote their lives to other people's children, yet only 26% of programs extend health insurance benefits to their employees' own families. Only 18% of programs offer a retirement plan, and an equally small percentage offer life insurance.

Inevitably, low wages and lack of benefits take their toll. Dedicated and qualified workers are leaving the field, particularly when public school teachers—low paid as they are—earn higher salaries for shorter hours and fewer days. With more children moving into elementary school classrooms and fewer teachers available, public schools are siphoning off our licensed day care teachers at an alarming rate.

Turnover, always a problem, reached a state of crisis. The average New York State program has a 40% turnover rate per year for teachers, 44% for assistant teachers, and 45% for aides. Most day care employees have been on staff for only three years or less—70% of all head teachers, 76% of assistant teachers, and 89% of aides. The most often cited reason for leaving is to take a better-paying job.

An unstable staff affects the quality of care. Children suffer when the bonds of trust in a caregiver are broken and a new person comes to take her place. Classroom routines are disrupted. When vacancies cannot be filled immediately, which is increasingly the case, other staff must cover the gaps by taking on extra responsibilities, resulting in fewer qualified adults caring for more children. When children are distressed, so are their parents, so much so that their own work may be affected.

Ironically, it is the economic facts of mothers entering the labor force that both cause the need for quality day care and at the same time undermine the compensation of those women we depend upon to provide that care. Taking care of children is a low-status job in our society, in part because it is work that has been traditionally performed by women in the home who received no wages. Unlike wage labor performed outside the home, which is recognized for its components of skill acquisition and specialized training, child care is generally viewed as an ability that comes "naturally" to all women.

It is a telling fact that we pay men as animal caretakers more than we pay the women who care for our children. Teachers whom we entrust as experts in early childhood education, in child development, in nutrition and health—as well as in having a loving heart—are paid less than we pay bartenders. Even within day care programs themselves, our survey shows that staff secretaries and bookkeepers earn more than teachers. Yet more than 80% of heads teachers and nearly 50% of assistant teachers are college-educated. Aides, 25% of whom are college-educated, earn less than day care center custodians.

National figures bear out the findings of our New York State study. Center-based child care workers are among the lowest 10% of all wage earners in United States. The Children's Defense Fund estimated that two out of three center-based caregivers earn below poverty-level wages, regardless of their experience, training, or education. Studies in Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon confirm the facts of a staff turnover rate of nearly 42%.

One might suppose that working mothers, realizing that skills and commitment are essential for quality child care, would champion day care workers and would demand that they be paid a fair compensation for the value ot their work. But working mothers are themselves caught in a cruel bind that works against an alliance between mother and child caregiver. Since working mothers figure the cost of

child care as an expense of their own earnings—instead of considering it a joint family expense—they measure what they can afford to pay fees against salaries depressed by pay inequity. Working women pay child care fees only out of their own earnings, which are still much lower than men's. As a result, day care workers are paid a lesser share of a lesser share. They bear the double weight of sex-based wage discrimination. Theirs is a sex-segregated occupation, undervalued by society, and dependent upon the wages of other women workers.

Low pay for women's work, low status for work in women-dominated job categories, and the large number of single working mothers are all factors which unfairly not only depress the compensation of working mothers, but doubly depress the wages of those women who care for their childern. When working women are so underpaid themselves that they cannot afford to pay adequate fees for child care, it is patently unfair to expect other women to subsidize these fees by low salaries and no benefits.

Day care workers also are women who must work. And the work they have chosen is of great importance to our families and to our economy. But for too long they have been depended upon to support the public interest at their own expense. They are finally, in protest, beginning to leave the field and to choose other work. Day care must be given increased government support to subdidize fees, not only to empower working parents in obtaining quality care for their childern but also to enable day care workers to earn a decent wage with adequate benefits.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 10, 1986]

A Welfare Revolution—Quietly, in the States

(By Richard P. Nathan)

For 20 years, welfare reform has been the Mount Everest of American domestic policy. Politicians have tried to climb it because it was there. The history of these ascents has been controversial. The proposals have been mostly comprehensive grand designs, made in Washington. One's position has been a test of one's ideology.

As a former participant, I now believe these earlier efforts to establish a negative income tax or guaranteed income system were the wrong approach to welfare reform. But in the past five years, there has been a subtle and little-noticed shift toward an alternative. A new consensus is emerging, emphasizing jobs and with state governments in the driver's seat.

In over two-thirds of the states, there is activity under the heading of "workfare," which I believe may turn out to be the real welfare reform. In this process, the meaning of the word "workfare" is subtly changing. In the 1970s, workfare was anathema to liberals who often damned it as "slavefare." The meaning of the term in this period was narrower than it is now. It referred to the single approach that people on welfare should "work off" their benefits. They should engage in public service jobs (often condemned as "make work") for an amount of time equal to some wage rate (such as the minimum wage) divided by their entitlement to welfare assistance.

Historically, this has been the approach to welfare for adult men without families under state and country assistance programs. In 1971, the federal law was amended to require that a woman in the then fast-growing Aid to Families with Dependent Children program register for work and accept a "suitable" job if one is available and if her youngest child is over 6 years of age. This requirement does not say that states and counties have to set up jobs—only that if a suitable job is available (along with child care) an AFDC family head is required to accept it.

Ten years later, Ronald Reagan tried to move even further in this direction. He proposed that states be required to provide jobs to all AFDC family heads, again with children over 6 years of age and where child care is available. Although Reagan succeeded in 1981 in obtaining passage of fundamental welfare changes removing many working poor families from the AFDC roles, he was not successful in winning enactment of universal and compulsory work as a condition of the receipt of AFDC benefits. Congress instead said that the states could test the approach along with other employment approaches to welfare reform.

The important new activity being undertaken by over two-thirds of the states involves tests under this new authority, although on a broadened basis that also includes job preparation and job search activities. The states are using a variety of approaches; they can be arranged on a continuum according to the degree and character of the obligations imposed under these new state systems.

The welfare reform programs of Michael Dukakis, governor of Massachusetts, and George Deukmejian, governor of California, bear particularly close watching. The Massachusetts program called "ET Choices" is the most liberal test of employment approaches to welfare reform. (ET stands for employment and training.) The emphasis in Massachusetts is on job preparation and placement services, not on compulsory work experience. This approach can be contrasted with that of states such as Utah and West Virginia that have a strong tradition of mandatory community work experience for welfare family heads.

California's program stands out as the most ambitious new state welfare reform in the nation. In 1985, the state enacted legislation to provide "Greater Avenues to Independence" -abbreviated, of course, as GAIN-for all qualifying welfare family heads. Under this program, all counties in California are to set up new systems to provide a range of services-training, education, job counseling and job placement. Eligible welfare recipients are required to participate in one or another of these services. If the services are not successful in getting an eligible AFDC family head into the work force, they are followed by six months or one year of "relevant" community work experience in a presumably useful (not "make work") public service job. It is estimated that California will spend as much as $300 million per year on this program, not counting the expected welfare savings, when GAIN is fully implemented. This is more than the federal government spent in 1985 for the nation as a whole on welfare employment and training programs under its work incentive (or WIN) program.

It is not yet clear what will happen under the California or other new state welfare reform programs in the turbulent environment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This quiet state-focused revolution is, in effect, an attempt to change welfare as an institution and, in the process, to reduce the stigma of welfare both for recipients and for the society. But such change does not come easily.

The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, based in New York City, has conducted eight state demonstration research projects on variations of the work and welfare approach in which more than 35,000 people have been assigned either to a new program or a comparison group. The results of these demonstrations so far, including one in San Diego that was a model for the California GAIN program, have been promising. However, the earnings and work increases achieved are not all that large, and furthermore there is variation among the states in these terms. One clear lesson from these state experiments is that it is bound to take time to deal with the accumulation of generations of the terrible problem of very high rates of single-parent families among the poor.

But there is new hope. The states are serving as testing grounds for welfare reform on a basis that involves a delicate balancing act by liberals and conservatives. Job-focused institutional changes to reduce the stigma of welfare are the essence of the new approach. It is too early to draw conclusions about its efficacy. But it certainly bears close watching: it could be the real welfare reform.

The writer, who was deputy undersecretary for health, education and welfare in the Nixon administration, now teaches at Princeton University.

Broad Support Buoys California's GAIN



PARTICIPATION IS MANDATORY, BUT RECIPIENTS MAY CHOOSE FROM A RANGE OF SERVICES.

BY DAVID B. SWIAT

California's new welfare reform legislation incorporates a unique blend of what traditionally have been considered liberal and conservative attitudes about the public role in caring for the poor.

Greater avenues for independence (GAIN) will offer new opportunities for eligible welfare recipients to find jobs. Yet, GAIN is a far cry from the old workfare programs of the seventies. GAIN borrows from conservatives the conviction that requiring eligible welfare recipients to participate in work-related programs need not be punitive—and may well be necessary to break the cycle of dependency. It borrows from liberals the belief that education and training services must be provided to certain recipients.

The goal of GAIN is to establish a means of improving work skills—whether through the sharpening of job-seeking skills, building self-confidence, providing on-the-job training, or making use of any other vehicle that meets the specific needs of an individual.

GAIN incorporates some components that are not new, such as job search and community work experience. But other features are unique: the number and sequence of components—and the all-important assurance that no eligible person will be left out as long as day care and transportation are available. While GAIN contains a long-term community work experience provision, called "pre-employment preparation (PREP)," the program's goal is to keep the number of people entering this component at a minimum—a very different approach from the workfare programs of the past.

The seeds of California's reform were planted over the last three years. The success of San Diego County's experimental work pilot project (see separate article), coupled with site visits by key officials to work-oriented programs in Massachusetts, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania, spurred action. It was on this trip to other states that Democrats and Republicans began to discover areas of mutual agreement. They began to seek ways to combine mandatory and voluntary elements in a way that would enhance opportunities for recipients and that would eliminate the low-pay, make-work jobs so often associated with workfare. The result was GAIN, a combination of education and training components carefully sequenced in a cost-effective manner and targeted at specific groups.

Upon passage of the reform, a *Los Angeles Times* editorial described the new program as the result of "constructive compromises" avoiding "the negative elements of past workfare proposals that often seemed designed to punish the poor rather than help them escape their poverty."

A Case for Reform

Welfare spending in California is disproportionate to the population. With 10 percent of the country's population, the state has been spending 22 percent of the nation's welfare dollars. Since 1980, the number of recipients has grown 18 percent, twice the rate of growth of the general population. The proportion of the state's children living in families receiving welfare—one in seven—is at an all-time high. Another disturbing fact is that, while California's grant level is the most generous in the country ($587 for a family of three versus the $361 average for the ten most populous states), welfare recipients did not appear to have access to the same kind of economic opportunities available to the rest of the population.

While unemployment in California dropped dramatically after the last recession, the welfare caseload actually increased. Between November 1982 and July 1985, when the unemployment rate in California dropped from 11.2 percent to 7.2 percent, the caseload for aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) rose 1.5 percent. California's costs for the AFDC program in fiscal year 1983-1984 were $1.4 billion and were estimated to rise by $78 million during fiscal year 1984-1985.

Clearly, the time was at hand for structural reform of the system, leading to better opportunities for recipients to attain eventual employment in the private sector.

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A Harmonious Blend

GAIN is a curious blend of conservative and liberal components. While program participation is mandatory, recipients may choose from a comprehensive range of education and training services. Liberals are assuaged by GAIN's in-depth, formal assessment provisions, while conservatives are well satisfied by the assessment's place in the sequence. GAIN incorporates job search, favored by both liberals and conservatives, but places it early in the process before training, a conservative position. The program's PREP incorporates some features similar to the conservative "workfare" concept. However, PREP takes the notion one step further by dividing it into two elements, basic–providing work behavior skills–and advanced–providing enhancement of existing participant skills through careful targeting of assignments to match those skills.

GAIN is a complex network of sequential components that are most easily described in three major stages. Registration with the GAIN program is mandatory for all recipients. Those with children under six, or who have other specified reasons for deferral, will be exempt. Those not required to participate may do so on a voluntary basis.

Recipients who need remedial education, such as English as a second language or general equivalency diploma (GED) instruction, receive those services before advancing in the process. Recipients without special needs who have not worked in two years participate in a three-week job club. It offers workshops that teach interviewing and other skills needed to obtain a job, as well as a supervised job search. Those who have been employed less than two years before registration may choose between a job club and supervised job search.

Clients who have been on aid more than twice in three years will go directly to the second phase: assessment. Likewise, those who fail to find jobs after job club or job search enter the assessment phase.

During assessment, participants will be tested for aptitude, interest, and achievement and will receive counseling and an evaluation of previous work history. Participants may then choose a course of action, depending upon their background and needs as well as the needs of employers. The options may include on-the-job training, vocational training, or grant diversion where a portion of the person's grant is paid to an employer to help offset the wage. Other choices might be supported work (a combination of grant diversion and special training on how to keep a job), other training and education, or short-term pre-employment preparation work in public or nonprofit corporations. At this point, an employability plan will be drawn up, showing what actions the person needs to take to get a job. The plan will be based on the assessment.

The contract between the participant and county would then be amended to reflect the educational or training activity chosen by the recipient. This allows recipients to make informed decisions and, as the legislation specifies, to live up to the accompanying responsibilities. At the same time recipients are informed about appeals procedures, which ensure that the counties live up to their requirements and promises as well.

Successful trainees who still are unemployed after the chosen educational or training activity is completed will be referred to a ninety-day supervised job search. Participants unemployed after a ninety-day job search, as well as trainees who fail to complete the educational or training component, are assigned to long-term work experience or pre-employment preparation. After completion of this year-long stage, the client is assessed again. Mid-way through the year, however, the assignment will be reviewed to ensure that the work being performed is consistent with the original referral and the provisions of the contract. This stipulation was included to prevent the "Velda factor," so termed because of an observed case of a woman named Velda in a southern state, who had been assigned to learn water testing but was actually working as a janitor.

PREP assignments will be in the public sector or in private, nonprofit corporations. The hourly wage will be determined by a formula–add the AFDC grant and food stamp coupon allotment and divide the sum by the average starting wage based on all job orders received by the state's employment development offices. This year, the resulting figure is $5.07 an hour. No recipient will be required to work more than thirty-two hours a week; the remaining eight hours will be used for job search. Once the assignment is complete, participants will seek further assessment to determine what their subsequent training activities will be.

Liberals are assuaged by GAIN's in-depth, formal assessment provisions, while conservatives are well satisfied by the assessment's place in the sequence.

Thus, the cycle is completed with a number of options along the way, based on the needs of the individuals, to rechannel into various education or training components. All eligible recipients will continue to be assigned to various components, based on their individual needs. Unlike the federal WIN program or the Massachusetts program, there will be no "unassigned" pool; all participants will be involved in some component of the sequence at all times, a unique feature of the California program. Thus, there will be no dead-ends for recipients. The program does not give up on anyone. While the program includes a mandatory work component, it is not required until recipients have had access to job training, voluntary work assignments, courses at community colleges, and other options. It is expected

that during that time, a significant number of recipients will find jobs.

The program includes a number of informal and formal sanctions. Recipients who are out of compliance will be placed on a three-month money management or substitute payee plan. Recipients who come into compliance during the three-month period will be reinstated and money management discontinued.

Second-time offenders will face reduced grants for three months if they are single-parent families. Grants of two-parent families will be terminated for three months. Third or subsequent offenses will carry similar penalties, but for a six-month period.

Components of the California GAIN program were taken from many areas of the country. The job search concept and the mandatory elements were borrowed from San Diego County's experimental work pilot project. The choices and assessment components, with some new, distinguishing features, were inspired by the Massachusetts employment and training choices program. Performance concepts that set job placement targets for those providing training services were incorporated from the locally administered Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA). From San Diego, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia GAIN adopted pre-employment preparation from the community work experience. Recipient contracts with counties, the provision for no unassigned pool, and the division of pre-employment preparation into basic and advanced segments are new elements conceived in California.

Smoothing the Sequence

Many states have learned that, in order to achieve cost-effective job placement, the sequence of program components is as important as the substance of the components. The experience of San Diego, for example, demonstrated that, rather than wasting money up-front on nontargeted training programs, it was far more cost-effective to let the marketplace decide whether the recipient was employable.

Under GAIN, job search, which occurs at the beginning of the sequence, is estimated to cost $500 per case; grant diversion, later in the sequence, $800 per placement; community work experience, $1,700; and supported work, targeted toward the long-term structurally unemployed, $6,000 to $8,000. These costs include the estimated cost of child care.

For the same reason, assessment, which requires intense individual analysis costing approximately $200 per person, was placed after job search and job clubs, but before the various other employment and training programs.

Another unique factor in the California reform is the significant amount of new flexibility for the counties to manage various components of the program. Counties will be able to decide, for example, whether they will run training programs themselves or contract with local employment offices, JTPA agencies, or private organizations. Each large county will be required to offer the full array of education and training services, but counties will be autonomous on the management of those services. Small counties may choose to join together to share resources. Counties will be able to work with local employers to establish training contracts and will have flexibility to arrange for day-care services.

Under the legislation, counties will have two years to develop their plans, which must be approved by the Department of Social Services. Three years are allowed for implementation of the plans.

Issues Resolved

The reform faced a major hurdle – fear that such a work-oriented program for welfare recipients would fail because the state would not be able to find enough jobs. A 1985 University of Southern California study points out, however, that under current trends, there will be 80,000 unfilled jobs in California each year between now and 1990. Also it has become increasingly clear that the official unemployment rate is not an accurate reflection of potential job opportunities for welfare recipients. A 1983 report by the Research Triangle Institute on the effect of 1981 federal budget changes on private-sector employment of welfare recipients concluded that "contrary to expectations . . . the unemployment rate is not a particularly sensitive measure of the opportunities available to AFDC recipients." In San Diego County, for example, more than 85 percent of the jobs found by recipients were not listed in the newspaper or in local employment offices.

By incorporating lessons learned from implementing the JTPA, the GAIN plan should substantially improve job opportunities for welfare recipients by training them for skills that are in demand in their communities. Previous training programs often failed to assess local job-market demand. GAIN will accomplish this by establishing performance contracting with trainers, where training is given only in demand occupations.

This procedure works just as well in areas of high unemployment as it does in areas of low unemployment. Butte County, with an unemployment rate of 11.6 percent, and Los Angeles County, with an unemployment rate of 8 percent, were almost equally successful in placing JTPA welfare recipients into jobs – placing 57 percent and 59 percent, respectively.

Fears that rural counties, with their traditionally higher unemployment rates, will have a hard time placing welfare recipients seem to be unwarranted. The California rural counties of Del Norte, Siskiyou, Modoc, Trinity, Lassen, Tehama, and Plumas have a combined unemployment rate of 14.9 percent, compared with the statewide average of 7.3 percent. Nonetheless, the counties placed 77 percent of their adult JTPA welfare population into jobs, well above the statewide average of 58 percent. The key to this success has been the ability of local communities to target training to the needs of local industries.

New flexibility granted to the state in 1981 by federal

legislation has offered California the opportunity to incorporate into GAIN elements from many successful employment and training measures already tested.

One of the most critical areas of compromise in structuring GAIN involved incorporating both mandatory and voluntary features into the plan. Opposition to the mandatory component began to fade as results from San Diego showed that the overwhelming majority of participants themselves felt the work requirements were fair. Most participants stated they felt the program should be mandatory because, had it not been, they never would have participated and acquired the valuable training and experience. We found similar results in other states implementing work programs. Gradually public office holders accepted that the benefits of the program could be reaped only if recipients actively participated in the system. When the voluntary component—a set of choices each individual could make—was incorporated, most of the opposition faded.

Another critical area was child care, and the state budgeted $100 million annually for the provision of child-care services. If child care is not available, a recipient does not have to participate. Portions of the money will be targeted for capital outlay for new child-care situations. Experiences from San Diego and other states that had implemented work programs demonstrated that providing child care generally was not the obstacle once anticipated.

San Diego, which expected to spend approximately $150,000 for child care services during fiscal 1984–1985, actually spent only about $80,000. Additionally, a Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation report found that in Maryland and Virginia, although some problems relating to child care arose, they were far less common than anticipated. In many cases, the report concluded, most women preferred to make their own informal arrangements with relatives, friends, and neighbors.

GAIN will ensure that counties have maximum flexibility to make innovative arrangements for the provision of child care. San Joaquin County already has begun a program under which welfare mothers will be trained and certified as child-care providers. This will allow these recipients to establish their own child-care centers where they can provide services for their own children as well as the children of other recipients involved in employment-related activities.

Implications for California

The state forecasts that about 46 percent of its welfare applicants will participate in GAIN. Of the applicant pool, projections show that 55 percent will become employed early in the sequence and about 46 percent will go through the education and training components.

Ongoing annual new costs to administer the program are estimated to be $158 million, with new savings estimated at $272 million. This will result in net savings of $114 million.

More importantly, however, the state views the reform as offering California welfare recipients a break from continued dependency on welfare. With welfare recipients working and paying taxes rather than depleting the tax base, there will be more tax resources for those truly in need.

This welfare reform will significantly enhance the role and opportunities of local government. While the federal government has a clear leadership role in assuring care for the needy, its effectiveness can be enhanced by a productive partnership with state and local governments. As University of California Berkeley professor Michael Wiseman has noted, "States have tended to operate AFDC as if they were simply agents of the federal government and, in California, the counties behave as if they are agents of the state. This is not a context in which imagination and innovation flourish."

Unlike WIN or the Massachusetts program, all participants will be involved in some component at all times.

The California welfare system landscape now will change dramatically because of the new freedom granted to counties. With fifty-eight counties, going from Bakersfield to Modesto is "like moving from one state to another." Ultimately, then, just as competition between states has stimulated new ideas, now California's counties will have new freedom and flexibility to design innovative jobs programs, provide for day care, and implement other administrative changes under the new reform. Yet, along with this flexibility, the state has built in protections to assure that the rights of recipients are upheld.

Challenges

Over the next several years the counties will face many challenges in carrying out the intent of the legislation. Counties also must assure that recipients are offered the array of choices promised, and must market the program as well as develop new avenues of communication with local JTPA agencies and the private sector.

The challenges for the state will be to provide enough flexibility to counties to allow cost-effective innovations. State administrators will need to be open to learning from the counties and flexible enough to mold state policies to accommodate productive local innovations. Above all, the state must orchestrate cost-effective administrative changes that support the goal of offering a significant number of new opportunities for California's welfare recipients. *PW*

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A Model Program for All California

WELFARE & WORK

SAN DIEGO EMPHASIZES PLACEMENT OVER TRAINING.

BY RANDALL C. BACON



The County of San Diego has tested a system to end welfare dependency—and the system works. In fact, it works so well that it has become the foundation for a plan all fifty-eight California counties must now adopt within the next five years. (See article by David Swoap.)

San Diego County did not invent a new concept, nor did it test radical academic theories. What it did was organize familiar employment approaches into a comprehensive three-stage system that serves welfare clients with all levels of education and experience. By using the least expensive job match and job search methods first, the three-part system quickly removes the more employable clients from welfare rolls. The approach saves scarce training dollars for those most in need of training—those who were not successful in earlier employment efforts. The result is a more humane and responsive system that attacks the roots of poverty without creating dependency.

The board of supervisors propelled the county into welfare reform in 1979 when it expressed frustration with a system that appeared to foster multigenerational welfare dependency while consuming almost 40 percent of the county's budget. The board symbolically resolved the problem by creating an Employment Services Bureau in the Department of Social Services that is equal in status to the more heavily funded Income Maintenance Bureau. It then pledged its support to efforts to restore clients to self-sufficiency with permanent and unsubsidized jobs.

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For two years, the San Diego Department of Social Services concentrated its reform efforts in the testing and refinement of a food stamp workfare demonstration project. It assumed national leadership by submitting legislative proposals that helped make food stamp workfare a program option to all counties across the nation. With that experience behind it, the department tackled the problem of large-scale employment services for its biggest client population, clients receiving aid to families with dependent children (AFDC).

Because of the scope of the problem, the department enlisted the aid of both the state's Employment Development Department (EDD) and the Regional Employment and Training Consortium, the local joint powers entity that administers the Job Training Partnership Act. Staff from all three agencies developed the plan eventually approved by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for a three-year demonstration project. With 50 percent federal and 50 percent state funding, the ambitious employment preparation program (EPP) began processing AFDC cases in all seven district offices in 1982. The program continues today with only a few minor changes.

The three-stage EPP demonstration involves employable clients as soon as they enter the office to apply for AFDC. Those with no children under six years of age enroll in job search workshops conducted jointly by staff from the department and from the state EDD. The week-long workshops teach motivational support training, job search techniques, and interviewing skills with a video feedback component. Leaders report that most partici-

pants begin the mandatory workshops reluctantly, but are very enthusiastic about them by the end of the second day.

A maximum of two weeks of intensive work on a phone bank follows as clients use their new job-search skills to set up job interviews. A strong sense of camaraderie develops among participants as they share the success of those who find work. In at least two workshops, 100 percent of the participants found permanent unsubsidized jobs by the end of the telephone segment. The first 100 percent group found jobs averaging $4.72 per hour—but ranging up to $10 per hour—in clerical, heavy equipment operation, and construction jobs. A subsequent 100 percent class found work averaging $5.03 per hour as entertainers, nurse's aides, stock clerks, picture framers, truck drivers, machinists, mechanics, construction workers, and retail clerks. Any of those who become unemployed in the future will possess the skills and self-esteem to find employment on their own without resorting to the welfare system.

Those unemployed at the end of the workshop advance to the second stage of the EPP system—a three-month work-experience program in a public or nonprofit private agency. Unpaid work assignments are matched to client interests and skills to enhance the chance of employment. The updated job experience and personal recommendations acquired at this stage often are the selling point for clients as they land private sector jobs. Statistics show that 46 percent of those participating in the first two EPP components find permanent unsubsidized employment.

Clients who remain unemployed after going through the first two components are evaluated and referred to training programs financed through the Job Training Partnership Act or through the community college system.

Since EPP began in 1982, more than 5,350 AFDC recipients out of the 11,600 involved in EPP have found permanent private sector jobs at an average starting wage of $5.07 per hour. From January 1983 through July 1984, the AFDC caseload declined 5.3 percent in San Diego County despite an increase throughout the rest of the state of almost 2 percent. At the same time, San Diego's population growth rate increased an estimated 39 percent more than the growth rate for the rest of the state. Although the final project test results compiled by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) are not yet available, the department is convinced that the caseload drop is the result of the success of EPP.

County data indicate that every $1.00 spent on the program saves $2.00 in avoided assistance payments. Preliminary MDRC results reveal that clients in the work-experience component were so highly productive that the estimated value of their labor more than paid for that component by itself. Most important, clients who found jobs in the first or second stages of the program showed earnings gains to be 35 percent above those clients in the control groups.

MDRC found that EPP, like other welfare employment programs, has the strongest impact on clients with little recent job experience. Somewhat unexpected was the overwhelmingly positive attitude of clients toward the fairness and value of the work experience component. "A very high percentage expressed satisfaction with their job assignment, felt they were part of the work force, and were positive about coming to work," the initial report stated.

Managers in the EPP program take special pride in the success stories of clients. They tell of a sixty-two-year-old mother with no previous work experience or skills who would have been termed unemployable under

By using the least expensive job-match and job-search methods first, the three-part system quickly removes the more employable clients from welfare rolls.

many programs; however, through EPP, she found work in a hospital. She then was hired away by a second institution at a higher salary. Another participant was employed as a clerk in a medical insurance company. She wrote, "I do thank you for all the help. You personally, as well as your program, have finally given me the confidence to attempt to make it on my own without welfare for the first time in 10 years." Other letters tell a similar story of appreciation for gaining freedom from welfare dependency.

The success of EPP invalidates the historical premise that job training should precede job placement. Using the less expensive job search and work experience components first not only allows the department to place more people in jobs, but it also reserves the most costly training programs for those who need them the most.

The state legislature used San Diego's experiment as a model for greater avenues to independence (GAIN), the state's new welfare reform program that each county must adopt within the next five years. GAIN offers more individual choice and more educational job training options than the EPP system. GAIN also has two work experience components: one lasts three months and the other, one year.

Plans are already underway to modify EPP and thereby make San Diego the first county to meet the state's GAIN requirements. San Diego expects to implement the new program by July 1986, to serve more than one-third of its 34,000 AFDC families.

Do employment programs really break the cycle of welfare dependency? As far as the department's staff and clients can see, the answer is a resounding "yes."

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Work for People on Welfare

WELFARE & WORK

INTERIM FINDINGS OF A MAJOR MDRC STUDY SHOW THE POTENTIAL OF STATE EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS.

For the past twenty-five years, administrators, legislators, and academics have debated the appropriate design of the nation's welfare system, particularly the federally supported aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) program.[1] A central question has been whether welfare programs should continue to be structured as broad entitlements, with aid conditioned only on categorical eligibility and income, or reshaped to impose obligations on recipients, to perform unpaid work – "workfare" – or to participate in some employment-related activity such as job search or skills training.

Three years ago, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) began a five-year, large-scale social experiment examining current state efforts to restructure the relationship between welfare and work. States not only are doing so primarily by introducing participation requirements, but also by changing the mix of employment and training services and the institutional structure for administering the work incentive (WIN) program – the federal work and training program targeted to able-bodied AFDC recipients.

The impetus for these state efforts was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), which gave states new flexibility to design their own work-related programs for AFDC applicants and recipients. Under the community work experience program (CWEP) provisions of the act, states for the first time could require AFDC recipients to work in public or nonprofit agencies in return for their welfare benefits.[2] States also were authorized to fund on-the-job training programs by diverting a recipient's welfare grant to use as a wage subsidy for private employers.

Since 1971 WIN's formal requirements were that all adult AFDC recipients who had no preschool children and no barriers that prevented them from leaving home register with the state employment service, participate in job training or job search activities, and accept employment offered to them. While in theory this imposed a participation obligation, WIN in fact was never funded at a level adequate to create a "slot" for each able-bodied person – the precondition of a real work test. Some of the states implementing their own variations on WIN after 1981 were therefore interested in trying to improve on this record by structuring their programs so that all eligible recipients were actually obliged to participate.

The 1981 amendments thus provided an important and unusual opportunity to study a variety of employment reforms. MDRC's eleven-state demonstration of state work/welfare initiatives was developed in response to that challenge. The demonstration includes large-scale evaluations of new welfare/employment initiatives in eight states and smaller-scale studies in three additional states. The states are broadly representative of national variations in AFDC benefit levels, administrative arrangements, and program capacity. Demonstration locations include several large urban areas – San Diego, Baltimore, and Chicago – and a number of multicounty areas that span urban and rural centers – Arkansas, Maine, New Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia.[3]

The demonstration tests not one program model, but a range of strategies. Some programs are limited to one or two activities, while others offer a wider mix. Most require participation as a condition of receiving benefits, but a few rely on a voluntary approach.

Contrary to some expectations, the states in the demonstration did not choose to implement universal workfare. An approach that was even more prominent was required job search, which typically teaches job-finding techniques and involves participants in a structured search for work. While the reasons are not always clear, the choice appears to have been a result of both practical and philosophical considerations. Job search is noncontroversial, relatively low-cost, and comparatively easy to run.

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Among the demonstration states, only West Virginia operated a workfare program with no limit on a recipient's length of participation, and it was directed primarily to unemployed heads of two-parent households, who are mostly male (recipients under the AFDC-U program), rather than to the mostly female AFDC caseload. Other states – Arkansas, California, Illinois – established a two-stage program of job search followed by a limited (usually three-month) work obligation for those who did not find unsubsidized jobs. Virginia required job search of everyone but offered CWEP as one option among other mandatory services. Maryland also offered a range of education and training options, including job search and unpaid work experience, with choices tailored to individual needs and preferences. Two states – New Jersey and Maine – established voluntary on-the-job training programs with private employers, using grant diversion as the funding mechanism.[4]

The projects varied in scale; and, although most were directed to women with school-age children, i.e., WIN-mandatory cases, within that category they differed in the groups targeted – for example, welfare applicants or recipients, people receiving welfare through the AFDC or AFDC-U program.[5] Five of the programs were implemented only in parts of the states (sometimes in only one city or county).

The states also differed in objectives. Some placed relatively more emphasis on developing human capital and helping welfare recipients to get better jobs and achieve long-term self-sufficiency. Others tended to stress direct job placement and welfare savings. In West Virginia, administrators stressed the importance of a work requirement, with or without welfare savings, as a way to improve the image of welfare programs.

As a result, states differed in the extent to which they emphasized and enforced a participation obligation. In each state the program can thus be described as a distinct multidimensional "treatment," including a specific degree of obligation and providing a certain mix and intensity of services and activities. The program's impact on eligibles can be conceived as a combination of the effect of both factors. The resulting "treatment" in some cases can be characterized as a work requirement – where eligibles either had to get a regular job or work for their grants – or a participation obligation – where those who did not find work would have to participate in program activities designed to help them obtain employment, but not necessarily work for their grants. For convenience, both types of programs are called "participation obligations" in this discussion.

The MDRC demonstration addresses four questions:

Question 1: Is it feasible to impose obligations – or participation requirements – as a condition for welfare receipt?

Pre-1981 initiatives that did seek to impose participation on welfare recipients generally resulted in low participation rates, staff resistance, and implementation failures.[6] The MDRC study tries to determine whether the programs after OBRA repeat this experience or in fact succeed in implementing a broad participation obligation.

Question 2. What do workfare-type programs look like in practice and how do welfare recipients themselves judge the fairness of requirements?

The workfare concept has engendered considerable controversy, hinging largely on whether the positions offered to recipients are punitive and make-work and the system coercive or stigmatizing, or whether they produce useful goods and services, provide dignity, and develop work skills. The MDRC study uses an in-depth survey of a random sample of twenty-five supervisors and ninety-four work experience participants in six of the states to shed light on this controversy.

Question 3. Do the state initiatives reduce welfare rolls and costs and/or increase employment and earnings?

In seven of the states, the study examines the programs' effects on welfare and employment behavior and in an eighth, New Jersey, it looks at welfare impacts alone. In all eight states, the evaluations use experimental designs: program eligibles are assigned randomly to the new test program – the experimental group – or to a control group, which receives no services or limited ones. The difference between the employment and welfare behavior of those in the two groups provides an estimate of program achievements. In an unusual display of commitment to such a study, the human services commissioners and their local counterparts in the eight states have actively cooperated with the random assignment of over 35,000 individuals.

Question 4. How do program benefits compare to program costs?

A benefit-cost analysis measures the programs' outcomes against the resources used to produce them. It not only looks at the net benefits for society as a whole, but identifies who – the welfare population or everyone else – gains from and pays for the programs.

Interim Findings

The demonstration is structured as a series of three-year studies. To date, MDRC has produced interim reports focusing primarily on the implementation issues in five states.[7] Reports addressing impact and cost-benefit questions have been completed for San Diego, Baltimore, and Arkansas.[8]

Given the differences across states in the characteristics of the individuals studied, local economic conditions, participation rates, AFDC benefit levels, and the extent to which the control groups received services, these interim results should not be used to reach conclusions about the relative impact and cost-effectiveness of the different program approaches. The interim results, however, already challenge some claims made by both proponents and critics of workfare and identify a number of critical policy issues.

The Feasibility of Imposing Obligations. What do the results to date suggest about the factors that affect operational success? One indicator of success is the participation rate, defined in the MDRC demonstration as the proportion of registrants in the group under examination who showed up at program activities within a given time period.[9] For a number of reasons—including the fact that many nonparticipants have already left welfare or are deferred from participating for legitimate reasons such as temporary illness—nonparticipation is not synonymous with program failure. All nonparticipants have not slipped through the cracks and been lost in the administrative shuffle of a large program. But the participation rates may also overstate achievement since they count only whether someone showed up for an activity, not whether that person fully satisfied requirements.

Notwithstanding these caveats and the lack of final data, the interim results suggest some tentative conclusions about the limits of participation in the initiatives. In most states, participation rates are running above those in previous special demonstrations or the WIN program. Typically, within six to nine months of registering with the program, about half of the AFDC experimentals had participated in some activity, the great majority in job search. Participation rates were lower in mandatory work programs when that activity followed job search in a sequence. Among the programs for which results are available, only in West Virginia, San Diego, and Baltimore has work experience so far involved a substantial share (10 to 20 percent) of AFDC eligibles.

Findings from the AFDC-U West Virginia program and the San Diego program for AFDC and AFDC-Ū applicants suggest that, at least in these two environments and for these segments of the caseload, it is possible to implement a broad participation obligation. In West Virginia, between 60 and 70 percent of the caseload were working at CWEP jobs; and most nonparticipants had legitimate reasons for deferral. In San Diego, all but a small proportion (no more than 9 percent) of applicants had either left welfare, become employed, were no longer in the program, or had fulfilled all requirements within nine months of welfare application.[10]

While this is a major change from the pre-1981 record, other demonstration states appeared to experience more difficulty. After nine months in Arkansas and twelve months in Maryland, about a quarter of the targeted eligibles were still registered in the program but had not yet participated in any of the mandated activities.[11]

A number of factors influenced these overall differences in participation rates. Programs varied in the degree of experience their staffs had in running employment programs, in funding levels, in the nature of the populations served, in scale, and in local economic con-

Table 1 Summary of Impacts on AFDC Applicants in San Diego

Outcome and Follow-up Period	Job Search followed by CWEP			Job Search		
	Experimentals	Controls	Difference	Experimentals	Controls	Difference
Percentage ever employed during						
Quarter 2[a]	32.4	25.6	+6.8***	35.6	25.6	+10.0***
Quarter 3	37.6	28.7	+9.0***	36.3	28.7	+7.6***
Quarter 4	40.7	33.4	+7.3***	38.8	33.4	+5.4*
Average total earnings during quarters 2–4 [$][a]	1783.37	1392.29	+391.08**	1898.69	1392.29	+508.40***
Percentage who ever received any AFDC payment during						
Quarter of random assignment[b]	77.0	81.3	−4.3*	79.3	81.3	−2.0
Quarter 2	84.7	89.0	−4.3*	86.1	88.0	−2.9
Quarter 3	54.2	58.7	−4.5*	51.9	58.7	−6.8**
Quarter 4	47.8	48.6	−0.8	45.8	48.6	−2.8
Average total AFDC payments received, quarters 1–4 [$]	2555.98	2761.98	−205.58*	2577.08	2761.98	−184.50

Source: Goldman et al, 1985.

Notes: These data include zero values for sample members not employed and for sample members not receiving welfare payments. There may be some discrepancies in calculating experimental-control differences due to rounding.

A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between experimental and control groups. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 percent; ** = 5 percent; *** = 1 percent.

[a]For unemployment insurance earnings quarters, random assignment may occur in any of the three months of the calendar quarter of random assignment. For this reason, quarter 1, the quarter of random assignment, may contain some earnings from a month or two before random assignment, and it is therefore not counted as a complete follow-up quarter for employment and earnings impacts.

[b]The first month of the quarter of random assignment is the month in which an individual is randomly assigned.

ditions. Furthermore, a factor noted earlier cannot be overlooked: program goals vary across states, with the imposition of a participation requirement being a primary concern in some states and a secondary one in others.

MDRC's findings point to the feasibility, in some circumstances, of running large-scale mandatory programs for a substantial subset of the AFDC caseload. Nevertheless, in light of the variations in participation rates documented in these states, questions remain about the potential to duplicate this record in other states and about the feasibility of implementing an open-ended participation obligation on their entire caseload, as proposed in the Reagan administration's "work opportunities and welfare" legislation.

The Nature of Workfare Jobs and the Reactions of Recipients. Findings to date from MDRC's work site survey in five states provide a complex picture of how these programs look in practice.

- The jobs were generally entry-level positions in maintenance or clerical fields, park service, and human services, and sometimes were slots that had been paid positions under the public service employment program, which Congress eliminated in 1981. On the whole, they did not provide much skill development, because most of the participants had the required general working skills at the time they began the assignment.
- While the positions did not primarily develop skills, they were not make-work either. Supervisors judged the work important and indicated that participants' productivity and attendance were similar to that of most entry-level workers.
- A high proportion of participants interviewed were satisfied with their work sites, felt positive about coming to work, believed that they were making a useful contribution, and felt that they were treated as part of the regular workforce. Many, however, felt that the employer got the better end of the bargain or that they were underpaid for their work. In short, they would rather have had a paid job. Nonetheless, most participants in most states agreed that a work requirement was fair.[9]

While some states placed more emphasis than others on using workfare as a way to achieve welfare savings or extract a quid pro quo for receiving benefits, results from the work site survey suggest that most states did not design or implement CWEP with a punitive intent. The survey results also are consistent with findings from other studies that show that the poor want to work. It has been observed that these workfare programs did not create the work ethic, they found it.

The Impacts on Employment and Welfare. Recently completed studies of program effects in Baltimore and two counties of Arkansas, plus the interim findings for San Diego, tell a complex story centering on consistent – although relatively modest – employment gains, but differences among programs on welfare savings. In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that they are averaged over a large segment of the caseload, for example, all applicants, both participants and nonparticipants. Thus, even relatively small changes, multiplied by a large number of people, have considerable policy significance.

In San Diego, the two separate treatments for AFDC applicants – mandatory job search alone and job search followed by short-term CWEP – increased quarterly employment rates by between 5 and 10 percentage points and nine-month earnings by between $391 and $806 – representing a 28 to 36 percent increase over control group earnings. There were relatively more modest changes in welfare rolls and benefits, with no evidence that, once they had applied, individuals were deterred from welfare by the work obligation. (See Table 1.) (In contrast, the program had quite different impacts for the primarily male AFDC-U group: minimal or no employment effects but more substantial welfare savings.) Most of the impacts resulted from job search; the CWEP component produced no major additional changes – except for somewhat larger welfare savings for the AFDC-U

Table 2
Summary of Impacts on AFDC Applicants and Recipients in Two Counties in Arkansas

Outcome and Follow-up Period	Experimentals	Controls	Difference
Percentage ever employed during			
Quarter of random assignment[a]	16.1	11.8	+ 4.3**
Quarter 2	14.6	9.6	+ 5.0***
Quarter 3	15.2	12.2	+ 3.1*
Average total earnings during Quarters 2-3 ($)[a]	290.63	212.94	+77.70*
Percentage who ever received any AFDC payment during			
Quarter of random assignment[a]	66.6	69.0	- 2.4
Quarter 2	65.6	71.4	- 5.8**
Quarter 3	56.8	63.8	- 6.9***
Average total AFDC payments received, Quarters 1-3 ($)	771.69	864.55	-92.86***

Source: Friedlander et al. 1985 (Arkansas).
Notes: See Table 1.

group. A final report will examine whether this pattern persists after more of the sample participate in CWEP.

The Arkansas program for AFDC applicants and recipients, consisting of mandatory job search followed in some cases by short-term unpaid work experience, led to employment gains of between 3 and 5 percentage points per quarter, an increase of one-third over the very low control group level. (See Table 2.) Impacts on the welfare rolls and benefits were relatively large. By the third quarter of follow-up, 64 percent of the control group were receiving welfare, compared to 57 percent of experimentals. During the same period, average benefits fell from $289 to $246, for a difference of $43 – a 15 percent reduction. Overall, more than three-quarters of the welfare savings occurred because people moved off the rolls.

In Baltimore, where both welfare applicants and recipients were required to participate in any of a broad range of activities, the program led to a similar increase in quarterly employment rates of between 3 and 5 percentage points and a twelve-month increase in earnings of $176. But in contrast to Arkansas and San Diego, these gains were not accompanied by any notable welfare savings.[o] (See Table 3.)

Table 3
Summary of Impacts on AFDC Applicants and Recipients in Baltimore

Outcome and Follow-up Period	Experimentals	Controls	Difference
Percentage ever employed during Quarter of random assignment[a]	28.1	26.4	+1.6
Quarter 2	27.2	24.0	+3.2**
Quarter 3	32.4	27.9	+4.5***
Quarter 4	34.7	31.6	+3.1*
Quarter 5	36.5	31.6	+5.0***
Average total earnings during quarters 2–5 ($)[a]	1935.15	1758.74	+176.41
Percentage who ever received any AFDC payment during Quarter of random assignment[a]	92.5	92.1	+0.4
Quarter 2	87.3	87.5	-0.2
Quarter 3	77.4	78.2	-0.8
Quarter 4	71.7	73.2	-1.5
Quarter 5	68.8	70.4	-1.7
Average total AFDC payments received, quarters 1–5 ($)	3058.03	3064.12	-6.09

Source: Friedlander et al, 1986 (Maryland).
Notes: See Table 1.

Impacts were concentrated among groups considered harder-to-employ. In general, they were largest for individuals with limited recent employment; and in Arkansas the program was just as effective for mothers with preschool children as for parents with older children.[n]

Benefits and Costs. The benefit-cost results from the same studies suggest that society as a whole benefited from these initiatives. Depending on assumptions about future benefits, benefits exceeded costs for the average experimental compared to control group member by between $100 and $700.

There were, however, striking differences across the three states in the distribution of net benefits between the AFDC women and the rest of society (often called the "taxpayers"). The Baltimore and San Diego results – although San Diego's are interim and could change in the final evaluation – show that the primary gainers were the AFDC women, with the taxpayers breaking even or incurring some net costs. Rather than reducing budgets, these results suggest that the programs will cost money, at least in the short run. In Arkansas, in contrast, benefits went primarily to the taxpayers and contributed to budget reductions, with the recipients apparently no better off financially. Finally, operating costs varied substantially across the three programs, from a low of $160 per experimental group member in Arkansas to a high of $960 in Maryland.

Issues and Conclusions

The interim findings point to a number of interesting conclusions, which MDRC will continue to examine as the study progresses. They suggest the feasibility, under certain conditions and at the scale implemented, of tying receipt of welfare to participation obligations. In a few cases – San Diego and West Virginia's AFDC-U program – this included an obligation to work in exchange for welfare benefits. In other cases, the obligation was usually limited to job search – Arkansas and Virginia – or to participation in any one of the available array of services – Maryland.

When the mandatory activity is workfare, the interim results do not support the strongest claims of critics. Today's "workfare" is more likely to be designed to provide useful work experience than simply to enforce a quid pro quo, although both objectives may operate. As a result, the positions often resemble public service employment jobs, structured to meet public needs and provide meaningful work experience. Under these conditions and with the obligation usually limited to three months, welfare recipients generally did not object to working for their grants.

Nor, however, do the findings so far justify the more extreme claims of proponents. The work positions pro-

vide relatively little development of skills. Furthermore, while the final report may change the story, results thus far from San Diego—where the research design allowed for the separate estimate of the effects of job search and work experience—suggest that the positive employment and welfare outcomes emanate from job search, with no clear increment from the addition of CWEP. As a result, while society as a whole appears to gain from the workfare program—primarily because the value of the services produced exceeds the direct operating costs—from a more narrow budget perspective, in which this value is not counted, workfare appears so far to cost, rather than save, money in the short run—although not necessarily to cost very much.

Thus, arguments for and against workfare may involve not so much a trade-off between welfare savings and fairness as questions about the values attached to the AFDC program. Some will argue, as did the West Virginia human services commissioner, that even if workfare costs more up front, it represents a sounder design for AFDC because it fits with the nation's value

So far, the benefit-cost results suggest that society as a whole benefited from these initiatives.

and will then improve the image of welfare among recipients and the public.[5] Others will contend that what is needed are not requirements but jobs and investments in training.

Meanwhile, a consistent lesson from the impact results available so far and from earlier research is that program administrators should reach out to provide services for more disadvantaged recipients. Results from San Diego, Arkansas, and Maryland all suggest that the impacts of these quite different programs are greater for the enrollees who would be considered the most disadvantaged or least employable. This does not mean that these very hard-to-employ groups had the highest placement rates and levels of postprogram employment. On the contrary, these outcomes were generally much higher for the individuals who seemed more able to work.

While seemingly contradictory, this pattern is consistent with the dynamics of the welfare population. For many, welfare is only a temporary source of aid.[6] A program achieving high placement rates by working with people who would have found jobs on their own may look more successful but, in fact, may not have accomplished much. In contrast, a program working with those who would do very poorly on their own may have less impressive placement or employment rates, but may have made a major change in behavior. This was the case in all three states.

Although they are interim and incomplete and therefore subject to change, the impact results at this point indicate that a number of quite different program approaches will lead to increases in employment, but that the gains will be relatively modest and in some cases will translate into even smaller welfare savings. The fact that programs have larger effects for the harder-to-employ groups suggests it may also be possible to target resources more carefully and increase the size of these impacts. Nevertheless, even as currently implemented, the state initiatives already have produced benefits to society that justify their costs. From a narrower budget perspective, however, the picture is more mixed, with welfare savings in some states—and among some target groups—but not in others.

The results to date also confirm the importance of using an evaluation design with a randomly selected control group. Underlying the relatively modest impacts are subtle differences in outcomes over time and across subgroups and locations. If participants had been compared to individuals in different counties or to selected nonparticipants rather than to a control group, these effects might have gone undetected or their validity questioned.

Finally, the findings also point to the extent to which estimates of cost savings derived without reference to behavior for a control group can overstate a program's true effects. For example, looking only at interim findings for the experimental group in San Diego's job search program, 79.3 percent were on welfare when the study began and only 45.8 percent by the fourth quarter of follow-up. (See Table 1.) In the absence of a control group, one might assume that the program led to a 33.5 percentage point reduction in the rolls, multiply that by the average grant, and claim large welfare savings. In fact, by the end of the fourth quarter, data from the control group show that much of that reduction would have occurred anyway and that the net program impact was around three percentage points. (There is danger of the same kind of overestimation if placement or employment rates are multiplied by welfare savings per employed person. Most of that employment would have occurred anyway.)

For those used to grandiose claims, this will seem discouraging. But, careful impact and benefit-cost studies reported here show that work approaches for welfare recipients can increase employment and be cost-effective. In short, programs do not necessarily have to lead to major changes to be worthwhile. Small changes may produce large savings if the impacts are long-lasting or if they occur for a large number of people.

Thus, the research findings point to something important about expectations. In the past, we have had to oversell social programs to convince policymakers that they were worthwhile investments. The data from these state programs suggest that this is not necessary. PW

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For "Notes and References," see page 49.

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THE BLACK FAMILY: A CRITICAL CHALLENGE

Glenn C. Loury

THE nuclear family, whether European or Oriental, socialist or bourgeois, modern or traditional is the center of social life in all cultures. Societies rely on the family, in one form or another, to accomplish the essential tasks of producing and socializing children. The continued prosperity—indeed the survival—of any society depends on how adequately families discharge this responsibility.

Trends in American Family Life

There is now enormous concern in many quarters that the American family has weakened, and that this weakening is implicated in an array of social problems from criminal participation to declining academic achievement. Measures to strengthen the family have been proposed and enacted in the Congress and the need to restore family values is widely discussed. Private foundations and government agencies are spending millions of dollars annually on research and demonstration projects that seek to understand how changes now occurring in family life can be dealt with best.

The basis for this concern is reflected in recent demographic trends. Compared to a generation ago, the American family of today has changed dramatically: Older and younger single adults are more likely to live alone (Fuch, 1983). Marriage seems to have become less popular. Divorce is a much more prevalent phenomenon today than it was thirty years ago (Cherlin, 1981). The age at which women first marry has been rising, the fraction of first children conceived prior to marriage has been increasing and the proportion of these women who marry by the time their child is born has been falling. O'Connell and Moore (1980) estimate that among white teens (15-19) who had a first birth between 1959 and 1962, less than one-third of the births were premaritally con-

ceived, though slightly more than two-thirds of these were legitimated by marriage. Whereas among white teens who experienced first births between 1975 and 1978, nearly two-thirds had conceived prior to marriage and slightly more than half of these births were subsequently legitimated.

The traditional relationship between childbearing and marriage is also undergoing dramatic change. The fertility of married women is falling, and that of most groups of unmarried women is rising (see the tables below). The incidence of teenage sexuality and childbearing has risen sharply in recent years. Between 1971 and 1979 the fraction of American teenage girls who were sexually active rose from 30% to 50% (Zelnick and Kanter, 1980). A recent Planned Parenthood report comparing teenage fertility rates in the U.S. with those in other industrialized countries shows that in 1980 the number of pregnancies per 1,000 women aged 15-19 was nearly twice as high in the U.S. as in the closest Western European country. (Elise Jones, et al., "Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: . . . ")

As a result of these trends, there has been an increase in family instability—i.e., a growing number of families which break-up or never form, leaving children to be raised by one of the parents, almost always the mother. This is a phenomenon affecting whites, blacks and Hispanics alike, though it is by far most significant among blacks (Wilson and Neckerman, 1984). Divorce, separation and widowhood are the principal means by which single-parent families arise among whites (Cherlin, 1981; Bane and Ellwood, 1984), but the most important source of such families among blacks is the high rate of out-of-wedlock births. Among black women aged 15-24 the fraction of births which occurred outside of marriage rose from 41% in 1955 to 68% in 1980. Out-of-wedlock births have also risen to unprecedented levels for white women. This has occurred in part because of the growing fertility of unmarried women, but an even more important reason is the recent, sharp decline in marital fertility.

It is clear from Tables 1 & 2 that, while the fertility of unmarried women (with the exception of white teens) held steady or declined between 1970 and 1980 (note the decline by more than 50% in fertility of unmarried nonwhite women ages 25-29 from 1960-

1980), birth rates among married women fell sufficiently faster than the fraction of births occurring to unmarried women of all ages and races rose notably over this period. Indeed between 1960 and 1979 fertility among both white and nonwhite married women fell by roughly one-third *(Vital Statistics of the United States, 1979)*. In addition, the fraction of women who are unmarried has been rising dramatically in recent years. Among white women 20-24 years of age, the percent single rose form 32.2% to 47.2% between 1965 and 1980, while the rise for comparable black women was from 34.3% to 68.7%! For women 25-29 the fraction unmarried more than doubled among whites (8.0% to 18.3%) and more than tripled among blacks (11.6% to 37.2%) between 1965 and 1980 (Wilson and Neckerman, 1984).

Also important for the rise of out-of-wedlock births among young and black women has been the trend in the fraction of women who never marry, which, according to Census data, rose from 9% to 23% of black women aged 25-44 between 1950 and 1979, while staying constant at roughly 10% over this period for whites (Cherlin, 1981). This racial difference in the increased fraction of never married women has also been observed in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics by Bane and Ellwood, who report a widening black-white difference in the fraction never married, and claim that " . . . in 1982 four times as large a proportion of black as white women were never married, separated, divorced or widowed mothers (Bane and Ellwood, 1984:33)."

Table 1

Births to Unmarried Women per Thousand Women, By Race and Age of Mother, Selected Years

	WHITES			NONWHITES		
	15-19	20-24	25-29	15-19	20-24	25-29
1940	3.3	5.7	4.0	42.5	46.1	32.5
1950	5.1	10.0	8.7	68.5	105.4	94.2
1955	6.0	15.0	13.3	77.6	133.0	125.2
1960	6.6	18.2	18.2	76.5	166.5	171.8
1965	7.9	22.1	24.3	75.8	152.6	164.7
1970	10.9	22.5	21.1	90.8	120.9	93.7
1975	12.0	15.5	14.8	86.3	102.1	73.2
1980	16.0	22.6	17.3	83.0	109.2	79.1

Source: Adapted from Wilson and Neckerman, 1984, Tables 3 & 4.

Table 2

Percent of Births which Occur Out-Of-Wedlock, By Race and Age of Mother, Selected Years

	WHITES			NONWHITES		
	15-19	20-24	25-29	15-19	20-24	25-29
1955	6.4	1.9	0.9	40.1	18.9	13.3
1960	7.1	2.2	1.1	42.1	20.0	14.1
1965	11.4	3.8	1.9	49.2	23.0	16.3
1970	17.1	5.2	2.1	61.3	29.5	18.1
1975	23.0	6.1	2.6	74.7	39.9	22.7
1979	30.3	9.5	3.7	82.5	50.1	28.7

Source: Adapted from Wilson and Neckerman, 1984, Tables 3 & 4.

Thus, female family heads have become both more numerous and younger among blacks and whites, but especially among blacks. The increasing prevalence of female-headed families is illustrated by the experience of the last decade:

Table 3

Percent of Families with Female Heads by Race 1974-1983

	White	Black	Hispanic		White	Black	Hispanic
1974	9.9	34.0	17.4	1979	11.6	40.5	19.8
1975	10.5	35.3	18.8	1980	11.6	40.2	19.2
1976	10.8	35.9	20.9	1981	11.9	41.7	21.8
1977	10.9	37.1	20.0	1982	12.4	40.6	22.7
1978	11.5	39.2	20.3	1983	12.2	41.9	22.8

Source: Adapted from Wilson and Neckerman, 1984, Table 2.

These trends have significant implications for the living arrangements of children, and therefore for the incidence of childhood poverty, as has been emphasized by recent observers (Moynihan, 1985; Wilson and Neckerman, 1984; Bane and Ellwood, 1984). For obvious reasons the incidence of poverty is substantially greater among female-headed households; the poverty rate of female-headed families was 36.3% in 1982, compared to a rate for married couple families of 7.6%. Female-headed families made up 45.7% of the poverty population in 1982, and 71% of the black poor (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1983).

Young, never married mothers, though likely to be living at home when they have their children, are also likely to change households before their child reaches the age of six. Bane and

Ellwood estimate (using the PSID) that two-thirds of black and white unwed mothers who give birth while living at home will move into different living arrangements prior to their child's sixth birthday. Among blacks, though, two-thirds of these moves are into independent female-headed families, while for whites two-thirds of the moves are into two parent families. They further estimate that, independent of the original living arrangements of the mother, among children born out-of-wedlock, less than 10% of whites but more than 50% of blacks will remain in female-headed families for their entire childhood (Bane and Ellwood, 1984).

The consequences of early pregnancy for both mother and child can be quite severe. Teenage motherhood has been shown to be associated with prolonged poverty and welfare dependency (Wilson and Neckerman, 1984; Bane and Ellwood, 1983; Hofferth and Moore, 1979), low achievement in education by the mother (Hofferth and Moore, 1979), and increased subsequent fertility and the closer spacing of births (Trussel and Menken, 1978). A careful longitudinal study of inner-city black children in Chicago raised under alternative family circumstances has found that the children growing-up in households where their mother is the only adult are significantly more likely to exhibit difficulty adapting to the social environment of the classroom, as measured by their first and third grade teachers' descriptions of the child's behavior in school (Kellam, et al., 1977).

Concern for the Black Family

Thus, these trends in adolescent and out-of-wedlock child-bearing should occasion the most serious public concern. This is especially so for the black population, in which the extent of the problem is vastly greater than for whites, for the decay of black family life is an awesome barrier to economic and social progress for blacks. It is directly implicated in the continued extent of poverty among black children. In 1980, nearly three of every five female-headed black families lived below the poverty line, compared to only about one of every six two-parent black families (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series

P-60, 1981). Even though the poverty rate fell during the 1970s for both male and female-headed black families, the fraction of black families below the poverty line increased, due to the higher rate of poverty among female-headed families, together with their growing number. This is a circumstance which deserves serious public attention.

A discussion of this sort can hardly avoid recalling the experience surrounding the controversial "Moynihan Report" (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 1965). There Moynihan had made two arguments: one regarding the causes of the (then only recently noticed) trend in family instability among blacks, and the other concerning the policy implications of this trend for the pursuit of equality of opportunity. His causal argument derived from the earlier work of E. Franklin Frazier (Frazier, 1939) and held that the black population was plagued by a "matri-focal family structure" deriving from the experience of slavery, during which the role of black men within the family had been severely circumscribed. His policy argument was that, in light of the deleterious economic consequences of this family instability, a national policy of racial equality should attempt to directly promote alternative family behaviors among blacks. He concluded that "The Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling. . . . So long as this situation persists, the cycle of poverty and disadvantage will continue to repeat itself."

The last two decades of history has shown that Moynihan had been remarkably accurate in his forecast. Today, the fraction of black children in single-parent homes is twice that when his report was released. Moreover, there is now a consensus, among blacks and whites, liberals and conservatives alike, that the birth of children to young, unwed teens is a critical element of the cycle of ghetto poverty. But at the time of its release, his report occasioned a firestorm of political protest, making it impossible that his policy recommendations be adopted. Prominent black intellectuals and politicians attacked Moynihan as a racist, and dismissed his report as an attempt to impose white, middle-class values on poor blacks whose behavior was simply different from, not inferior to, the norm. (For a discussion of the reactions to the "Moynihan Report" see Rainwater and Yancey, 1967.) As a result, plans by the Johnson

Administration to develop a national initiative to assist the black family were abandoned, and many years passed before public officials dared to broach the subject again.

This tragic error must not be repeated. Never again should we refuse to acknowledge grave social problems facing any segment of our society. Still, there is the need to maintain a delicate balance when discussing these issues. It is not the proper role of government to mandate the morals of its citizens. Nor should public officials label specific groups of citizens as exhibiting "deviant" or "pathological" behavior. But this does not mean that social norms and community values have no role to play in restraining individuals' anti-social and dysfunctional behavior. Nor does it rule out the possibility that the problems are sometimes more severe for some groups than for others.

Though correct in his emphasis on the problem and his recommendation that public action was necessary, recent historical research has demonstrated that Moynihan's explanation of family problems among blacks as having derived from the slave experience is almost certainly wrong. Racial differences of the extent discussed above are a post-World War II phenomenon, and are not to be found in the earlier historical record; they therefore cannot be explained by reference to the experience of black slavery. Although national information on family structure first became available only with the 1940 decennial census, examination of early manuscript census forms for individual cities and counties clearly demonstrates that most women heading families in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were widows; that even among the very poor, a substantial majority of the families were intact; and that, for the most part, the positive association between intact family structure and social class was due to the higher rate of mortality among poor men (Furstenberg et al., 1975).

The evidence also demonstrates that among northern, urban black migrant communities in the early twentieth century, the intact family was also the norm. Approximately 85% of black families living in Harlem in 1925 were intact, and the teenage mother raising her children alone was virtually unknown; comparable findings were noted for blacks in Buffalo in 1910

(Gutman, 1976). In 1940 10.1% of white families and 14.9% of black families were female-headed; and though single-parent families were more common among city dwellers, census data from that year indicate that fully 72% of urban black families with children were headed by men (Wilson and Neckerman, 1984). By 1960 the proportion of single-parent families had begun to increase sharply for blacks, rising from 21.7% in 1960, to 28.3% by 1970, and reaching 41.9% in 1983. Among whites the proportion also rose, from 8.1% in 1960 to 12.2% in 1983.

Black Teenage Pregnancy: Trends and Responses

We may ask then, if Moynihan's (and Frazier's) sociology was wrong, what accounts for the current group disparity in family instability? Given the higher rate of teenage childbearing among urban blacks, investigators have explored a number of hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. Beginning in the mid-1960s, a series of ethnographic studies involving close observation of specific communities have been undertaken (Clark, 1965; Rainwater, 1970; Stack, 1974; Gilder, 1978). These studies have called attention to cultural and normative factors operative in poor urban communities, deriving from the severe economic hardship of inner-city life, but interacting with governmental income support systems (Gilder, 1978; Murray, 1984) and evolving in such a way as to feedback onto individual behavior and exacerbate this hardship.

Wilson and Neckerman (1984), citing evidence from a survey of black female teens undertaken in 1979 by the Urban League of Chicago and compiled by Dennis Hogan of the University of Chicago, argue that there is an insufficient aversion to unwed pregnancy in this population. The aforementioned data are said to show that black teen mothers reported far fewer pregnancies to be unwanted than their white counterparts (among whom Zelnick and Kanter, 1980, report finding 82% of premarital pregnancies to 15-19 year olds to have been unwanted). Stack, 1974, observing an unnamed midwestern inner-city community, notes "People show pride in all their kin, and particularly new babies born into their kinship networks. Mothers encourage sons to have babies, and

even more important, men coax their 'old ladies' to have their baby (p. 121)."

Observation of participants in Project Redirection, a two-year planned intervention with teenagers who had already borne one child out-of-wedlock, which had the objective of preventing the additional pregnancy, confirms that prevailing values and attitudes among these young women and their boyfriends constitute a critical part of the teen pregnancy story (Branch, et al., 1984). There it was observed that "Participants who lack self-esteem often find it difficult to resist pressure from boyfriends. . . . Participants tolerate (being beaten by their boyfriends, or exploited economically) believing that, because of their children, other men will not want them (p. 39)." Moreover, concern at the Harlem site of this project regarding the issue of welfare dependency led to the following observation:

> Staff initially took an activist stance in their efforts to intercede with the welfare system on behalf of participants . . . This pattern changed, however when . . . (certain) behavior patterns were beginning to emerge . . . It seemed that many were beginning to view getting their own welfare grants as the next stage in their careers . . . (I)t became apparent that some participants' requests for separate grants and independent households were too often a sign of manipulation by boyfriends, in whose interest it was to have a girlfriend on welfare with an apartment of her own . . . (S)taff realized that these attitudes and behaviors were . . . counterproductive to the goal of promoting self-sufficiency (Branch et al., p. 60).

Project Redirection involved the use of "community women," older women who befriended and advised the teen mothers over the course of the first year of the study. It is noteworthy that these community women " . . . have come out strongly against emancipated minor status for participants (which allows 15 and 16 year old mothers to obtain public aid, including housing, independently of their parents), feeling that it is better that teens remain under family guidance, no matter how difficult the family situation or conflict may be (Branch et al., 1984:60)." This project had a very limited impact on the sexual behavior and subsequent additional pregnancies of the young women enrolled. Commenting on this outcome Branch et al. (1984) observed: "The major finding is that members of this target group . . . hold a constellation of attitudes

and values about boyfriends, sexual relationships, pregnancy and childbearing that are extremely resistant to change. Against the tenacity of these values, the presentation of factual information alone is inadequate to bring about substantial behavioral improvement (p. 103)." These findings lend credence to the view that peer group and community behavioral norms in the inner-city play a substantial role in the explosion of young single parents.

In seeking an appropriate response to these developments we must understand two things: (1) the forces that have caused the teen pregnancy and illegitimate birth rates to be so high in poor black communities; and, (2) the manner in which governmental policies and private actions within black communities can combine to counteract these forces. What was missing in 1965, and what remains scarce now, is *combined* public and private actions that can effectively attack the problem. The confusion of values, attitudes and beliefs of black youngsters who produce children for whom they cannot provide must be addressed; and, those aspects of government policy which reinforce, or reward such values must be publicly questioned. It is the job of black civic, political and religious leaders to do the former, and the task of public leadership at the local, state and federal levels to undertake the latter.

It should be stated at the outset that some of the factors influencing the behavior of young people do not lie within anyone's control. Our youth are engaging in sexual activity outside of marriage at a higher rate, and at a younger age than did their parents. Social taboos that exercised some restraint on extramarital sexuality a generation ago have become passé. Yet, though yesterday's moral climate cannot be restored, teaching our young people to behave responsibly in the face of today's social pressures and temptations should be within our grasp. It has traditionally been the role of the family and of religious institutions to instill this sense of responsibility, and so it remains. For blacks, this issue is especially critical.

The National Urban League has taken the lead with its Male Responsibility Campaign. The program objective is to reach young black males through a national advertising effort of print

ads, posters and a radio commercial. Its theme: "Don't make a baby if you can't be a father." With the voluntary cooperation of black newspapers, music associations, and broadcasters it is geared to reach a mass audience. Several aspects of the program deserve special emphasis. First, it illustrates the opportunity for traditional civil rights organizations to provide leadership for the black community on important social issues too sensitive for public agencies. Second, it focuses on the male. Too often intervention is directed exclusively at the teen mother—helping her to return to school and trying to prevent further pregnancies. Third, it harnesses the creative talents and notoriety of prominent blacks to improve the quality of life for ordinary black people.

One often hears the argument that nothing significant can be done about "children having children" until something is done about the lack of economic options for poor ghetto youngsters. Some commentators have suggested that the unemployment of black men is mainly responsible for the family problems observed in this population (Norton, 1985; Wilson and Neckerman, 1984). In their interesting and valuable paper, Wilson and Neckerman note that the numbers of employed black men relative to the numbers of black women of comparable age has declined sharply for every age group of blacks since 1960, with the decline being particularly precipitate for younger men. The low employment of black men is presumed to reduce their propensity to marry, without having a comparable negative effect on the propensity to reproduce. The result is an increasing out-of-wedlock birth rate, with comparable increases in the percentage of families headed by women.

There is, to be sure, a great need to expand employment among poor young people, but more is involved here than limited economic opportunity. The foregoing argument is far from satisfactory, because it presumes what in part needs to be explained—that young men will continue to father children though they know they cannot support them. The link between employment and family responsibilities for men is very complex, and the direction of causality is far from clear. It is arguable, for example, that a

man's effort to find and keep work would be greater to the extent that he feels himself primarily responsible for the maintenance of his family.

The fact that so many young black men are fathers but not husbands, and that they do not incur the financial obligations of fatherhood, might then be taken as an explanation of their low levels of employment. A more serious kind of unemployment plagues young men in poor black communities. There many women struggle to raise their children without financial or emotional support from fathers who have jobs, but make no effort to see their children. These men are unemployed with respect to their most important adult responsibility. Yet unlike the hardship caused by a lost job and income, this kind of unemployment can be cured by an act of will. Every means of persuasion should be used to see that both parents take full responsibility for their children.

Unfortunately, some of the crippling social problems evident in poor black communities have been exacerbated by the way public programs and agencies have chosen to treat those problems. Easy and stigma-free availability of public assistance, and the financial penalty imposed when a welfare family takes a job and thereby loses its public housing and medical benefits along with its welfare payments, may discourage responsible behavior by young men and women who bring children into the world without the means to support them. This concern, expressed by Charles Murray in his recent, much debated book *Losing Ground* (Murray, 1984), is of particular significance to blacks, because such a large fraction of our community depends on state and federal assistance.

It is clear form statistical evidence that, while conditions have worsened for the low-income central city black population since the 1960s, the status of blacks with good educations and marketable skills has improved significantly. Increasingly, the black community is becoming divided into a relatively prosperous middle-class and a desperately poor underclass. Though problems of discrimination continue to exist for middle-class blacks, they are minor when compared to the life-threatening conditions and dwindling opportunities poor blacks face. It has become evident that the problems of poor black communities are greater than

simply a lack of resources—that the norms and behaviors of residents in these communities contribute to their difficulty. Thus, the question becomes whether government efforts to help have, in any way, served to undermine the normative base of poor black communities.

Murray believes that they have, and his argument deserves the most serious attention. He charges that aspects of the conventional wisdom which has dominated thinking about public policy in the social sciences and allied helping professions since the sixties have contributed to the decline in living standards among inner-city blacks, one aspect of which is the growth of female-headed families. He holds that a complex and delicately balanced system of values and norms regulates the behavior of individuals in poor (and all other) communities, that adverse change in these behavioral norms has occurred in recent decades, and that ideological precepts particular to the liberal wisdom on social policy (e.g., that those in need of public assistance were in no way to be held accountable for the behavior which may have led to their dependency) may have played a key role in abetting this change.

Yet, in our effort to avoid the sin of "blaming the victim," we sacrificed the ability to reward those persons who, though perhaps of modest financial means, conducted themselves in such a way as to avoid falling into the trap of dependency. The status and dignity that people derive from conducting their lives honorably—working to support themselves and their children, raising their sons to stay out of trouble with the law, and their daughters to avoid early unwed pregnancy—was undermined by the idea that poverty is everywhere and always the result of a failure in the system, not the individual. For if those who fail are seldom at fault, those who succeed can only have done so by their good fortune, not their virtue.

This points to what I consider to be the most critical element of any strategy to confront the current black family crisis—the need to promote virtuous behavior among the inner-city poor. This is inevitably a sensitive, controversial matter, one which public officials will often seek to avoid. But it is a crucial aspect of the problem which concerned private leaders in the black community

must confront head-on. Among those many black families who have attained middle class status in the last two decades, there is a keen sense of the importance of instilling in *their* children values and norms consistent with success. It would seem then that there is a responsibility for successful blacks, through religious and civic organizations and personal contacts internal to the black community, to transmit the norms that have proved so useful in shaping their own lives to the black poor who have fallen behind the rest of society (Loury, 1985). One might refer to such an activity as supplying "moral leadership." No one else can do it; the matter is urgent.

Community organizations, public housing resident management associations, churches and the rest must deal with this matter. Mutually concerned people who trust one another enough to be able to exchange criticism must seek to establish and enforce norms of behavior that lie beyond the capacity of the state to promulgate. Government has, after all, limited coercive resources (incarceration, or the denial of financial benefits being the main ones). Communities can invoke more subtle and powerful influences over the behavior of their members. The expectations of people about whom we care constitutes an important source of such influence. Yet to employ these means requires that people be willing to come forward and say: "This is what we believe in; this is what we stand for; yet, look at where we now are."

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WORK AND THE FAMILY

The family has been analyzed extensively by psychologists, sociologists, historians and economists. Most of us now have a general notion of the evolution of the traditional multigenerational and extended family into the modern nuclear family consisting of father, mother, and children only. In turn, this family configuration, particularly when the mother is not in the paid labor force, is now more and more frequently called traditional itself, as the "new" family is now the "egalitarian" family (both spouses working), the single-parent family, the childless family, and often the "alternative" family (homosexual, unrelated). However adults may choose to live and procreate and however they choose to define their own relationships is not in and of itself a concern of government. But there is a strong public interest in strengthening the family, because when families fail, the rest of society has to pick up the pieces. And from society's point of view, "family" must be, above all, a viable and healthy socioeconomic unit for raising children.

The increasing labor force participation rate of women, then, and especially of mothers, is a cause of public concern. If one approves of the trend and sees it as the wave of the future, then day care, flexible working hours, and parental leave seem to be the paramount public policy issues. If one has a rather dimmer view of the changes, however, the focus of policy concern should be the economic and social conditions which make it difficult for a single earner to support a family, and welfare policies which treat the symptoms of family dissolution and nonformation but not their causes.

More than half of married women work, and almost half of those work full-time. More than half of all mothers with children under 6 are in the labor force, and well over two-thirds of mothers with youngest children between 6 and 13 are. The earnings of women contribute significantly to family well-being. If wives did not work, the average family would have only three-quarters the income, and the poverty rate would be a good third higher than it is. Clearly, for many women, paid labor is not a matter of personal self-fulfillment but of economic necessity. This is confirmed by the results of a national poll done by Decision/Making/Information in 1983, which showed that about half of all working women perceived themselves to be working out of necessity rather than choice.

Sociologist Brigitte Berger of Wellesley College, in a paper prepared for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in June, 1984, pointed out that popular misconceptions notwithstanding, the vast majority of women in America today perceive family to be of paramount importance to them. Empirical data and surveys indicate that some 86 percent of American women feel family is the single most meaningful part of life, while only 9 percent think work is. 83 percent of American women "would welcome more emphasis on traditional family ties," and young women 18 to 24 "confess to a greater longing for traditional family life than they think their own parents had." Furthermore, according to Berger, these priorities are not likely to change in the near future. She cites a study of high-school girls, for example, which shows that the majority, including the brightest, do not expect to be working more than five years after graduation. While reality will clearly dash such expectations for many of them, these desires and perceptions clearly influence the career choices and life decisions of women.

The conundrum for policymakers, then, is how to assist women who choose to work without overburdening those women and families where the wife would prefer not to work. It is ironic that promoting massive governmental involvement in day care provision and other services for two-earner families is likely to increase the tax burden on middle-class families and hence push even more wives into the labor force. And it is no accident that the recent wave of work-for-welfare reform has broad-based political and popular support. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is an anomaly. When it was created, single women with children (then primarily widows) were considered unemployable ipso facto. Today, when so many women with children feel compelled to work, it is hardly fair to use the taxes they pay to enable other women with children to stay home to care for them.

Raising children is becoming increasingly costly. And a look at the poverty statistics indicates how difficult it is for families with children to make ends meet. Childless couples have a very low 5.4 percent poverty rate. Families with one child have a poverty rate of 12.7 percent. The rate rises rapidly for large families. The poverty rate for families with four children is 34.5 and 52.7 percent for those with five or more. Children as a group have a poverty rate of 22 percent, and poverty is heavily

concentrated among children in single-parent-headed households, reflecting the lower earning potential of such families. Children are a nation's future, and America does not seem to be planning very well for that future.

Ironically, many government policies contribute to the difficulties families, particularly working families, with children face. Policymakers should heed the ancient admonition that to do good, first do no harm, and set about examining the vast web of public policies that have a negative impact on families and on work effort.

TAX POLICY

The federal tax system has had a systemic bias against families and the poor over the last three decades. Inflation-induced bracket creep has meant that taxes rose automatically unless adjustments were legislated. These adjustments were called tax cuts, but they would more accurately be viewed as politically necessary reductions in unlegislated tax increases. Since the tax brackets are narrower at lower incomes, and the personal exemption and standard deduction are a larger proportion of income, bracket creep disproportionately harmed lower-income taxpayers and larger families. Indexation of the tax rates, of course, already enacted, will stop this trend, but cannot make up for ground already lost.

The real value of the personal exemption, for example, is now about half what it was in 1955, and it has fallen from 14 percent of median family income to 4 percent. H.R. 3838, the Tax Reform Act of 1985, by reducing tax rates and increasing the standard deduction, personal exemptions, and the earned-income tax credit amounts, would go a long way to improving the situation for families and the poor, but the bill is not yet law and at the present time it is unclear how it will fare in the Senate.

Ideally, the tax code should be neutral with respect to a wife's decision to work or not work outside the home. In practice, of course, there are many aspects of the tax code that are "anti-family." For example, under the present system, two-parent families with only one earning spouse are not eligible for the child-care credit, clear discrimination against "traditional" families in favor of one-parent households and two-earner households. A family of four earning $15,000 with a wife working outside the home is eligible for the credit, for example, which could be worth nearly $1,300 to them. But a family earning only $10,000 with the wife at home is not. In other words, child care is subsidized by the government only if a spouse leaves the job of child-rearing to others by working at something else.

Another example: the limit on potential IRA contributions of married couples with a non-earning spouse of $2,250, compared to $4,000 for two-earner couples, strongly implies that the traditional homemaker is not entitled to the same benefits in planning for old age as the wage-earner. And the declining real value of personal exemptions referred to earlier has had a decidedly anti-family effect. Since 1960, average tax rates rose far more rapidly for families with dependents (including one-parent families) than for couples or singles.

Finally, one must bear in mind the close relationship between tax policy and welfare policy. Increases in all taxes, but especially the Social Security tax, disproportionately burden the working poor and increase the disincentives to work. This is particularly true for large families, because welfare benefits increase with the number of children while wages do not. Last year, the Christian Science Monitor described an unskilled Hmong refugee in California and the typical welfare Catch-22 faced by his family of seven. If he worked too many hours each month, he would lose welfare eligibility. But to get off welfare entirely and make up the value of his welfare subsidies, he would have had to earn about $1,000 a month, a virtual impossibility given his skills. Adding a tax burden into the equation amounts to discouraging self-sufficiency even further.

WELFARE POLICY

There are two related but distinct public policy problems regarding welfare. One is improving the earnings of the recipient so that welfare is no longer necessary or attractive for that recipient. The other is decreasing caseloads and public expenditures. It is a mistake to assume that a strategy attacking the first problem will necessarily solve the second in the short term, or vice versa.

The simple view that welfare is an alternative to work is insufficient to understand the dynamics of welfare dependency in the aggregate. Clearly, the willingness of a person to work is affected by the relationship between his earnings potential and the level of welfare benefits. But the relationship is not a simple equation. If leisure has high positive value in and of itself, potential earnings would have to be higher than welfare to induce someone to work. If work has a high intrinsic value,

then clearly some low-income people will prefer working to being on welfare even if they are worse off financially. And in practice, of course, most people do not have a "free" choice between welfare and earned income, because there are both constraints on access to each and relative costs imposed by welfare and tax laws.

Thus, rational economic choices are made in the context of a value system and a legal-administrative system. It is not insignificant, considering the composition of the dependent population today, that Aid to Families with Dependent Children was almost the only welfare program that imposed no work requirement for decades, and when it did, applied and enforced these requirements very incompletely and halfheartedly. This feature of AFDC could not help but affect family structure in the population it served. The potentially damaging effects of welfare on low-income families were recognized and discussed in the 1960's, as even cursory survey of the literature will demonstrate. For some reason the warnings were ignored. Economist Elizabeth Durbin, for example, wrote then: ". . . there is clearly some economic advantage for the group affected by the existence of welfare to maintain fairly loose ties between men and the women with children. The mothers can obtain a steady, if low, income from welfare, and the men have more flexibility to come and go, to work for not . . . it is not unreasonable to expect more informal relationships where unwed motherhood is one qualification for the receipt of welfare income." (Welfare Income and Employment, 1969.)

Further, if the labor market offers unskilled men insufficient earnings to compete with a mother's welfare benefits—and this can be the case even in low-benefit states—then the mother becomes the family's primary earner, which complicates the problem of reducing dependency on welfare for two reasons. First, her opportunities in the labor market are usually those of a secondary wage-earner. And since the welfare department has assumed the role of dependable primary provider, men are encouraged to adopt a secondary role as well, which further loosens their ties to the labor makret. Hence the increasing prevalence of secondary-earner labor market characteristics among low-income men, which must unavoidably contribute to what some have called a lack of "marriageable" men in low-income communities.

Perversely, even though no one would argue that welfare benefits enable anyone to live in style, and in some states, one can hardly scrape by on welfare at all, increasing benefits can only serve to exacerbate these trends. The underlying problems does not disappear with increased benefits, because the welfare system must deal with the results of family nonformation or dissolution even as it facilitates those results. The new wave of work-requirement reforms will not change things either, because they cannot improve work incentives or opportunities for absent fathers, while attempting to transform mothers into primary earners. Is this really our social policy goal? Welfare reform must focus on effects on community and on family. And whether a father is divorced or never married to the other, he and his children are still family. We need a systems approach to welfare policy. Fathers and poor intact families must be included in the equation.

REGULATORY POLICY

Everyone pays lip service to fostering self-help among the poor and enabling them to become independent. But, as Don Anderson, director of the National Association for the Southern Poor, has said, "Although this principle is universally recognized, it is regularly violated. When working with the poor, the temptation to "help" is too great." And in the name of protecting the poor, at the behest of unions, social workers, community organizers and many other such spokesmen, government has set up barriers to many of the poor, particularly poor women, who would like to combine family and paid work within the context of home.

The regulations which were promulgated in the 1940's to forbid producing certain goods like women's apparel, gloves and buttons at home were intended to protect workers from sweatshop conditions and wages. But conditions and needs have changed. Enforcement of the ban on "homework" only serves to destroy jobs and opportunities for women, particularly in rural areas where transportation, day care, and social services pose obstacles to employment. The recent elimination of 85 jobs in North Carolina by the Labor Department is a case in point. And opportunities for homework are bound to expand in the future, as personal computers and word processors expand home business opportunities. Unions are currently lobbying against some computer work as well. But forbidding capable women from contracting with employers for the sale of their merchandise and services does more to protect unions from competition than it does to protect women. And the ability to integrate productive labor into the context of home promotes family values.

Many other barriers to women's ability to help their families economically result from state and local regulations. The federal government, through guidelines attached to funds, frequently has a hand in this rule-making. For example, although affordable day care is increasingly important, people who wish to provide day care in their homes are faced with many obstacles. Occupational licensing and zoning ordinances can be problems. Most states limit the number of children who can be cared for in a home. If the specified limit of children is exceeded, the facility may become subject to building codes designed for schools, including separate toilet facilities for boys and girls and accessibility to wheelchairs.

Such extensive regulation hurts working women in two ways. It makes child care more expensive (but not necessarily better or safer) for women who work outside the home. And it limits the opportunities for women who prefer to work at home. The provision of day care should be largely deregulated and the responsibility for oversight shifted to parents, as it is when the child is in the home.

The creation and successful implementation of enterprise zones in depressed economic areas is proof that excessive taxation and regulation saps a community's vitality. When such taxation and regulation is eased, communities find the capital and human resources to rebound. Innovative approaches to promoting enterpreneurship among women and unemployed inner-city youth have also shown promising success. In such a climate, the economic viability of families is enhanced.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Each tax policy, each welfare program, each regulation has a rationale of its own. And certainly government has an obligation to promote the general welfare of its citizenry, so the point of criticism is certainly not to sweep all these policies away entirely. But the "helping hand" of government can sometimes be a heavy hand indeed. When social and economic trends place increasing stresses on an institution as fundamental to the continued success of our society as the family, it is time to step back and look at all the pieces of the system together. Even if it was not intended, the social policies in place today constitute a family policy and express our values toward work and the family. If, then, they do not meet the needs of contemporary families—and they obviously do not—we need to give serious thought to redesigning the system in a more conscious manner.

